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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the psychological underpinnings of citizens’ political judgements in 
Turkey. Drawing upon political psychology studies, it focuses on the cognitive, affective and 
motivational components of political behaviour and investigates the role that ideological 
inclinations, value-orientations, emotions and sophistication play in shaping individual-based 
political decisions. By taking account of the electoral stronghold of the AK Party - whose 
roots are traced to its pro-Islamist agenda - in combination with the recent authoritarian turn 
in the country, the examination sheds light on the way citizens negotiate their political 
belonging and shape their positions in a non-traditional Western context. In doing so, the 
study uses both quantitative and qualitative data: the 2007 World Value Survey, a survey 
conducted in Ankara in 2009, and 25 semi-structured interviews with Turkish citizens. The 
findings highlight the importance of ideological divisions, value orientations and affective 
expressions of public opinion driving differential accounts of the socio-political reality, thus 
confirming the widely acknowledged high levels of polarization in Turkey. A key division 
emerges around ideological inclinations and values dividing citizens on the basis of their 
position towards the AK party. Also, the research suggests that more moderate segments of 
the population converge when it comes to the importance of individual freedoms and rights, 
the importance of democracy and the coexistence of traditions and modernization. Political 
sophistication conditions the function of ideology, values, and emotions at the individual 
level highlighting important differences in the belief systems of high sophisticates and 
novices.  
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The primary objective of social science scholars is to investigate ‘why people do what they 
do’ (Lupia et al., 2000, p. 1). Bringing this in the political context, the aim is to understand 
why people act as they do in regards to political affairs. For doing this, we need to examine 
the hidden individual-based dynamics that determine the conditions under which citizens 
think, decide and feel in a given socio-political context. In other words, we need to assess the 
processes that take place at the individual level and which in turn shape what constitutes the 
sum of their political behaviour.  
This dissertation looks into the psychological underpinnings of political behaviour 
focusing in particular on individual processes.
1
 I examine the individual-based psychological 
determinants that lead certain parts of the Turkish public to either rally around the democratic 
(and in some cases secular) principles of the Republic or stay divided on the basis of the 
long-standing dichotomies that have been traditionally dominating the country’s socio-
political environment. Taking a different stance from the traditional accounts that stem from 
political science studies on public opinion - which focus predominantly at the aggregate level 
of analysis - my work focuses on the internal processes that shape the individual spectrum of 
political behaviour. Specifically, I investigate the mechanisms that underline the way that 
citizens think, feel, decide and reason their political positions and beliefs in Turkey. Because 
of this, the key question that underlies my work is: Which are the individual-based processes 
that drive citizens’ political opinions? And more specifically, which are the mediating factors 
that drive their political judgements and evaluations? My work crafts an explanation of the 
mechanisms that shape the public political behaviour in a context of increasing 
authoritarianism such as Turkey. It offers an in-depth investigation of the main factors that 
drive citizens’ considerations towards political matters and affairs looking in particular at the 
affective, cognitive and motivational factors of individual political behaviour.
2
  
My study has four main aims: a) to examine the functioning capacity of the dominant 
ideological dichotomy that refers to Kemalism versus political Islam and their corresponding 
                                                 
1 I use the term public opinion to refer to the opinion of the public on political matters, which refers to Page and 
Shapiro’s ‘aggregate (surveyed) public opinion’ (1983, p. 176). Conversely, I employ the term political 
behaviour to point at the individual based mechanisms that shape the behavioral and attitudinal orientations 
towards political affairs. 
2
 I employ the term ‘consideration’ following Zaller’s definition that suggests that is ‘any reason that might 
induce an individual to decide a political issue one way or another’ (1992, p. 40). 
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representative agents of the CH Party
3
 and the AK Party
4
; b) to uncover the dynamic role of 
individual values in shaping political judgements; c) to assess how affective reactions come 
into play in the formation of attitudinal responses towards politics; and d) to investigate the 
role that political sophistication plays in citizens’ decision-making processes by accounting 
for its interaction with ideology, values and emotions. To put it simply, my investigation 
offers an in-depth account on how ideological inclinations, value orientations, affect and 
political sophistication interact and shape citizens systems of beliefs towards politics. In 
doing so, I examine whether individual-based attitudes substantiate and confirm the dominant 
position about the clear-cut polarization of the Turkish society based on the ideological 
division of political Islam-Kemalism - and their corresponding values of Islamism-secularism 
- or whether there are certain issues that reconcile these positions. In assessing the cognitive, 
affective and motivational components of political behaviour, I offer an understanding of 
how citizens negotiate and develop their personal belonging and positioning in the socio-
political arena of Turkey amidst an environment of growing authoritarianism and state-led 
repression accompanied by restrictions on individual freedoms and civic rights (Amnesty 
International 2013; Göle 2013; Abbas and Yiğit 2014; Ete and Taştan 2014).  
Examining the dynamic mechanisms that take place at the individual level requires an 
understanding of the context within which citizens formulate their political orientations. The 
political culture of Turkey in combination with the changes that the country has been going 
through -especially since 2002- offer a significant political environment for the exploration of 
citizens’ political behaviour. The country’s role in the international arena as well as the 
peculiarities of the Turkish context constitute an important case for the investigation of the 
underlying mechanisms and determinants that shape citizens’ political beliefs and opinions. 
The social and political structure of Turkey has been historically determined by the 
conflictual discourse rooted in the secularism-Islamism division embedded by the principles 
inherited by Kemalism and political Islam.
5
 These ideologies along with their representative 
political actors -CHP and AKP respectively- seem to remain of central importance and drive 
                                                 
3
 Hereafter references to the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party) will be with the form of its 
acronym CHP or with CH Party. 
4
Hereafter references to the governing Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) will be with 
the form of its acronym AKP or with AK Party. 
5
 The terms political Islam and Islamism are used interchangeably to denote the political connotation of Islam 
highlighting the influence of religion in the socio-political arena. One of the most commonly used definition of 
political Islam suggests that it is ‘a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and 
organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by 
imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the 
Islamic tradition’ (Denoeux, 2002, p. 61). 
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the evolutionary process of the country’s political environment while also shaping and 
driving the public political discourse. On one side, stands the Kemalist inheritance that has 
embedded in the Constitution the secular and modern driven nature of Turkey. On the other 
side, stands liberal political Islam, which has reconciled modernity and a version of 
conservative liberalism with Islamist principles. The former is advocated by the CH Party, 
assuming the role of the official protector of Kemalism, while placing itself on the centre-left 
of the political spectrum representing a commitment to social democracy and a state 
controlled economy (Ciddi, 2009; Uyusal, 2011).
6
 The latter, is advocated by AK Party 
which since its electoral win in 2002 has declared itself as a conservative agent of liberal 
political Islam that bridges modernity with the Islamic tradition of the country (Erdoğan, 
2004; Gülalp, 2001; Yavuz, 2009).
7
 With liberal political Islam driving the country, there has 
been a change in the paradigm of governance but also in the political discourse between the 
exponents of political Islam and Kemalism. These political actors have been dominating the 
socio-political environment of the country. This has resulted in the enhancement of public 
polarization that originates from the ideological principles and values both political actors 
promote. 
The high levels of fragmentation of Turkish society have been historically explained 
by focusing on the domination of certain social and political cleavages (Taagepera, 1999). 
Since its early Republican days the socio-political life of Turkey has been characterized by 
deep divisive lines based on a variety of factors such as religion, secularism and ethnicity. 
Interestingly, the levels of socio-political fragmentation of the country’s public opinion have 
remained intact, with the only difference being the actual impact each factor plays in a given 
point of time. As Öniş (2013) suggests, despite the procedural democracy that has been 
reached - due to electoral processes - the country is bound to several clear-cut divisions, 
which in their turn map the behaviour of the Turkish citizens. The society remains deeply 
divided with conflictual tendencies among the political, religious and ethnical communities 
shaping opposing sides such as Kemalists, Islamists, Kurds and Alevis. These division lines, 
which have proved as being time-resistant have in fact determined the path of development 
that the Republican Turkey has been following towards its democratisation resulting into 
today’s drift towards authoritarianism as promoted by the AK Party (Önis, 2013). In other 
words, the parallel existence of competing camps on the basis of ideology, levels of 
                                                 
6
 For more information please see CH Party’s official online platform at: http://www.chp.org.tr/  
7
 For more information please see AK Party’s official online platform at: http://www.akparti.org.tr/ 
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religiosity and secularism as well as ethnic identity formulate the basis of their asymmetric 
conflict in the political arena and in extent, the public mind.  
What is interesting is that across time, both political actors and their ideological lines 
have changed adjusting their positions in accordance to the needs of the society. A large 
number of scholars have looked at the nature of the ideological changes that the main 
advocators of political Islam and Kemalism have been undergoing (Çağaptay, 2006; Ciddi, 
2009; Uyusal, 2011; Çarkoğlu, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2007; Çarkoğlu and Eren, 2002; Taniyici, 
2003; Bayramoğlu, 2009; Yavuz, 2006, 2009; Daği, 2006; Kuru, 2006). Many studies also 
address the effects of these changes on the country’s public opinion resulting into a shift of 
the electorate towards the centre or centre-right of the political spectrum (Ergünder, 1980-1; 
Esmer, 1995; Çarkoğlu, 2007; Çarkoğlu and Eren, 2002; Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2007; 
Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu, 2007).  
 Recent spikes in public political involvement through unconventional channels of 
participation provide evidence of the turbulent status of Turkish politics. Specifically, there 
have been occasions and events where certain segments of the public united under common 
issues sharing their individual grievances and dissent overcoming the existing boundaries. 
However, there have also been circumstances where public opinion remained divided on the 
basis of ideological inclinations and value orientations. The Gezi protests that unfolded in the 
period between May-July 2013 as well as the post coup d’état public mobilisations in July 
2016 are two of the latest and most significant examples. In Gezi, we saw members of the 
public overcoming their differences standing together against the government (Chrona and 
Bee, 2017; Acar and Uluğ, 2016; Damar, 2016; Önis, 2015; Özdemir, 2015). In contrast, in 
the aftermath of the failed coup in July 2016 the public that came to the street stood apart 
divided by different goals and with a varying view of who was the responsible agent for 
leading the country to this upheaval. These two events differ in terms of the nature of public 
dissent but also in terms of their composition. On the one hand, the Gezi movement brought 
together a large segment of Turkey’s population reacting against the increasing 
authoritarianism promoted by the AKP government with restrictions on individual rights and 
freedoms and was met with the use of excessive violence by the police and security forces 
(Öniş, 2015; Chrona and Bee, 2017). On the other hand, in the rallies against the coup the 
largest segment of participants came from the AKP pool of supporters who mobilised 
following the call by Erdoğan to take to the streets and defend the country’s democratic 
establishment. At the same time, another segment of the protesters in the post-coup period did 
not support the government and mobilised to make clear their support for democracy and 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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public sovereignty opposing any military intervention in public life. The clear-cut ideological 
and value-driven boundaries and the political differentiation lines across the members of the 
public who mobilised against the coup became evident throughout the mobilisations. This is 
because each political camp or civil society group brought their own group of people in the 
streets under their own banners. Interestingly the unequivocal condemnation of the coup 
d’état by all political parties and the public statements of key political figures supporting the 
current status quo of the government along with the public rallies that lasted over a month in 
both Istanbul and Ankara denote that the public sovereignty, democratic principles and 
individual rights and freedoms are key mobilising agents in Turkey.
8
  
One of the most significant observations we can make by looking at these events, is 
that in certain occasions and under certain circumstances the otherwise impermeable 
dichotomies that have traditionally characterised the Turkish political arena are overcome and 
the boundaries that were previously seen as clear-cut relax, resulting into the creation of new 
forms of political belonging. Yet in other occasions, those boundaries remain intact 
showcasing the persistent divisive nature of the social and political environment of Turkey. 
Following this logic, a number of scholars have made similar considerations. 
Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007) show that the boundaries between the ideologically charged 
continuums of secularism versus Islamism have become more fluid and relaxed. In the same 
direction, Bayramoğlu in examining the ‘mentalities’ of people on the basis of the 
secularism-religiosity axis finds that the religious and secular positions that exist in the socio-
political environment consist of ‘change-resistant’ and ‘changing spheres’ (2009, p. 8). He 
suggests that the religiosity-secularism dichotomy is not valid insofar as the two poles 
intersect on issues related to ‘democracy and patriarchy’ (2009, pp. 7-9). The author points to 
the creation of new social dynamics that have transformed the dominance of secularism 
versus religiosity. More recently, Göle notes that the Gezi protests offered a momentum in 
which the long-standing cleavage of secularism and Islam was overpassed and replaced by ‘a 
new culture of recognition and acceptance’ (2013, p. 14). She highlights that Gezi brought 
together individuals regardless of their gender, levels of religiosity, ethnic identity, age and 
class. Similarly, Turam (2015) suggests that the country’s increasing authoritarianism has 
brought together individuals that belong to opposing groups such as those in support of 
secularism and Islamism to defend individual freedoms and civil rights. Damar (2016) 
concurs that Gezi created the potential of overcoming the boundaries of the secularism-
                                                 
8
 For more information on the public reaction in the aftermath of the failed coup in July 2016 see: Sims, 2016; 
Naylor, 2016.  
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Islamism division and opened up the path of recognition and dialogue between the two 
communities away from the rigid and competitive preservation of the polarising ends. The 
above research stream demonstrates two important points: first, the political transformation 
that Turkey has been undergoing under the AKP governance has led to the relaxation of the 
previously rigid boundaries for certain segments of the population leading to the creation of 
new ways of social belonging; and second, we see that under certain circumstances and vis-à-
vis certain issues the deep rooted divisions inherent to the socio-political life are overcome in 
the quest for a more open, democratic and representative society. These studies unveil certain 
trends of public political behaviour in certain occasions of heightened tension focusing on the 
authoritarian turn of the current government. Yet they do not touch upon the full spectrum of 
the determinants that shape the country’s public opinion in this context.  
The study of public opinion in Turkey has been following the conventional models of 
investigation that have been employed traditionally in the field of political science focusing 
in particular on electoral behaviour. Looking at the aggregate level of analysis, existing 
studies explore the impact of key factors that drive voting behaviour such as ideology, 
religiosity, ethnic origin, economic considerations, as well as various demographic variables 
such as age, class, place of residence and the like and which contribute to the high 
fragmentation and volatility of the country’s electorate. Focusing on aggregate survey data, 
they provide an overall account of the Turkish public opinion reflecting the various 
ideological and socio-political shifts that have been taking place in the public sphere 
discussing predominantly what drives electoral preferences.  
The aggregate approach of public opinion holds significant shortcomings that limit 
the operationalization of the findings and their application to understanding what happens at 
the individual level. Due to its focus on the collective level, extant research fails to provide an 
investigation of the latent processes that take place at the individual level -such as decision-
making and motivated reasoning- and which drive the outcomes of what is perceived as the 
public opinion.
9
 By using national representative samples and looking at the electoral 
outcomes across time or attitudinal orientations and voting preferences, these studies offer 
systematic explanatory accounts of the main trends that characterize citizens’ electoral 
behaviour, ideological positioning and issue-based preferences. Existing studies set the 
ground for making safe predictions about the future but they do not point at the underlying 
processes that drive the determinants of individual political behaviour. To obtain an in-depth 
                                                 
9
 What is commonly perceived as the aggregated public opinion is in fact the final outcome of these mechanisms 
that take place at the individual level. 
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understanding of what drives public opinion in a given context the procedures that take place 
at the individual level - which are by consequence the drivers of political behaviour - need to 
be substantively assessed. The identification of these gaps of knowledge in the studies of 
public political behaviour in Turkey is the starting point for moving beyond the traditional 
and conventional approaches that focus on its aggregate level of analysis. 
My study stems from these limitations of existing studies on the Turkish public 
opinion, which do not account for the individual-based processes that citizens engage with in 
order to shape their political judgements, preferences and evaluations. I investigate the 
dynamic psychological mechanisms that shape citizens’ political behaviour. In particular, I 
look into the role of ideological inclinations (namely those that relate to the dominant 
division of Kemalism-political Islam), value-orientations, sophistication and affect in driving 
the cognitive, affective and motivational components of citizens’ political behaviour in 
Turkey. Focusing on the period between 2007 and 2012, I look into the mechanisms that 
formulate public perceptions in the beginning of the authoritarian turn of the country. In 
doing so I explore the way citizens negotiate their political identities and shape their political 
decisions in the socio-political environment that led to the events linked to Gezi and the anti-
coup protests.  
Here, I take into account the evidence that points to the relaxation of the old dominant 
boundaries, and focus in particular on the Islamism versus secularism cleavage in the name of 
democracy and individual rights and freedoms. I investigate the individual-based 
psychological mechanisms that created the space and the opportunity to develop the Gezi 
movement and the anti-coup protests. Having as a starting point the recent events in 
combination with the inherently fragmented nature of the political system, my work provides 
an in-depth exploration of the mechanisms that drive citizens’ political behaviour in Turkey 
focusing on the individual-based conditions under which citizens choose to stand united or 
apart in regards to political affairs. Through the combination of survey data and semi-
structured interviews, my work uncovers the dynamic individual-based processes that lead 
citizens to either overcome the traditional dichotomies shaping alternative routes of 
belonging in the socio-political environment (which subsequently bring them together with 
diverse groups of people) or stick to their attachment to the traditional cleavages empowering 
and perpetuating the long-standing fragmentation of the public. Along these lines, I examine 
the individual-based psychological underpinnings of citizens’ political preferences 
corresponding to two distinct public positions: a) those aligning themselves to the clear-cut 
boundaries that perpetuate the dichotomies of the Turkish political arena allowing for clear 
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demarcations in individual political preferences and b) those who hold softer positions 
picking principles that are more appropriate to their individual understanding of politics 
resulting into fudged political boundaries opening the path for opportunities to override the 
traditional cleavages. 
 As a result of these considerations the research questions of my work are: How do the 
two ideological lines of political Islam and Kemalist secularism along with their respective 
values and principles - as promoted by political elites and leaders - meet or clash at the 
societal level through the eyes of the individual citizens? How do ordinary citizens internalize 
the changing faces of both ideologies amidst the current wave of growing authoritarianism 
promoted by the governing AK Party? My work assesses empirically whether the political 
Islam-Kemalism ideological division retains its rigid boundaries when it comes to the public 
mind. Understanding whether and how these divisions exist at the individual level allows us 
obtain a deep understanding of the way the two dominant political ideologies together with 
their respective values and emotions they activate, shape the political behaviour of citizens in 
Turkey. If the boundaries between the two ideological camps are distinct then citizens’ 
political behaviour should be characterized by clear demarcations; however, if there are 
points in time and certain issues that drive citizens closer to the middle of the political Islam-
Kemalism spectrum sharing common views and ideas about certain issues, this would 
indicate that the previously perceived ‘hard-line’ divisions are now more relaxed. To answer 
this, we need to consider the psychological conditions under which these boundaries become 
accepted or surpassed while accounting for the determinants that drive individuals to hold 
either of the two positions: those that are keen to overcome the closed borders of the two 
ideological lines and those who remain bound to them for the sake of their individual political 
choices.  
 The mechanisms that take place at the individual level are the outcome of the 
internalisation of the external environment, which is then being internally processed resulting 
in the externalisation of attitudinal responses.
10
 I argue that, to obtain an in-depth 
understanding of citizens’ political behaviour, we need to unveil the dynamic effect that the 
social and political environment has on the individual processes that shape their political 
judgements and beliefs. On this basis, in my investigation of the underlying determinants of 
political behaviour in Turkey, I account for the simultaneous impact of the contextual factors 
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 According to Winter ‘we are shaped by external contexts, but these contexts […] become part of our 
personalities’ (2003, p. 116-117). 
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and those individual-based mechanisms that drive the formation of attitudinal orientations 
and political judgements.  
 
Employing a Political Psychology Approach  
Accounting for the transformational processes that have been taking place in the socio-
political environment in Turkey, I investigate the mechanisms through which 
environmentally generated factors are being absorbed and processed at the individual level, 
fuelling emotional arousal and judgemental evaluations that result into the expression of 
attitudinal responses, beliefs and positions towards political matters and affairs (Lippmann, 
1922). Taking a political psychology approach, my investigation focuses on the way through 
which ideological dispositions, value-orientations, political sophistication and affective 
expressions shape attitudinal responses and political judgements. My explanation relies on 
the investigation of the interplay between cognition, affect and motivation in shaping political 
behaviour in Turkey. 
My work offers an assessment of the role of political sophistication in the political 
behaviour of citizens in Turkey. Evidence from political psychology suggests that political 
sophistication has significant effects across the full spectrum of political behaviour ranging 
from the mechanisms of information processing and political thinking to decision-making 
and motivated reasoning (Converse, 1964, Conover and Feldman 1984; Markus et al., 1974; 
Luskin, 1987, 1990; Pierce, 1993; Price and Zaller, 1993; Knight, 1985; Zaller, 1992). When 
citizens are sophisticated, they hold higher political cognition and their political preferences 
are consistent with their ideological inclinations and party identification along with their 
value orientations (Rahn et al., 1990; Krosnick 1988; Zaller, 1992). Conversely novices (low 
sophisticates) formulate their political decisions relying on simpler and easier accessible 
resources; their political preferences are usually based on their system of values (Conover 
and Feldman, 1984).  
In my study, I explore the impact of levels of sophistication on the functional capacity 
of ideological orientations, value-based preferences and affective reactions of Turkish 
citizens. I am interested in the consistency, strength and coherence of individual issue-based 
preferences and political judgements and the content of the reasoning that justifies these 
positions. In other words, I investigate whether the levels of sophistication (high versus low) 
of Turkish citizens can explain their self-placement along ideological spectrums, value-driven 
judgements and their emotional expressions towards political phenomena. I seek to 
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understand an unexplored component of Turkish public opinion:  whether and under which 
conditions sophistication relaxes or makes more rigid existing ideological dichotomies. 
Political sophistication is expected to act as an important factor that mediates ideological 
inclinations, value preferences as well as affective reactions but currently these questions 
remain unanswered.  
 I also focus on measuring and understanding how ideological attachments and 
considerations can determine citizens’ political opinions in Turkey. Studies in political 
psychology have extensively demonstrated the significance of ideological inclinations in 
driving individual attitudes towards political matters and affairs (Campbell et al., 1960; 
Converse, 1964; Conover and Feldman, 1986; Knight, 1985; Feldman, 1989; Denzau and 
North, 2000; Sniderman et al., 1991; Jost et al., 2009).
11
 Based upon this, I explore how the 
public perceives the two ideologies in the current environment of Turkey but also the 
mechanisms through which their individual self-attachment develops. Assessing the current 
understandings of political Islam and Kemalism sheds light on the structural framework upon 
which citizens make up their minds on political affairs. I investigate the consistency between 
ideological identification and issue-based preferences and evaluative judgements following 
the clear-cut boundaries between the political Islam and Kemalism dichotomy. I am 
particularly interested in whether the existing boundaries remain rigid at the individual level 
and examine an interesting alterative: whether citizens have relaxed ideological attachments, 
formulate positions that are not following the traditional ideological trajectory of each end of 
the spectrum and instead rely on their value-orientations. This would suggest new forms 
political belonging in Turkey. To unpack the significance and rigidity of ideological 
boundaries, I am interested in the relationship between ideological inclinations, party 
identification and issue-based preferences. There, I will assess their consistency and 
coherence by examining citizens’ responses. In addition, I am interested in the interaction of 
political sophistication and ideological rigidity, I ask whether individuals with high levels of 
sophistication display internally consistent and coherent systems of beliefs based on 
ideological preferences. I am also interested in taking a close look at low sophisticates and 
whether they are more prone to rely on simpler considerations such as their values to 
formulate their judgments. Although the majority of citizens in Turkey are familiar with what 
divides the Kemalist-political Islamist camp looking at the level of sophistication individuals 
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 The terms ideological inclinations, orientations and dispositions will be used interchangeably through my 
work. All three terms are used to indicate one’s tendency to support and demonstrate agreement with a 
particular political ideology.  
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hold provides important information on the mechanism through which citizens arrive at their 
conclusions about politics.  
My research also looks into the motivational role of values in the formulation of 
citizens’ attitudinal responses towards politics in Turkey. Political psychology studies have 
shown that value-orientations direct citizens’ political orientations and ideological 
inclinations (Sniderman et al., 1991; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987; Feldman, 1989; Rokeach, 
1973). As the main ideological inclinations of Kemalism and political Islam (as promoted by 
CHP and AKP respectively) are currently in flux, it is interesting to ask whether citizens’ 
value-orientations are also undergoing a transformation. Do citizens follow the political 
advocators of each ideology or do they selectively identify with elements of both ideological 
orientations on the basis of their own system of values and beliefs. On this basis I am 
particularly interested in exploring the dynamic role of value-orientations in driving 
individual political preferences. My attention falls on the consistency and coherence between 
value-orientations, ideological inclinations and party preferences. Specifically, in looking at 
the ideological orientations and party preferences citizens hold I ask whether there is a clear 
pattern that points to attachment towards a certain set of values for those who hold Kemalist 
orientations and those who hold pro-Islamist orientations. In addition, I seek to investigate 
the role of political sophistication on individual reliance on values to formulate judgments.  
 Politics is an inherently emotional affair, and I am very interested in the role of 
affectivity in the formation of individual political belonging in Turkey as well as the interplay 
of affective reactions with ideological orientations and value preferences. Evidence from 
political psychology reveals that affect dramatizes a significant role in the mechanisms that 
drive attitudinal responses towards politics (Forgas, 1992, 1988; Abelson, 1963; Sniderman et 
al., 1991; Neuman et al., 2007; Redlawsk, 2006; Marcus, 2000, 2003; Ottati and Wyer, 1993; 
Markus and MacKuen, 1993, 2001; Sears, 2001; Isbell et al., 2006). Drawing upon these 
studies I ask what is the impact of affect on the dynamic formation of individual political 
behaviour in Turkey. I am interested in the content of emotional expressions as well as the 
sources that generate each emotion at the individual level. In simple terms, I ask a question 
that is often assumed but not investigated empirically: whether positive and negative valence 
emotions are generated from the same sources for all individuals or whether, as I suspect, 
ideology and value-orientations play a determinant role in directing affective expressions. 
Extant studies, particularly experimental and survey works, rarely examine the meaning that 
each emotion holds for different citizens. I seek to understand how individual and social 
experiences can lead to individual-based interpretations even when citizens report they 
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experience the same emotion. Does anger mean the same for all? Is everyone experiencing 
fear the same way? Does hope carry the same meaning and the same motivational power for 
different citizens? 
To answer these questions, I want to examine closely citizens’ affective reactions as 
well as their intensity and endurance, and map them alongside individuals’ placement on each 
side of the ideological and value-based continuums. I also explore how affect might interact 
with political sophistication. I am particularly interested in identifying the emotions 
experienced by those that occupy the rigid ends of the Kemalism-Political Islam continuum, 
as well as those who hold more relaxed political judgements bridging ideological and 
political divisions.  
I take as a starting point the beginning of the AKP’s governing era with the party’s 
first electoral win in 2002, and cover a ten-year period, up to 2012, looking at the effects of 
government’s authoritarian turn on the public behaviour, which led to the Gezi movement 
and the post-coup public mobilizations. 
The study starts in 2002 because Turkey’s current outlook (domestic and 
international) has been shaped by the AK Party’s governance. In fact, the party’s line of 
governance has re-shaped the socio-political arena of the country in the last 15 years. As Önis 
(2013) notes, the political dominance of AKP and its reforms initiated a process of social 
engineering that follows an increasingly conservative track putting the significance of 
religion back in the public space. The renewed importance given to religion along with the 
full spectrum of AKP practices including the recent drawbacks on individual rights and 
freedoms as well as the excessive use of violence and the repressive repertoire that has been 
employed against oppositional voices, are all indicators of the top-down process of social 
engineering employed by AKP. Overall, the AKP’s dominance in the political life of Turkey 
has had a dramatic impact on the development of the political behaviour of citizens in 
Turkey. This is evident if we take a close look at the electoral results since 2002 leading to 
the elections of June 2015 where the AK Party faced its first electoral loss with follow up 
elections in November 2015 that eventually reconfirmed its electoral stronghold and 
governing mandate (Çarkoğlu and Yildirim, 2015).  
 Taking into account the investigation of the long-standing conflict between the 
ideologies of political Islam and Kemalism, their respective political actors as well as the 
values they promote can offer significant information on what leads to public mobilisations 
such as the ones witnessed during Gezi or the anti-coup protests. This is even more important 
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when accounting for the endurance or softening of the main ideological frameworks looking 
in particular at how individuals adjust and develop their political placement.  
 
The Relevance of My Study 
My research is relevant and timely for a number of reasons that I address below. First, public 
opinion in Turkey deserves special attention because of the country’s political culture and 
current socio-political environment. Turkey’s path towards democratisation has been 
following a rather adventurous direction with several drawbacks throughout time created 
either by the intervention of the military in public affairs or more recently by the current 
government under the AK Party. Internal dynamics in the country have changed with the rise 
into power of the AKP. In fact its electoral win in 2002 signified an important turn for the 
domestic and international position of the country. Notably, during the first years of the AKP 
governance, Turkey was characterized as being under a consolidated democratic transition 
(Kubicek, 2001; Tessler and Altinoğlu, 2004), as an unconsolidated democracy (Mutfuler-
Bac and Keyman, 2015), or as a developing democracy (Erisen and Kubicek, 2016). Yet, 
recent studies - accounting for the drift towards authoritarianism that has unfolded - have 
classified the country’s regime trajectory as competitive or electoral authoritarianism (Esen 
and Gumuscu 2016; Arbatli, 2014; Herzog, 2015, Karakatsanis, 2016; Iğsiz, 2014). Recent 
events such as the Gezi movement and the anti-coup mobilisations demonstrate the 
questioning of the socio-political stability undermining what many scholars were hoping for 
after AKP came into power (Erisen and Kubicek, 2016). Hence, in order to understand the 
current political culture of the country, it is important to investigate how the public 
internalises the political environment and how individuals’ position themselves in the 
existing political environment. My work, offers an exploration of the individual-based 
dynamics that shape the electoral results that sustain AKP in power but also the minds and 
hearts of those who mobilise against the government and it principles.  
 Second, understanding the political behaviour of the public in Turkey provides us 
with important insights into the mechanisms through which citizens internalize political 
developments and motivate their behavioural and attitudinal responses towards politics. The 
recurrent breakdowns of the democratic system of the country (Çarkoğlu, 2012) along with 
the recent drift in authoritarianism shape the conditions through which citizens develop their 
political belonging. The public opinion in Turkey has been traditionally characterized by high 
levels of fragmentation on the basis of several dichotomies. However, recent developments 
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and extant research points to the creation of new forms of belonging in the Turkish society. 
Several case studies show that traditional cleavages (such as the secularism-Islamism) are 
surpassed by certain segments of the population in the name of democracy, individual 
freedoms and rights (Göle, 2013; Bayramoğlu, 2009; Turam, 2015; Damar, 2016; 
Karakatsanis, 2016). Yet, there are also those citizens that choose to stick on either side of the 
political divisions remaining faithful to their inclinations. In order to understand the 
conditions under which certain segments of the population choose each side of the political 
spectrum or choose to reconcile ideas coming from both sides we need to account for what 
takes place at the individual level. A focus on what drives the cognitive, affective and 
motivational processes can reveal those individual laden processes that shape citizens’ 
political behaviour and explain the mechanisms through which the public negotiates their 
political belonging on the basis of political developments.  
 Third, obtaining information on how citizens formulate their political judgements can 
offer significant insights into the social and political future of the country. A close look into 
how certain segments of the public may disregard their differences and come together or 
decide to remain divided on the basis of their differences can provide important information 
on the future of the political landscape of Turkey, as the public projects it. Although electoral 
outcomes point to the stronghold dominance of Erdoğan and his AK party, what takes place 
at the social level provides evidence of the existence of antithetical forces that go beyond the 
traditional cleavages, overcoming stereotypical ideas such as those that point to the 
secularism versus Islamism continuum, in the name of freedom and human rights against any 
form of authoritarian dominance. Along these lines my study explores whether and how the 
traditionally divisive lines of political Islam and Kemalism along with their corresponding 
values coexist at the individual level. 
 Finally, considering the increasing authoritarian tendencies in the country, the 
examination of those mechanisms that drive public opinion can provide useful information on 
public responsiveness to the government and its policies. Several scholars that look into 
public opinion and policy-making have noted that there is no absolute congruence between 
the two (Weissberg, 1976; Bardes and Oldendick, 2004). These scholars look into policy 
responsiveness mainly focusing on democratic contexts offering insights on the various 
mechanisms governments use in order to comply with the public sentiment. They also 
consider the mechanisms of public opinion that come into play when citizens are asked to 
evaluate a policy or participate in a poll. However, our knowledge on how the public 
responds in electoral authoritarian settings is rather limited. Following up from these, my 
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study offers an extended understanding of the mechanisms of citizens’ political behaviour 
amidst growing authoritarianism. 
For these reasons Turkey, with its particular political culture and system, provides an 
appropriate environment to test for my political psychology model of individual political 
behaviour focusing in particular on the pronounced effects of ideology, values, emotions and 
political sophistication in an authoritarian context. The exploration of the cognitive, affective 
and motivational elements of citizens’ political behaviour, is both valuable and timely as it 
can offer insights into what moves citizens’ political behaviour in Turkey. 
 
Plan of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided in four parts with each part covering a separate aspect of my 
investigation. The first part consists of chapters two and three and offers a detailed discussion 
on the contextual environment of Turkey. It also addresses the evidence from extant research 
on the determinants of the country’s public opinion. The second part consists of chapters four 
and five and introduces the political psychology framework I employ. This discussion shapes 
the background of the hypothesis that I empirically test in my work. The third part consists of 
chapter six and addresses the research design and methodology of my study. The fourth part 
consists of chapters seven, eight and nine and offers an analytical discussion on the findings 
of my empirical investigation. Finally, chapter ten offers the concluding remarks of my 
research. Specifically, I discuss the added value of my work in the study of political 
behaviour in Turkey. It also points to further avenues for research as they result from my 
empirical findings.  
Chapter two provides a brief discussion on the political history of Turkey. 
Analytically, the chapter addresses historical developments that have shaped the basis for the 
conflictual relationship between political Islam and Kemalism and their respective party 
agents. It also discusses the emergence of the governing AKP and points to the ideological 
transformation that political Islam underwent in gaining its political legitimacy to re-emerge 
in the society and which led to the Party’s domination since 2002. Next, it focuses on the 
ideological transformation both agents of political Islam and Kemalism (AKP and CHP 
respectively) have gone through in the past years forming the ground upon which the public 
behaviour is shaped. My focus lies on the ideological basis of the tension that drives the 
socio-political environment of Turkey along with the authoritarian turn that has been 
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promoted by the AKP since 2009 changing dramatically the trajectory of the country’s 
governance.  
Chapter three offers an analytical discussion of the study of public opinion and 
political behaviour in Turkey. Having as starting point the high levels of fragmentation and 
volatility of the public sphere - consistently reported by several scholars - this chapter 
discusses the determinants that shape the country’s electoral behaviour. I also discuss the 
methodological designs that existing research has used and point to the key limitations of the 
literature on Turkish public opinion.  
Chapter four introduces the political psychology approach that my work employs for 
acquiring new knowledge on the processes that shape citizens’ political opinions and beliefs 
in Turkey. Specifically it provides a detailed discussion on the cognitive, affective and 
motivational processes that drive the formation of citizens’ political judgements and 
addresses the individual-based mechanisms through which citizens’ process their ideological 
inclinations, value-orientations, emotions and sophistication in shaping their political 
judgments.  
Chapter five offers a discussion of the environmentally generated factors that play an 
important role in the processes that drive political behaviour. Namely it addresses the role 
that ideology, values, sophistication and emotions play at the cognitive, affective and 
motivational level in driving citizens’ political behaviour. Drawing upon the existing 
literature, this chapter also introduces the key hypotheses my work puts into empirical test.  
Chapter six presents the research design and methodological approach of my 
research. It introduces the three studies that constitute my empirical work pointing at their 
strengths and limitations. Focusing on the complementary nature of the three studies this 
chapter explains the logic and the aims that underpin each study individually. It also offers an 
analytical discussion on the operationalization and measurement of the key concepts that 
drive my work (ideology, values, emotions and sophistication).  
 The chapters that follow discuss the findings of my empirical research. Chapter seven 
addresses the findings relevant to the role that ideological inclinations play in shaping 
attitudinal responses towards politics. Chapter eight looks into the role that core personal 
values and political values play in driving the mechanisms that shape citizens’ political 
judgements and evaluations. Chapter nine focuses on the role that affective expressions play 
in the processes of political behaviour. The findings on political sophistication are presented 
as part of the discussion on ideology, values and emotions. 
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 Chapter ten provides the concluding discussion of my thesis focusing on two distinct 
directions. First, it discusses the key findings of my work and highlights the new evidence 
that my study brings in the study of political behaviour in Turkey. Second, it addresses my 
contribution in the field of political psychology in regards to the cognitive, affective and 
motivational aspects of political behaviour. Finally, it points to new avenues for research that 
my study generates for political psychology studies and for public opinion and political 
behaviour research in Turkey as well as in other similar contexts. 
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Chapter 2. Historical Background of Turkish Politics 
 
The societal context holds great power in the formation of public opinion (Kinder, 1998). 
Looking at the basic ingredients of public opinion, individuals and their collectivities form 
complex relationships that are bound to the time, place and setting in which they belong 
(Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1993). The experiences individuals obtain in the span of their 
lifetime by social interaction play a determinative role in the formation of their political 
attitudes. These experiences as Kinder suggests, ‘are partly individually chosen, partly 
environmentally supplied’ (1998, p. 815). This supports the view of public opinion as both a 
driver and a by-product of the socio-political context. Hence, to explore public opinion it is 
essential to account for the contextual particularities focusing on the socio-political culture of 
a given society, which has been constructed through various historical moments and political 
circumstances (Back, 1998; Shiraev and Sobel, 2006). The political culture of Turkey has 
been shaped throughout the years by the co-existence of two antithetical directions that hold a 
diverse vision for the country and its future: Kemalism and political Islam. Throughout time 
the conflict between the two camps has taken many faces following the evolution of both 
ideologies and their corresponding political actors. In fact they have both shaped decisively 
the political culture of the country, setting the basis for the political life, directing the values 
inherent in the society and to a certain extent determining citizens’ political belonging.  
The current political arena of Turkey has dramatically changed under the governance 
of the pro-Islamist AKP since 2002. Although in the first years of the Party’s administration 
several hopes were expressed in regards to the role of AKP in the prospect of the country’s 
process of democratization these have progressively faded. Since 2009 - as a consequence of 
the increasing conservatism promoted by the AKP - the country has started stepping on an 
authoritarian regime trajectory (Özbudun, 2014; Önis, 2015; Esen and Gumuscu, 2016; 
Karakatsanis, 2016; Arbatli, 2014; Herzog, 2015). Under these circumstances, the 
dichotomies existing between Kemalism and political Islam as well as their social expression 
have been enhanced. Expectedly, this has had a direct impact on the country’s public opinion. 
To understand the complex mechanisms that shape citizens’ political behaviour in Turkey, it 
is vital to study the origins of the current ideological frameworks and the key political actors 
that drive Turkey’s social and political life. This chapter provides a discussion on the main 
historical developments that have shaped the current outlook of the country’s socio-political 
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arena. It provides a detailed review of the clash between Kemalism and political Islam by 
focusing on their ideological differences and their party advocators. In doing so, it addresses 
the changes that both political directions have gone through since 2002 by focusing in 
particular on the differential ideological principles they carry and which shape their 
conflictual coexistence in the society.  
 
2.1 The Conflictual Basis of Kemalism and Political Islam  
The historical context brought the Ottoman Empire in front of the need of its transformation. 
It was the competitive international arena that started to reshuffle after the end of the World 
War I as well as a number of internal problems - such as its weaknesses in local governance 
and the economic field - that started becoming obvious during the Ottoman years, which set 
the scene for the start of the country’s progressive transformation. Hence the beginning of the 
westernization process appeared as a historical opportunity for change in the Ottoman Empire 
(Heper, 1993). The foundation of the Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923 initiated 
the operations for the total Westernization and modernization of the Empire and the secular 
transformation of the new state (Heper, 1993; Liebesny, 1953; Al- Muhairi, 1996; Taniyici, 
2003). The Kemalist development strategy was composed of six pillars: republicanism, 
statism, nationalism, secularism, populism and reformism. These constituted the basis of the 
political, social and economic changes that constructed the new Turkish state (Heper, 1993; 
Zurcher, 1993; Mehmet, 1983; Dursun, 2006).  
The transformations that Ataturk brought into the newly established Republican 
Turkey set the ground for the conflictual basis of the relationship between Kemalism and 
political Islam. The new Turkey was based on the Western model of modernization and 
secularism (Mellon, 2006; Al-Muhairi, 1996). The Turkish paradigm of secularisation 
promoted by the Kemalist ideology was dependent on the complete state control over 
religion. The implementation of secularism practically meant the de-construction of the role 
of religion in public life, which resulted in its persecution in the private sphere. In reality, the 
Turkish case of secularisation was the beginning not only of an effective control of religion 
by the state, but also of all aspects of the socio-political life (Yavuz, 2006). The Kemalist 
secularisation project of Ataturk was modelled after the French secularization example where 
religion and religiosity were viewed as main characteristics of backwardness. The past role of 
Islam and its dominance in the socio-political arena was viewed as the most significant 
enemy of the modern transformation of the state (Mellon, 2006). Accordingly, the Kemalist 
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project promoted the control of religion by the state; and while it did not prohibit the personal 
obedience to Islam, it viewed the influence of Islam on politics, economics, education and 
culture as the most significant barriers towards modernization (Fuller, 2004; Mellon, 2006). 
The processes of modernization and especially the secularisation of the society came at the 
top of the priorities for the new state. The marginalization of religion in the personal life 
away from the public sphere composed a significant act aiming to protect the modern state. 
Unlike the French example however, the Islamic religion was part of the Turkish national 
identity.  
State-led nationalism was the vehicle for the accomplishment of the modernization 
and secularization agenda promoted by Kemalism. The main aim of the Kemalist nationalism 
was the construction of a homogeneous Turkish citizenry sharing the same culture and 
language. This been one of the most important aspects of the Kemalist nation-building 
processes (Icduygu et al., 1999; Keyman, 2007; Kadioglu, 1996; Icduygu and Kaygusuz, 
2004; Kaya, 2013; Çolak, 2003). This top-down process of citizenship and national identity 
construction under a single unifying framework demonstrates the importance of the power 
state structure in assigning the necessary characteristics to the Turkish population and then in 
imposing them through the Constitution. Under the principles of Kemalist secular nationalism 
the State was striving to create a new national identity by shaping accordingly ethnicity, 
nationalism and religion. The state-driven nationalism was secular in nature, since it was 
asking the re-placement of religion from the public sphere and the re-shaping of a new 
Turkish modern state. Essentially, the Kemalist version of nationalism used secularization 
procedures to restructure the new state and subsequently to put an end to the domination of 
the old religious-led actors and their institutions (Narli, 1999; Çolak, 2003).  
The roots of the clash between Kemalism and political Islam can be traced to the 
implementation of the Kemalist secular nationalism (Lesser, 2004; Yavuz, 2009). The efforts 
to modernize Turkey under the principles of Kemalism led to the growth of political Islam as 
an oppositional force. Islamism was against the nationalist view of modernization as 
promoted by Kemalism, and saw modernization as a threat against the authenticity of the 
Islamic traditional values and principles. Islamism viewed the identity of the Turkish state as 
predominantly Islamic and aimed for the unification of the population under the Islamic 
principles (Mellon, 2006; Mehmet, 1990). For Islamism, religion was seen as the unifying 
factor of Turkish society, whereas for Kemalism, religion was perceived as an element of 
backwardness that compromised the ‘Turkishness’ of the citizenry (Yavuz, 2009; Ciddi, 
2009). While the Kemalist nationalism viewed Turkey as a modern-Western state, Islamism 
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saw a threat posed by the goal of modernization against the authenticity of traditional values 
and principles within the Islamic Turkish state (Mellon, 2006; Mehmet, 1983; Colak, 2003).  
The aggressive nature of the Kemalist practices towards the marginalisation of 
religion into the private sphere and the subsequent elimination of the advocators of Islamism 
from the centre of the societal structure created the Islamist opposition movement and built 
the basis of its narrative throughout the years (Dursun, 2006). The different points of view 
that Kemalism and political Islam hold for the role of religion in the society as well as for the 
nation and its future development have set the basis for their development and their current 
outlook in Turkey.  
 
2.2 AK Party: The Liberal Transformation of Political Islam  
The political landscape of Turkey changed dramatically with the foundation of the AK Party 
in 2001 by the reformist wing of the pro-Islamist FP, which was banned in the same year. 
Key political figures in the foundation of AKP were the former major of Istanbul, R.T. 
Erdoğan who is now the President of the Republic and A. Gul who has served as President as 
well as Deputy Prime Minister (Lesser, 2004). The establishment of AKP opened a new 
period for Turkey and the circumstances under which it was established as well as its current 
performance provide useful information for its ideology as well as for the future of the 
country. 
The AK Party managed to enter the political arena dynamically with its outstanding 
victory at the 2002 national elections, which were a turning point for the Turkish political 
system (Bozarslan, 2004).
12
 It was the first time after the establishment of the Republic that a 
single pro- Islamic party gained enough seats to form a government. The only other party that 
received sufficient votes to overcome the 10 percent nationwide threshold to enter the 
parliament was the Kemalist center-left CH Party. It was the first time in Turkish history that 
only two parties entered the parliament (Başlevent et al., 2004; Çarkoğlu, 2002). 
Interestingly, AKP with its pro-Islamist agenda and ideological principles that characterize 
the party as liberal conservativist, has managed to sustain its electoral stronghold until the last 
elections in November 2015. In April 2017, it also managed to switch the country’s 
governing system from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential one with executive power 
being held by the President. 
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 For an overview of the electoral performance of AKP in the period between 2002-2015, please see Table 1.1 
in Appendix 1. 
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The AK Party won in 2002 because of a combination of factors that made its agenda 
appealing to the vast majority of the Turkish citizens. First, the key political leaders from 
AKP such as R. T. Erdoğan and A. Gül disassociated the party from its Islamist past by 
advocating a new ideological profile based on a combination of liberal and conservative ideas 
as well as moderate Islamism placing the party on the center-right of the political spectrum. 
Second, AKP being a newly established party provided viable suggestions for the recovery of 
the economic crisis that hit the country. Third, the Party promoted the principle of social 
justice aiming to put an end to the previous discrimination on the basis of religion and ethnic 
and cultural identity (Önis and Keyman, 2003). The collapse of the earlier governments in 
Turkey with the high levels of disintegration in the center-right and center-left parties led the 
electorate to choose the newly founded AKP (Başlevent et al., 2004). At the same time, the 
AK Party has also focused in its rhetoric on the country’s relations with the EU starting the 
negotiations for full membership in 2005 with the prospect of becoming a permanent member 
(Lesser, 2004; Önis, 2006). Erdoğan perception of the idea of ‘Muslim Democrats’ entering 
the EU entails a view of Islam being a cultural background and not an element that influences 
its political agenda combined with the democratic ideas his party advocates (Lesser, 2004). 
This is to be interpreted as an added dimension to the party’s appeal in the country’s 
electorate.  
The aforementioned positions held and promoted by the AKP offered significant 
evidence that the party surpassed its political Islamist background shaping a new viable 
alternative for the country’s future based on democracy and social justice while respecting 
and advocating the secularist nature of the Republic (Özbudun, 2006). In fact the AK Party 
guaranteed the results of the 2002 elections because of its political agenda focusing on the 
respect of the will of the nation as the only source of legitimacy for the country while 
promoting democracy and freedoms regardless of language, ethnicity, religion and the like. In 
fact, the Party appeared as the safeguard of democracy, promoting freedoms of expression 
and individual rights for the expression and exercise of individual and religious beliefs 
(Özbudun, 2006). In interpreting the reasons for its victory several scholars also remarked the 
AKP’s reformist agenda aimed at reducing the old bureaucratic machinery as well as the 
power of the military to intervene in the social and political life of the country rather than a 
primarily pro-Islamist actor (Avcı, 2011; Bardakçı, 2013; Cizre, 2007; Dağı, 2006; Özbudun, 
2006; Hale and Özbudun, 2010; Keyman, 2007; Yavuz, 2009). Several scholars, regardless of 
their critique of the party’s orientations and Islamist roots, held the hope that the AKP would 
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follow its political rhetoric leading the country towards the path of democratic consolidation 
(Özbudun, 2006; Çarkoğlu, 2002).  
The domination of the AK Party in the political arena did not come without the party 
evolving and adjusting its agenda on the basis of its vision for the society. The governing 
trajectory of the country under the AKP has been characterized by its attempts to consolidate 
its democratic transition (Kubicek, 2001; Tessler and Altinoglu, 2004). However more recent 
studies pay particular attention to the increase in authoritarian tendencies promoted, designed 
and implemented by the governing party since 2009. In particular, several scholars have 
pointed to the democratic backslide of the country (Özbudun, 2014; Önis, 2015; Esen and 
Gumuscu, 2016; Karakatsanis, 2016). Consequentially a number of scholars have 
characterized Turkey as a case of ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Arbatli, 2014; Herzog, 2015) 
or ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016). The above classifications of the 
country’s regime trajectory demonstrate the co-existence of two seemingly antithetical 
elements. On the one side, authoritarianism expressed with significant restrictions in 
individual freedoms and liberties under the complete control of the governing AKP. On the 
other side a dependency upon electoral procedures, which offer the Constitution-based 
universal right of voting to the public for the selection of the government.  
The AK Party’s downslide towards authoritarianism has become more intense since 
its 2011 electoral win. By putting an end to its democratic tendency, the party appeared to 
push towards the hard division lines in the Turkish society with the aim to stabilize its power 
in terms of its electoral performance as well as its domination in the socio-political 
environment (Ezikoğlu, 2016; Karakoç, 2015; Yilmaz, 2015). The increasing authoritarian 
tendencies of AKP in fact led to a number of turbulent developments that have shaped the 
country’s current outlook. Two of the most important are represented by the Gezi movement 
in 2013 and by the government crackdown against oppositional voices in the aftermath of the 
failed coup of July 2016. From the one side, in Gezi public rage against the government 
brought to the streets a large number of people protesting against the oppression of the 
governing AKP and advocating freedoms and individual rights (Chrona and Bee, 2017). On 
the other side, the repercussions in the aftermath of the failed coup resulted in a massive 
operation by the governing AKP to shut down opposing voices with the excuse of protecting 
the country’s freedom and civil liberties (Abbas and Zalta, 2017). 
The country appears to be divided in clear-cut camps with the supporters of the AK 
Party and its governance and those who stand against it being willing to come to the streets 
and protest against the practices of the government and the state-led repression. What is 
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particularly interesting is the existing evidence offered by a number of studies which 
demonstrate that in the case of Gezi pro-Islamists met with the secular Kemalists expressing 
their dissent against AKP and eventually demonstrating in support of individual freedoms and 
rights (Damar, 2016; Chrona and Bee, 2017). At the same time and contrary to this, in the 
post-coup period large numbers of AKP voters demonstrated in support of the government 
and its practises against the military fraction in protection of the public sovereignty that led 
the coup, whereas those against the AKP went to the streets to demonstrate against the 
intervention of the military in the public life protecting public sovereignty. 
 
2.3 Ideological and Political Tensions between Kemalism and Political 
Islam 
To obtain an understanding of the nature of public opinion and political behaviour requires an 
appreciation of the dominant ideological orientations in Turkey. Political Islam and 
Kemalism have been the two ideological camps that have dominated and shaped the political 
arena of Turkey throughout the years since the establishment of the Republican State in 1923.  
The re-emergence of political Islam in Turkey’s political life in combination with the 
electoral win of its main political agent (AK Party) was a significant turn for Turkey’s 
development. In fact AKP with its moderate religious face has managed to legitimize its 
position in the social arena and to gain continuous electoral support that has kept it in the 
governing seat of the country until today. Importantly, these developments take place in a 
country whose constitutional framework is based upon the Kemalist principles of secularism 
and nationalism. In other words by principle the competitive coexistence of political Islam 
and Kemalism under their respective party advocators - AKP and CHP - is based upon the 
division lines of their ideological orientations. In fact, the domination of the AK Party in 
Turkey and its electoral strength since 2002, has paved the way for the socio-political conflict 
between those in support of the Kemalist ideals and those who support the AKP.  
The AK Party managed to establish an attractive modern face contrary to the past pro-
Islamist actors of the country. The party’s agenda based on conservative democracy laying in 
the center-right of the political spectrum and with clear roots in the pro-Islamism tradition has 
managed to change drastically the country’s political arena (Taspınar, 2012). The main 
party’s aim is a way of modernity that goes in hand with traditions, a kind of universalism 
combined with the local; a rationalism that does not ignore the religious understanding of life. 
As Erdoğan stated, AKP supports a system that incorporates local and traditional values and 
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principles and the universal trends of conservatism (Erdoğan, 2004). The AKP’s agenda 
combines religion with the secular values of Turkey. Namely, it supports secularism in line 
with democratic values and freedoms, while religion works as a social value. Hence, it 
promotes Islamic ethics and ways of life in terms of religious values and principles (Yavuz, 
2009). For AKP, the national identity is Islamic
13
 and modern; traditional values and 
principles go in hand with the universalist perspective of Europeanization, while at the same 
time the ‘new Turkish citizen' is subject to this mixture of Islamic authenticity and liberal 
transformation. The main focus of AKP lies on the Islamic identity or in other words on 
Muslim brotherhood rather than the Turkish identity (Yavuz and Özcan, 2006). 
What is particularly interesting is that AKP - especially in the first years of its 
governance and until 2011 - did not follow the traditional pace of political Islam (Yavuz, 
2009). Aiming to be a legitimate dominant actor in Turkish politics the party initiated its 
liberal transformation. This guaranteed the maintaining of its power while being in line with 
the country’s Kemalist pillars and principles. This transformation had implications not only 
for the direction of the country under the AKP’s rule, but it also changed the terms of the 
conflict between the Kemalist inheritance of secularism and nationalism and the advocators 
of Islamism (Yavuz, 2009). According to its agenda AKP supports secularism in line with the 
democratic values and freedom rights, while religion works as a social value with no 
involvement in the political life.  
The second most important political actor in Turkey in terms of power is the Kemalist 
CH Party, founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The party has also followed a direction of 
change in regards to its political rhetoric and ideological principles in line with the needs of 
the society also with the aim to perform better in electoral terms. The CH Party keeps strong 
its’ historical orientation towards nationalism and secularism while also following the 
Kemalist inheritance of a state-controlled economy (Tepe, 2006). CHP since its establishment 
has been a sound advocator of secularism promoting the complete control of religion by the 
state and its subsequent marginalisation in the private sphere. In fact, the Kemalist version of 
nationalism has always been hostile to the politicisation of any other identity out of the state 
and the nation.
14
 Although upon its establishment the CHP was representing the Kemalist 
ideology, progressively and since the 1970s the party has started leaning towards the center-
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 ‘In Turkey “Islamic” is someone who seeks a prominent role for Islamic ethics and practices in the 
organisation of the everyday life’ (Yavuz, 2009, p. 5). 
14
 Some argue that this rigid nationalistic approach along with the difficulty to integrate the need of a number of 
societal fragments of the Turkish society that were in favour of religious freedoms in the secular Republic left 
the party far behind in terms of electoral and public support (Öniş, 2004).  
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left (Uluğ an Cohrs, 2017). Currently the party occupies the center-left of the political 
spectrum, and represents a socio-democratic stance advocating a state controlled economy 
following the Kemalist principles of progress for the Republic while also promoting the 
priority of the labor rights within the society against the liberal capitalist reforms.
15
 
Additionally CHP also supports pluralism and participation in the society, individual 
freedoms and minority rights. In terms of the country’s foreign relations, CHP supports 
Turkey’s EU accession and in general Turkey’s relations with the West. 
The development of the CH Party into a socio-democratic actor did not result in the 
party neglecting its Kemalist principles. In fact the party is a strong defender of the unified 
structure of the state, its official language and the principle of secularism (Beriker-Atiyas, 
1997). However, it led the party to becoming a more moderate political actor compared to its 
past. The election of Kılıçdaroğlu in 2010 as the new party leader that replaced Baykal, was a 
turning point both for the party’s rhetoric as well as for the party’s electoral performance, its 
socio-political activities and the mobilization of supporters in general. In fact since the 
election of Kılıçdaroğlu the party has started being more active and in touch with its 
grassroots organizations and supporters. It has also updated its stance towards a number of 
issues such as for example the lift of the ban on headscarves at Universities across the 
country. CHP has also addressed more convincingly and in a decisive fashion the issues of 
unemployment and government corruption as well as it started denouncing openly the 
aggressive authoritarian tendency of Erdoğan and the AK Party. For instance, the party’s 
rhetoric towards the AKP’s campaign advocating for a constitutional change from a 
parliamentary into a presidential system ahead of the referendum of April 2017, has been 
particularly aggressive in standing against the governing party. Although up to recently there 
has been a mounting critique questioning the CHP leader’s ability to effectively stand in 
opposition to President Erdoğan’s authoritarianism, in June 2017 Kılıçdaroğlu announced the 
launch of a protest march from Ankara to Istanbul in the name of justice (March for Justice). 
This came as a response to the imprisonment of a CHP MP (Enis Berberoğlu) over charges of 
spying (Hurtas, 2017).  
The view that Islamism and Kemalism are adversary political forces reflects the 
historical processes that constructed the faces of political Islam and Kemalist secular 
nationalism that have been dominating the social and political environment of the country 
since its establishment. The development of the political actors from both sides provides 
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evidence of the clear-cut boundaries that divide the two ideological orientations. As 
previously discussed, recent studies reveal that the ideological base of the advocators of both 
orientations have undergone some changes. This transformation consequently changed the 
electorate of the country. In particular, the ideological transformation of AKP has affected 
dramatically its electoral basis. Evidence of this is provided by Taniyici (2003) who suggests 
that the directional change of the ideological rhetoric as articulated by the pro-Islamist elite 
has led to the transformation of its main principles promoted by its party advocators. An 
example of this can be found in the study of Başlevent et al. (2009) where the authors find 
that the AK Party’s positive positioning towards the country’s EU membership coincided 
with an increase in the electoral support of the party, bringing to the electoral base new 
supporters belonging to the liberal segments of society. Additionally, studies of Turkish 
politics have been consistently using the dichotomy of Islamism versus secularism to 
understand public opinion. Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007) highlight that the boundaries 
between Islamism and secularism have become more fluid in recent years with many citizens 
opting to place themselves on the middle of the continuum rather than picking sides. They 
interpret this as a weakening of the cleavage between Islamism and secularism for a large 
segment of the population while at the same time they point to the existence of those citizens 
who allocate themselves on each side without any doubt. More recent evidence suggests the 
relaxation of the Islamism versus secularism cleavage in the name of democracy and 
individual rights and freedoms (Bayramoğlu, 2009; Damar, 2016; Göle, 2014; Turam, 2015).  
As a consequence of the recent events and especially since the authoritarian turn of 
AKP, the division between the two party advocators of political Islam and Kemalism (AKP 
and CHP) has become deeper than ever. Nevertheless, a few scholars suggest that the 
traditional Islamism-secularism continuum has been overpassed while others demonstrate 
that in certain occasions and under certain circumstances the boundaries between the two 
ideologies have become blurred. This happens on occasions where citizens find the chance to 
overcome these boundaries by constructing new forms of political belonging that go beyond 
traditional cleavages. However, in other occasions the electorate decides to support the 
traditional ideological principles and values and their corresponding party orientations 
reinforcing by consequence the existing clear-cut boundaries.  
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2.4 Concluding Remarks 
The Turkish political arena has been persistently viewed as utterly fragmented and highly 
volatile by a vast amount of scholars. In the heart of this, lay the conflictual by nature co-
existence of the Kemalist inheritance and political Islam as represented by the current faces 
of CHP and AKP respectively. The present nature of Turkish politics is inevitably 
characterized by complexity. Turkey has entered a new period of transformation since 2002 
with the electoral win of the AK Party accompanied by the changes the party underwent in 
order to stabilise its power in the political arena.  
Turkey since the beginning of the AKP’s tenure in governance has been viewed as a 
model Muslim country for the Middle East. This was due to the combination by AKP of 
principles of liberalism under a conservative framework without disregarding the role of 
Islam yet viewing it predominantly as a cultural element in driving the country’s political life. 
Several scholars have looked at the AK Party with the hope to bring Turkey closer to the 
consolidation of democracy. However, throughout the years and with the AKP’s electoral 
stability the situation in the country has gone towards a different direction. Current evidence 
of the increasing authoritarian and oppressive practices employed by the political elites of 
AKP - especially under the rule of Erdoğan (currently the President of Turkey who holds the 
executive power in his hands) - demonstrates that the country’s trajectory has switched from 
the expectation of increasing democracy to a more authoritarian state in which the rule of 
Islam plays an important role in the driving seat of the country. The 2013 Gezi protests and 
the use of excessive force by the state’s armed forces followed by a number of arrests and 
prosecutions of civilians, as well as the post-coup era - which initiated a period of arrests of a 
vast number of public servants considered as ‘enemy of the state’- provide evidence of two 
key elements. First, in Turkey there is a large number of people who are against the AKP that 
come from all backgrounds regardless of their level of religiosity, ethnic background and 
ideological placement and who are ready to take to the streets and protest against the 
government. At the same time, AKP since 2002 has its own strong basis of supporters who 
have continuously given the party the legitimacy to govern the country under its principles. 
Second, the AKP has proven to be willing to employ all required means in order to reduce 
and silence all opposing voices in the country in order to maintain its power and shape the 
society according to its vision and its agenda. 
The nature of the conflict-based contextual environment is key for understanding the 
framing of public opinion in Turkey. The public interest and positioning of the citizens in 
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Turkey has been entrenched under this discursive frame of these two diverging dominant 
perceptions. With Kemalism and political Islam being the direct product of the conflict in the 
political and ideological arena and also the main factor that has been feeding the continuity of 
this discourse, the public in Turkey has been following and simultaneously empowering both 
ideological standpoints and their view of the society. On this ground, the public in Turkey is 
by consequence the main receiver of this ideological and political competition since it has 
been on the one side, internalising the elements of the socio-political context and on the other 
side externalizing them through forms of public participation when for example voting in 
elections, expressing opinions in polls or joining demonstrations.  
To the outside observer, the view of Turkey has been changed in the last 15 years. 
First, Turkey was believed to be a Muslim country closer to the Western world and the EU 
leaving behind its conservative religious face. Contrary to this, today Turkey is believed to be 
a deeply oppressive authoritarian regime with electoral mechanisms in place. Accounting for 
these developments, the understanding of how citizens negotiate their political belonging in 
the society can provide significant insights into the way citizens formulate their political 
opinions and preferences. To do so, it is essential to map the transformational processes that 
take place in the political environment in the country in which the public is a determinative 
actor. Along these lines, public opinion in Turkey needs to be investigated accounting for the 
impact of the dominant and oppositional norms and values that have been driving the 
country’s social and political life. To get a well-rounded appreciation of the political 
dynamics in Turkey the study of citizens’ political behaviour can unveil significant evidence 
of the underlying mechanisms that drive the country’s evolutionary process. In the following 
chapter I offer an account of the evidence on the nature and drivers of the public opinion in 
Turkey highlighting the existing shortcomings while also introducing the political psychology 
approach I employ in my work. 
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Public opinion has been perceived as being simultaneously a driver and an outcome of 
society (Glynn et al., 2004).
16
 It is a driver of society because it is a decisive actor in the 
design of public policy. In fact the inextricable link between public involvement, civic and 
political participation and democratic governance has been widely addressed by a variety of 
scholars across social sciences and throughout time (Page and Shapiro, 1983; Verba et al., 
1995; Norris, 2002; Barrett and Zani, 2015). Public opinion is also the outcome of all sort of 
social processes. That is because the opinion that the public holds is not static but develops 
and gets shaped by the various processes that take place in the public sphere (Glynn et al., 
2004). This two-way interactive approach of public opinion relies heavily on the happenings 
in the socio-political context for its formation (i.e. governance and governing bodies through 
policy-making) while at the same time it has a direct impact on how these processes unfold 
(i.e. through means of participation and engagement). 
Being a universal concept, public opinion when broken down into its main 
components contains people’s opinions and attitudes on a wide range of issues that touch 
upon the social, political, economic and cultural environment of their belonging. Yet these 
opinions and beliefs are not created in a personal political laboratory detached from the 
outside world; they are instead shaped and develop as a result of a dynamic interaction 
between the individual and the political environment. In simple terms, public opinion is the 
outcome of the interaction between individual-based mechanisms with externally generated 
factors. Hence, the study of public opinion encompasses an understanding of the elements 
that drive its formation and the outcomes of the opinions that citizens hold.  
In the sections that follow, I discuss the current research on public opinion in Turkey. 
I first address the high levels of fragmentation and volatility that the vast majority of scholars 
point to and I discuss its effects on our current understanding of what moves citizens’ 
political behaviour. I then offer a detailed account of the main dichotomies and key 
determinants of Turkish public opinion as they have been acknowledged by extant research. I 
also address the methodological designs that research studies employ and I highlight their 
shortcomings for our understanding of the underlying determinants of political behaviour. I 
conclude with how my work overcomes these pitfalls in order to provide a well-rounded 
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account of the psychological underpinnings of individual political behaviour in the case of 
Turkey.  
 
3.1 Public Opinion and Political Behaviour Studies in Turkey 
Public opinion and electoral behaviour are concepts that have been thoroughly examined in 
Western academia, bringing together a number of different and complementary fields such as 
political science, sociology and political psychology. The contribution of those studies is 
valuable in that we have an extensive amount of theoretical frameworks drawing upon a wide 
array of disciplines (such as political science, social and cognitive psychology, sociology, 
anthropology) accompanied by a vast amount of empirical evidence that can be put into test 
in a variety of contexts. Yet, the study of public opinion and political behaviour in Turkey has 
been rather limited and has remained constrained within the Turkish academia. Çarkoğlu 
(2012) in his critique of electoral studies in Turkey points that the field is dominated by 
descriptive analyses that focus on the aggregate level while studies that examine the 
individual level are significantly fewer. As he notes, most studies rely on the significance of 
the Turkish context opting to explain the context per se rather than to test the applicability of 
existing theoretical models in understanding citizens’ political behaviour (Çarkoğlu, 2012). 
Under the same logic, Erisen pinpoints to the absence of ‘well-founded theories on the 
Turkish voter and empiricism in scholarly research’ in the field of Turkish political science 
(2013, p.1). Current literature on Turkish public opinion is characterized by a limited testing 
of theoretical frameworks and empirical models that could offer significant insights into the 
study of citizens’ political behaviour moving away from the traditional understanding of 
electoral outcomes.
17
 Although several scholars have explained public opinion in Turkey this 
has been done in a theoretically and empirically detached way; with the aim to explain 
context-specific factors that affect the public opinion or investigate the impact of a single or 
more factors on certain aspects of political behaviour. Following up from these 
considerations, the studies that grasp the behavioural and attitudinal aspects of public opinion 
fail to construct models that could explain the full spectrum of public opinion outcomes in 
Turkey. Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006) suggest that studies on electoral preferences in Turkey 
do not link the contextual results with the broader political science theoretical framework and 
empirical models that would allow obtaining the full picture of the Turkish voter.  
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and Capelos, 2016; Yilmaz et al., 2016; Kalaycioğlu, 2008). 
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Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to reduce the importance of the extensive and 
influential work that has been conducted. Since the 1990s, the study of public opinion in 
Turkey has focused on the systematic study of electoral preferences through the extensive 
investigation on the impact of factors that explain voting behaviour such as the geographic 
division of the country, religiosity, secularism and nationalism along with several socio-
demographic characteristics such as class, ethnicity, education, economic status. Following 
up from this tradition and stemming from the changes taking place in the socio-political arena 
of the country, a large number of studies that focus on electoral behaviour employ empirical 
models that explain the basis of the high levels of fragmentation and volatility that have been 
dominating the Turkish context (Kalaycioğlu 1994, 1997, 1999, 2008; Çarkoğlu 1998, 2002, 
2007, 2014; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu, 2007; Esmer, 2002; Esmer and Sayari, 2002; 
Başlevent et al. 2004, 2009). 
Existing studies offer an extensive framework that maps the determinants of citizens’ 
electoral behaviour and attitudinal orientations in Turkey. However, the mechanisms that 
push citizens to vote the way they do or align with a certain party or political ideology, have 
been understudied. In other words, although the current research provides a breath of 
information on the factors that drive citizens’ electoral behaviour the processes that citizens 
engage with in shaping their political judgments have been largely ignored.  
 
3.2 The Fragmented and Volatile Stability of the Turkish Political System 
One of the most widely studied aspects of the Turkish political system refers to the highly 
polarised socio-political arena attributed to the high levels of fragmentation and volatility of 
the electorate (Başlevent et al., 2004; Taagepera, 1999; Çarkoğlu, 1998; Kalaycioğlu, 
1997).
18
 In fact these have been viewed as the main ‘maladies’ of the Turkish political system 
(Özbudun, 2013, p. 64).  
In explaining the long-standing trend of polarization several scholars have looked into 
the party system as one of the main sources responsible, while others have focused on the 
investigation of the socio-political dichotomies at the aggregate level by looking at electoral 
results and the voting behaviour of the public. These two streams of studies are 
complementary insofar they furnish a comprehensive account of the role that the two 
important actors – the parties and the electorate - play in shaping the main dichotomies of the 
country’s political environment. The outcomes of those studies provide the ground upon 
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which we can understand the political system within which public opinion and individual 
political behaviour originates and crystallizes.  
Several scholars provide insightful explanations on the reasons and underlying factors 
that set the ground for the polarization that has been dividing the country’s public opinion in 
antithetical camps. Focusing on the underlying factors of the unstable party competition 
Sayari identifies as significant three features of the party system: (1) the number of parties, 
(2) the ideological spaces between party actors and 3) the mode of party governance i.e. 
single party, majority rule, coalitions governments (2008, p.401). Çarkoğlu views the military 
interventions in the political life in combination with the military-based regimes and their 
involvement in setting the patronisation of politics, the oppression of civil society and the 
lack of dialogue between political parties and the civil society as some of the key factors that 
set the instability that has been characterising Turkish politics (2007, p. 132). Following the 
same logic, Taniyici (2003) views as an important factor that adds to the high levels of 
fragmentation in the Turkish electorate the high levels of institutionalization of the political 
parties in Turkey with parties playing an important role for the individuals due to the absence 
of sound civil society organizations. 
The high levels of fragmentation and volatility that used to describe the party system 
in Turkey changed with the appearance and electoral performance of the AKP (Sekercioğlu 
and Arikan, 2008). The 2002 electoral win of AKP introduced a period of transformation that 
touched upon all levels of social and political life. The landslide victory of a pro-Islamist 
party and the consequent failure of all other parties to enter the parliament on the basis of the 
10 per cent threshold - apart from the CHP - were followed by a re-shuffling of the political 
environment leaving outside the parliament a number of parties with strong historical 
background and deep social roots in Turkey (Çarkoğlu, 2007; Akarca and Başlevent, 2011). 
In explaining this, several studies suggest that the economic conditions and the increasing 
levels of corruption and calls for democracy along with the failure of previous coalition 
governments to offer stability and growth in the country led to the 2002 electoral result 
(Akarca and Başlevent, 2009; Akarca, 2010). The realignment of the voters towards AKP 
opened up the path for the country’s turn in a number of fronts regarding the social and 
political arena (Akarca and Başlevent, 2011).  
 Along the same lines, Çarkoğlu in his discussion of the 2011 electoral results 
addresses the decline of the volatility and fragmentation in the Turkish political arena. With 
AKP obtaining its third landslide win since 2002, the political landscape started to become 
more stabilised. The author notes that AKP has managed to consistently increase its voting 
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support (with a large enough vote difference in comparison to the oppositional parties) 
transforming the ‘Turkish party system into a dominant party system’ (2011, p. 43). In 
addition, in discussing the declining levels of fragmentation and volatility in 2011 he notes 
that only approximately 10% of the electorate has switched from one to another party since 
2007 while fragmentation has steadily dropped since 1999, with a crystallisation of electoral 
preferences (Çarkoğlu, 2011). Similarly, Sekercioğlu and Arikan recognize as one of the key 
factors that assisted in the maintenance of high levels of fragmentation and volatility in 
Turkey the existence of multiple parties belonging in the same ideological spectrum 
(Sekercioğlu and Arikan, 2008). The decline of volatility levels came slowly since 2002 with 
the AKP and was crystallized with the 2007 elections with each party representing clearly 
different ideological ends: AKP representing the centre-right, CHP representing the centre-
left and MHP representing the nationalist stance (Sekercioğlu and Arikan, 2008).  
 With no doubt, the consolidation of AKP’s electoral support in the 2002, 2007 and 
2011 elections clearly demonstrate that the party system of Turkey has changed. By applying 
Sayari’s (2008) three dimensions to the socio-political environment of the country we see that 
1) the number of parties declined dramatically with only two parties competing for the 
biggest share of the electorate whose ideological differences are clear-cut (AK Party versus 
CH Party), (2) the ideological spaces between the two parties are clear and distinct 
accounting for the historical roots and 3) the country’s governance has been stabilised since 
the 2002 electoral win of AKP.  
 Despite the favourable electoral support towards AKP and its stabilization in the 
country’s governance since 2002, the June 2015 elections threatened the single party rule of 
AKP revealing a new unstable reality. As can be seen from Table 1.1 (in Appendix 1) 
although the AK Party has managed to suffer some losses throughout time, its outright win in 
all elections that took place since 2002 provides an interesting trend in regards to its 
popularity and party support. Yet, the party’s strong grip on power was put into question for 
the first time in the national elections of June 2015. With the AKP being unable to formulate 
a government, President Erdoğan19 announced repeat elections, which led the party to win 
back its position in the government in November 2015 (Çarkoğlu and Yildirim, 2015).  
 It is important here to provide a short yet informative discussion on the background of 
both elections. As Kemahlioğlu (2015) suggests June’s elections took place in a highly 
polarized context. The highest peak of this was witnessed during the Gezi events with mass 
                                                 
19
 Erdoğan served as the country’s prime minster for the period between 2002-2014. In the presidential elections 
in August 2014 Erdoğan became the first President-elect of the Country (Çarkoğlu and Yildirim, 2015).  
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protests against the government (Yoruk and Yuksel, 2014). The period before the November 
2015 elections was marked by a number of significant events such as the terrorist attack by 
ISIL in Suruç (June 20 2015) targeting humanitarian assistance to Kobani, the intensification 
of armed conflicts between the Turkish armed forces and PKK in the southeast of Turkey, 
and the Ankara terrorist attack (October 10 2011) when a bomb hit a rally organized by left 
leaning unions and confederations that were protesting against the increasing conflicts 
between PKK and Turkish armed forces. These events had a dramatic impact on the main 
parties’ political agenda and rhetoric ahead of the elections, on the results of the elections but 
also left a significant mark in public memory. Along the same lines, Kemahlioğlu suggests 
that there were mainly three issues that shaped the electoral campaign in 2015 and which 
determined the final electoral outcome: the AK Party’s authoritarian drift, the country’s 
economic performance and the vote of the Kurdish population (2015, p. 450). According to 
Çarkoğlu (2015) the salience of the issues of national security and terrorism and the need for 
political stability followed by the AKP’s incapability to form a coalition with the opposition 
parties won the ground against economic considerations or other social issues such as 
education or health. This led to the electoral result of November 2015 that saw AKP gaining 
back its outright electoral support. 
Interestingly, despite the high levels of polarization, which led to the electoral result 
of June 2015 and which shook the stability of the country, AKP in November of the same 
year managed to regain its losses and increase its vote share significantly by offering the 
electorate personal safety and securing the public order (Çarkoğlu and Yildirim, 2015; 
Kemahlioğlu, 2015). Soon after the governing AKP - in collaboration with the nationalist 
MHP - submitted a proposal for the country’s Constitutional amendment, which led to the 
referendum of 16 April 2017. The public support towards the system change resulted into the 
transfer of the governing power from the parliament to the president who will also be the 
holder of the executive power (Erdem-Aytaç et al., 2017). Without any doubts, the shift into 
an executive presidential system has significantly secured the AKP’s position in power and in 
extent Erdoğan’s authority and rule in the country.  
To the external observer, the political arena of Turkey until 2013 might have seemed 
relatively stable regardless of its inherent social and political dichotomies. Yet a combination 
of events - the Gezi protests in 2013, the June and November elections of 2015, the failed 
coup d’état that led to the mass anti-coup rallies, the highly polarising context surrounding 
the political campaign and the results of the referendum of April 2017 - illustrate that that 
socio-political stability in Turkey is far from reached. Accounting for the public involvement 
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in these events it is evident that deep fragmentation and volatility drive the country’s 
electorate. Çarkoğlu in 2007 acknowledged that some of the most salient characteristics of 
the Turkish party system are: ‘the lack of continuity, together with ever-increasing 
fractionalisation and volatility of electoral support’ (2007, p. 123). However, what we witness 
today entails a significant alteration to what Çarkoğlu noted. Although the levels of 
polarization remain high, the factor of continuity has been achieved with AKP holding its 
power since 2002. Turkey therefore provides an interesting yet complicated arena where 
fragmentation and volatility have become aspects integrated in the stable political reality led 
by AKP. As Özbudun notes ‘party systems reflect to a greater or lesser degree the social 
cleavage structure of societies’ while ‘the degree of intensity of the cleavages also affect […] 
the degree of polarization’ (2013, p.3). On this account, looking at the volatility and 
fragmentation of the electorate in Turkey provides important information of the political 
arena yet it does not offer the necessary information in regards to the underlying individual 
determinants of the electoral outcomes. Understanding the dichotomies inherent to the 
Turkish society is vital in order to obtain a sound idea of what drives citizens’ electoral 
behaviour, which by consequence shapes the outlook of Turkey in its current form.  
 
3.3 Determinants of Political Behaviour: The State of the Art 
The AKP’s electoral performance demonstrates that the party has managed to steadily keep 
its electoral stronghold by shaping a group of supporters that have been (either consistently or 
as a one-time decision) voting in favour of the party since 2002 (Çarkoğlu, 2012). Regardless 
of some electoral losses throughout time, AKP has managed to sustain a stable grip on power. 
At the same time what happens at the public level demonstrates an equally complex 
environment with instances where the public goes against the government such as is the case 
of Gezi events, or instead acts in support of the party such as in the post-coup protests and the 
favourable public decision of the referendum in 2017 in support of the AKP’s proposal for 
the presidential system.  
Extant research on public opinion in Turkey focuses predominantly on voting 
behaviour. These studies offer complex models that point to the long-standing effects of the 
existing dichotomies and social cleavages as well as certain factors that have been 
consistently found to shape citizens’ electoral choices. Although the list is extensive, they all 
share a common consideration. Analytically, there is a wide agreement on the existence of 
social dichotomies and cleavages as well as value-based differences and socio-demographic 
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factors that have been playing a driving role in sustaining the high levels of polarization, 
fragmentation and stability of the country’s socio-political environment. As Akarca and 
Başlevent (2011) put it, those cultural, ethnic and socio-economic elements that bring 
together certain segments of the population at the same time create clear-cut divisions in the 
country’s public sphere.  
In the discussion that follows, I address the dominant cleavages and factors that have 
been found to play a decisive role in the formation of the country’s public opinion and which 
provide the basis upon which I rely for the exploration of the underlying mechanisms that 
drive citizens’ political judgments and shape their political behaviour. 
 
Political Geography: center vs. periphery  
One of the most studied aspects of citizens’ electoral behaviour in Turkey is based on the 
geographical division of the country and specifically on the differentiation between the centre 
and the periphery (Mardin, 1973; Tachau, 1984; Özbudun, 1976). This approach has been 
used extensively to explain Turkish politics by framing the geographical centre and periphery 
as being composed by groups of people that have certain social, economic and cultural 
attributes. Specifically, the centre of Turkey represents the urban, secular, nationalist and 
more Westernized part of the country where military and bureaucratic officials - holding state 
protectionist attitudes - compose the centre-based elite. The country’s periphery is more 
heterogeneous in terms of its composition with citizens who are religiously oriented coming 
from agricultural areas, with more traditional views of the society holding an oppositional 
stance to the modernization reforms and Western principles. The citizens that belong in the 
periphery are of varying origins in terms of ethnic (i.e. Kurdish) and religious identity 
(Sunnis and Alevis) (Mardin, 1973; Çarkoğlu, 1998, 2005, 2008, 2009). This approach by 
relying on the geographical basis of the country accounts for the effect of a number of socio-
economic factors such as economic and social mobility, religion, nationalism and the like in 
the understanding of electoral preferences. The general trend among a large number of 
scholars is that the centre votes traditionally for more liberal parties while the periphery votes 
for more conservative ones (Özbudun, 1976; Tachau, 1984; Tachau and Good, 1973; 
Kalaycioğlu, 1994; Secor, 2001; Ergüder, 1980-1; Heper, 1980).  
However there are also a few scholars that regard the centre-periphery division as out-
dated. Specifically, Toprak (1995) notes that the centre-periphery cleavage is out of date 
because of the social and geographical mobilisation that took place in Turkey. He suggests 
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that those citizens who live in the periphery and who in the past did not have any 
communication with the modernized centre do not exist anymore. Following the same logic, 
Özcan (2000) in criticizing the application of the centre-periphery cleavage in the 
examination of the country’s electoral behaviour, highlights that the changes that happened in 
Turkey after 1950 modified qualitatively the context of the centre and periphery, which in 
turn brought significant changes to what was previously perceived as the centre- periphery 
division. 
Regardless of these critical accounts of the centre-periphery framework in the Turkish 
case, its dominance in the study of electoral behaviour continues. A significant difference is 
that current research takes into account these qualitative changes that both the centre and 
periphery have undergone. Accordingly, Akarca and Tansel (2007) find that the level of 
urbanisation plays a significant role in voting preferences. Similarly, Çarkoğlu (2002) in 
acknowledging the geographical discrepancies and their impact on voting patterns, notes that 
citizens who live in the costal areas of the country - where socioeconomic conditions are 
better- support centre-based parties whereas the less developed parts of the country tend to 
support Kurdish parties. Similarly, Başlevent et al. (2005) suggest that certain parties appear 
to have weak support in urban and metropolitan areas (i.e. DYP, MHP and DSP) whereas 
residents in these areas are more likely to support the AKP. The authors also find that that 
AKP receives greater support in highly populated areas (Başlevent et al., 2009). This finding 
is also corroborated by Akarca and Başlevent (2011) who find that votes in favour of the 
AKP increase while going from west to east whereas the CHP and DSP’s parties votes 
decreased from west to east highlighting the significance of geographical patterns in 
explaining voting preferences. These studies also suggest that what lies underneath these 
geographical divisions is the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the 
population which in turn affects their electoral preferences. 
We can argue that the analysis of the political geography in Turkey has expanded 
significantly since the seminal study of Mardin (1973) who suggested the centre-periphery 
dichotomy. Existing studies focus on differentiations based on rural versus urban, east versus 
west, costal versus mainland as well as urbanised versus villages. The key outcome from 
studies that look into the political geography of Turkish voting patterns remains the same: 
spatial differences matter. Importantly, a number of recent studies have pointed to the 
invasive nature of the centre-periphery differentiation in shaping electoral preferences 
highlighting its reliance on a number of other factors and dichotomies such as pro-Islamist 
and secular attitudes, religiosity, ethnicity and nationalism as well as ideological orientations 
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(Kalaycioğlu, 1994, 1997; Çarkoğlu, 1998, 2007; Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006; Çarkoğlu and 
Avci, 2002; Sekercioğlu and Arikan, 2008). As Çarkoğlu suggests, geographic divisions have 
been seen as a mirror of the social and political cleavages that dominate the Turkish politics 
(2007). 
 The key limitation of the centre-periphery approach is that it disregards the 
individual-based mechanisms at play when citizens form their electoral preferences and in 
general their political judgements. Existing studies offer evidence on the determinants of 
voting preferences but they do not provide evidence on the way that citizens in the centre and 
periphery decide about political matters and affairs at the individual level. 
 
Ideological Orientations: left-right 
Another dimension of voting behaviour concerns the effects of citizens’ ideological 
inclinations. The vast majority of scholars who deal with the impact of ideology as a key 
factor in shaping citizens electoral preferences have looked at the left-right division (Esmer, 
2001; Akarca and Baslevent, 2011). The appreciation of the left-right dichotomy comes as a 
result of a number of studies that have focused on the development of the key parties’ 
ideological lines suggesting the stabilisation of the left-right differentiation and the 
appearance of centrist ideas between key party actors (Çarkoğlu, 1998; Esmer, 1995). These 
studies suggest that ideological self-identification on the left-right as well as centre-based 
attachments to this dichotomy are powerful divisive factors of citizens’ electoral preferences 
(Esmer, 2002; Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2007; Başlevent et al. 2004; Çarkoğlu 2004, 2012). A 
number of studies also highlight the association between ideological orientations and 
attachment to certain political values such as conservatism and nationalism as well as 
personal values such as religiosity and secularism and ethnicity (Günes-Ayata and Ayata, 
2002; Esmer, 2002; Başlevent et al, 2004; Çarkoğlu 2004; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu, 2007; 
Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006). Interestingly Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006) in criticizing the 
application of the left-right continuum in the Turkish case suggest that it has lost its salience 
in the citizens’ voting preferences by the predominant effect of pro-Islamism, nationalism 
and ethnicity.  
 Applying the left-right dimension in a non-Western context with a different socio-
political history and development encompasses naturally a number of significant 
shortcomings in regards to the adjustment of the two camps in the Turkish context. The 
majority of existing studies have used the left-right dichotomy in a rather disconnected 
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fashion. As discussed above, several studies account for the parallel function of the left-right 
orientations and value-orientations on electoral preferences disregarding the inherent 
involvement of these values in the mind of the citizens in shaping their electoral preferences. 
Accordingly, extant research on ideology has not looked into the effects of Kemalism and 
political Islam as such but rather draws upon certain orientations and values that are 
connected to each ideology (such as placement on the left-right axis, religiosity and 
secularism). Consequently, existing studies make assumptions about attachments to 
Kemalism and political Islam based on certain values or individual placement on the 
religiosity axis as proxies to ideology but the conceptualisation of the two ideological camps 
has been based on these approximations.
20
 To an extent, this can be charged to the historical 
transformation both Kemalism and political Islam have been through in shaping their current 
outlook as expressed by CHP and AKP respectively (Bayramoğlu, 2009; Uyusal, 2011; 
Ciddi, 2009).  
 Existing studies by looking at the aggregate level ignore the way that citizens 
negotiate their ideological understanding and political and personal values arriving at their 
ideological orientations and electoral preferences. Specifically, current literature carries 
certain drawbacks that are important for our understanding of political behaviour in Turkey. 
First, individual understanding of the existing ideological divisions (political Islam and 
Kemalism) in Turkey has been largely ignored. And second, the processes through which 
citizens combine certain values and ideological orientations has been limited to electoral 
preferences overlooking the mechanisms through which citizens formulate and reason their 
political judgements. 
 
Political Values: secularization, Islamism, nationalism 
Another important area that has been addressed in the study of voting preferences and 
political orientations in Turkey concerns the role of political values. Namely, secularisation, 
Islamism and nationalism are three factors that have been extensively addressed by a large 
number of scholars in the examination of the functioning capacity of ideologically charged 
concepts that are linked with political values.  
The socio-political antagonism between secular, nationalist and pro-Islamism 
advocators has been driving the country’s political arena since the early stages of the 
                                                 
20
 Toros (2014) accounts for nationalism and Islamism (political values) and levels of religiosity (personal 
values) as indicators of political ideology. Similarly, Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007) use the Islamism-secularism 
axis to examine issue-based preferences.  
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Republic. In fact the dichotomous dimension of secularism and pro-Islamism has been 
viewed as a key source of the country’s high levels of polarization (Çarkoğlu, 1998, 2004). 
Taniyci (2003) in addressing the transformation of political Islam, states that secularism is the 
determinant factor upon which the centre- periphery framework is based upon. Looking at the 
existing empirical work, a number of scholars have looked at these political values and their 
role in determining political preferences. Çarkoğlu (2004) in his examination of policy 
evaluations finds that one of the most central divisions of Turkish electoral politics is the one 
between secularist and pro-Islamist forces. Toros (2014) finds that nationalism is a key 
determinant factor that drives electoral preferences whereas Islamism does not play a role. 
However the largest bulk of existing work discusses political values in relation to the centre-
periphery cleavage. Specifically, several scholars in their examination of electorate’s 
preferences point to the Islamism-secularism continuum as inherent to the centre-periphery 
dichotomy of the country (Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006; Çarkoğlu 2009). 
Political values have been extensively studied in the Turkish context and especially as 
part of the ideological dichotomy of left-right or as being linked to the geographical division 
of the county. Yet again, the focus has been on their impact on electoral preferences 
disregarding the dynamic role that values play and their interaction with ideological 
orientations at the individual level. In addition, the processes through which individuals 
develop their attachment to certain political values and arrive at their political judgements has 
been ignored. On this basis, there is no relevant study that looks at the impact of values in 
gauging the internal consistency between ideological inclinations, party preferences and 
issue-based position of the Turkish public. 
 
Core Personal Values: religiosity, conservatism, universalism 
Core personal values have also been examined by a number of scholars in the Turkish 
context. A large number of studies identify religiosity as a key determinant that drives 
citizens’ electoral preferences (Ergünder, 1980-1; Ayata, 1993; Heper and Evin, 1998; 
Kalaycioğlu, 1994, 1997, 1999; Esmer, 1995; Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2007; Başlevent et al., 
2004; Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006). Analytically, several scholars highlight that high levels of 
religiosity lead to voting for pro-Islamist or nationalist parties whereas low levels of 
religiosity and religious affiliation lead to more secular voting preferences (Ergünder, 1980-
81; Kalaycioğlu, 1994; Başlevent et al. 2004, 2009; Akarca and Tansel, 2007). Similarly, 
Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007) find that high levels of religiosity are directly related with right-
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wing ideological placement and orientation. Religiosity is also viewed as a determinant for 
individual positioning towards public affairs. Çarkoğlu in his 2004 study finds that high 
levels of religiosity are related to support for pro-Islamist societal arrangements (i.e. the 
Sharia law) whereas low levels of religiosity is a negative predictor of the support towards 
these arrangements for the society. The effect of religiosity has also been examined in respect 
to EU attitudes. Çarkoğlu (2002) notes that the relationship between level of religiosity and 
support towards the EU is reverse; when level of religiosity increases support towards the EU 
declines. Adding to these, a few studies also look at the effect of religious-based sectarian 
variants and in particular the Sunni versus Alevi dichotomy on voting preferences (Çarkoğlu, 
2005; Sarigil, 2010). These scholars find that identification with Alevism relates to left-wing 
orientations and voting preferences in support to the CHP Party whereas Sunni orientations 
are mostly related with right-wing preferences and voting in support of the AK Party.  
Focusing on conservatism, a few scholars have examined its impact on voting 
preferences. They suggest that attachment to conservatism has a significant effect in 
determining voting preferences in support of religious, nationalist and conservative parties 
(Toros, 2014; Akarca and Tansel, 2007). Another value that has attracted some attention 
refers to universalistic attitudes.  Başlevent et al. (2009) identifies universalism as a 
significant value that affects the voting behaviour of the electorate in Turkey. Focusing on 
attitudes towards the EU he finds that high universalism leads individuals to be in favour of 
the country’s EU accession, negative universalism leads to opposing EU accession and 
selective universalism leads to a conditional favour of the country’s EU access.  
There are also a number of studies that have examined the role of values on political 
participation. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu (2007) looking at life satisfaction find that high 
levels of life satisfaction have a reverse effect on participation in politics through 
conventional means. Focusing on satisfaction with the democratic levels of the country 
Kentmen-Çin (2015) finds that satisfaction increases the likelihood of engagement with 
unconventional means of participation. Chrona and Capelos (2017) make a distinction 
between conventional and unconventional participation and find that there are significant 
differences between the value-orientations that lead individuals to engage with each typology. 
Specifically the authors find that attachment to traditions and religiosity is a positive 
predictor of engagement with conventional political participation, values related to 
benevolence are a positive predictor of unconventional participation and attachment to 
tradition and religiosity and normative patterning are negative predictors of unconventional 
participation.  
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Instead of looking at values as a significant and vibrant part of citizens’ systems of 
beliefs, most scholars have focused on specific values that provide the ground upon which 
certain electoral patterns can be explained. Accordingly, the current literature has ignored the 
wide range of values that empirical evidence has highlighted as of key importance in political 
behaviour (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz et al., 2010; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, 1990). 
At the same time, the key focus of the majority of studies has been again on electoral 
preferences and not on other expressions of political behaviour with only a few exceptions. 
There is only a small number of work by social psychologists examining the role of values in 
the Turkish society testing the applicability of existing theoretical models (Başaran, 1992; 
Hyman et al., 1958; Karakitapoğlu and Imamoğlu, 2002) as well as the role of values in life 
orientations (Gündoğdu, 2010). Although these studies point to the importance of certain 
values in the Turkish context, they do not provide an understanding on the motivational role 
that personal values play in political behaviour. However, there is also a small number of 
more recent studies that highlight the role of personal values on political participation 
(Chrona and Capelos, 2017; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu, 2007; Kentmen-Çin, 2015) as well as 
attitudes towards social policies (Arikan, 2013). Notably, extant research has disregarded the 
dynamic role of values in driving the mechanisms that drive citizens’ political judgments. 
Equally, existing studies do not look at the issue of consistency between personal values and 
political orientations such as party preferences and ideological inclinations, disregarding the 
role that individual characteristics play in the formation of political behaviour.  
 
Economic Considerations: retrospective and prospective sociotropic evaluations 
and individual conditions 
One of the most studied aspects of voting behaviour in Turkey has been the impact of 
economic considerations on party preferences. A large number of scholars coming from 
political science and economy offer valuable insights on the role of economic indicators in 
electoral behaviour. The focus has been divided among those who focus on macro-economic 
aspects and the effects of aggregate indicators as well as more specific elements such as the 
role of taxation and vote buying. Following the US literature on economic voting several 
scholars have looked at the role that retrospective and prospective sociotropic evaluations 
play in shaping electoral preferences (Başlevent et al, 2005, 2004 and 2009; Çarkoğlu, 2007, 
2012). Çarkoğlu (1997) uses as indicators of economic voting the levels of unemployment, 
inflation rates and income growth. A few studies also examine the patterns of voting 
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preferences focusing at the aggregate level of analysis. Specifically several scholars focus on 
economic growth rates or general economic indicators such as inflation and unemployment 
levels (Akarca and Tansel, 2006, 2007; Hazama, 2017).  
 The findings from these studies suggest that economic indicators both when looking 
at the individual-based perceptions (sociotropic and retrospective evaluations) or aggregate 
economic indicators provide a good explanatory basis for the analysis of party preferences. 
An important shortcoming of these studies is the absence of a clear focus on individual based 
characteristics. On the one side, studies that focus on the aggregate level ignore the individual 
basis providing useful insights on the economic patterns of voting preferences. On the other 
side, the studies that focus on individual-based economic evaluations ignore the underlying 
psychological mechanisms at play when formulating voting preferences.  
 
Political Sophistication: education, interest and knowledge as proxies 
Political sophistication is a concept that has not been taken into consideration in the case of 
Turkey. Existing studies employ proxy measures of sophistication that rest on its components 
for the examination of the drivers of political behaviour such as education and political 
interest. Several scholars have viewed educational level as an important determinant of 
voting preferences (Esmer, 2002; Kalaycioğlu, 1994; Akarca and Tansel, 2007; Başlevent et 
al., 2004 and 2009; Çarkoğlu, 2008, 2012). Yet the findings on education have reported 
varying results in regards to its role depending on the point of time under consideration. For 
instance scholars who focus on the context prior to the 2002 elections find that education is a 
negative predictor for supporting parties such as ANAP and MHP and the DSP and a positive 
predictor for CHP support (Esmer, 2002; Akarca and Tansel, 2007). More recent studies 
suggest that citizens with higher levels of education are more likely to support the CHP and 
MHP whereas those with lower educational level are more prone to support the AKP and 
HADEP (Çarkoğlu, 2008, 2012). In addition, education and levels of political interest and 
knowledge have also been used by a few studies that examine political participation in the 
Turkish context. Specifically Çarkoğlu and Kalaycioğlu (2007) as well as Kentmen-Çin 
(2015) find that political interest and knowledge as well as education level are important 
drivers of both conventional and unconventional participation in politics. 
The only study to date that has looked into the effects of political sophistication on the 
political behaviour of citizens in Turkey is by Chrona and Capelos (2017). The authors 
examine the differential effects of political sophistication on conventional and 
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unconventional forms of participation controlling for age. Their findings suggest that 
sophistication is a positive predictor of unconventional acts of participation whereas it has no 
effect on conventional participation. 
 
Emotions: anger, fear and hope 
Research on Turkish public opinion has largely ignored the dynamic role of affective 
expressions. In fact to date there has been only one study (Erisen, 2013) that looks into the 
role of emotions in the shaping of public behaviour towards politics in Turkey. The author 
tests the role that emotions such as anger, fear, anxiety and hope play on public attitudes 
towards the Syrian crisis. His findings confirm the importance of affect in driving citizens’ 
political judgements. He finds that anger, fear and hope have the capacity to invade and 
change citizens’ ‘risk assessments, threat perceptions, policy evaluations, behaviour on 
information seeking and premiership approval and performance evaluations’ (2013, p.131). 
The most important aspect to consider when accounting for the role of emotions in the 
Turkish case is the absence of similar research that can reveal powerful insights into their role 
in the political behaviour of Turkish citizens.  
 
Ethnic and Collective Identity  
Although there is a vast amount of studies that look into the role of ethnic identity in Turkey - 
such as the Kurdish identity (Heper, 2007) - the literature that focuses on the individual level 
has been rather limited. Başlevent et al. (2004, 2005, 2009) focusing on the Kurdish identity 
look into the pattern of voting preferences while also accounting for the role of religiosity. 
Çarkoğlu (2007) investigates the relationship between ethnic background and voting 
preferences controlling for left-right wing orientations, economic considerations and partisan 
family history. On the same line, Kalaycioğlu (1997) identifies ethnicity as a significant 
factor that affects electoral behaviour leading to high levels of fragmentation. These studies 
suggest that there is a clear pattern of ethnicity-based voting behaviour. A more recent study 
that looks at the individual-based indicators of political participation comes from Erdoğan 
and Uyuan-Semerci (2017). The authors test the effects of a number of indicators on political 
participation including in their analysis the role of self-identification with certain politicised 
collective identities that exist in the country. Asking their participants to note their affiliation 
to certain politicized groups their findings suggest that collective identities play a significant 
role in determining participation of both conventional and unconventional nature. A major 
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limitation of existing research that focuses on ethnic or collective identities is that it does not 
address the ways that individuals perceive these identities and does not shed light on how 
citizens negotiate their social belonging and shape their affiliation with the existing identities. 
 
3.4 Methodological Designs in the Study of Political Behaviour 
The vast majority of the work on the political behaviour in Turkey utilizes survey designs. 
Most studies use secondary sources with data collected through state-based organisations 
such as the State Institute of Statistics or private organisations such as the Turkish Values 
Survey conducted by the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD) or the Survey 
of Electoral Intentions conducted by Veri Araştırma, the Foundation for Political, Economic, 
and Social Research (SETA), the Social Economic Political Research Foundation of Turkey 
(TÜSES) (Başlevent et al. 2009, 2004; Kalaycioğlu, 1994, 2000; Çarkoğlu, 2007, 2012; 
Akarca and Tancel, 2007). These surveys employ face-to-face interviews with national 
representative samples allowing the assessment of the general trends of public opinion in 
Turkey. However, their utilisation entails two significant shortcomings. The first shortcoming 
concerns availability. These data are not publicly available and therefore access is restricted 
and mainly constrained to Turkish academics. The second shortcoming regards the nature of 
the items these surveys use. The vast majority of items are borrowed from international 
surveys adjusted to fit the Turkish case or case-specific questions that focus solely on the 
Turkish society. On this basis, there is no ground upon which certain aspects of the 
psychological underpinnings of political behaviour can be studied through the use of these 
data. There is also a small number of scholars who collect their own survey data using 
advanced sampling methods and nationally representative samples using face-to-face 
interviews (Erdogan and Uyuan-Semerci, 2017). Several scholars make use of international 
surveys for the study of political behaviour in Turkey such as the European Social Survey 
(Arikan, 2013), European Value Survey (Kentmen-Cin, 2015; Toros, 2014) and the World 
Values Survey (Chrona and Capelos, 2017). However, these secondary data sources - being 
designed predominantly for comparative purposes - disregard the context-specific aspects that 
are important in understanding citizens’ political behaviour.  
 There is also a number of scholars who employ qualitative methods and in particular 
interviews with certain segments of the population such as activists or selected individuals as 
well as observations of social surroundings and certain cities in examining public attitudes 
and political behaviour (Bee, 2017; Bayramoğlu, 2009; Tastan, 2013; Bee and Chrona, 2017; 
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Bee and Kaya, 2017). These studies provide rich information but their findings are not 
representative and offer a restricted perspective on the case studies under investigation. 
Finally, experimental design has been recently introduced in the study of political behaviour 
in Turkey. Erisen (2013) using experimental manipulations assesses the role of emotions in 
citizens’ political attitudes focusing in particular on the Syrian crisis. 
 From the above it is evident that the majority of studies that look into the political 
behaviour of Turkish citizens focus at the aggregate level of analysis examining the 
determinants of voting preferences and electoral behaviour. On this basis, the fact that the 
dominant methodological approach is survey design comes to no surprise. As Converse notes 
in his seminar study in 1964 what has been perceived as public opinion is situated on the 
aggregated views of the members of the public.
21
 However, the usage of survey designs and 
aggregated levels of analysis do not offer a sufficient understanding of the dynamic processes 
that take place at the individual level shaping the way that the public feels, thinks and decides 
about political affairs.  
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter provides an analytical discussion on the key dichotomies and factors that have 
been identified as of key importance in the formulation of public opinion in Turkey. The vast 
majority of existing studies provide insights on the main drivers and determinants of the 
citizens’ electoral behaviour. They furnish significant explanations of the electoral patterns 
and trends that have emerged throughout the years advancing our understanding of the social 
and political developments that have been taking place in the country and the way that the 
public stands towards them. An important limitation is that the majority of these studies focus 
on the aggregate level, offering explanations about the electorate and their party preferences. 
Hence, they do not provide adequate evidence on the underlying factors that motivate citizens 
to shape their political preferences. In other words, extant research demonstrates certain 
trends that appear throughout time in regards to public electoral behaviour relevant to self-
placement on the left right, the role of certain personal and political values, economic 
considerations and the like, but does not shed light on the individual-based processes and 
determinants that influence citizens’ political judgements and considerations.  
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As a final point, it is worth noting that the effect of existing dichotomies and factors 
that have been found as important in driving the country’s public opinion has been varying 
throughout time due to the varying social, political and economic circumstances (Çarkoğlu, 
2012). This is important for two reasons. At first it regards the fluidity of considerations 
citizens refer to, in order to shape their voting preferences. Accounting for the impact of 
present conditions on one’s life, individual decision-making follows the considerations that 
are more salient in citizens’ mind (Zaller, 1992). And second, although certain considerations 
matter at a specific point of time, all individuals make use of heuristics (i.e. cognitive 
shortcuts) that drive their political preferences and which assist them in forming their 
opinions. What works as a shortcut for one person might not work in the same way for 
another. Eventually it is the individual-based framework and processes that drive citizens’ 
decisions and evaluations about politics.  
Under this logic, regardless of the persistent nature of certain dichotomies, the 
salience and valence of certain factors at the individual level depends on the interaction 
between the external environment and the individual. In other words, although electoral 
results might point to the reduction of the importance of certain factors (such as the role of 
economic considerations
22
) this does not mean that citizens do not account for their 
pocketbook considerations in general. To address the mechanisms that citizens prioritize 
when deciding about politics it is necessary to unveil the psychological mechanisms that 
underlie political behaviour and shape their systems of beliefs. The next chapter focuses on 
the theoretical foundations of my investigation of how citizens in Turkey think, feel, decide 
and reason their positions towards political affairs. 
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Chapter 4. Political Behaviour: A Political Psychology 
Perspective 
 
This chapter introduces the political psychology framework I employ for the investigation of 
political behaviour in the Turkish context. Shedding light on the individual level of analysis 
allows unpacking the mechanisms through which citizens process the developments and 
transformations that characterize the political environment in which they belong and which in 
turn affect directly the formation of their political judgements. These mechanisms refer to the 
processes through which individuals perceive and evaluate new information, think, feel and 
make reasoned political choices. 
To assess the nature and origins of political beliefs at the individual level requires 
inevitably the study of the interaction between the social and political environment and the 
individual. According to Lane, political beliefs are the outcome of the ‘interaction between 
the self and the world’ (Lane, 1969, p. 2). The world and the self are the two directions that 
individuals will be interchangeably looking at in order to formulate and reason their political 
beliefs and judgements. On this basis the internally generated processes that are activated at 
the individual level play a primary role in the formation of political attitudes and beliefs.  
Political psychology research by combining fundamental principles from political 
science and social psychology - especially in the last three decades - has enriched our 
theoretical and empirical understanding of the latent mechanisms and factors that drive 
political behaviour (Nesbitt-Larking et al., 2014; Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011; 
Deutsch and Kinnvall, 2002). Being a discipline that focuses on the psychological basis of 
citizens’ political opinions and beliefs, it provides the ground upon which we can explain the 
variability of the opinions the public holds towards politics. Focusing on the individual level 
of analysis political psychology studies examine the antecedents of citizens’ political 
opinions by exploring the internal mechanisms that drive the formation of attitudes and 
judgments towards politics (Zaller, 1992). 
Cognitive, affective and motivational processes interact at the individual level and 
shape the outcomes of political behaviour (McGraw, 2003). Drawing upon political 
psychology my study surveys the mechanisms that activate when Turkish citizens make their 
political decisions. Understanding these processes is fundamental insofar it enables the 
assessment of the way through which environmentally generated stimuli are perceived and 
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processed at the individual level resulting in the heterogeneous outcomes of political 
behaviour.  
 This chapter discusses the theoretical foundations underlying the tri-partite structure 
of individual political behaviour. In the sections that follow, I provide an analytical 
assessment of the cognitive, affective and motivational components, which activate 
automatically or intentionally at the individual level as citizens shape their political attitudes 
and beliefs. Specifically, which are the key cognitions and emotions that produce the 
reasoning that motivates citizens’ political judgements? What are the interactive processes 
between cognition, emotion and motivation that determine how citizens engage with politics? 
And focusing on the process rather than the outcome of a political decision, how do different 
groups of citizens arrive at their judgments?  Providing answers to the above will be 
instrumental in allowing us to understand the complex weave of individual orientations that 
constitute public opinion. 
 
4.1 The Cognitive Component  
The cognitive processes that drive political behaviour refer to the cognitive structures (also 
named as ‘heuristics’, ‘schemas’ or ‘judgemental shortcuts’) and also deliberative cognitions 
that enable citizens to perceive, organise and store incoming information and which in turn 
drive the formation of political judgments and beliefs (McGraw, 2003). As Markus and 
Zajonc note cognitive structures ‘are built up in the course of information processing and they 
function as interpretative frameworks’ (1985, p. 143). Accordingly, schemas - representing 
the amount of knowledge one holds - provide a structural device that allows new information 
to be stored, structured and evaluated in less time and with less effort on the basis of 
previously acquired and processed information. Existing judgements along with their 
reasoning are stored in memory and remain available for future use once a relevant stimulus 
appears. 
Cognitive structures entail the processes through which external stimuli are being 
evaluated and stored or rejected and overpassed. They enable the formulation of associative 
thoughts - based on previously stored experiences and their related cognitive and emotional 
outcomes - that in turn constitute the framework upon which individuals evaluate incoming 
information and shape their political judgments and reasoning. Hence, schemas assist in 
formulating a consistent interpretation of the social environment (Markus and Zajonc, 1985). 
When an external stimulus appears such as for example a new piece of information or when 
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someone is asked to provide their position on a political matter, schemas are automatically 
activated. What follows is the reliance on previously stored schemas assisting in the 
formation of evaluative judgements (Lingle and Ostrom, 1979). On this basis, the 
understanding of cognitive-based processes that drive the activation of a schema once a 
stimulus from the political environment is generated is essential in order to assess the 
underpinnings of political behaviour. Due to their nature, schemas are a significant 
component that drives all mechanisms of political behaviour ranging from information 
processing to decision-making and motivated reasoning. According to Luskin, ‘the amount of 
schemas one holds’ shapes a person’s ‘Political Belief System’ (1987, p. 858). It 
encompasses the political cognitions that one holds along with those that they are constrained 
with. 
Traditionally, studies in political science have ignored the issue of the amount and 
structure of individual political knowledge mainly due to their focus on the determinants of 
public opinion at the aggregate level. Studies in political psychology have paid excessive 
attention to the issue of cognitive structures that produce varying outcomes of political 
opinion and judgements. One of the most repeated issue in early political psychology studies 
is concerned with the assumption that the public does not pay enough attention to politics and 
in extent does not devote enough time and thought to reach well-informed political decisions 
(Sniderman et al., 1991). According to Converse’s (1964) minimalist approach to public 
opinion, citizens’ systems of beliefs are characterized by the absence of organisational 
structure and lack of coherence and consistency between their political beliefs. He argues that 
common citizens do not have a clear understanding of ideological concepts and thus cannot 
provide an adequate explanation of the principles they hold. This eventually results into the 
lack of usage of these considerations when deciding upon political issues.  
The minimalist approach regarding the functionality of public opinion has dominated 
the discussion on mass political behaviour until the early 70s (Sniderman et al., 1991). 
Following a number of significant studies by scholars such as Achen (1975), Judd and 
Milburn (1980), Nie et al. (1976), Sullivan et al. (1978) and Graber (1976, 1980, 2012) there 
has been a turn in the consideration of the public as minimally informed lacking of cognitive 
structure with ideas that are not coherent and consistent. In fact, citizens may or may not pay 
enough attention to politics, and may or may not share an analytical understanding of the 
political context of belonging yet they manage to make up their mind regarding particular 
issues, make decisions and shape their reasoning (Sniderman et al., 1991; Kinder, 1998). 
Accordingly, citizens formulate opinions, favour specific ideological orientations, support 
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candidates and specific parties in elections, process incoming information, make preferences 
and justify their choices regardless of their cognitive structures (Kinder, 1998).  
Understanding the nature and functioning capacity of the cognitive shortcuts 
individuals use, can reveal important information on the structural differences that underlie 
the decision-making mechanisms of well-informed and average citizens. The nature of the 
cognitive shortcuts one makes use of depends directly on the amount of political information 
that has been previously acquired (Sniderman et al., 1991). What differentiates well informed 
from less informed citizens is the structural organisation of their political ideas (Converse, 
1964; Sniderman et al., 1991). The use of heuristics is what assists those citizens who do not 
hold a wide variety of information to shape and reach their political decisions and formulate 
their reasoning. Looking for less time-consuming and an effortless way to shape a position, 
shortcuts offer the most convenient way to formulate an opinion for the average citizens. 
Naturally, schemas enable the formulation of future judgments in less time and in an easier 
way without requiring the initial amount of processes that shaped the schema itself. They 
reduce the complexity of similar situations and create a pool of associative thoughts that can 
be used for future opinions. Understanding how individuals formulate their schemas and how 
they rely upon the most convenient one to formulate their positions is undoubtedly a complex 
procedure that requires the identification of those factors that activate the schema that drives 
each response at a given time and occasion.  
Studies in political psychology have acknowledged the role of ideology, values and 
emotions as working schemas in creating political judgments and reasoning. On this basis, 
the examination of the cognitive aspects of political behaviour entails the assessment of the 
role that ideological inclinations and value orientations play in the formation of attitudinal 
responses towards politics in general. 
 
4.2 The Affective Component  
By affective elements of political behaviour, I refer to the emotional arousal that follows the 
stimuli perceived from the political environment. Affective states play a significant role in the 
perceptions that citizens hold. The affective arousal that results from a particular piece of 
information, or the emotional state one is in when thinking of a political issue along with the 
emotion that an issue-based preference elicits are all part of the affective element of political 
behaviour.  
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Emotions are intense and periodic reactions to environmental stimuli with distinct 
mental and psychical characteristics that reflect the individual aims and goals (Fiske and 
Taylor, 1984). They range beyond positive and negative and include anger, fear, anxiety, 
sadness, enthusiasm, hope, pride and the like. They also touch upon the affective evaluations 
individuals shape towards specific targets such as when asked to express their likes and 
dislikes towards political actors and objects (such as political parties or specific policies). 
These evaluations are being activated automatically when the subject or object comes to mind 
(Capelos, 2013). Emotional reactions towards politics are key because of their pervasive 
nature for two key reasons: first they allow past experiences and their corresponding 
evaluations to be stored cognitively and second they enable current experiences to be 
evaluated quickly by reference to past experiences (Marcus et al., 2000). On this basis, the 
role of emotions in political behaviour is inescapable and therefore their investigation is 
necessary to unveil what drives individual political judgments.  
Studies in political science have traditionally disregarded the role of emotions, 
focusing predominantly on the main determinants that drive citizens’ political preferences. 
Early studies in political psychology have followed a similar logic diminishing the role that 
emotions play by focusing on purely cognitive models in explaining political behaviour. The 
calculation of the best outcomes through the minimal cost has led to establishment of the 
rational models of decision-making borrowed from the field of economics. Based on this 
approach, individuals are expected to arrive at the best decisions through the cognitive 
calculation of the various alternatives.  
The focus on purely cerebral activities while ignoring the importance of affect has 
offered a one-sided approach of political behaviour. In fact, this perception goes hand in hand 
with the oldest belief that views affect separately from cognition (Marcus, 2002). The key 
assumption under this view is that affective expressions are an invasive force misleading and 
undermining cognitive functions (rational thinking and reasoning) generating irrational 
political choices (Shafir et al., 1993; Nussbaum, 1994). Holding this view on emotions, 
decision-making and reasoning have been perceived as cold processes, constrained within the 
limits of rational calculations detached from affective elements (Lupia et al., 2000; Marcus, 
2002; Erisen, 2013).  
  The discourse on the role of affect and cognition regarding the prominence of the 
former over the latter dominated the outlook of emotions and cognitive processes in political 
behaviour studies in the 1980s (Zajonc, 1980; Lazarus, 1984). Contemporary research in 
political psychology has generated a new appreciation of the role that emotions play leading 
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to the development of an integrative approach regarding the interplay between affect and 
cognition. Evidence from neuroscience studies suggests that political thinking and decision-
making are in fact based on both cognition and affect (Damasio, 1994). Studies in cognitive 
psychology have accounted for the interconnectedness of cognition and affect suggesting that 
all political thinking carries an affective reaction (Fazio et al., 1986; Fiske and Taylor, 1984). 
Based on this evidence studies in political psychology have developed a large body of 
literature looking at the role of affect highlighting its importance both in the dynamic 
functions as well as the outcomes of political behaviour. 
Studies in political psychology have shown that affectivity plays a significant role in 
how people view and organise their social experiences and shape their social interactions 
(Forgas, 1992, 2000). As Zajonc suggest, ‘there are no social phenomena that do not 
implicate affect in some important way’ (1980, p. 153). Similarly, Lodge and Taber highlight 
that all sorts of social and political concepts, actors, events and processes are affect laden 
(2000). Following from this, several studies have found that affect plays a significant role in 
cognitive processes such as information processing and political thinking as well as 
motivated reasoning. One of the most cited approaches in the study of emotions is the 
affective intelligence theory developed by Marcus and his colleagues (2000). According to 
this approach, when individuals feel positive emotions they are more likely to follow their 
habitual political attitudes such as prior opinions, stereotypes and mechanisms based on their 
stored schemas. However, in occasions when levels of anxiety are high individuals seek for 
new information reducing the importance of prior opinions and past political preferences. 
Looking at motivated reasoning several studies show that citizens receive emotional 
cues from the social stimuli, which are then automatically processed as subjective evaluations 
(Lodge and Taber, 2000; Capelos, 2010). Lodge and Taber (2000) suggest that individuals 
react on the basis of their affective cues to shape their judgmental evaluations and political 
opinions. When they are asked to provide an evaluative response the ‘how do I feel’ heuristic 
is activated. This in its turn brings automatically in mind the feelings towards the object at 
hand (being an event, political leader or policy), which ultimately drives the evaluative 
judgements that individuals come up with. The memory-based association between an object 
and its affective evaluation follows the same rule of heuristics. The stronger the connection 
the less time and effort it requires to be activated; the weaker the association the more time 
and effort (Lodge and Taber, 2000). These findings are in accordance with Abelson’s (1963) 
hypothesis on ‘hot cognition’ according to which all socio-political constructs are affect laden 
carrying a positive or negative tag, which is mentally stored. Accordingly, all past political 
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thoughts and evaluations carry an affective tag (positive or negative) that is stored in memory 
in the form of heuristic ready to be activated once an evaluation of the same nature is 
required. This affective tag activates effortlessly and automatically when an environmental 
stimulus appears and influences directly the motivated reasoning and the formation of 
evaluative judgements. 
To sum up, affect is an important component that drives the mechanisms of political 
behaviour. Understanding emotionality at the individual level adds explanatory value in the 
complexity that characterizes citizens’ beliefs and attitudes towards politics. Specifically, 
accounting for the role of emotions at the individual level provides a systematic account of 
the affective tag that ideological inclinations and value orientations generate when citizens 
shape their political judgments.
23
 
 
4.3 The Motivational Component  
The final component viewed as fundamental in political behaviour studies refers to the 
motivation that underlies political judgments. The motivational aspect of political behaviour 
encompasses the dynamic function of reasoning that lies behind every political decision 
individuals make in the course of their lives. It is composed by the incentives, goals and 
attitudes citizens possess and which shape the reasoning behind their political decisions and 
judgements (Lane, 1969; Lodge and Taber, 2000; Taber et al., 2001; Sniderman et al., 1991; 
Sniderman, 2000; Kunda, 1990). As such, motivation is a complex mechanism that is being 
driven by the cognitive and affective processes that individuals engage with when they shape 
their opinions about political affairs (Lupia et al., 2000; Taber et al., 2001, Sniderman, 2000; 
Lodge and Taber, 2000; Marcus and MacKuen, 2001; McGraw, 2003; Miller, 2011). 
Motivation - in combination with cognition and affect - enables the systematic 
structure of citizens’ systems of belief (Sniderman et al., 1991). In simple terms, the 
reasoning that underlies and motivates a political choice along with the cognitive and 
affective functions that lead to its formation constitute altogether the basis of political 
behaviour. The way that people feel and think drives their position on political affairs. 
Similarly, people think and decide about politics by having a specific goal and reason behind 
them. And although the majority of the public is not well informed, citizens formulate 
political opinions supported by adequate reasoning. Under this framework in investigating 
political behaviour, it is essential to account for the individual-based ability to process and 
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make use of the cognitively and affectively stored information which in turn moderates the 
way people shape evaluative judgments and reason their political choices (Sniderman et al., 
1991). 
For assessing the motivational element of political behaviour the main focus lies on 
the dynamic mechanisms that intervene and influence the justification behind political 
choices. Studies of motivated reasoning focus on the role of cognition and affect in the 
organisation and process of incoming political information that when evaluated provide the 
basis upon which the motivation behind a choice arises. It is in fact the intersection of 
cognitive and affective mechanisms that assists the formulation of evaluative judgements and 
the reasoning that lies behind political choices and beliefs (McGraw, 2003). Motivation has 
two distinct dimensions: consistency and accuracy. In my study I pay particular attention to 
consistency, because I am interested in understanding individual-level variations that might 
be due to ideological, value, affective or sophistication differences.  
Opinion consistency in judgemental reasoning has attracted the highest attention in 
the study of motivation in political psychology studies (Converse, 1970, 1972; Feldman and 
Zaller, 1992; Zaller 1992; Lau, 1986, 2003; Lau and Redlawsk, 2006; Sniderman et al., 1991; 
Lodge and Taber, 2000). As Sniderman et al. (1991) argue one of the most common problems 
in research on mass beliefs systems is the problem of superficial inconsistencies on the 
opinions that individuals report when expressing their political views. The minimalist 
tradition of mass beliefs systems suggests that most citizens do not follow what is going on in 
politics and thus have limited amount of political information. This in turn affects the nature, 
stability, and internal consistency of the opinions that individuals hold. Converse (1970) who 
introduced the minimalist view accounted for low levels of opinion stability as an absence of 
attitude. This perception of non-attitudes of the public has been criticized significantly by a 
large number of scholars. One of the most influential lines of criticism comes from the work 
of Feldman and Zaller (1992) who argue that opinion instability exists because of 
ambivalence of opinions. In particular in their 1992 study they found that individuals hold 
large amounts of political information and are able to formulate favouring or opposing 
statements for the same issue. This ambivalence is viewed as being directly related with the 
instability of opinions that citizens’ hold. Feldman and Zaller (1992) suggest that the 
examination of the level of coherence amongst opinions and beliefs is particularly important 
in the study of individual political behaviour because it offers a systematic overview of the 
mechanism that underlies the process of motivated reasoning. In simple terms examining the 
accuracy of the motives and their consistency with the goal reveals important information on 
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the interaction between cognitive and affective elements that drive political behaviour in all 
its expressions (McGraw, 2003). Opinion consistency is attributed to a number of factors that 
take part in all processes of political behaviour such as ideological inclinations, value-
orientations, political sophistication and emotions. The weight and consistency between these 
factors at the individual level is of great significance in shaping the motivational element that 
drives political reasoning.  
To recap, motivation is where cognitive and affective elements come together 
assisting in the formation of political judgements and opinions (McGraw, 2003). Political 
reasoning is the dynamic mechanism behind every political choice and is being involved in 
the categorisation and organisation of supportive and oppositional opinions at the cognitive 
and affective level. Understanding the complex processes that drive the reasoning behind 
political judgements is therefore key in assessing political behaviour at the individual level. 
In my work, I am interested in the opinion consistency component of motivated reasoning. 
Understanding the drivers of motivation that drive citizens’ political judgements can provide 
significant insights into the role that ideological orientations, values and emotions play at the 
individual level. The evaluation of the level of consistency between ideological inclinations, 
value-orientations and emotions sheds light on the way citizens cope with their individual-
based characteristics and offers insights into the hierarchical structure of their belief system 
in driving their political preferences.  
 
4.4 Concluding Remarks  
This chapter addressed the complex dynamics that drive the cognitive, affective and 
motivational mechanisms of political behaviour. Motivated by the findings from social 
psychology and neuroscience research, political psychology studies acknowledge the 
interconnected nature of the tri-partite structure of political behaviour. Extant research 
suggests that the cognitive, affective and motivational mechanisms are being activated 
concurrently with any incoming information, associative thought but also when an individual 
is asked to provide their position towards socio-political affairs (Marcus, 2000; Sniderman et 
al., 1991; Lodge and Taber, 2000; McGraw, 2003; Markus and Zajonc, 1985).  
According to McGraw (2003) only few scholars have examined the intersection of the 
three components of political behaviour in a single study. My study offers an integrative 
framework focusing on the systematic analysis of the cognitive, motivational and affective 
processes that drive citizens’ political behaviour Turkey. The structural differentiations on 
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political thinking, feeling and reasoning ultimately result in different trends of political 
opinions among citizens. Political behaviour as discussed previously is not only an individual 
matter but its roots and implications are also traced at the collective level. In fact, it is the 
interaction of the external environment with the individual processes, which determines the 
nature of citizens’ political considerations and judgments at the individual level. As such, the 
internally activated processes in combination with the externally generated elements drive the 
varying outcomes of citizens’ political behaviour.24  
Political ideology, values, sophistication and emotions have been acknowledged by 
political psychology studies as significant mediators of political behaviour creating 
differentiating effects on citizens’ political judgments. The chapter that follows provides an 
analytical account of the cognitive, affective and motivational functions of ideology, values, 
emotions and sophistication that create variations among citizens’ political opinions and 
beliefs. 
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Chapter 5. Drivers of Political Behaviour 
 
This chapter introduces the key drivers of political behaviour that my work explores in the 
Turkish context. Having discussed the internal processes that drive the formation of citizens’ 
political judgements I address the underlying factors that theoretical and empirical literature 
on political psychology has found to be important in the shaping of individual-based political 
behaviour.  
 Political behaviour is the outcome of internal processes that activate from externally 
generated factors (Lupia et al., 2000; Lane, 1969). Therefore, understanding the interaction 
between individual processes and externally constructed factors is essential in order to obtain 
a complete account of the nature and origins of citizens’ political judgements.  External 
mechanisms of political behaviour refer to those aspects that are being developed at the 
societal level such as political ideology and the subsequent values and principles that each 
ideology holds and promotes. The externally generated factors are dependent on the socio-
political actors and structures that drive the development of the political sphere in any given 
context. Interestingly, the degree of each actor’s influence at the individual level varies (Page 
et al., 1987). As such these externally generated elements are dependent on the environmental 
setting and condition the mechanisms that take place at the individual level. 
Exploring the mechanisms that underlie political attitudes at the individual level 
requires the identification of those externally generated factors that once internalised by the 
individual result into specific attitudes, beliefs and opinions about politics. Undoubtedly there 
is a plethora of factors that drive citizens’ political decisions and opinions. The weight that 
each factor carries in the matrix of political thought of each individual varies and this is due 
to the internal processes that take place within each individual. However the precedence that 
some factors have in directing the process of political thinking, feeling and reasoning is 
undeniable. The ideological dispositions one holds, the attachment to values, the emotions 
evoked when thinking about politics as well as the level of political sophistication are few of 
the most prominent factors whose impact on political behaviour have been examined 
extensively by a variety of scholars throughout time.
25
 Their shared effect is considered to 
produce differential accounts of the social and political reality at the individual level.  
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When citizens are required to make political decisions or shape political judgements 
the cognitive, affective and motivational mechanisms activate simultaneously in order to 
assist in the formulation of individual positions. The ideological inclinations, value-
orientations, levels of sophistication that an individual holds as well as the emotions that are 
being aroused play an integrative part in determining the outcome of these processes. 
Drawing upon the political psychology literature, my study examines the role that ideological 
inclinations, values, emotions and sophistication play in shaping political judgements at the 
individual level by accounting for their interaction at the cognitive, affective and motivational 
levels. In the sections that follow, I provide a detailed account of their dynamic impact of 
ideology, values, emotions and sophistication on citizens’ political judgements. I also 
highlight the hypotheses that my empirical investigation puts into test in my examination of 
the underlying mechanisms of political behaviour in Turkey. For a quick reference to the 
hypotheses related to the Turkish context, please refer to Table 3.1 and Table 3.2, in 
Appendix 3. 
 
5.1 Political Ideology 
Political ideology is an externally generated, socially shared system of competing beliefs 
about the way the society should function (Lane, 1962; Jost et al., 2009) that has a dual role 
in the social structure. First it acts as factor of unification, bringing together certain segments 
of the population creating a sense of community based on their shared principles, on how the 
present should be and how the future should develop. Second, it plays an important role for 
the individual per se driving all aspects of citizens’ political behaviour (Apter, 1964).  
  Because of its direct effect on the social basis of the society, political ideology is one 
of the most studied determinants of political behaviour. It affects public thinking and 
responses, which in turn influence the public, social and political reality (Lane, 1962). 
Studies in political psychology have extensively demonstrated the great significance of 
ideological inclinations in driving individual attitudes towards political matters and affairs 
(Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Conover and Feldman, 1986, Knight, 1985; 
Feldman, 1989; Denzau and North, 2000; Sniderman et al., 1991; Jost et al., 2009).  
 Political ideology and the various forms that political categorisations of ideology can 
take, operates as a schema on its own. As such, ideological inclinations play a substantive 
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role driving several mechanisms of political behaviour rather than simply determining the 
ideological self-placement one has. The ideological inclinations citizens hold formulate a 
structural basis upon which they evaluate and decide upon incoming matters related to all 
aspects of the socio-political life. Ideological orientations play also a significant role as a 
functional characteristic of stored schemas that are based on previously evaluated and stored 
information. Specifically, the ideological orientations one holds assist the creation of the pool 
of connotations that connect positive evaluations with the preferred ideological inclination 
and negative ones with the ideological principles that the person is opposing. The existing 
cognitive structures that relate to ideological orientations subsequently allow the individuals 
to evaluate and decide upon any new information that has an explicit or implicit link to ones’ 
ideological principles and inclinations (Markus and Zajonc, 1985). Any incoming stimulus 
that relates to a stored schema automatically activates the feelings and thoughts that are 
associated to it resulting into structurally consistent evaluations, positions and attitudes. 
 An important aspect of political ideology as Apter puts it is that ‘each place has its 
own mood and its own special problems which are expressed in ideologies’ (1964, pp. 16). 
From this there are two points that are of particular relevance to my study. First that political 
ideology is a reflection of a given social context, a societal by-product that encompasses 
ideas and views about the socio-political aspects of life in a given society. The second point 
refers to the contextual significance of the study of political ideology. It is important here to 
mention that there have been various attempts to classify the structure of ideological 
inclinations by using universal dichotomies such as the traditional left-right or liberalism-
conservatism continuums. Nevertheless this has been extensively recognized as insufficient 
for the study of political attitudes (Kinder, 1998; Hochschild, 1981; Converse, 1964; Lane, 
1962). Self-positioning on the ideology scales point to a schematic categorisation of 
ideological inclinations and political preferences that are pre-identified on the principles that 
each ideological orientation holds (Conover and Feldman, 1981; Feldman, 2003; Huber and 
Inglehart, 1995; Knutsen, 1995, 1998; Piurko et al., 2011). Although the employment of these 
dichotomies can provide rich information, citizens’ understanding of these is contextually 
bound. Effectively, the social, political, historical and cultural inheritance combined with the 
current conditions of the socio-political environment of belonging plays a significant role for 
the cognitive schemas that individuals hold and make use of when self-identifying with these 
continuums. In other words, the meaning that these constructs hold varies across countries 
and socio-political settings (Greenberg and Jonas, 2003; Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Knutsen, 
1998; Jost et al., 2009).  
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Assessing citizens’ ideological understanding and self-placement on ideological 
continuums sheds light on the cognitive, affective and motivational organisation of their 
beliefs, which in turn shape their political decisions and judgments. Focusing on the Turkish 
political context, my study explores the role that ideological orientations play in determining 
citizens’ political positions and judgments. First, I explore citizens’ understanding of the key 
orientations that have been used in examining public opinion in the country (political Islam-
Kemalism, left-right and conservatism-liberalism). Specifically, I look into how citizens 
perceive these ideologies focusing on the mechanisms through which individual self-
attachment is developed and reasoned. Focusing in particular on the political Islam-Kemalism 
division that historically has been key for the Turkish context, I examine the relationship 
between ideological inclinations, party identification and issue-based preferences assessing 
the level of consistency and coherence amongst citizens’ responses. In particular, I focus at 
ideological self-placement on the ideological continuums and look at the consistency between 
ideological positioning and the official ideological principles promoted by the key political 
actors (AKP for political Islam and CHP for Kemalism).  
Taking into account the recent evidence that suggests that on certain occasions 
citizens come together overcoming ideologically charged divisions whereas in others remain 
divided (Bayramoğlu, 2009; Turam, 2015; Damar, 2016, Acar and Uluğ 2016), I examine 
how citizens’ ideological inclinations can affect evaluative judgements. In addition I look at 
the affective responses that citizens’ ideological inclinations and value-orientations generate 
when asked to evaluate particular political matters and identify their positioning on them. In 
other words, I look at whether one’s self-placement on the ideological continuum drives their 
issue based preferences and evaluative judgements following the clear-cut boundaries 
between the political Islam and Kemalism dichotomy or whether those boundaries have 
relaxed allowing individuals to formulate positions that are not following the traditional 
ideological trajectory of each end of the spectrum resulting in new forms political belonging. 
In doing so, I look into the patterns that emerge in considering ideological self-placement and 
issue-based preferences and political judgments. Based on the discussion on role of political 
ideology, I postulate:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The majority of citizens are likely to rely on ideological constructs in 
justifying their political positions. Political Islam and Kemalism are expected to be 
the driving ideological orientations in Turkey as opposed to the left-right or 
liberalism-conservatism continuums. Citizens’ reasoning of their ideological 
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inclinations is expected to vary according to their understanding of each ideological 
orientation and on the basis of their self-placement on the ideological continuums. 
  
Hypothesis 2: Citizens’ ideological orientations are going to be in line with their 
party preferences and issue-based positions. Those citizens who are strong supporters 
of the political Islam-Kemalism ideologies are expected to hold a coherent and 
consistent system of beliefs in line with their ideological inclinations and party 
preferences. Drawing upon the official orientations of the key party actors in Turkey 
those in support of political Islam, are expected to be supporters of liberalism and 
conservatism and the centre-right voting for AKP. Those in support of Kemalism are 
expected to be supporters of a socio-democratic lean towards the centre-left and vote 
for the CHP. More moderate supporters on both sides are expected to refer vaguely to 
the ideological orientations of the parties they support paying more attention on 
issues related to their everyday life and personal experiences to formulate their 
ideological orientations. These participants are expected to pay greater attention on 
the ideologically charged issues they consider as important and are likely to 
demonstrate more relaxed opinions on issues that hold certain disagreements with the 
main ideological orientations and their respective parties’ actions.  
 
5.2 Value Orientations 
My research looks into the role of motivational values in the shaping of attitudinal responses 
towards politics in Turkey. The study of values has received extensive attention due to its 
important role in the full spectrum of political behaviour ranging from decision-making to 
issue-based preferences and affective expressions (Goren et al., 2016). In fact, values lie at 
the basis of all political orientations and preferences citizens hold. Values are the structured 
cognitive representations of what is desired and serve as mechanisms that direct the political 
orientations and ideological inclinations of the individual (Sniderman et al., 1991; Schwartz 
and Bilsky, 1987; Feldman, 1989; Rokeach, 1973). According to Rokeach (1973) values have 
the functioning capacity to structure and organise our beliefs, are trans-situational and their 
significance varies across individuals.  
Values have been classified into core personal and political values. Core personal 
values have been conceptualised as the cognitive representation of what is desired in all 
aspects of individual life (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987). They are abstract and long-lasting 
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beliefs about how the world should be. According to Schwartz (1992, 1994) there are four 
superordinate basic values, which are organised into two distinct dimensions: openness to 
change versus conservation and self-enhancement versus self-transcendence (Schwartz and 
Bilsky, 1987, 1990). The former refers to the position of the individual in the society, 
whereas the latter refers to what the individual desires in their personal life (Schwartz, 1992). 
These superordinate dimensions of values consist of 10 subordinate basic values that are 
linked to the goals citizens have set for their life. These are: achievement, benevolence, 
conformity, hedonism, power, religiosity, self-direction, stimulation, security, tradition and 
universalism. Political values are the structured cognitive representations of what is desired in 
the socio-political life and serve as mechanisms that direct the political orientation and 
ideological inclination of an individual (Sniderman et al., 1991). They reflect the normative 
beliefs individuals’ hold about political affairs and assist in the formation of political 
judgments. Accordingly, political values are related to issues such as freedoms and individual 
liberties, egalitarianism, economic security, governance, law and order and moral 
traditionalism (Goren, 2005; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Schwartz et al., 2010; Huddy et al., 
2005).  
The key difference between core personal values and political values is that the 
former function in all domains of life (both private and public) whereas the latter are limited 
in the political arena (Ciuk and Jacoby, 2015). Both core personal and political values have a 
similar function because they form the framework upon which individuals shape their ideas 
about their personal and political life, which in turn affects the full spectrum of their political 
behaviour (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, 1990). 
Values operate as heuristics (functioning schemas) in political decision-making and 
judgements. Holding a particular position about political affairs has multiple implications for 
both the self and the society (Lane, 1969). As such it involves associative thoughts that bring 
together ideas and perceptions of how the world is and how it should be. Schemas play a 
significant role in the perception and formulation of inferences regarding the others (Markus 
and Zajonc, 1985). As such, values provide a direct link from the individual to the collective 
level; every decision aiming to satisfy the desired goal as driven by the value one holds has 
wider socio- political consequences. The identification of values as working schemas denotes 
their role in assisting with the formulation of the basic parameters that drive our positions and 
preferences. According to Schwartz, values are ‘the criteria people use to select and justify 
actions and to evaluate people (including the self) and events’ (1992, p. 1). Accordingly, 
value-orientations have a direct impact on the nature of the political information and 
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knowledge that one obtains as well as on the emotions that are being elicited towards socio-
political affairs and events.  
Values direct the desirability of specific objects (by evaluating political actors) and 
subjects (judging specific policies or taking a position on a political issue). They carry a 
motivational function by driving political evaluations and judgements as well as political 
decisions (Schwartz and Bilski, 1987, 1990; Feldman, 1989; Rokeach, 1973; Sniderman et 
al., 1991). As Allport (1955) suggests, value-based priorities affect directly our view of 
reality. Similarly, Lane (1969) notes that value orientations are of great significance in 
driving political thinking and endeavour. Along these lines values have been viewed as 
significant predictors of political behaviour and in particular as the underlying determinants 
of attitudes towards politics (Bem, 1970; Tetlock, 2000; Feldman, 2003; Rohan, 2000). 
Interestingly, values being motivation-laden desires reflect the overall value system 
an individual holds; however they can reinforce a conflict within the same individual 
(Schwartz, 1992). That is due to the fact that every individual holds a number of values 
whose importance can increase or decrease depending on the contextual environment as well 
the nature of the desired outcome and its position in the personal hierarchy (Bardi and 
Schwartz, 2003). Additionally, value-orientations can vary over time within the same 
individuals (Bardi and Schwartz, 2003). Although the values one holds cannot change 
overnight or after a single experience, values can change throughout time across individuals. 
On this basis the examination of core and political values can provide significant 
information on the framework that drives citizens’ political judgments. Moving beyond the 
focus on the traditional continuums based on the ideological taxonomy, values can provide 
significant information regarding the attitudes that one has in their perception and evaluation 
of the socio-political environment (Feldman, 2003). Also focusing on the role of personal and 
political values and examining the relationship between issue-based preferences and values 
orientations can provide important information on the structural consistency between the 
political beliefs system one holds. 
Taking the above into account, I test the role that political and values play in the 
formation of issue-based preferences and evaluative judgements of citizens in Turkey. I 
expect that citizens’ value orientations will be harmonized with their ideological dispositions, 
and party preferences. In testing for the role of values in the political behaviour of Turkish 
citizens my main hypotheses are:  
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Hypothesis 3: Personal values will play a driving role in the formation of citizens’ 
political preferences, party preferences and evaluations. Specifically in line with the 
ideological orientations of the country’s key political actors, citizens that demonstrate 
high attachment to religiosity and traditions are more likely to be supporters of the 
liberal conservative line as being promoted by the pro-Islamist AK Party. Contrary to 
this, those citizens who have high attachment to modernization will be supporters of 
the CH Party.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Political values are also expected to play a significant role in political 
attitudes and ideological preferences. In accordance with the main ideological lines 
as expressed by their party representatives, citizens who support the AKP will 
demonstrate high attachment to the state and authority, equality (based on religion), 
economic security and, moral traditionalism as well as individual freedoms and civil 
rights (based on religion). Contrary to this, supporters of the CHP are more likely to 
show higher attachment to democracy, public involvement in the political life, the 
nation, civil liberties and individual freedoms. 
 
5.3 Emotions 
Another important factor that has been viewed as fundamental in driving the processes and 
outcomes of political behaviour is emotions. Political psychology studies have extensively 
examined the role of emotions at the individual level highlighting their importance in driving 
the full spectrum of political behaviour such as attitudinal orientations, decision-making, 
information processing as well as motivated reasoning (Forgas, 1992; Forgas and Bower, 
1988; Abelson, 1963; Sniderman et al., 1991; Neuman et al., 2007; Redlawsk, 2006; Marcus, 
2000, 2003; Ottati and Wyer, 1993; Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; 2001; Sears, 2001; Isbell et 
al., 2006; Sniderman et al., 2001; Redlawsk, 2006; Marcus et al. 2000; Redlawsk et al., 
2010). 
Focusing on its conceptualization, the word emotion stems from the Latin word 
‘emovere’, which means to move or motivate (Marcus et al., 2000, p. 14). Emotions are 
‘brief, distinct, physical and mental reactions to particular stimuli that is considered 
consequential for the goals of the individual, and they are comprised of five processes: the 
appraisal that the stimulus is consequential, the physiological change that prepares the 
individual for action, the cognitive activity changes that allow the individual to adapt, the 
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tendency to act, and the conscious experience of the emotion, known as feeling’ (Capelos 
2013, p. 41). Affective reactions are basic, inescapable and simultaneous (Marcus et al., 
2000). Emotions generate at the individual level and the socio-political environment 
conditions them. When an emotion arises, the situation the individual is confronted with is 
associated with other emotions triggering their arousal. Their establishment follows the 
experience of certain events throughout one’s lifespan and it is the result of the social 
interaction with others (Hochschild, 1979). Emotional expressions are not only a matter of 
the individual that experiences them and their experience does not end at the felt emotion. 
Emotions transcend the private life by shaping and directing individual political behaviour 
(Capelos et al., 2017b). In essence, emotions are aroused by evaluation and reason that 
derives from acquired experience (Capelos, 2013). Hence the role of emotions in political 
behaviour is detrimental both for what happens individually as well as for the decisions and 
political judgments that are taken by the individual. The valence and intensity of the affective 
expressions determine the full spectrum of political behaviour.  
Emotions being intense and periodic feelings, directed towards specific objects or 
subjects, generate at the individual level through the internal evaluation of the environment. 
They are being activated automatically when the subject or object comes to mind (Capelos, 
2013). As such appraisals of external stimuli (such as objects and events) are related to what 
citizens find interesting and relevant to their needs and personal values generating various 
emotional reactions (Lazarus, 1991; Frijda and Zeelenberg, 2001). In addition, the emotional 
tag that past thoughts and experiences carry, play a significant role in the encounter of new 
information or similar events. The stored affective appraisals drive our interpretation of 
similar stimuli once encountered driving citizens’ action and reasoning. On this basis, 
emotional reactions towards politics are key, because of their pervasive nature for two 
reasons: first they allow past experiences and their corresponding evaluations to be stored 
cognitively and second they enable current experiences to be evaluated quickly by reference 
to past experiences (Marcus et al., 2000).  
Basic discrete emotions range between positive and negative emotions and include 
anger, fear, anxiety, sadness, enthusiasm, hope, pride and the like (Fiske and Taylor, 1984). 
Once activated emotions stimulate concurrently both mental and physiological procedures, 
which in turn drive and direct decision-making, reasoning and action towards politics 
(Lazarus, 1993; Frijda, 2004). In fact research on emotions has revealed certain patterns 
resulting from the elicitation of certain emotions. Specifically, positive valence emotions such 
as enthusiasm, hope and pride have been viewed as generating participatory practices. For 
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instance, enthusiasm is related to risk taking decisions, hope when linked to efficacy leads to 
action readiness and pride is related to positive trust evaluations towards institutions (Frijda, 
1986; Ekman, 2003; Brader, 2005 Gross et al., 2009; Capelos et al., 2017a). Negative valence 
emotions are divided in two distinct types: aversion and anxiety. Aversive emotional 
expressions such as anger and frustration generate in familiar environments carrying 
discontent and punishment related tendencies which lead to low cognitive processes, lack of 
attention to new incoming information and decision-making based on past decisions. Anxiety 
related emotions such as worry and fear are linked to behavioural patterns of risk aversion 
with the aim to reduce exposure to the source of anxiety whereas when milder forms of 
anxiety promote learning and active engagement with new information (Huddy et al., 2002; 
Marcus, 2002; Capelos et al., 2017a).  
My approach on individual emotionality focuses on the link between emotional 
arousal and patterns of behavioural outcomes. Looking at the valence (positive or negative) 
of emotional expressions I investigate their interplay with ideological dispositions and values. 
I also look at the effect that the elicitation of emotions has on the mechanisms of political 
behaviour that relate to evaluative judgements and reasoning. Evaluations have a specific 
target that in my case refers to political actors and objects (i.e. political parties). On this basis 
my work tests the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Positive valence emotions, such as hope and enthusiasm, will be 
manifested towards the ideological orientations, party actors and issue preferences 
that are in line with the individual’s system of beliefs. The reasoning and actions that 
result from the positive valence of felt emotions are expected to promote the set of 
beliefs each person holds. Negative valence emotions, such as anger, fear and 
anxiety, will be prevalent towards those issues and political actors that go against 
individual ideological inclinations and personal and political values. The justification 
of negative valence emotions among participants is expected to rely upon the stimulus 
leading to open expressions of opposition to what generates the negative emotion 
being this a party actor, a policy line, an ideological orientation etc.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Strong supporters of the main ideological divisions and their 
corresponding political actors are expected to express straightforward emotional 
reactions based on their ideological orientations. More moderate supporters are 
expected to focus predominantly on their value-based preferences expressing positive 
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emotions for issues that are in agreement with their system of beliefs and negative 
towards those against it.  
 
Hypothesis 7: Evaluations of political actors are expected to be in line with the system 
of beliefs an individual holds. Strong supporters of AKP and CHP (holding 
attachment to pro-Islamism and Kemalism respectively) are expected to formulate 
positive evaluations for the party they support whereas more moderate supporters are 
expected to acknowledge both positive and negative evaluations for the party they 
support as well as its opponents.  
 
5.4 Political Sophistication 
Political sophistication has been recognized as a significant determinant that affects the full 
spectrum of processes related to political behaviour (cognitive, affective and motivational) 
(Sniderman et al., 1991; Fiske, Kinder and Larter, 1983; Hagner and Pierce, 1982; Barton and 
Parsons, 1977; Rivers, 1998). It refers to the amount and the structure of citizens’ political 
cognition on the process of political behaviour (Bartels, 1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; 
Zaller, 1992).  
Political sophistication allows obtaining a large amount of information over a wide-
range of political issues, to set links between them and categorize them into hierarchical 
structures in which higher abstracts function as the main classification categories of the 
subordinate ones (Converse, 1964; Conover and Feldman 1984; Marcus et al., 1974; Luskin, 
1987; Zaller, 1992). As Luskin (1987) suggests sophistication acts as an integrative 
mechanism that evaluates and stores the incoming information in a coherent and internally 
consistent fashion.  
High sophisticates hold a large amount of political information, stored in memory in a 
coherent and consistent fashion. Due to the consistency that characterizes the storage of 
information along with their ability to construct links amongst stored information, high 
sophisticates are able to formulate well-informed opinion-based preferences that are 
internally consistent and coherent (Luskin, 1987, 1990; Fiske et al., 1983). The opposite 
happens for those citizens who hold low levels of political sophistication. Due to the lack of 
sufficient amount of political information low sophisticates (also called as novices) make use 
of the available schemas stored in their memory to decide on a given political matter 
(Sniderman, 1991, p. 20). Accordingly, high levels of sophistication lead to a higher level of 
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political cognition (Pierce, 1983). On this ground, high sophisticates rely on high constructs 
such as ideology and political values in formulating their issue based preferences (Sniderman 
et al., 1991; Rahn et al., 1990; Krosnick, 1988; Shaffer, 1981). On this basis high 
sophisticates formulate responses towards political affairs coherent and consistent with their 
structural organisation of political information, positions and attitudes. Conversely, low 
sophisticates rely on those stored cues that are easily accessible and simpler (lower in the 
taxonomical organization) abstracts (Pierce, 1993). Hence, low sophisticates make their 
issue-based preferences on the basis of their personal values and beliefs (Conover and 
Feldman, 1984).  
Political sophistication is also a significant factor that has been seen as important in 
the process of motivated reasoning. Because of the different organisational structures of 
stored information among high and low sophisticates the process of constructing the 
reasoning behind their ideas is also different. According to Sniderman et al. (1991) high 
levels of political awareness and political sophistication play a significant role in opinion 
consistency. Low educated and less politically aware citizens formulate their opinions and 
ideas on the basis of ‘proximal consistency’, whereas those who own higher levels of 
political sophistication aim to a greater ‘distal consistency’ of opinions (1991, pp. 5-6). 
Citizens who are less sophisticated and do not hold high levels of political knowledge try to 
formulate consistent ideas by taking into account information and considerations that are 
easily accessible in the pool of available political ideas. As opposed to this, high sophisticates 
go into more depth and opt for choices and opinions that fit into the broader framework of 
their political and ideological placement. This in turn means that high sophisticates - when 
making their mind upon political matters - take into account not only those aspects that are 
immediately available but also those that are on the periphery of the aspects that constitute 
their political opinions, such as ideological dispositions. 
Sophistication also plays a role in motivated reasoning processes (Sniderman et al., 
1991; Kinder, 1994). The motivated reasoning of those with higher levels of political 
sophistication is shaped by well-informed thinking and decision-making processes. 
According to Sniderman et al. (1991) for those citizens who hold high levels of sophistication 
emotions can serve as an additional thrust in the direction that is most positively preferred 
and against the direction that offers negative emotional reactions (1991). For those citizens 
that hold lower levels of political sophistication emotions play a decisive role in their 
formation of attitudinal responses. On this basis, for high sophisticates emotion is 
complementary to their cognitive evaluations allowing for more sound positions. For those 
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citizens who hold low of levels political sophistication, affective shortcuts play a driving role 
assisting the shaping of attitudinal responses towards politics. Those who hold lower levels of 
political information can formulate their political inclinations on the basis of their 
discriminatory preferences that are affect-driven. Lower levels of political sophistication 
allow for a more extensive role of likes and dislikes in shaping policy preferences. Higher 
levels of political sophistication allow for a lower effect of likes and dislikes (Sniderman et 
al., 1991). As Sniderman et al. (1991) point out it is adequate enough to know what are ones’ 
likes and dislikes in order to support an opinion. This ‘affect-driven’ view of political 
reasoning is also supported by Lodge and Taber’s (2000) work on motivated reasoning. The 
authors support that affective shortcuts drive evaluative judgements. The stronger the 
connection between the stimulus and its affective evaluation the less time and effort it 
requires to be activated; the weaker the association the more time and effort (Lodge and 
Taber, 2000).  
To sum up, political sophistication allows for the accounting of the heterogeneity in 
all facets of political behaviour (Pierce, 1993; Luskin, 1987). Hence, levels of political 
sophistication determine citizens’ use of ideological dispositions, value orientations and 
emotions and result in variations of their cognitive, affective and motivational mechanisms at 
play when taking political decisions (Luskin, 1987; Converse 1975; Marcus and Converse, 
1979; Pierce, 1993; Knight, 1985; Rahn et al., 1990; Rahn, 1993; Krosnick, 1988; Shaffer 
1981; Fiske et al., 1983). Taking the above into account, my primary prediction is that 
political sophistication has an important influence on the determinants of political behaviour 
among individuals. Based on individual levels of political sophistication, I test two distinct 
hypotheses referring to high sophisticates and average citizens:  
 
Hypothesis 8: High sophisticates are expected to rely heavily on high order constructs 
such as ideological inclinations, political values as well as their party preferences in 
shaping their political judgments. They are also expected to provide issue-based 
preferences that are consistent and internally coherent deriving from a systematic 
system of beliefs. High sophisticates are expected to be able to also provide in detail a 
coherent line of reasoning that is in agreement with their ideological and party 
placement. In terms of affect, high sophisticates are expected to experience and report 
positive emotions and evaluations towards issues that comply with their ideological 
inclinations, political values and party actors of their support and negative emotions 
towards factors they disagree with.  
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Hypothesis 9: Average citizens
26
 with low levels of sophistication are more likely to 
rely on simpler constructs that are readily available on the ‘top of their head’ such as 
their personal values and every day experiences to formulate their political 
judgments. In terms of affect, low sophisticates are expected to use emotions as 
heuristics relying upon them to formulate and justify their positions. In addition, their 
likes and dislikes are also expected to play a driving role in their political 
preferences. Specifically, low sophisticates are expected to report positive emotions 
towards the issues that are in line with their values and party preferences and their 
likes and negative emotions to the issues that go against their beliefs according to 
their dislikes.  
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
The discussion on the theoretical and empirical foundations offered by political psychology 
points to the significance of ideological inclinations, values, emotions and sophistication at 
the individual basis of political behaviour. The interplay of these factors at the individual 
level through the cognitive, affective and motivational processes can provide important 
information on the structural differences that characterize the way through which citizens 
arrive at their political judgements.  Unveiling these structural differences can shed light on 
the differences among individuals on how they perceive, process, decide and reason but also 
feel when it comes to politics. Equally, they can also provide significant information 
regarding the structure of political conscience that individuals have and the coherence 
between their ideological inclinations, value orientations, electoral choices, emotions and 
issue-based preferences.  
My study comes to fill in this gap in the literature on Turkey’s public opinion. 
Existing studies focusing at the aggregate level of analysis provide significant information on 
the main trends and determinants of the country’s public opinion. Nevertheless there has been 
no assessment of the dynamic and interconnected by nature impact of ideological 
dispositions, value-orientation, emotions and political sophistication at the individual level in 
driving political judgements. Drawing upon the field of political psychology my work 
explores the nature of citizens’ beliefs system looking at the individual unit of analysis. The 
analytical model of my approach looks into the cognitive, affective and motivational 
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components of political behaviour by accounting for variations on the basis of ideological 
dispositions, values, affective reactions and political sophistication. 
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Chapter 6. Research Design and Methodology 
 
This chapter introduces the research design and methodological approach I employ in my 
study of the cognitive, affective and motivational mechanisms that drive citizens’ political 
judgements in the case of Turkey. First, I address the multi-method design that combines both 
quantitative and qualitative methods of inquiry: i) survey data from the World Values Survey 
(WVS) conducted in 2007; ii) survey data collected in Ankara in 2009 and iii) in-depth 
interviews conducted in Istanbul in 2012.
27
 After this, I explain the reasoning behind the 
selection of each data source addressing their complementary nature. I then highlight the 
strengths and shortcomings that each method carries while addressing my strategy in 
reducing these for the purposes of my research. I then review the administration details and 
technical specifications of each study and provide a detailed discussion on the objectives and 
key research questions that drive my analysis. Finally, I elaborate on the operationalization 
and measurement of variables that I employ to capture the concepts of interest in my study 
namely, ideology, values, sophistication and emotions. 
 
 6.1 Methodological Triangulation 
My research design is based upon the combination of the analysis of WVS data, the data from 
the Ankara survey along with the analysis of the qualitative interviews. The three studies are 
interrelated insofar they serve the scope of my research that is to unveil the psychological 
underpinnings of political behaviour in Turkey. In this section I address the details of the 
three levels of my empirical analysis, present the benefits and shortcomings each study 
carries along with my strategy of tackling the weaknesses to maximize the validity of my 
findings. 
Quantitative methods have been traditionally viewed as the most suitable technique to 
examine behavioural trends in regards to socio-political attitudes (King et al., 1994). 
Advances of statistical analysis have benefited greatly the study of public opinion and shaped 
its current outlook (Kinder, 1998; Back, 1998; Converse, 1984). The increasing application of 
statistical techniques in the study of mass beliefs systems has resulted into multi-disciplinary 
collaborations that brought together insights coming from a variety of disciplines, such as 
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political science, psychology, sociology and economics in the study of political behaviour. 
This led to the development of a variety of statistical models that excel our understanding on 
the mechanisms and determinants of political behaviour.
28
 
The majority of public opinion studies in Turkey focus predominantly on the 
aggregate level with only a few exceptions that look at the determinants that drive political 
behaviour focusing at the individual level. Accounting for the fact there is no empirical 
evidence on the cognitive, affective and motivational determinants of public opinion in 
Turkey my work draws upon hypotheses that political psychology studies generate and put 
them to test using survey data combined with semi-structured interviews. The survey data 
assist in the examination of the main trends that characterize individual attachment to the 
dominant ideologies in Turkey, political Islam and Kemalism and their related values; 
whereas the interviews offer the ground upon which I assess in detail the role that political 
ideology, values, sophistication and emotions play in the cognitive, affective and 
motivational mechanisms that underpin individual systems of belief towards politics.  
 The methodological design of my research follows the tradition that combines 
fieldwork with survey data accounting for the insights that both methods can offer (Vidich 
and Shaphiro, 1955; Jick, 1979). The triangulation approach is based on the premise that 
quantitative and qualitative methods are complementary to each other (Campbell and Fiske, 
1959; Webb et al., 1966; Jick, 1979; Brewer and Hunter, 2006; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
1998). Conceptually, triangulation is defined as the ‘combination of methodologies in the 
study of the same phenomenon’ (Denzin, 1978, p. 291).29 Methodological triangulation has 
been seen of great effectiveness in the study of social sciences because it counterbalances the 
shortcomings of each method by the strengths of the other (Jick, 1979). Campbell and Fiske 
(1959) highlight that the shared agreement between the diverse methodological approaches 
enhances the external validity of the outcomes. Similarly, Sieber in discussing the value of 
combining fieldwork with survey analysis notes that this strategy can provide insights ‘with 
respect to the validation of results, the interpretation of statistical relationships and the 
clarification of puzzling findings’ (1973, p. 1345). 
                                                 
28
 Studies that employ statistical techniques in the analysis of the affective, cognitive and motivational 
determinants of public political behaviour include Feldman, 1989; Conover and Feldman, 1981; Bartels, 2000; 
Luskin, 1987; Sniderman et al., 1991; Neuman et al., 2007; Redlawsk, 2006; Wyckoff, 1987; Jacoby, 1991; 
Knight, 1985; Lodge and Taber, 2000; Tetlock, 1986; Price and Zaller, 1993; Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; 
Page and Shapiro, 1983; Pierce, 1993; Lau and Sears, 1986; Marcus et al., 2000; Iyengar et al., 1984; Jacobs and 
Shapiro, 1984 to name a few. 
29
 Campbell and Fiske explain that triangulation allows to test whether ‘a hypothesis can survive the 
conformation with a series of complementary methods of testing’ (1959, p. 82).  
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 Following Denzin’s typology of triangulation models, I employ the ‘between 
methods’ technique (1978, pp. 302-303). The combination of quantitative survey and 
qualitative interview data enables the cross-validation of research outcomes (Denzin, 1978; 
Campbell and Fiske, 1959). My model also falls into Jick’s (1979) ‘holistic description’ end 
of his methodological continuum. For studies that belong on that end, qualitative methods 
play a prominent role uncovering results that quantitative techniques cannot reach due to their 
nature (Jick, 1979).
30
 In discussing the importance of using interviews in unravelling survey 
outcomes Hochschild notes ‘intensive interviews may find results where surveys find only 
noise’ (1981, p. 25). To put it simply, interviews allow for the investigation of the full 
spectrum of associative thoughts that are enrolled in political behaviour processes at the 
individual level as opposed to surveys that are constrained in testing the relationship between 
certain variables as set by the researcher. Accordingly, I use survey data to assess the 
ideological considerations citizens take into account when asked to provide their issue-based 
preferences and semi-structured interviews to investigate the cognitive, affective and 
motivational functions of political behaviour in the case of Turkey. The interviews assist in 
the understanding of the survey findings focusing on individual-based processes that shape 
the differentiated outcomes of political judgements.  
The timeframe that my empirical investigation captures the period between January 
2007- September 2012. Since 2007, the AK Party has stabilised its electoral dominance 
throughout national and local elections. In simple terms, AKP has shown what it can offer to 
the Turkish society and it is not anymore perceived as new party whose practices remain to 
be seen as it was back in 2002. An important factor that makes 2007 an important starting 
point for my research is that during this time the authoritarian tendencies promoted by AKP 
started becoming evident (Esen and Gumuscu, 2016). Especially, throughout the period 
between 2009-2012 AKP has established its authoritarian agenda, which led to the 2013 Gezi 
mass mobilisations against the government and its practices (Karakatsanis, 2016; Önis, 
2013). The WVS (2007), my own survey (2009) and the interviews (2012) capture this time 
frame in which public attitudes started developing on the basis of the clear-cut boundaries 
between AKP and the remaining political actors and ideologies in the country.  
 
                                                 
30
 Jick offers a somewhat similar classification of the various types of triangulation that are positioned in a linear 
continuum. In Jick’s continuum of triangulation techniques, Denzin’s “between methods” type of triangulation 
is called “Convergent Validation” after which comes the “Holistic (or Conceptual) Description” end (Jick, 1979, 
p. 603). My study belongs at both the “Convergent Validation” and the “Holistic” end of the triangulation 
continuum. It belongs to the “between methods” end of the continuum because I combine both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches offering the maximum external validity amongst the research outputs (Jick, 1979 p. 603). 
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6.1.1 World Values Survey (WVS) Data  
My empirical investigation starts with the quantitative analysis of data from the 2005-2009 
wave of the WVS that was conducted in Turkey in 2007.
31
 I explore the effects of ideological 
inclinations and sophistication on the political orientations of citizens in Turkey concerning 
attitudes towards the role of religion, modernization, democracy and its essential 
characteristics as well as attitudes towards the nation state and world institutions, opinions 
regarding the requirements for obtaining the Turkish citizenship, attitudes towards the state 
and the government and confidence in political institutions. Drawing upon the secularism- 
Islamism dichotomy that lies at the basis of the ideological conflict between Kemalism and 
political Islam, I identify the tensions and overlaps that these ideological orientations create at 
the individual level determining citizens’ attitudinal orientations towards politics. In addition, 
I examine the role of political sophistication as a moderator of the role that ideological 
inclinations play in determining citizens’ political judgements. In doing so, I test the level of 
consistency between issue-based preferences and ideological orientations in order to assess 
the cognitive basis of citizens’ belief systems.  
The benefits from using the WVS data are multiple and concern the technical 
specifications and administrative details of the survey as well as its universal focus. First it 
contains good measures of my study’s independent (ideology and sophistication) and 
dependent variables (attitudes towards a number of political issues) allowing me to test my 
hypotheses through statistical analysis.
32
 Equally significant is that the WVS data are drawn 
from large national representative sample that enables the generalisation of findings on the 
whole population of the country. By consequence, this dataset allows for making safe 
predictions for the future. In addition, the 2007 WV Survey in Turkey was at the time the 
most recent available wave allowing for comparisons with the findings of my own survey 
conducted in 2009 and the interviews conducted in 2012. As such the 2007 WVS data allow 
obtaining a picture of the general trends concerning citizens’ ideological orientations and 
issue-based preferences looking in particular at the division line between AKP and CHP.  
The shortcomings of using the WVS data are inherent to the survey’s scope that is to 
study the universal change on a wide array of values and their impact on the socio-political 
                                                 
31
 The World Values Survey Association website is available online at: www.worldvaluessurvey.org (Accessed: 
3 August 2017).  
32
 For the completed codebook of the WVS used in the 2005-9 wave please visit the official WVS online 
platform at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp (Accessed: 3 August 2017). 
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life across the world.
33
 On this basis, the WVS questionnaire does not contain items on 
emotions whereas it only contains a limited number of items that can be used to capture 
sophistication. In addition and because of the survey’s lack of contextual focus the ideology 
related items available are not sufficient to account for the ideological particularities inherent 
to the Turkish context. Another important drawback of the WVS survey data - which is again 
related to its purpose - is that it does not provide the ground upon which the underlying 
mechanisms that direct individual political behaviour can be studied. As such using the WVS 
data enables the identification of certain trends in regards to the cognitive based mechanisms 
that drive political judgements but does not enable the exploration of the affective and 
motivational mechanisms that underpin political behaviour at the individual level. 
 
6.1.2. Public Opinion Survey in Ankara 
The public opinion survey conducted in Ankara in 2009 identifies the mechanisms by which 
citizens’ issue-based preferences and positions can be explained on the basis of their 
ideologically charged attitudes that concern attachment to Islam and the Turkish nation. The 
aim in this study was to identify the patterns of individual attachment to Islamism and 
nationalism and their impact on decision-making processes that drive evaluative judgments in 
politics rather than tracing aggregate trends that would result from a national representative 
sample. I was particularly interested in the individual processes of CHP voters and the way 
they mediate their attachment towards religion and the nation in shaping attitudes towards the 
role of religion in the society, modernization, minorities and ethnic diversity, citizenship, the 
role of the state, as well as the trust and confidence in intra-state and international 
organizations.  
The design and administration of the public opinion survey in Ankara resulted from 
the shortcomings that were encountered by the use of the WVS data. Because I designed the 
survey questionnaire I had the flexibility to control the measurement and operationalization 
of the variables. Hence I included items that capture the ideology-charged attitudes that relate 
to attachment to Islamism and nationalism in the Turkish socio-political context and which 
drive the aims of this study. This is also one of the most important benefits of this study, 
which allows through statistical analysis to unveil the nature of the impact of attachment to 
Islam and the nation on citizens political preferences. Another important strength of the 
                                                 
33
 For a detailed view on the aims and objectives of the WVS please visit: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp (Accessed: 3 August 2017) 
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survey in Ankara is that I was also able to control the sample by using specific selection 
criteria on order to obtain a sample of predominantly CHP voters. Existing evidence points to 
the transformation of the ideological principles of Kemalism and Islamism resulting to 
changes in both the AKP and CHP. Nevertheless, there is no empirical evidence of how 
considerations that relate to the changing face of political Islam under the AKP governance -
and in particular the level of attachment to Islam - influence CHP voters’ political attitudes 
(they are traditionally expected to hold primarily strong attachment to the nation, since 
nationalism is one of the basic principles of the Kemalist ideology). Because I wanted to put 
this premise on hard test by assessing the impact of attachment to religion in the CHP voters, 
the design of the survey in Ankara allowed me to control for the CH Party preference of my 
sample. An important shortcoming of this study is the small sample size (n=107), which is 
not representative of the country’s population. However, this does not pose a problem in my 
study since its aim is to examine trends in the cognitive links between one’s attachment to 
nation and religion on a number of issue-based preferences with a particular focus on CHP 
supporters. Hence caution is required in the interpretation of the findings since they do not 
aim to provide a generalizable model for the Turkish public opinion.  
 
6.1.3. Semi-Structured Interviews  
The analyses of the two sets of data from the WVS survey and the survey in Ankara cannot 
shed light on the role that ideological inclinations and political sophistication drive citizens’ 
political behaviour at the individual level. These studies reveal information regarding the 
associations that are individually activated and drive certain issue preferences and attitudinal 
orientations. In other words, the survey data do not assess the full spectrum of the cognitive, 
affective and motivated processes that activate when individuals are asked to provide their 
political judgements and evaluations. Following the methodological stance of Lane (1962) 
and Hochschild (1981), I have designed and conducted 25 semi-structured interviews in 
Istanbul in 2012. The interviews - being a follow up of the main trends that the two surveys 
reveal - shed light on the affective, cognitive and motivational basis of the way that 
ideological inclinations, value-orientations, political sophistication and emotions drive 
citizens’ considerations, attitudes and beliefs on politics.  
The decision of using qualitative interviews relies predominantly on the fact that they 
provide the ground upon which we can explain the survey data looking at the full spectrum of 
processes that take place at the individual level (Sieber, 1973). Taking into consideration the 
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absence of relevant evidence for the study of public opinion in Turkey, my research provides 
insights for understanding of the individual mechanisms of reasoning and affectivity. For 
instance, the survey data analyses highlights the attitudinal patterns that relate with 
ideological inclinations yet it does not capture the individual understanding of these 
ideologies as well as the justification behind individual choices and the mediating role of 
emotions. 
With the interviews, participants have the opportunity to unveil their thoughts without 
the constraints that a survey questionnaire entails. They provide interviewees the freedom to 
reveal genuine attitudes and idiosyncratic responses such as uncertainty, indifference, 
ignorance, opinion instability, incoherence along with the reasoning behind their beliefs and 
preferences and emotional arousal and responses (Hochschild, 1981; Lane, 1962). Identifying 
these individual based elements is crucial for my study due to the impact they have on the 
mechanisms (affective, cognitive and motivational) that drive individual attitudinal responses 
towards politics. According to Lane (1962) interviews hold the power to highlight the whole 
decision process one engages with when thinking and deciding about political matters and 
affairs as well as they reveal both conscious and subconscious elements that affect individual 
political behaviour. (1962). On this basis, interviews enabled me to obtain an in-depth 
assessment of the cognitive and affective considerations that participants take into account 
when they formulate their political preferences.  
In contrast to this, survey data do not assess the underlying considerations that one 
takes into account when individuals make issue-preferences or simply report their position on 
a given scale or open-ended question. In addition, semi-structured interviews offer the 
flexibility to allow participants talk about the themes that are relevant to my study (political 
ideology, values, sophistication and emotions). Specifically, during the interviews I was able 
to ask follow up question in the cases when responses were short but dense and not 
adequately justified or explained.  
 Using interviews as a methodological tool carries a number of shortcomings 
(Hochchild, 1981). One weakness that is pertinent for my study is that the research can only 
highlight a line of thinking instead of proving a generalizable truth. As such, interviews do 
not offer generalizable conclusions since the evidence is narrowed by the limited experience 
of the interview responses. By consequence, the interviews offer a first analysis of the 
underlying mechanisms of political behaviour in the country addressing the existence of 
certain traits that look at ideology, values, sophistication and emotions towards politics. 
However it is important to link this with the key aim of my work that is to unpack the 
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behavioural patterns that exist in political behaviour in Turkey. The analysis of the interview 
data comes from my direct involvement in the interview procedure combined with the trends 
that have been identified from the survey data analysis (Jick, 1979). 
 
6.2 Details of Administration and Technical Specifications  
In this section, I offer a thorough discussion on the technical specifications of the three 
studies. I focus on the administering agent, the sample selection criteria and sampling 
technique, administering process, response rates and basic demographics of the final sample 
across all studies. 
 
6.2.1 The World Values Survey 
This study involves the analysis of the WVS dataset from the 2007 wave that took place in 
Turkey. The WVS that fits with the timeframe of my study’s interest was part of the 2005-9 
wave that took place in Turkey during the period January 28-March 5, 2007 and was 
conducted by the SAM Institute (Sosyal Araştirma Merkezi, Social Research Centre, 
Istanbul). The principal investigator for the survey was Prof. Yilmaz Esmer. Prior to the 
official survey, 50 pilot interviews were conducted which resulted into minor adjustments to 
the final questionnaire that was employed in the main survey.  
The initial representative sample size was 1,815.
34
 The response rate was 74% that 
lowered down the sample size to 1,346 participants with ages ranging from 18 to 82 years. 
The survey was carried out in the form of face-to-face interviews that were conducted in the 
areas of Istanbul, Western Marmara, Aegean, Eastern Marmara, Mediterranean, Central 
Anatolia, Western Black Sea, Eastern Black Sea, North Eastern Anatolia, East Central 
Anatolia and South Eastern Anatolia.
35
 
 
                                                 
34
 The sample selection involved three progressive stages of random selection. First, a random selection of 
statistical blocks each on having 150 households. This was then narrowed down to the addresses within the 
selected blocks, which lead into the random selection of the interviewees within the selected household. In the 
cases of invalid addresses, hard refusal, or unavailability of the targeted responded, the selected interviewee was 
substituted with the next in line. 
35
 For an overview of the technical specifications of the WVS in Turkey, please visit: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp (Accessed: 3 August 2017). 
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6.2.2 Public Opinion Survey in Ankara 
The public opinion survey in Ankara was conducted during the period of July 9
th
 and 20
th
, 
2009. Participants for this study were selected through a snowball sample originating from 10 
initial contacts from diverse educational and socio-political background.
36
 The targeted 
sample size was 138 participants. The response rate was 77,54% that lowered the sample size 
into 107 participants.
 
Because of the sensitive issues of the survey as well as the nature of the 
political environment in Turkey snowball sampling was preferred because it enables a higher 
level of trust between participants and the researcher allowing to obtain truthful responses. 
The first questionnaires were distributed after arranging a set of appointments with the initial 
set of contacts, which brought me in touch with the next set of participants coming from their 
close circle of contacts who also referred me to people from their environment until I reached 
the target size. The survey was conducted in the following neighbourhoods in Ankara: 
Kavaklıdere, Gaziosmanpaşa, Bahçelievler, Kızılay, Tunalı Hilmi, Bahçelievler and Bilkent. 
The survey was administered in Turkish. The English version of the questionnaire was 
translated by a native speaker and was then checked by a second native speaker to eliminate 
ambiguous questions. For the full survey questionnaire, please see section 4.2, in Appendix 4. 
The key characteristics of the sample are determined by both the sampling procedure 
as well as the needs of my work. Specifically due to the technique used, the sample is not 
representative of the national population, it is restricted to the capital of the country and the 
majority of participants are voters of CHP (73.1%) with only small number AKP supporters  
(8.6 %). The sample is equally split by gender, but it contains a large percentage of highly 
educated and younger citizens. However, these shortcomings are not problematic for my 
study. 
The decision to administer the survey in the capital of Turkey was taken on the basis 
of its electoral returns. The province of Ankara appears to be an AKP stronghold with 
electoral returns systematically higher than CHP since 2002.
37
 Ankara therefore offers the 
ground upon which I can test two scenarios. According to the first scenario, the strong 
electoral position of AKP would generate high levels of polarization among CHP and AKP 
supporters, putting to hard test the influences of Islamic attachments on their orientations. For 
the second scenario we expect the opposite; high AKP support in Ankara might make the 
                                                 
36
 Snowball sampling is a special non-probability method, which relies on referrals from initial subjects to 
generate additional subjects. Most commonly it is being used in studies, which aim to produce specific measures 
to be tested in larger samples. Although estimates have to be done cautiously, snowball and respondent-driven 
samples can provide asymptotically unbiased estimates (Salganik and Heckathorn, 2004; Snijders, 1992). 
37
 For a review of the electoral results in national election by city please see Yüksek Seçim Kurulu (2015).  
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influence of AKP ideological orientations such as attachment to Islam more evident in the 
political preferences of CHP supporters. In my study, about 73% of our participants are CHP 
voters and the analysis focuses solely on these participants in testing these two scenarios.  
Turkey’s population is heterogeneous in terms of the determinants of political 
orientations such as in ideological levels, religiosity strength and traditionalism.
38
 For the 
purposes of this study I used a large number of initial contacts and tried to ensure that the 
participants came from different socio-political backgrounds. Because of the study’s focus on 
the identification of trends in the ideology and value-based considerations that voters account 
for when they reach their political preferences the fact that the sample is not representative is 
not problematic for my work. In essence, here I am interested in tracing the process of 
decision-making by looking at the trends that result from attachment to nationalism and 
religion, rather than making claims about population averages (Capelos and Chrona, 2012). 
Nonetheless it is essential to recognise, that generalising the results from this study should be 
done with caution, keeping into account the characteristics of the sample (middle class, 
highly educated, mostly male participants, living in Ankara).
39
 
 
6.2.3 Semi-structured Interviews 
The 25 qualitative interviews were conducted in Istanbul, in the period between July-
September 2012. A small-scale pilot study with 5 interviews was conducted in June 2011 in 
the neighbourhood Tarabya in Istanbul to pre-test the interview script (wording and order of 
questions) and the flow of the interview process. The pilot study resulted into minor 
adjustments to the interview questionnaire. Specifically, a small number of questions were 
excluded from final script as well as a number of adjustments in the wording of the Turkish 
script were made. Participants were selected through a snowball sampling technique starting 
from my primary list of 20 contacts in Istanbul and Ankara coming from diverse educational 
and socio-economic backgrounds. Also in this case, the sampling procedure was selected 
because of the high sensitivity of issues that are being addressed in the interviews such as 
                                                 
38
 Residents of urban centers on the coast are distinct from the population living in the eastern parts of the 
country. A representative cross-sectional survey would be costly and time consuming and could not be 
implemented without substantial funding. In addition, given the poor response rate figures of representative 
public opinion surveys at about 25-35%, it is questionable whether a truly national sample would be acquired 
even through random sampling. 
39
 The reader is reminded to take caution when generalizing this study’s results to the overall national population 
of Turkey. The sample was not intended to be representative of the country’s overall population, and as such it 
is not balanced in terms of gender, age, and education. About 63% of participants are male; 44% are between 
30-40 years old, and 43% are between 20 and 30 years. In addition, 51% have completed university level 
education, 81% are employed, 68% identify as middle class and 42% has monthly income of 750 to 1,500 YTL. 
Chapter 6. Research Design and Methodology 
 95 
ideological inclinations, likes and dislikes of parties and politicians and the like. Snowball 
sampling assisted me to contact a number of interviewees ensuring their trust because of the 
personal contacts we shared. My initial contacts referred me to 20 interviewees from whom I 
also arranged 5 more interviews resulting to a total number of 25. The interviews were 
conducted following Lane’s analytical approach; hence, they required more time than the 
usual 30-40 minute interview. The total duration of the conducted interviews is 
approximately 41 hours. This provided rich and dense data that provide significant 
information in meeting the study’s research objectives. For the script used in the interviews 
questionnaire, please see section 4.3, in Appendix 4. 
Appointments were arranged via email or telephone and interviews were conducted at 
the interviewee’s preferred places (local cafes or private residencies) across Istanbul.40 A 
recorder was used after ensuring the agreement of the interviewee. Prior to the interview, 
participants received information on the procedure of the interview process: how the 
interview would unfold, the questioning and answering process, and the main direction for 
the type of answering. Respondents were advised that they did not have to stick to the 
question wording rather than explain all the thoughts coming on the top of their heads during 
the discussion. They were also given the opportunity to omit answering any questions they 
felt uncomfortable with. For the cases that an interviewee did not provide sufficient 
explanation behind their answers follow up explanatory questions were used. 
Regarding the sampling criteria and selection, I control for age, education level, 
income and place of residence with having the aim to interview a range of people from 
multiple backgrounds. Interviewees belong to the young and middle age bracket according to 
the WVS classification of age. In particular, the majority of interviewees fall into the young 
age bracket (from 18 to 29 years old) and a small number of participants belong to the 
middle-aged bracket (from 30 to 40 years old). In terms of gender, 14 participants are men 
(56%) and 11 are women (44%). Although there is a small discrepancy in the gender 
proportion among my sample this is not expected to have an impact on the findings since the 
role that gender plays in the formation of political behaviour in Turkey is not of relevance 
here. The occupational status varies across interviewees ranging from workers of the private 
sector in a variety of companies (tourism, private tutors, bank, school teachers). There are 
also two participants that are unemployed. In terms of education, the range varies from 
                                                 
40
 Interviews were conducted in the areas of Beyoğlu, Beşiktaş, Fatih, Üsküdar, Kadıköy, Şişli and Sarıyer.  
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interviewees that completed high school or acquired a Bachelor or Masters degrees in other 
disciplines than political science (i.e. Architecture or Mathematics) and also a PhD candidate 
in Political Science that is being used as a control case for high sophistication. The majority 
of participants have obtained or were studying for a BA or MA degree at the time of the 
interviews (88%) whereas 12% have only finished high school. The variance of income 
ranges between high among those who work in the private sector and no income for those 
who are unemployed. Class self-placement varies across participants with 5 (20%) who 
identify themselves as belonging in the upper-middle class, 16 (64%) placing themselves in 
middle class and 4 (16%) in the middle-lower class. Although the majority of participants 
come from highly educated and middle-class backgrounds this does not weaken the findings 
of my work since I am mostly interested in the psychological underpinnings that drive their 
political evaluations. Looking at the voting preferences of my sample 15 (60%) participants 
are voters of the CH Party, 6 (24%) participants are voters of the AKP, 2 (8%) vote for MHP 
and 2 (8%) for the TKP. The large number of CHP supporters in comparison to those who 
vote AKP is a significant limitation of my sample but does not reduce the value of my 
findings insofar my study’s scope is to address the cognitive, affective and motivational 
trends that drive participants’ political judgements.  
 The interviews were conducted in Turkish and in English. Specifically, 14 interviews 
were in Turkish and 11 in English. Some interviewees preferred to conduct the interview in 
English. On the occasions that they could not find the right English word to express their 
thoughts, they were able to switch into Turkish. For the transcription of the Turkish 
interviews a research assistant (native Turkish speaker) was hired to complete the 
transcription from Turkish into English. I went through these transcripts to identify any 
inaccuracies and crosschecked the text with the original recordings. 
 
6.3 Objectives and Research Questions  
In the following sections, I present the main research objectives and questions that drive each 
study.  
 
6.3.1 World Values Survey  
Using the WVS data, I explore the impact of ideological orientations and political 
sophistication on citizens’ political preferences and evaluations. Specifically, by looking at 
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the ideologies of Kemalism and political Islam I explore their tensions and overlaps at the 
individual level by measuring their shared impact on citizens political attitudes. In addition, I 
look at the mediating effect of political sophistication on the way the two ideological 
orientations drive political preferences. The research questions addressed in this study are:  
 What is the impact of attachment to political Islam and Kemalism on citizens’ issue-
based preferences and value orientations? Are there instances where the two 
orientations share their influence in respect to citizens’ political preferences? If so, 
which are the instances they converge and when do they diverge? 
 What is the impact of political sophistication on citizens’ political preferences? 
Looking at the interaction of sophistication (low versus high) with ideological 
attachment, how does sophistication mediate the influence of ideological orientations 
on issue-based preferences? 
 
6.3.2 Public Opinion Survey in Ankara  
The aim of the public opinion survey in Ankara in 2009 is to investigate the dynamic role that 
attachment to Islam and the nation (being ideologically charged orientations referring to 
Political Islam and Kemalism respectively) play in determining citizens’ political 
judgements. Focusing in particular on CHP voters (being the political advocator of 
Kemalism) I investigate whether and how attachment to Islam and the nation function in a 
way that co-determines attitudinal responses towards politics or whether attachment to the 
one side of Islam versus the nation axis excludes their shared impact at the individual level. 
My focus on the CHP voters is because to date there is no evidence regarding the impact of 
the transformational changes that both CHP and AKP that have been undergoing since 2002 
on the CHP supporters. With AKP being the governing party gathering on a consistent basis 
the majority of the electoral support since 2002, I examine whether Islamic considerations 
influence the political attitudes and preferences of the CHP votes that are primarily expected 
to hold strong attachment to the nation (on the basis of the Kemalist principles). The main 
research questions that the public opinion survey in Ankara addresses are: 
 What is the impact of the ideology driven attachment to the nation and Islam on CHP 
voters’ issue-based preferences?  
 Are there instances where attachment to the nation and Islam share their influence or 
do they only clash when it comes to CHP voters? Which are the issues on which the 
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two orientations converge and which are the issues on which the two orientations 
differ? 
 
6.3.3 Semi-Structured Interviews  
The interviews explore the cognitive, affective and motivational mechanisms that drive 
citizens’ political behaviour by focusing on the impact of ideological dispositions, value 
orientations, political sophistication and emotions on political judgements and evaluations. 
The aims of this study are divided into four distinct categories that are linked with the main 
research objectives of my research: i) political ideology; ii) values-orientations; iii) political 
sophistication and iv) emotions towards politics. 
 
Political Sophistication 
In regards to political sophistication my work uncovers its role in the processes of decision-
making, reasoning and affectivity when it comes to politics. Specifically, looking at the role 
of sophistication as a mediator in shaping political judgements, my work uncovers the effects 
of the interaction between low and high sophistication and ideological inclination, value-
based preferences, party identification and emotional arousal towards politics. I also look at 
the coherence and consistency between these issues on the basis of sophistication 
highlighting the role sophistication plays in shaping individual systems of beliefs towards 
politics. My work highlights the cognitive, affective and motivational model that explain the 
way political sophistication affects participants’ ideological positioning, party identification 
and issue-based preferences and if there is to test its internal consistency and coherence. 
Because political sophistication can determine the degree and nature of ideological 
attachments, values and emotions, political sophistication related results are being discussed 
as part of my analysis of each factor.  
 
Political Ideology 
Focusing on political ideology, I assess the cognitive structure upon which participants shape 
their individual understanding of political ideologies, driving their political preferences and 
motivated reasoning. My focus lies predominantly on the main ideological division of 
political Islam and Kemalism in evaluating individual perceptions towards each side of the 
axis. I also look at individual understanding of mainstream ideological division that are 
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dominant in Western public opinion studies such as left-right and liberalism-conservatism. In 
doing so, I investigate whether and how individual understanding of the Political Islam-
Kemalism division shapes the perception of the mainstream ideological divisions that pertain 
to the left-right and liberalism-conservatism continuums. In short, I am interested in 
identifying the frame of differentiation that participants hold in driving their self-placement 
and judgemental evaluations of the existing ideological continuums. The main research 
questions on political ideology that are addressed by this study are: 
 How do citizens perceive the ideologies of political Islam- Kemalism, left-right and 
liberalism-conservatism? How do they justify their positions when they place 
themselves along these spectrums?  
 How do perceptions of political Islam and Kemalism affect self-placement on the 
traditional ideological scales (left–right, liberalism-conservatism)? How is this being 
justified?  
 What is the impact of self-placement on the political Islam-Kemalism axis on political 
judgements? For those citizens that reconcile both orientations at the individual level, 
which issues receive their shared attention and how is this being justified? Which are 
the key differences and commonalities between political Islam and Kemalism? 
 Is there a systematic pattern between ideological orientations and party preferences? 
For instance does attachment to political Islam or Kemalism direct voting for a 
specific political party or range of parties? 
 Depending on levels of sophistication is the individual self-placement on the 
ideological continuums consistent with participants’ party identification and 
attitudinal orientations? 
 What is the role of political sophistication in the coherence and consistency between 
ideological placement, party preferences and in general political judgements and 
evaluations? 
 
Value Orientations  
My focus on value orientations provides an assessment of the cognitive and motivational role 
that values play in citizens’ systems of beliefs. Looking at core personal and political values I 
examine their function in shaping citizens’ attitudinal responses, evaluative judgements and 
motivated reasoning towards political affairs. For personal values, I focus upon attitudes 
towards religion, tradition and modernization, power, stability and individual rights. For 
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political values, I look into attitudes towards democracy, individual freedoms and equality, 
the role of the state and authority. My work here provides insights into the mental patterns 
that connect value orientations with ideological placement on the political Islam-Kemalism 
continuum as well as issue-based preferences. In addition, I examine the interaction of 
sophistication with values and look into the level of consistency and coherence among values, 
ideological inclinations, party preferences and political choices. The main research question 
regarding values that interviews answer are:  
 What is the role that core personal and political values play in determining citizens’ 
political judgements and issue-based preferences?  
 Are the values each individual holds in agreement with their ideological inclinations, 
party identification and issue-based preferences?  
 Focusing on levels of political sophistication, is there a level of consistency between 
value orientations and ideological placement, party preferences and issue choices? 
 
Emotions  
My work uncovers the affect-based mechanisms that drive the emotional reactions and 
motivational reasoning towards political matters. I investigate the role that emotions play in 
the political behaviour of citizens in Turkey. In particular, I examine the nature of stimuli that 
trigger positive (such as hope, enthusiasm, confidence and trust) and negative valence 
emotions (anger, fear, anxiety, disappointment, uncertainty, insecurity and distrust). In 
addition, I explore the role of political sophistication as a mediator of emotional reactions. 
Specifically, looking at high and low levels of sophistication, I examine the emotional 
patterns that generate on the basis of ideological inclinations, value orientations and party 
preferences. In doing so, I am interested in the pattern that characterizes the interaction of 
affect with the mechanisms of decision-making (cognition) and reasoning (motivation) that 
high and low sophisticate engage with when asked to express their attitudinal responses. The 
main research questions addressed by this study on emotions are: 
 What kind of issues/actors related to politics trigger positive and negative emotional 
expressions? 
 What is the role that participants’ evaluative judgments (likes and dislikes) towards 
the key political actors play in shaping their attitudinal orientations towards politics? 
 Looking at levels of political sophistication, is there a pattern that characterizes 
emotional arousal in relation to ideology, values and party preferences? How do 
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emotions affect the political decisions and reasoning of those with high levels of 
political sophistication and those with low levels of political sophistication? 
 
6.4 Variable Operationalization and Measurement 
In this section, I provide a detailed discussion on the operationalization and measurement of 
the variables that I have used across the three studies of my research project. I also explain 
the rationale and reasoning that drives the operationalization of each variable in accordance 
with my study’s aims. In addition, I offer an analytical presentation of the variables that have 
been used in all three studies divided on the basis of the main theoretical concepts of political 
ideology, core personal values and political values, affect and sophistication. 
 
6.4.1 Political Ideology  
Because of the nature and objectives of the three studies, the measures of political ideology 
vary. Specifically, in the WVS survey I look into the secularism versus Islamism as an 
extension of political Islam-Kemalism, for the survey in Ankara I focus on attachment to the 
nation and Islam and for the interviews I employ a more detailed focus on ideological 
orientations by looking at Kemalism-political Islam, left-right and liberalism-conservatism. 
Below I provide the operationalization for measurements of the ideology related variables 
that were used in each study.  
 
Secularism versus Islamism 
With the WVS data I draw upon the secularism versus Islamism dichotomy that pertains to 
the conflictual relationship between the two ideological orientations of Kemalism and 
political Islam. Secularism is measured by combining the extent to which participants agree 
or disagree with the influence of religious leaders in the way people vote in elections (V195) 
and the influence of religious leaders in government (V197)
41
. Islamism is measured by 
combining the level of participants’ agreement with the statement that politicians who do not 
believe in God are unfit for public office (V194), and that better conditions would take place 
if more people with strong religious beliefs held public offices in Turkey (V196).
42
 
                                                 
41
 The number in the parenthesis throughout this section indicates the code allocated to each question in the 
original WVS codebook. For the full version of the questionnaire used in the WVS 2005-2009 wave please visit: 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp (Accessed: 3 August 2017). 
42
 These variables are measured on a 1-5 scale where is strongly agree and 5 strongly disagree.  
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Nationalist Attachment versus Attachment to Islam 
In the survey in Ankara, I focus on the attachment to the nation and attachment to religion 
line of dichotomy that belongs to the basis of the principal difference between Kemalism (and 
its pillar of nationalism) and political Islam (Islamism). Attachment to Islam is measured by 
the extent to which participants feel part of the Islamic world, and attachment to the nation 
by the extent to which they feel part of the Turkish nation.
43
 These two variables capture the 
main characteristics of Islamism and Kemalist nationalism focusing on individual attachment 
to the Turkish nation and Islam, as they derive from the two ideological orientations.  
 
Kemalism-Political Islam 
The semi-structured interviews allow me to assess the way participants perceive and 
conceptualise the ideological orientations of Kemalism and political Islam. Specifically, 
participants are asked to discuss how they view the two ideological ends and to explain the 
differences and whether they see any commonalities between them. In relation to this, 
participants are also asked to explain the social and political significance of the political 
Islam-Kemalism continuum and the impact this has on the current political arena of the 
country. Because of the nature of interviews, participants have the opportunity to justify their 
responses and point to particular examples that support their evaluative judgements in regards 
to the two main ideological dichotomies. 
 
Left-Right and Liberalism-Conservatism 
Interviewees are also asked to explain their understanding of the left-right and liberalism- 
conservatism continuums and the role these divisions play in the Turkish society. In doing so, 
participants have the opportunity to explain in their own words how they apply these 
continuums in the Turkish context and also position certain political actors and other 
ideological orientations on these continuums. Again here, participants had the space to 
discuss their opinion and address their reasoning in detail. 
 
                                                 
43
  For both variables an 11-point scale was used where -5 means strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. The 
question asks participants to indicate their agreement with the statement “I see myself as part of the Islamic 
world/Turkish nation”.  
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Ideological Self-Placement  
Participants in the interviews were asked to position themselves on the two-dimensional 
scales that concern ideological orientations (i) political Islam–Kemalism, (ii) the left- right44 
(iii) liberalism-conservatism dichotomies. Self-placement on these scales is important in 
order to identify participants’ ideological inclinations as well as their reasoning on selecting 
to place themselves on each end. Here participants had the opportunity to discuss in detail 
their cognitive structure and organisation of their ideological inclinations by pointing to the 
three different continuums and explaining how they formulate their individual placement in 
their belief system. Interviewees’ responses on these questions offer the ground upon which 
their cognitive structures can be evaluated by testing for the coherence and consistency 
between their ideological inclination and their opinion and issue-based preferences as they 
are expressed throughout the interviews.  
 
Political Orientations  
 In order to evaluate the cognitive structure that characterizes my study’s participants, I focus 
on the link between ideological inclinations, political judgements and voting preferences. I 
am also interested in participants’ views of the ideological orientations carried by the key 
political actors that dominate the political system in the country.  
Specifically, in the WVS survey there is only a measure of vote intention that asks 
participants which party they would vote for if national elections were taking place tomorrow 
(V231). To identify CHP supporters in the Ankara survey, I asked participants to mention the 
party that they have voted for in the last general elections.
45
 During the interviews, 
participants were asked whether they have voted in the three (depending on their age) 
national and local elections in Turkey as well as whether they remember which parties they 
have voted for in each election. In addition, during the interviews, following up the question 
on their voting preferences participants were asked to position a number of parties (namely 
AKP, CHP and MHP) on the ideological continuums of political Islam-Kemalism, liberalism- 
conservatism and left-right. This allows evaluating participants’ perceptions of the key 
political parties as well as the way they perceive their ideological orientations. Here, 
participants had the opportunity to provide in detail their reasoning as well as to point to a 
number of issues concerning these parties’ positions.  
                                                 
44
 Participants in the public opinion survey in Ankara are also asked to place themselves on the left-right axis. 
45
 This operates as a filter variable in order to select the CHP voters for my analysis.  
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6.4.2 Core Personal Values 
To assess the core personal values that participants’ hold I looked at the role of religiosity and 
secularisation and perception of tradition, culture and modernization (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). 
In the discussion that follows, I provide an overview of the items relevant to core personal 
values that I use across the three studies to measure attachment to core personal values.  
 
Religiosity and Secularization 
My focus on religiosity accounts for the role of religion as an individual practice and its 
importance in citizens’ systems of belief. Accordingly, to measure religiosity I draw upon 
Norris and Inglehart (2004) and use three indicators based on religious participation, religious 
values and religious beliefs.  
The items that I use from the WVS survey to measure religious participation, is the 
frequency of personal attendance at religious services (V186) and personal religious 
characterisation (V187).
46
 For the importance of religion in individual life, I look into the 
importance of Allah in participants’ lives (V192) and the importance of religion as a system 
of faith in one’s life (V9).47 Religious beliefs are measured by the position one takes on the 
role of individuals in shaping their own destiny (predetermined fate versus human control) 
(V122).
48
  
The measures of religiosity that I use in the Ankara Survey focus on religious 
participation and religious values. Specifically, participants are asked to note their frequency 
of attendance in religious services as well as to rate their own level of religiosity as well as 
the importance that Allah plays in their life.
 49
 In terms of religious values, participants were 
                                                 
46
 For attendance in religious services participants are asked how frequently they do so on a 7-point scale where 
1 is more than once a week and 7 never. For self-characterization of religiosity participants are asked whether 
they are a religious person, not a religious person or an atheist.  
47
 Importance of Allah in life is measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 is not important at all and 10 is very 
important. Participants are asked how important religion is in their life on a 1-4 scale where 1 is very important 
and 4 not important at all.  
48
 Participants are asked to place themselves on a 0-10 scale where 0 is everything is determined by fate and 10 
is people shape their fate themselves.  
49
Participants are asked about their frequency of attendance in religious services using the same scale with 
WVS. Participants are asked to rate their level of religiosity on a 0-10 scale where 0 is not religious and 10 is 
religious. For the importance of Allah in life participants are given a scale of 0-3 where 1 is very important and 
3 is not important at all.  
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asked about the importance they assign to religion in their personal life as well as the 
importance of religion in the country.
50
  
In the interviews, to measure the role of religious values participants are asked a wide 
range of questions that regard religion as a private practice as well as its role in politics and in 
the society in general. Concerning religion as an individual practice participants are asked 
about position themselves in regards to their personal level of religiosity and also to address 
their religious attendance both in and outside religious services (mosques or praying at 
home). Here, participants had the chance to elaborate on their talk feelings in regards to their 
connection with religion. In terms of religious values, participants are asked to discuss the 
importance of religion both at the individual and the societal level. Here, participants were 
provided with a range of questions on the role and importance of religion as a personal 
practice as well as an institution. Specifically, participants were asked about the importance 
of religion in their personal life as well as to address the importance of religion in Turkey 
focusing on the aspects they consider as meaningful; about the involvement of religion in the 
country’s political life and their opinion about the extent to which religion should or should 
not influence the country’s political agenda at national and international level.51 They were 
also asked to provide their opinion on the political leaders of Turkey in terms of their level of 
religiosity
52
 as well as on the role and influence of religious leaders in political life. 
Regarding the relationship between religion and society participants were asked to mention 
the extent to which they believe people in Turkey are free to practice worship requirements of 
Islam and whether there is oppression of religious people in Turkey. Those participants 
answering positively were then asked to provide some specific examples and expand on their 
justification. Participants were also asked to state whether religion helps a person to stay 
honest and keep on the right track or whether it does not make a difference and how they feel 
about people who belong to different religions. These items act as an indicator or their 
judgemental processes regarding the others that are different from their own position on 
religion.  
 
                                                 
50
 A 0-3 scale is used to address importance of religion in life and in the country where 1 is very important and 3 
not important at all.  
51
 This measure is being used in the WVS as part of the Islamism variable.  
52
 This is also used in the WVS as part of the Islamism variable. 
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Tradition and Modernization  
Looking at attachment to traditions, in the WVS survey, participants were asked to rate the 
importance of following the customs delivered by religion or family (V89)
53
. To measure 
attachment to modernization in the WVS, I drew upon attitudes towards the role of science 
and technology (rationalisation). Specifically, participants were asked about the extent to 
which they believe that science and technology make life healthier and easier (V91). In 
examining attitudes in regards to tradition versus modernization, participants were asked 
about their opinion in regards to the opportunities that science and technology bring for the 
next generations (V92), their level of agreement towards the fast changes that science and 
technology brings in our lives (V93)
 54
 and whether the world is better or worse off because 
of science and technology (V123)
55
.  
In the public opinion survey in Ankara attitudes towards modernization were 
measured by asking participants whether tradition and modern values should coexist, and 
whether modern values should be emphasized more than tradition.
56
 Participants were also 
asked to mention the extent to which they are willing to adjust their moral behaviour to the 
changes of the world.
57 
  
In the interviews, instead of asking issue-specific questions first I asked participants 
to define in their own words the terms modernization and preservation of traditions and 
culture. Participants were also asked whether and how the two could coexist in the society.  
 
6.4.3 Political Values 
To explore the role of political values among participants across the three studies, I focus on 
attachment to democracy, the role of the state and people as a representative body, the role of 
nation and attitudes towards citizenship as well as perceptions of individual freedoms and 
basic human rights. In the discussion that follows, I address the measures used to 
operationalize attitudes relevant to political values.  
                                                 
53
 Participants are asked to say whether they feel close to the following statement tradition is very important to 
his person; to follow the customs handed down by one’s religion or family’. They are given a 6-point scale 
where 1 is very much like me and 6 not at all like me.  
54
 For V91-93 participants are given a 1-10 scale where 1 is completely disagree and 10 completely agree.  
55
 Participants are given a 1-10 scale where 1 is a lot worse off and 10 a lot better off.  
56
 An 11-point scale is provided here where –5 is strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. 
57
 An 11-point scale is used where -5 is strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree. The 2004 Questionnaire of 
American National Election Study contains a similar item (see ANES 2004). Participants are asked to state their 
agreement with the statement ‘The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behaviour 
to those changes’ using a -5 (strongly disagree)- 1 (strongly agree) scale. Available at: 
http://www.electionstudies.org/CoreUtility/varfiles/Q547_2004.htm (Accessed: 3 August 2017). 
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Democracy  
To measure attitudes towards democracy participants in across the three studies were asked to 
rate the importance of living in a country that is governed democratically (V162).
58 
In 
addition to these, I looked into participants’ perceptions of key characteristics of democracy. 
Drawing upon the WVS, I use a list of items that participants were asked to rate on the basis 
of whether they think they are essential characteristics of democracy. These items concern the 
equal taxation of both rich and poor (V152), the ability of religious leaders to interpret the 
laws (V153), freedom to elect leaders in elections (V154), the possibility of the army taking 
over when the government is incompetent (V156), the protection of civil rights against 
oppression (V157), the freedom of people to change the laws in referendums (V160) as well 
as the issue of equality between men and women (V161).
59
  
Moving on to the interviews, participants were asked about their opinions regarding 
the state of democracy in Turkey. Considering that the interviews provide the flexibility to 
assess the conceptualisation and expectations one holds towards democracy, participants 
were asked to provide their own conceptualisation and discuss the importance they assign to 
democracy as well as whether there should be limits on democracy. Adding to these, 
participants were also asked the extent they believe Turkey is a democratic country as well as 
to comment on the future of democracy in the country. My aim is to recognize a systematic 
pattern between beliefs towards democracy and the ideological inclinations interviewees’ 
hold.  
 
State, Governance and People’s Representative Power  
The next set of questions look into the role of the state and its accountability along with the 
views participants hold in regards to the role of the public in regards to the state. Participants 
in the WVS were asked about the importance of having strong leaders (V148), having experts 
in making decisions (V149), having the army rule (V150), the importance of having a 
democratic political system (V151),
60
 as well as the importance of respect towards authorities 
                                                 
58
 A 1-10 scale is provided here where 1 is not important all and 10 absolutely important.  
59
 This group of items is used in the WVS to measure the essential characteristics of democracy on a 1-10 scale 
where 1 is not essential and 10 as essential characteristic of democracy. 
60
 Variables 148-151 are measured on a 1-4 scale where 1 is very good and 4 is very bad.  
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(V78) and the level of agreement with more emphasis on the development of technology 
(V77)
61
.  
Participants in the Ankara survey were asked about their importance they assign to 
obeying the state, as well as whether people should have more say in government decisions
62
 
as well as to rate their agreement with tolerance towards different moral standards.
63
  
During the interviews participants were asked about their perception of the role of the 
state and its authority as well as their position in regards to the public’s civic responsibilities 
towards the way the state operates. In addition, interviewees were asked whether there are 
issues that should not be discussed in public or whether everything should be addressed 
publicly. Participants, who provided a positive response to this question, were then asked to 
identify the specific issues that they believe should be discussed privately instead of in 
public.  
 
Nation and Citizenship  
In the WVS, attitudes toward the nation were measured by how proud participants feel of 
their nationality (V209) and by the levels of willingness to fight in a war for Turkey (V75).
64
 
Attitudes towards one’s self-positioning in the world were measured, in both the WVS and 
public opinion survey in Ankara, by the extent to which participants feel themselves as world 
citizens (V210), members of their local community (V211), members of the Turkish nation 
(V212) and as autonomous individuals (V214).
65
  
During the interviews, participants were asked to tell how they felt when they see the 
Turkish flag and the picture of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In regards to the prerequisites of 
obtaining the Turkish citizenship participants in both the WVS and the Ankara survey were 
asked to identify the importance of a number of relevant items such as having ancestors from 
Turkey (V217), being born in Turkey’s soil (V218), adopting the country’s customs (V219) 
and abiding the law as key requirements for acquiring the Turkish citizenship (V220).
66
  
                                                 
61
 For the variables V77and V78 participants are asked to evaluate the two statements on a 1-3 scale where 1 is 
good and 3 bad.  
62
 An 11-pont scale is used for these items where -5 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree.  
63
 A 0-10 scale is used where 0 is not important at all and 10 is very important. 
64
 Proudness of nationality is measured on a 1-4 scale where 1 very proud and 4 not proud at all. Willingness to 
fight in war is measured on a 3-point scale where 0 is no 1 is yes and 2 don’t know.  
65
 A 1-4 scale is used where 1 is strongly agree and 4 strongly disagree.  
66
 Participants are given a 4-point scale where 1 is very important and 3 not important at all.  
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Participants in the interviews were also asked to express their opinions towards the 
nation and its role. Here, participants had the opportunity to address the issue of citizenship 
and the responsibilities that holding the Turkish citizenship entails. 
 
Basic Freedoms and Individual Human Rights  
Participants in the Ankara survey were asked about the importance of protecting freedom of 
speech.
67
 During the interviews, participants were asked to define the meaning and 
importance of freedoms according to their own system of beliefs as well as to explain 
whether there should be any limits to individual freedoms. In addition, interviewees were 
asked to mention the extent to which they felt free in the country and whether they identify 
any factor that poses a risk on the level of freedoms in the country. Participants were also 
asked to mention whether there should be more or less freedom in Turkey as well whether 
there were any groups that could go a bit too far if they had too much freedom.  
 
6.4.4 Affective Reactions Towards Politics 
In assessing the impact of affect on the political behaviour of citizens in Turkey, I use three 
distinct ways. First, I refer to the levels of confidence citizens’ hold towards political 
institutions.
68
 According to Capelos et al. (2015) trust is the most reliable measure to access 
the moral reliability perceptions of citizens towards organisations. However, in the WVS the 
only relevant item looks into participants’ level of confidence towards a list of political 
institutions such as mosques (V131), the armed forces (V132), television (V134), labour 
unions (V135), the police (V136), the justice system (V137), the government (V138), the 
political parties (V139), the parliament (V140) and the civil services (V141).
69
 The same 
items were also included in the Ankara survey.
70
 
 Contrary to the limitations of the survey studies, the semi-structured interviews 
allowed for the in-depth examination of the affective element that drive participants’ political 
behaviour. During the interviews participants were asked to address what (actor, institution or 
anything else related to politics) made them feel a number of positive valence (namely hope, 
enthusiasm, trust) and negative valence (such as anger, fear, anxiety, disappointment, 
                                                 
67
 An 11-point scale is used here where 0 is not important at all and 10 extremely important. 
68
 It is useful to note here that in Turkish the word for trust and confidence is the same [güven].  
69
 This is measured on a 1-4 scale where 1 is a great deal and 4 none at all.  
70
 This is measured on 0-10 scale where 0 is no confidence at all and 10 is great confidence 
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distrust) emotions when thinking about political affairs. The assessment of affect throughout 
the interviews was done on the basis of the explicit as well as the implicit mention of 
participants on these emotions. Specifically, although participants were asked directly what 
makes them feel these emotions when they think about politics, a wide range of emotions are 
also revealed throughout the conversational environment during the interviews.  
The final measure I employed to investigate affect, is through overall judgmental 
evaluations (likes and dislikes) towards political actors (Sniderman, 1991; Marcus, 1988; 
Neuman et al., 2007; Capelos, 2013). These items allow to tap the affective evaluations that 
regard the main political actors of the country and to assess the level of accuracy and 
consistency between affective and cognitive responses related to the ideological dispositions 
and value-orientations participants hold. Accordingly, during the interviews participants were 
asked to mention what they like and what they dislike from the main political parties of 
Turkey (AKP, CHP and MHP). The findings on the participants’ judgmental evaluations are 
discussed as part of my findings on political ideology since they offer an in-depth 
understanding of the coherence and consistency between ideological inclinations and party 
preferences.  
 
6.4.5 Political Sophistication 
Political sophistication is a latent multi-dimension concept that captures the structure of 
political cognitions at the individual level (Bartels, 1996; Zaller, 1992).
71
 Its measurement 
across the two studies required the identification and employment of measures that can 
capture in the most effective way individual levels of sophistication. From the pool of items 
available in the WVS study, political sophistication is measured by using a tri-partite scale 
consisting of interest in politics, media attention and education level. In the interviews I had 
the chance to employ a more detailed measure of political sophistication using a multi-
dimensional scale which consists of the following categories: factual knowledge and political 
information, media exposure, participation in politics, education as well as the self-
                                                 
71
 Due to the complexity of the construct of political sophistication and because by nature it entails several 
characteristics that have been also used on their own to capture similar but not identical concepts, its 
measurement has generated a wide debate. The key indicators used vary across scholars. For instance some 
scholars use self- identification based on political ideology (Bennett, et al., 1979), likes and dislikes of parties 
and candidates (Campbell et al, 1960; Converse, 1964; Luskin, 2004; Kessel, 1980; Smith, 1989), items on 
factual knowledge and levels of political information (Luskin, 1987; Smith, 1989; Zaller, 1986; Price and Zaller, 
1993; Iyengar, 1986; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996;), political awareness (Zaller, 1986, 1992) media exposure 
(Price and Zaller, 1993), knowledge on the basic positions that political parties hold (Luskin, 1987), 
attentiveness and interest in political (Neuman, 1986), or only interest in politics (Luskin, 1990), attention to 
media (Luskin, 1990) education (Luskin, 1990; Zaller, 1992) as well as interest in politics (Luskin, 1990). 
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positioning in the scale of interest in politics. In total 20 items were used to measure political 
sophistication. Low sophisticates are classified as those interviewees who answered correctly 
10 or less questions (50%) whereas high sophisticates are those who answered correctly 
beyond 11 (50%) questions. The total number of sophisticates in my sample is 7 out of 25 
(28%). Below, I provide the items used to measure political sophistication in the interviews 
and the WVS.  
 
Factual Knowledge and Political Information  
Factual knowledge and political information questions aim to identify the level of knowledge 
and political information each participant holds (Iyengar, 1986, Zaller, 1986). The use of 
items related to factual knowledge and political information captures the level of knowledge 
and attention that participants hold in regards to politics. To assess the factual knowledge and 
levels of participants’ political information during the interviews, I used a set of different 
questions. Specifically I assessed participants’ knowledge of certain events from the Turkish 
political history that carry high significance
72
, of the way that political institutions function
73
, 
as well as their knowledge of certain political actors 
74
 and current political affairs.
75
 In 
addition, they were asked to mention the vote percentages and the seats in Parliament that 
AKP, CHP and MHP received in the 2011 and 2007.  
 
Media Exposure 
Media exposure is used to investigate whether and how participants acquire their political 
information through the use of the media. Frequency and also the source from which 
participants obtain their political information were used to reveal first the actual interest of 
the participant into politics and then whether one or multiple sources are being used to 
acquire a broader range of political information. Information acquisition and media exposure 
in the WVS survey was measured by whether participants have used a daily newspaper 
(V223), printed magazines (V225), watched in depth reports on radio or TV (V226), read 
books (V227), used internet or email (V228) and whether they talked with friends or 
                                                 
72
 Here participants were asked the date that the current constitution was ratified as well as to name the main 
principles of the constitution. Additionally they were asked when the universal voting was implemented. 
73
 Here participants were asked about duration of the presidential term as well as to point at the bodies that hold 
the executive and legislative power in the country. They were also asked the number of the MPs in the 
Parliament.  
74
 Participants were asked to name the Minister of labour and social security and minister of national defence. 
75
 They were also asked about the current unemployment and inflation rates.  
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colleagues (V229) in the last week. During the interviews, participants were asked to state 
and name, the sources they use to acquire political information as well as to state the 
frequency of their use.  
 
Political Interest 
Another item I used to capture political sophistication refers to participants’ level interest in 
politics. In the WVS dataset, political interest is captured by the importance that politics hold 
in participants’ lives (V7) and the self-categorisation in the scale of political interest (V95).76 
During the interviews, participants were asked to identify their interest in Turkish politics and 
also their interest in international politics. They were also asked to note how much they 
follow what is going on in politics.  
 
Participation in Politics 
Another measure of political sophistication used in the interviews refers to participation in 
politics. The items I used fall into the categories of conventional and unconventional 
participation (Inglehart, 1977). To measure conventional participation, I asked participants 
about their electoral activity and in particular whether they voted in the last three general 
elections (2011, 2007 and 2002) and the last three local elections (2009, 2004 and 1999) as 
well as to name the party and the candidates they supported in these elections. Participants 
were also asked whether they are or have been in the past members of a political party 
(Barrett and Smith, 2014). Moving to participation that aims to influence politics through 
indirect means, participants were asked whether they attended demonstrations during the past 
years as well as whether they discussed about politics with friends (Verba and Nie, 1972, 
1995; Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Barrett and Smith, 2014).  
 
Educational Level 
The level of education appears to be a decisive factor of citizens’ political attitude that 
determines their level of political sophistication (Zaller, 1992; Luskin, 1990). Therefore, both 
in the WVS (V238) and interviews to measure education I asked participants what was the 
highest level of education they have attained.  
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 Importance of politics in life is measured on a 4-point scale where 1 is very important and 4 not at all 
important. Interest in politics is measured on a 4-point scale where 1 means not interested at all and 4 very 
interested. 
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6.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter discussed the methodological approach that I employed in my study for the 
empirical investigation of the affective, cognitive and motivational determinants of the public 
opinion in Turkey. Drawing upon political psychology, I used survey data to identify the 
cognitive-based function of political ideology, values and sophistication that drive citizens’ 
attitudinal responses towards politics and interview data to assess the interlink between the 
cognitive, affective and motivational mechanisms that formulate citizens’ political 
judgements. 
My methodological approach follows the suggestion by Jick that ‘the use of multi-
methods can […] lead to a synthesis or integration of theories’ (1979, p. 609). Combining 
survey data and interviews my study puts into test hypotheses from political psychology 
literature in the context of Turkey and reveals important insights into role that ideological 
inclinations, value-orientations, political sophistication and emotions play in citizens’ 
political behaviour. 
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Chapter 7. Data Analysis and Findings: Political Ideology 
 
This chapter presents the empirical findings of my work on the role of ideological 
considerations on citizens’ political behaviour in Turkey. The discussion addresses the results 
across the three studies on the cognitive, affective and motivational nature of political 
ideology. The chapter is divided into five distinct parts corresponding to the objectives of my 
work in regards to the role of political ideology. Analytically, I discuss participants’ 
understanding of the key ideological divisions of political Islam-Kemalism, left-right and 
liberalism-conservatism, their self-placement and their placement of key political actors on 
these axes. I also address participants’ evaluations of key political actors along with their own 
voting preferences and party identification. My main aim in this chapter is to assess the 
cognitive and motivational structure that underlies participants’ ideology-based 
considerations. I am interested in the coherence and consistency between citizens’ ideological 
understanding and orientations; and focus on the role that political sophistication plays in 
shaping participants orientations and judgements. 
 
7.1.Perceptions and Understandings of Key Political Ideologies 
In this section, I discuss participants’ perceptions of the key ideological dichotomies that 
dominate the socio-political arena of Turkey. Namely, I look into their understanding of the 
divisions based on political Islam-Kemalism as well as left-right and liberalism- conservatism 
differentiation. Due to the nature of these questions, the findings presented here focus on the 
qualitative interview data.  
 
Dominance of Political Islam versus Kemalism 
When asked about the importance of the political Islam- Kemalism dichotomy, the majority 
of participants (17 out of 25 interviewees) notes that this division is central in the Turkish 
public sphere with the two ends forming the basis for all other ideological subdivisions (left-
right, liberalism-conservatism) that exist in Turkey. For these interviewees what drives the 
ideological divisions that come into play in Turkey are the role that religion plays in society 
and secularism. However, there are a few participants (5 out of 25) that point to the lower 
significance of the political Islam-Kemalism division. For these interviewees, this dichotomy 
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has been overrun by more modern ideological tendencies such as the left-right or liberal 
conservatism divisions. Political sophistication plays a significant role in driving the 
justification of the importance of the political Islam-Kemalism division. High sophisticates 
are able to rely upon their knowledge of the main ideological orientations whereas low 
sophisticates find it easier to refer to examples from the everyday life i.e. certain policies that 
have had an actual impact on the social arena to justify their position. 
 
Conceptualization of Political Islam and Kemalism 
Looking at perceptions of political Islam interviewees’ responses point to a clear demarcation 
between the boundaries that divide the two camps. One the one side, there are those who hold 
a clear and hostile position against the involvement of religion in the political life and who 
are openly against the AKP -viewed as an advocator of political Islam- and its policies. On 
the other side, there are those interviewees who deny the existence of political Islam yet 
acknowledge the importance of Islam and who are in support of the AKP or MHP.  
Political Islam is being understood by a large number of participants as the 
involvement of religion in the political life of the country or in other words the politicisation 
of Islam and its rules (17 out of 25).
77
 These participants are either CHP or TKP voters. The 
common aspect between their views is their negative stance towards political Islam pointing 
to AKP and the party’s attempts to bring religion and in particular Islam into the centre of the 
socio-political life. Several participants point to the party’s self-declaration as neoliberal 
supporting the promotion of religious freedoms and individual rights in order to acquire a 
legal justification for their political actions (9 out of 25). For these participants that oppose 
political Islam and its practices in Turkey, AKP is a clear advocator of political Islam 
suppressing individual rights and freedoms while also deepening the polarization of the 
country between its supporters and opponents. Similar arguments come from those 
interviewees that place themselves on the extreme and far left side of the political spectrum. 
According to these participants, political Islam through the AKP has managed to dominate 
the political life and control not only everyday practices and the political environment but 
also individual rights and freedoms for those who hold opposing attitudes against the ruling 
party. Interestingly, amongst those participants who are against political Islam (and AKP) a 
few high sophisticates point to the party’s roots in the political Islamist tradition of the 
country and highlight its aim to impose political Islam in the socio-political arena (6 out of 
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 As interviewee no.4 argued ‘political Islam uses people’s faith for political purposes’. 
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25).
78
 Low sophisticates, rely predominantly on the religious aspect focusing in particular on 
the extensive use of religion by AKP aiming to change the society from secular to Islamic.  
In addition, a few participants (4 out of 25), in addressing the connection between 
political Islam and AK Party refer to certain policy changes that point to the increasing 
inclusion of religion in public life. Characteristically, these participants address a number of 
policies that were promoted by AKP such as changes in the educational system (with the 
increase of the religious Imam Hatip schools and the following decrease in the numbers of 
secular schools
79
), the lift of the headscarf ban in universities and public buildings in 2013 
(which opened the door to covered females to enter higher education institutions as well as to 
hold public offices) as well as the increase in the number of mosques that have been built 
especially since 2009. By referring to these examples of Islam entering the social and 
political life though public policies and governmental decisions, they highlight the 
centralisation of religion in certain aspects of the public life which according to them 
signifies a conservative step towards the ‘Islamization of the society’ to use the words of 
interviewee no.25. Political sophistication mediates participants’ views in an interesting 
fashion. Specifically, high sophisticates refer to actual policies that have been implemented 
by AKP whereas low sophisticates refer to examples that come from their everyday life such 
as the increase of mosques all across Turkey as well as the more extensive use of headscarves 
in Istanbul.  
Contrary to these views, there are also a few participants that deny the view of 
political Islam as an ideology that exists in Turkey (8 out of 25). These are AKP and MHP 
voters. They share the acknowledgement of the distinction between Islam as a religion and 
political Islam. They unanimously note that Islam is a religion and therefore comprises a 
deeply personal matter, which has no involvement in the political life. Characteristically as 
interviewee no.2 noted:  
‘I don’t see political Islam as an ideology. Islam is not about the politics. I am a 
Muslim. My religion contains rules for my life but Islam does not have rules that 
concern politics. What Islam says is that everything should be done in a fair manner. 
Religion is concerned only with the fairness of the governance and is not interested in 
whether someone is religious or not’.  
                                                 
78
 For instance, three participants refer to the National Outlook Movement (Milli Gorus) as well as the 28 
February 1997 military memorandum as indicators of the deep politicization of Islam paving the path for the 
increasing role of religion in the country. 
79
 Imam Hatip schools are religious vocational high schools in Turkey. As part of the educational reform 
introduced by AKP in 2012 religious schools were also introduced as an alternative to secondary stage 
schooling.  
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MHP voters also acknowledge that Turkey is a Muslim country suggesting that the existence 
of Islam-friendly policies is key in sustaining the national unity. Yet, about 8 participants (of 
25) do not associate political Islam with the AKP. Of these, 6 use the official rhetoric of the 
party and Erdoğan in justifying their position, by referring to the party’s self-classification as 
a liberal conservative actor. They note that Islam is the country’s official religion, which 
naturally provides the basis for more religion-friendly policies. Yet they all deny openly the 
involvement of Islam in political life. However, although supporters of AKP deny the party’s 
Islamist orientation, they acknowledge the importance given to religion by referring to the 
increasing freedoms of religious expression. In fact this is viewed as a very positive aspect of 
the AKP’s political establishment. Nevertheless, a few high sophisticates among the AKP 
voters express concerns in regards to the increasing role of religion in society promoted by 
AKP (2 out of 25). Similarly, MHP voters note that there are no parties that represent 
political Islam in Turkey highlighting that it is to an extent natural for Islam being in the 
middle of politics considering that religion in Turkey is a factor of national unity. 
 Moving to the conceptualisation of Kemalism, the vast majority of participants relate 
it with the principles and ideas of the founder of the Republic. The majority of participants 
note that the Kemalist ideology is based on secularism and its opposition to the role of Islam 
in society (17 out of 25). In addition, a very large number of interviewees share the opinion 
that Kemalism is a synonym to modernization and westernisation for the Turkish case 
pointing to Kemalism as the creator of a combination of Turkishness and a Western version 
of modernization (14 out of 25).
80
 
 Assessing interviewees positioning towards Kemalism yields more complicated 
findings than those presented for political Islam. In first instance, there are those interviewees 
who hold a positive attachment and provide a favourable discussion on what is Kemalism. 
Then, there are interviewees who are favourable to Kemalism but disappointed for its current 
representation by the CHP. There are also those that oppose Kemalism and its principles 
altogether. Analytically, a good number of participants adopt and support a traditional 
approach of Kemalism (4 out of 25), by remaining faithful to the ideology as created by 
Kemal Ataturk pointing to the need to continue his legacy in order to avoid Turkey stepping 
backwards towards religious conservatism. For these participants, the danger that is posed by 
AKP and its party policies and actions - that point to conservatism and the increasing role of 
Islam in the society -, is key for sustaining the view that is necessary to keep alive and 
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 According to interviewee no.16 ‘Kemalism is the Turkish version of the French enlightenment.’ 
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promote the Kemalist values. Through their eyes, Kemalism is the only ideology that can 
provide an alternative reality to ensure the country’s democratisation and modernization 
process while remaining faithful to the principles of secularism and nationalism. These 
participants hold a critical approach in regards to how Kemalism is currently being 
implemented by its main advocator, the CHP. Specifically, a few participants criticize the 
left-leaning direction the party has adopted through its socio-democratic turn moving away 
from the original ideological principles (2 out of 25).
81
 
Several participants also hold a favourable yet critical point of view towards 
Kemalism (10 out of 25). They acknowledge the important contribution of Ataturk and hold 
the view that Kemalism is the only source of secularism in the country. However, they note 
that its current advocators along with the citizens have failed to adjust and develop the 
Kemalist principles in order to fit to the needs of the current socio-political setting of the 
country. In other words, they are in support of Kemalism; yet they argue that its interpretation 
and the way it has been promoted in the society needs to change in order to serve the current 
social and political needs of the country. To use the words of interviewee no.6: 
‘We are still trying to continue what Kemal left approximately 80 years ago. […] 
Kemal was urging people to become reformists, democrats, defenders of the 
Constitution and the Turkish Republic. But our times have truly changed, everything 
has changed and we have yet to adjust to the needs of today’.  
The interviewees that point to the need of changing Kemalism in order to reflect the needs of 
the new society base their justification on a number of indicators such as the country’s 
economic development, the appearance of the new middle-class but also to the way that 
religion is implemented in the personal and public space. Interview no. 22 summarizes this 
view nicely:  
‘The way that peoples’ lives have changed, the way we consume and we invest money 
also changed. A new middle class has emerged and is now trying to climb higher 
towards the social ladder. The beliefs of people have changed too. There are people 
who are deeply religious, they follow religious practices but they are open to 
alternative views to the extent their rights are not violated. This is normal in the sense 
that everyone should be free to live in the way he chooses to of course without 
restricting others’. 
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 Interviewee no.3 suggested ‘I am closer to Kemalism. But not the left leaning Kemalism that is being 
promoted by the current CHP, I definitely do not belong to the left side of it. I am a strong admirer of the 
Kemalist revolution and the changes it brought in the society’.  
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They express favourable opinions on the socio-democratic turn of the CHP hoping that the 
party will manage to play a more active role in line with the emerging social and political 
problems. Several interviewees also point openly to the past mistakes made by the Kemalist 
political elites trying to oppose certain lifestyle choices oppressing a large segment of the 
population, as opposed to the current outlook of the CHP supporting a more open and 
democratic view of the society (4 out of 25).  
There are also those participants that oppose Kemalism and its founding principles. 
The common argument among them is that the Kemalist elites - during their domination in 
the socio-political arena of the country - have imposed their own views in the society without 
however considering alternative values and ideas, and disregarded opposing opinions. In 
particular, a source of strong opposition comes from those participants that self-identify as 
communists or with the far-left (3 out of 25). For these interviewees, Kemalism - similar to 
political Islam - poses a danger to individual freedoms and rights and represents an 
alternative route to oppression. In other words, they compare Kemalism to a dictatorship. An 
oppositional view to Kemalism is also expressed by AKP supporters (6 out of 25) who view 
Kemalism as posing a threat to individual rights and freedoms by opposing certain groups of 
the population ‘in the name of saving the country’ to use the words of interviewee no.2. 
Again those who are in support of AKP, characterize the Kemalist rule as a dictatorship that 
seek to create a society based on the Kemalist ideals against any opposing voice, promoting a 
high level of conservatism and leaving no space for the expression of alternative views. 
Interestingly both sides that express a negative attitude towards Kemalism (those in the 
extreme left and those in support of AKP) identify Kemalism and its implementation as a key 
driver for the existing levels of polarization in the Turkish society. As interviewee no.17 
noted:  
‘One of the worse things of Kemalism is that it made people angry, it managed to 
polarise the society mainly because of the oppression it imposed on religious people. 
It created a system of hate against the others’.  
A similar critical approach is also promoted by the far-right nationalist voters of MHP who 
see Kemalism as posing a threat to the nation by referring to the Westernization attempts and 
the negative effects towards the Turkish nation and its Islamic character (2 out of 25). For 
these participants Kemalism failed to protect its nationalist stance. They hold a negative view 
of the religious oppression as well as the domination of the Kemalist elites against its 
opponents.  
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 From the above, we see that the interviewees’ party preferences, personal values 
(religion and modernization) and political values (freedom of religion and individual rights) 
are important in shaping their conceptualization and understanding of the two ideological 
orientations of political Islam and Kemalism. Political sophistication seems to play an 
interesting role. Sophistication acts as a moderator driving the attitudes interviewees express. 
High sophisticates, formulate attitudes that are well explained with examples that refer to 
history, political parties and positions as well as public policies and their political values, 
whereas low sophisticates, rely predominantly on their party attachment and refer to aspects 
that are easier to grasp and that are linked to their value-orientations such as the issue of 
religion and individual rights as well as oppression of certain rights (such as freedoms of 
religious expression). 
 
Commonalities and Differences between Political Islam and Kemalism 
In addressing the differences between political Islam and Kemalism the majority of 
interviewees draw clear-cut boundaries between the two ends of the spectrum. However, 
there is a divergence when it comes to the specifics of this differentiation.  
The vast majority of participants - who identify with the Kemalist camp - when 
discussing the conflictual relationship between political Islam and Kemalism, acknowledge 
that their differences shape the basis for the deep fragmentation of the Turkish society (17 out 
of 25). For these interviewees the fundamental distinction between the two camps lay on the 
simple - yet very meaningful for its impact on social practices - division between the Islamist 
versus secularist principles. On the one side, there is political Islam, that follows a religious 
interpretation of the state based on the Islamic traditions and culture, and for which religion is 
a driver of all aspects of public life. On the other side, there is Kemalism, that adopts a 
secular view of the state inspired by the Western and European models as well as the ideas of 
Enlightenment holding the view that the state and religion should be separate with religion 
placed outside of the public life while opposing any form of religious oppression and 
conservatism. Interviewee no.16 addresses the historical basis of Kemalism and political 
Islam by stating:  
‘What Kemal used as his main ideas is the homeland and the secular nation which is 
what ensures the integrity and unity of Turkey. On the other side political Islam relies 
predominantly on the role of religion in the society. This is the main difference 
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between the two. The one takes into account the country and the other has as priority 
the religion for the social and political life of the country.’ 
Another perspective comes from those participants who support Kemalist ideas yet sustain a 
critical perspective on their implementation. They view the current conflict between political 
Islam and Kemalism as a response to the past Kemalist status quo and the attempts of the 
Kemalist elites to dominate state institutions and shape the society according to certain norms 
(5 out of 25).
82
 These participants view the current domination of political Islam through 
AKP as a reactive response to the past domination of Kemalism in the attempt to get back the 
previous losses that citizens experienced due to the Kemalist establishment.
83
 Specifically, 
some participants point to the AKP’s repression of certain lifestyle choices (such as the 
consumption of alcohol in public or the abstention from religious practices), viewing them as 
a response to the past Kemalist policies. These are blamed because they restricted religion to 
private life, abolishing all religious inspired cultures and traditions while at the same time 
repressing certain religious segments of the population. Interestingly, some interviewees 
discuss negatively the changes promoted by the AKP in several state institutions such as 
universities, the army, the judiciary system, the Higher Education Council (YÖK), security 
forces (police and army) which in the past where under the control of the Kemalist CHP (3 
out of 25).  
An interesting perspective is expressed from these participants who belong to the 
extreme-left side of the ideological spectrum (3 out of 25). For them, Kemalism and political 
Islam are different expressions of conservatism. They justify this position by acknowledging 
that both sides try to impose a certain lifestyle in accordance to their worldviews of the 
society. As interviewee no.23 notes:  
‘The conflict between the two worlds is at the end of the day a conflict of lifestyles’.84 
They point to the obstacles that the polarization between political Islam and Kemalism 
creates to individual rights and freedoms, but also to the country’s development and 
democratic future. They suggest that both orientations try forcefully to fit all citizens within 
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 Interviewee no.4 suggests that ‘whoever is not a supporter of AKP is angry, but those in support of AKP and 
especially those from the lower classes believe they finally got a government that truly represents them. To give 
you a simple example, AKP is now saying “its our turn, now we will do the things the past elites where doing ’. 
83
 Interviewee no. 1 notes: ‘Kemalism represents the old status quo with all that implies. Political Islam is the 
new state that followed and tries now to impose its own principles and set up its own guidelines on how things 
should work. That is the source of the conflict’. 
84
 Interviewee no.25 suggests that both ideological orientations ‘construct a different type of citizen; those that 
blindly support Islam and its involvement in the political life and those that although are Muslims they support 
Kemalism and want religion out of the public life. These two types of people are in a direct conflict at the social 
level: supporters of AKP and CHP represent these two types of people.’ 
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their own pattern of how things should be, while at the same time oppose with all means 
everyone that goes against their own principles. An interesting example comes from 
interviewee no.17: 
‘[…] Let’s take the headscarf for example. On the one side, Islamists want to impose 
the headscarf because it is an Islamic tradition, whereas on the other side, Kemalists 
want to abolish the use of headscarf because religion should remain in the private 
sphere. However, this issue is exclusively a personal one and individuals should take 
their own decision freely. The headscarf issue should not be a part of any kind of 
political oppression’.  
For these participants, the issue of religion has been extensively used both by political Islam 
and Kemalism in order to sustain a deep polarization within the society while at the same 
time preserving a social conflict on the basis of religion, which does not leave the space for 
expressing other kind of political motives. Referring to the clash between these two 
worldviews participants point to the existence of fanatic supporters of the two sides who are 
protecting their own ideals through their support of the two ideological spaces, which results 
in the enhancement of their conflict in the society. In providing more personal details two of 
these participants note that they have to individually struggle in order to keep their political 
identity intact since their ideological views oppose both Kemalism and political Islam.  
Drawing upon these perceptions, the majority of interviewees view the two ideologies 
as being under an endless conflict due to their main principles and opposite worldviews. 
Interestingly, the conflict between political Islam and Kemalism is viewed as the key cause 
for the creation of a deep social conflict that during the time of the interviews seems to 
intensify. The reason for this is the AKP’s electoral landslide wins of past decade and its 
governance. For instance, there are participants who point to an increasing polarization of the 
society especially after 2010. In their view, this also affects the everyday interactions with 
friends and colleagues. It is not limited anymore to the voting booth and electoral outcomes 
but instead has brought politics back into the centre of everyday life. The impact of this 
increasing polarization seems to have started affecting social ties and public interaction 
intensifying the division between political Islam and Kemalism and its party advocators as 
well as other political forces against political Islam and AKP.
85
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 As interviewee no.5 notes ‘The key commonality between the two is that they both manage to attract citizens 
resulting in a deep social division that translates into those who support AKP and the others, the majority of 
which supports the CHP’.  
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A different opinion comes from 8 participants who acknowledge that the conflict 
between political Islam and Kemalism is out-dated and does not reflect the current reality of 
the country. In more detail, this view is expressed by AKP supporters who deny the party’s 
connection with political Islam, as well as MHP voters who deny the existence of political 
Islam in the country. Among these, 4 participants note that political Islam is not existent in 
Turkey while they point to AKP as an advocator of conservative liberalism promoting greater 
respect towards religion and individual freedoms and rights (4 out of 25). There are also 2 
interviewees, who view the division between political Islam and Kemalism as posing a great 
danger to the society since the focus is always on what happens domestically ignoring the 
international political arena, which in turn weakens Turkey’s position in the world. By 
referring to the conflict between political Islam and Kemalism they bring to the fore a 
number of considerations in regards to the democratic and economic development of the 
country along with its EU prospect. Similar opinions that reject the existence of political 
Islam in Turkey are expressed by the 2 nationalist supporters of MHP. They justify their 
position by pointing at the role of religion as a unifying factor among the population in 
Turkey rather than an element of backwardness as opposed to Kemalism.  
Levels of political sophistication play an important role in shaping the reasoning 
behind participants’ position towards the commonalities and differences between political 
Islam and Kemalism. Specifically, high sophisticates rely on their knowledge of the 
principles that relate the two ideologies whereas novices mainly refer to those issues that are 
in line with their personal and political values such as religiosity, individual rights and 
freedoms to express their views on the two ideologies. Accordingly, high sophisticates refer 
to the ideological principles promoted by the key party actors of political Islam and 
Kemalism whereas low sophisticates rely on their values and the main party actors as take the 
key parties as their starting point in explaining their ideological orientations. 
 
Coexistence of political Islam and Kemalism 
Another aspect that surfaced during the interviews concerns attitudes towards the coexistence 
of political Islam and Kemalism at the social level. Also in this case, the ideas presented by 
the interviewees vary significantly. In short, there are a number of participants that reject the 
possibility of a peaceful coexistence between the two ideologies. This is because of the 
incompatibility between the underpinning principles of each ideology but it is also due to the 
political agents that represent the two poles. For others, the only way to achieve a peaceful 
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society free from the domination of these dichotomies is the creation of a new ideological 
pole that is progressively abandoning the country’s political heritage. There are also some 
participants that although they acknowledge the conflictual nature of the two orientations 
they note that at the societal level citizens in Turkey have learnt how to coexist peacefully 
disregarding their differences in everyday life.  
The vast majority of participants reject the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of the 
two ideological sides with most interviewees pointing at their fundamental differences. These 
involve issues such as religion, the state, national identity and individual freedoms and rights 
(18 out of 25). Interestingly, some of the interviewees that belong to the extreme-left 
highlight the conservative nature of the current establishment and point to the need of 
creating an alternative third pole in order to absorb and reduce the effects of the conflict 
between political Islam and Kemalism at the social level (2 out of 25). These participants, by 
keeping their distance from both sides, refer to the conflict between political Islam and 
Kemalism as politically constructed on the basis of superficial differences that disregard the 
actual problems in the society and which aim to sustain the political polarization of the 
country’s population. Specifically, they suggest that political Islam and Kemalism use Islam 
and secular nationalism by employing oppressive means in order to capture citizens within 
their political lines aiming to increase their political gains (for their corresponding political 
actors of the AKP and CHP).
86
 
 A few participants (4 out of 25) that are also coming from the socio-democratic 
segment of CHP note that citizens in Turkey ‘have learnt and gotten used to be divided on 
these two oppositional camps’ to use the words from interviewee no.16. Interestingly for 
these interviewees, the co-existence of the two antithetical ideologies is perceived as natural 
since their conflict has dominated the socio-political environment of the country since its 
early establishment. However, as they note, because citizens have been accustomed to this 
ideological conflict its impact on the everyday life is less evident. For instance, a few 
interviewees (2 out of 25) point to their families and the variety of ideological tendencies 
family members represent yet coexisting all together. To use the words of interviewee no. 4: 
‘we all sit around the same table, talk, disagree, argue and the next day we will still be eating 
at the same table doing it all over again’.  
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 As interviewee no. 21 notes ‘this conflict between AKP and CHP, political Islam and Islamists and Kemalists 
is fake and is constructed for political purposes. For instance the main political parties tell the people that they 
have to choose sides. Yet me like many others do not want to pick a side. They don’t agree with any of the two.’ 
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Another participant points to this ‘habit of coexisting’ by referring to the Ottoman years with 
the Empire being the house of several cultures, religions, ethnicities yet all coexisting 
together. However, three out of these participants point to a significant change that has been 
undergoing in the past years and especially from 2007 onwards with ideological and political 
tensions becoming increasingly more prominent at the social level. To use the words of 
interview no. 12: 
‘[…] Personal boundaries have been limited, people react momentarily and there is 
not much tolerance left. I don’t know why this happened, I cannot blame AKP for that 
but certainly this swift change happened under the governance of AKP. This kind of 
polarization that affects our tolerance and our willingness to engage with people that 
hold different opinions was not there before’.  
The key reason for that - according to those participants - is to be found at the political level, 
because of the way dominant parties negotiate their differences and react at the social level. 
Referring to it as a chain of events interviewee no.12, suggests that once a certain level of 
intolerance comes in to the fore, eventually this reflects in the society. According to these 
participants, under the AKP governance the deep polarization in the society has increased, 
and levels of tolerance turned very low, with citizens being increasingly unwilling to accept 
opposite ideas and opinions.  
Looking at the role of political sophistication on interviewees’ views towards the 
nature of the existence of both political Islam and Kemalism, an interesting trend emerges. 
Sophisticates rely on their ideological orientations and understanding to conceptualise the 
conflictual basis of the society whereas novices refer mainly to every day practices and their 
own experiences to justify their positions. 
 
Conservatism versus Liberalism  
The next ideological dichotomy that was addressed during the interviews touched upon the 
conservatism-liberalism division. Here, participants are asked to explain their understanding 
of the two poles. A large number of participants openly address the complexity of the 
application of liberalism-conservatism dichotomy in Turkey (21 out of 25). A shared view 
among a large number of interviewees (13 out of 25) looks at conservatism as the 
preservation of traditions and cultures whereas liberalism promotes a more liberal and 
modern outlook of the society, which focuses predominantly on economic growth and 
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development. However, this is not shared among all participants with several interviewees 
addressing a more complex outlook of the two ends.  
An important aspect to note is that the vast majority of interviewees (17 out of 25) 
when asked to explain what the two ends of the conservatism-liberalism pole mean for the 
Turkish political arena draw upon Kemalism and political Islam and their party advocators 
CHP and AKP respectively. In fact throughout the interviews participants used the terms of 
liberalism-conservatism in order to characterize the principles supported by both ideological 
camps. For instance, a number of opponents of Kemalism that come from the extreme-left as 
well as the AKP refer to Kemalism as a conservative ideology by default (6 out of 25). In 
explaining this, a few participants note that although in terms of its outlook Kemalism 
appears to be liberal promoting Western ideals and a more European outlook and progressive 
economic policies for the society, its vision for the state and the society is deeply 
conservative (3 out of 25). As they suggest, Kemalism as set by the founder of the Republic 
is a deeply conservative ideology that considers the state as sacred in the sense of its primary 
importance over any other aspect of the society imposing a social cohesion necessary to 
sustain the Republican state (2 out of 25). At the same time, 6 interviewees identify with the 
AK Party and consider themselves as conservatives. For them, AKP represents a conservative 
outlook for the society that aims to protect the tradition and culture of Turkey that is based on 
religion and which ensures the authentic Islamic character of the country both domestically 
and internationally.  
A number of participants coming from diverse political camps (such as voters of the 
AKP, CHP and MHP) note that conservatism and liberalism have many faces in the Turkish 
society (7 out of 25). Many point to the existence of various modes that combine 
conservatism with the existing ideological orientations (8 out of 25). As interviewee no.17 
noted:  
‘A person can be religious and conservative or religious and liberal. Religion has 
always played a key role in all aspects of life.’  
In addition, interviewee no.3 suggested:  
‘Conservatism in Turkey has a religious shade but it is not only that. Conservatism 
can have many faces that are not all necessarily bad. For instance the preservation of 
traditions can be seen as conservatism but this is not a negative thing! Kemalism is a 
conservative ideology too. If you are a conservative you should protect traditions and 
culture but also you have to protect your nation and your state too. And this in my 
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opinion can help a lot our society. The most important thing is how conservative ideas 
are being implemented’.  
Interestingly, a good number of interviewees (10 out of 25) note that the AKP’s version of 
liberal conservatism is the dominant direction in the country nowadays. This perception is 
shared between two opposing groups of citizens. First, those in support of the governing AKP 
(6 out of 25) for whom the liberal conservative ideas held by the Party are the only way 
forward for Turkey. In explaining this ideological tendency these interviewees suggest that it 
promotes a conservative outlook of the society where Islamic tradition and culture play a 
driving role combined with a more liberal direction for the economy, individual rights and 
freedoms.
87
 At the same time, there are also some interviewees (4 out of 25) that even if 
against the AKP, acknowledge the changing face of ideologies and camps which led to the 
creation of an amalgam of liberalism and conservatism under the governing party’s flag for 
electoral purposes. As interviewee no.20 noted:  
‘Nowadays the liberalism-conservatism [typology] is more commonly used rather 
than the left-right one. Politics in Turkey are always discussed by focusing on parties. 
AKP is considered as centre-right and conservative and MHP lies on the extreme-
right. CHP on the other side is considered as centre-left and liberal and on the left 
and extreme-left belong the communists and anarchists’.  
At the same time, a number of interviewees oppose the existence of liberal conservatism by 
viewing the two ends of liberalism and conservatism as two diametrically antithetical 
ideological orientations that cannot go together (7 out of 25). These participants are 
opponents of the governing party coming either from the extreme-left side of the political 
spectrum, the moderate Kemalist camp as well as the traditional Kemalist camp suggesting 
that the promotion of this tendency that combines liberalism and conservatism in fact 
 ‘hinders the promotion of truly conservative and Islamic principles in the society 
under a liberal framework of the economy which is nothing else than the promotion of 
the capitalist needs of the society’ to use the words of interviewee no.21. 
What results from the discussion on the liberalism-conservatism continuum, is that the vast 
majority of participants seem comfortable in using political parties in order to explain 
ideological dichotomies rather than using ideological principles in order to classify existing 
political parties. Yet, this seems to vary on the basis of the level of political sophistication, 
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 Interviewee no.12 notes ‘In Turkey the biggest ideology is the liberal conservative one. To explain this., the 
person that promotes liberal principles in economy and politics and supports Islam and its principles and 
lifestyle in their personal life belong to the liberal conservative group. According to the standards of Turkey this 
is the biggest ideological orientation and is currently represented by the AK Party’. 
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with low sophisticates using political parties to discuss ideological orientations and 
sophisticates being able to refer to ideological principles in order to classify existing political 
parties on the ideological continuums. 
 
Left-Right 
For many participants there is an appreciation of the existence of the left-right ideological 
continuum yet the discussion focuses on the way the two poles adjust to the existing 
ideological lines (17 out of 25). Some participants feel comfortable using the left-right axis 
and placing certain political parties on it using religion and secularism, acknowledging that 
the left-right division in Turkey works differently than in the Western world.  
 Along these lines, a number of participants (11 out of 25) acknowledge the left-right 
division; however, they point to several other ideological directions that come into play when 
placing key political actors on the left-right scale. In particular, the majority of these 
interviewees place the governing party to the centre-right, the nationalist MHP to the right 
and the Kemalist CHP to the centre-left side of the political spectrum. However, it is 
important to note that participants rely on the political Islam-Kemalism ideological principles 
and the corresponding values based on Islamism-secularism to justify their placement of the 
political actors in the left-right spectrum.  
There are also some participants (7 out of 25) that see the left-right division in Turkey 
as deeply problematic acknowledging that the boundaries between the two ends are blurred in 
the case of Turkey. According to these interviewees, the left-right continuum does not stand 
alone in the Turkish political scene; instead it adjusts on the basis of the dominant political 
Islam-Kemalism continuum. Kemalism is seen as an advocator of the left or centre-left with 
the CHP being its key party advocator and political Islam is seen as an advocator of the right 
or centre-right with AKP its key party advocator. An extract that summarizes in an interesting 
way the varying meanings that both ends of the left-right pole assume when applied to 
Turkey, comes from interviewee no.21:  
‘On the one hand, within the right you can see nationalists that promote Turkishness, 
Islamists that promote the importance of Islam and religion in general. On the other 
hand within the left you can also see nationalists that promote the nation and the 
state, secularists that want religion to go away from the public life and so on’. 
 A number of interviewees, also, present an easier and more straightforward opinion in 
regards to the extreme-left ends of the political spectrum (9 out of 25). Specifically, these 
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participants acknowledge the existence of the extreme-left holding more radical and 
revolutionary ideas such as communists, anarchists and other leftish groups that do not 
necessarily belong in a political party. In addition, for a couple of participants the left-right 
division in Turkey has been out-dated and replaced with the liberalism-conservatism 
application to the traditional political Islam- Kemalism ideological orientations (2 out of 25).  
Political sophisticates here follow the same pattern that I discussed earlier when I 
addressed the conservatism-liberalism division. High sophisticates, rely on the ideological 
lines as promoted by the key parties, whereas low sophisticates, rely predominantly on the 
placement of political parties on the ideological continuums justifying this by referring to 
certain positions promoted by the parties. 
 
7.2 Self-Placement on Ideological Poles 
Next, we see participants’ self-placement on the ideological continuums of political Islam -
Kemalism, conservatism-liberalism and left-right. Participants provide detailed responses on 
their individual positioning on these scales and discuss in-depth the considerations they take 
into account to justify their responses. 
 
Political Islam and Kemalism 
The majority of interviewees position themselves with relative ease on the political Islam- 
Kemalism continuum and are able to provide sufficient explanation for their choice. For those 
who are in support of the traditional Kemalism ideals, the legacy and the changes made by 
Ataturk in Turkey are of great significance for their ideological placement (4 out of 25). The 
vast majority of Kemalist supporters (regardless of whether they support the socio-
democratic tendency or the traditional Kemalism) report favourable positions on the Kemalist 
view of religion for the society, which goes against its involvement in the public life (9 out of 
25). Many also focus on the Western model of modernization that Kemalism brings to the 
society that opposes pro-Islamist, conservative views, seen as agents of backwardness (6 out 
of 8). Several interviewees also point at the importance of national unity that was promoted 
by Ataturk, which created a united nation under the same flag allowing for the formation of a 
secular and modern Turkish Republic (4 out of 25). The justification offered by these 
participants is very much linked to their levels of sophistication. High sophisticates, refer 
comfortably to the Kemalist directions for the society and express openly their opposition to 
Chapter 7. Data Analysis and Findings: Political Ideology 
 130 
the governing AKP as well as past political Islam agents. Low sophisticates, refer briefly to 
the Kemalist ideas mainly pointing to secularism and the importance of the nation yet they 
justify their position mainly referring to their opposition against AKP as an agent of political 
Islam focusing predominantly on the increasing role religion has been playing in the society. 
When it comes to self-placement on the political Islam end of the spectrum the picture 
is somewhat different. From my sample there is no participant that acknowledges their 
affiliation with political Islam; yet, there are those that declare their preference towards AKP 
(6 out of 25), which has been widely perceived as an agent of political Islam. In fact, these 
participants deny placing themselves on the political Islam-Kemalism continuum because 
they reject the existence of political Islam in Turkey while they view this division as old-
fashioned. The reasoning and justification of those interviewees that express their 
identification with AKP is more complicated. These participants - although they make clear 
their disagreement with political Islam as an ideology that promotes a pious society based on 
the Islamic values -, explain their support for the AK Party because of its views regarding the 
liberalisation of the economy, the conservative attitude towards minorities as well as the 
freedom of religious expression and individual rights the party has promoted. They also 
express their support to AKP because of the several changes the party has brought in regards 
to individual rights and freedoms - with special reference to religious freedoms - as opposed 
to the previous Kemalist elites that restricted the religious segments of the population. Yet, 
several interviewees (4 out of 25) acknowledge Islam as a significant unifying factor of the 
society that can protect the unity of the country but also its uniqueness against the western 
countries. Here political sophistication plays an important role. Sophisticated supporters of 
AKP (2 out of 25) hold a significant knowledge on the AK Party’s line on liberal 
conservatism and they seem to support this along with the party’s view on individual 
freedoms and religious rights. These participants also point to the privileges that society 
managed to get back and the appearance of a new middle class that was non-existent before 
the AKP’s economic policies (2 out of 25). For low sophisticates, the explanation of their 
affiliation with the AKP relies mainly on easier to grasp aspects such as the religious 
freedoms and rights that were granted through the AKP policies that allows them to express 
their religiosity openly without constraints, as well as the better economic conditions of the 
country (2 out of 4).  
A similar position is expressed by a few participants (2 out of 25) who prefer to not 
relate with any of the two ideological orientations but would rather pick the good sides from 
both in shaping their ideological inclinations going beyond the rigid boundaries of political 
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Islam and Kemalism. It is important to note, that these two participants cast their votes in 
support of AKP and report low levels of political sophistication. Their attitude demonstrates 
that the two poles are not totally incompatible at the individual level where certain ideas and 
beliefs come together to satisfy individual goals and values. For instance, they both place 
themselves right in the middle of the spectrum. They both express their preference of more 
liberal society with freedoms of religion as practised by AKP
88
 however they also note their 
support of a secular society with religion remaining in the private sphere. Participant no.9 
also expresses a positive outlook of the economic liberalism promoted by AKP but admits 
that the nationalism promoted by Kemalism implemented by Ataturk made Turkey a more 
cohesive and strong country. Interestingly interviewee no.9 concludes by saying: 
‘I would like to support the good sides from both poles but if I have to choose only 
one of the two then I don’t select any. I prefer to stay in the middle’.  
In a similar direction, there are also those participants that place themselves on the centre of 
the political Islam-Kemalism continuum closer to political Islam. Although these participants 
deny the existence of political Islam in Turkey they do not reject placing themselves on the 
axis. These interviewees, who both belong to the camp of the nationalist MH Party, express 
their support for a strong Turkish nation with Islamic characteristics, which should retain its 
secular nature but stay away from Westernisation and related processes that aim to transform 
the country and keep it away from its authentic Turkish Islamic outlook.
89
 
However, there are also several participants that opted out from placing themselves on 
the political Islam- Kemalism continuum due to their disagreement with both ideological 
lines as a matter of principles (8 out of 25). These opinions are expressed by three 
participants who self-identify with the extreme-left as well as five supporters of CHP who 
self-identify as socio-democratic supporters of the CHP. In justifying their choice, these 
interviewees, refer to the views that each side holds for both private and public life. For 
instance, a few interviewees point to the fundamental restrictions that result from the key 
principles that both ideological spaces place upon citizens in regards to freedoms and 
individual rights as well as the role of religion and its relationship with the state and public 
life. In an interesting extract when comparing both ideologies interviewee no.1, concludes 
that although they are restrictive - in the sense that they try to fit all individuals under the roof 
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 In a meaningful extract interviewee no.4 notes ‘I love Kemal, I am a Kemalist but I am not against all 
principles that AKP implements. For instance I totally agree with the entrance of women that wear headscarves 
in the universities. They should enter, they should wear the headscarf and whatever they want, it is really a 
matter of freedom and AKP is right in allowing this to happen.’ 
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 Both supporters of MHP report low levels of political sophistication and therefore it is impossible to assess 
the effects of sophistication on their self-placement choices here. 
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of one ideology regardless of individual and group differences -, he believes that political 
Islam appears to be a bit more restrictive for his own lifestyle and worldview. However, as he 
notes, if Kemalism gets back its power it will also impose certain rules in regards to lifestyle 
choices on the basis of its guiding principles resulting in a similar situation to the current one 
experienced under the AKP rule. Sophistication here seems to play an important role. High 
sophisticates, reject their placement on the scale mainly due to their ideological disagreement 
with both orientations, and instead justify their electoral choices on the basis of the existing 
political actors. Low sophisticates, on the other hand, highlight the conservative ideas 
promoted by both ends while acknowledging certain principles of the Kemalist camp, which 
advocate more modern ideals.  
 
Liberalism- Conservatism 
The vast majority of participants when asked to place themselves on the liberalism-
conservatism continuum draw upon party politics and the way certain parties represent and 
promote the two ideological ends. Yet, only a few participants are able to position themselves 
on these poles having a more critical approach on how parties adopt and promote each side. 
These participants adopt a selective view of the liberalism-conservatism debate and few of 
them, even manage to pick and combine elements from both sides. However, it is important 
to note that the majority of participants refrain or express a great difficulty from placing 
themselves on the liberalism-conservatism scale acknowledging the inadequacy of this 
division to capture the Turkish political scene (17 out of 25).  
 Those participants that are voters of CHP report a difficulty in picking sides (14 out of 
25). Among CHP supporters, those who are high sophisticates and supporters of the 
traditional Kemalist agenda declare their agreement with the conservative side of Kemalism 
that promotes a secular republican state and the unity of the nation under one flag away from 
any form of religious domination and combating all threats coming from minorities (2 out of 
25). For these interviewees, the Kemalist inheritance has great importance for preserving the 
state and the social cohesion in society. Those who report low levels of sophistication and are 
supporters of Kemalism do not seem to be able to express a clear self-placement on 
liberalism-conservatism yet they refer to the progressive nature of Kemalism and its 
modernization attempts for the society (2 out of 24). Those participants, who support the 
socio-democratic turn of the Kemalist CHP, advocate great support of individual rights and 
freedoms away from the conservatism promoted in the past by the Kemalist elites (10 out of 
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12). The high sophisticates (2 out of 10) rely on the new turn that CH Party has started 
following with the party’s new leadership (i.e. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu). Low sophisticates (8 out 
of 10) who are predominantly younger, demonstrate the social and democratic position that 
the party holds referring to their opposition against the AKP’s domination blaming the 
party’s conservative outlook that promoted the Islamic principles and culture in Turkey going 
against the Kemalist secular principles. The majority of interviewees here - regardless of their 
level of sophistication - address again the liberal conservative rhetoric used by AKP in order 
to attract voters and promote its Islam-based agenda.  
AKP voters place themselves on the liberal conservative side, combining elements 
coming from both directions (6 out of 25). This in fact goes in agreement with the liberal 
conservative agenda of the AKP. Political sophistication, in this case, plays a conditioning 
role. Sophisticates seem to prioritize materialistic considerations which bring them in support 
to the AKP’s administration liberalising the economy of the country, creating a new strong 
middle class that is free to go up the social ladder without restrains. They also point to the 
liberalisation of religious expression by AKP putting an end to the exclusion of those 
religious segments of the population from participating actively in the socio-economic 
sphere. This is in direct opposition to the sense of exclusion caused because of the approach 
followed by the past Kemalist elites (2 out of 25). However, both interviewees express some 
concerns in regards to the increasing power held by Erdoğan as well as the AKP’s focus on 
Islamic practices that favour a religious/Islamic outlook of the society. Novices, on the other 
side, express a different side of reasoning (4 out of 25). They keep their distance from the old 
Kemalist establishment and while they position themselves far from political Islam they 
suggest that AK Party has managed to offer a liberal alternative to society. In particular, it has 
offered religious freedoms allowing those that want to follow they Islamic traditions and 
principles can do so in public and not only in their private space.
90
 They also point to the 
good economic condition of the country under AKP and its liberal logic.  
Looking at the supporters of the nationalist MH Party, they openly position 
themselves on the conservative end of the spectrum highlighting that a strong state that can 
protect Turkish citizens can only be promoted by conservative principles that respect the 
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 Interviewee no.10 notes ‘I am conservative in the sense that I do follow the religious rule of Islam in my 
personal life. To give you an example, in the One Love festival the use of alcohol was banned. I went to the 
festival, I don’t drink alcohol because I don’t like it but it’s also a religious choice yet I don’t think that banning 
alcohol was correct. People should have a choice to drink. Or another example, take a person that expresses an 
opinion about women who are covered. Again that is not right, everyone should be free to express themselves in 
whichever way they feel like. These are all to say that I am both conservative but also liberal because I believe 
in the individual freedoms’.  
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authentic combination of Islam and secularism in Turkey (2 out of 25). Yet they both focus 
on the importance of the national unity and the focus that needs to be drawn on issues that are 
putting the country in danger such as the Kurdish issue. A different perspective is promoted 
by those that place themselves on the far-left (3 out of 25). They refrain from choosing a side 
on the liberalism-conservatism continuum highlighting their disagreement with both sides 
and pointing at the fluidity of both ends with AKP promoting liberal conservatism and 
Kemalism being a highly conservative political ideology.  
Political sophistication here conditions participants’ ability to pick sides on the 
liberalism-conservatism continuum. Sophisticates, sustain positions that point to a consistent 
and systematic system of beliefs that acknowledges the ideological basis of each side as 
expressed by the key political actors. Novices, demonstrate a mixture of opinions, which 
point to the complexity of the political actors in Turkey with both actors of AKP and CHP 
trying to adjust their face vis-à-vis the current political arena by updating their ideological 
positions. 
 
Left-Right 
The final ideological continuum I focus on pertains to the left-right division. The WVS 
survey data reveal an interesting pattern in regards to the self-placement of participants on the 
left-right scale. As Table 7.1 below shows in the results of a regression analysis with left-
right orientations as the dependent variable, attachment to Islamism predicts left-right 
placement, generating an increase of .34 points to the right. Interestingly there is no statistical 
indication that points to the opposite direction for those citizens that attach to the Kemalist 
side of the ideological camps. This could be explained by the recent attempts of the CHP to 
reorganize its political identity with a focus on the centre-left calling for socio-democratic 
values. 
 
Table 7.1. Ideological Self-Placement 
 
Left-Right (V114) Constant 4.14***  (.36) 
Political Islam .34*** (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.05 (.04) 
High Sophisticates -.68 (.58) 
High Soph. x Islam .10
+
 (.06) 
High Soph. x Nation -.08 (.07) 
Adj R2 .15  
N 1345  
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Notes: 
+ 
p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, 
standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are measured on 0-10 scales, with values in between. Data from the 
2007 WVS.  
 
Looking at the Ankara survey data in Table 7.2 below we see that on a 0-10 scale (where 0 is 
left and 10 is right) CHP voters have a mean value of MCHPvoters = 1.84 on the left-right scale 
of ideological self-placement.  
 
Table 7.2: Average Scores on Political Attitudes of CHP Supporters 
 
   Mean (Standard 
Deviations) 
Confidence: Religious leaders 1.9  (2.1) 
Confidence: Parliament   2.3 (2.19) 
Confidence: Political parties 2.3 (2.2) 
Confidence: EU 2.5 (2.2) 
Confidence: UN 2.8 (2.4) 
Confidence: Labour unions 4.8 (2.3) 
Confidence: Courts 5.4 (2.4) 
Confidence: Armed forces  5.9 (2.6) 
Importance: Allah in life 6.3 (2.8) 
Importance: Religion in Turkey 7.7 (1.8) 
Citizenship: Having Turkish ancestors 4.3 (3.3) 
Citizenship: Being born on Turkish soil 4.3 (3.1) 
Citizenship: Adopt customs 6.3 (2.6) 
Citizenship: Abide laws 7.6 (2.4) 
Agreement: State is sacred and must be loved and obeyed 
unconditionally 
3.6 (3.1) 
Importance: Being a world citizen 7.3 (2.5) 
Importance: Giving people more to say in government decisions 8.9 (1.4) 
Importance: Protecting freedom of speech 9.3  (1.2) 
Agreement: Tolerating different moral standards  9.1 (1.4) 
Agreement: Newer lifestyles contribute to the breakdown of society 4.7  (3.0) 
Agreement: Modern values are more important than tradition 5.6  (2.5) 
Agreement: People should adjust their behaviour to the changing world 6.3  (2.7) 
Agreement: Modern values should respect traditions 6.7 (2.8) 
Agreement: Modern values should coexist with tradition 8.6  (1.9) 
Left-right Ideological self-placement 1.84  (2.14) 
Note: Data from the Ankara survey (2009). Values are means, standard deviations in parenthesis. All variables 
are measured on 0-10 scales, with values in between. A score of 0 indicates lack of confidence, lack of 
importance, or lack of agreement, left ideological self-placement and 10 indicating very high confidence, a great 
deal of importance, very strong agreement or right ideological self-placement.  
 
Looking at the OLS regression coefficients as Table 7.3 below shows, CHP voters’ 
attachment to Islam increases right-wing orientations whereas attachment to the nation leads 
to left-wing orientations. Accounting for the fact that my focus in the survey falls on CHP 
voters this finding is not surprising. CH Party through its official ideology places itself on the 
centre-left of the ideological spectrum representing socio-democratic values. On this basis 
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CHP voters’ attachment to the nation is what drives their ideological placement on the left 
side of the political spectrum whereas attachment to religion leads to right-wing orientations. 
 
Table 7.3 Ideological Self-Placement 
 
 
  CHP supporters 
Left-Right placement Constant 3.78* (1.44) 
 Attachment to Islam .26*** (.06) 
 Attachment to the nation -.32* (.16) 
 Adj R
2
 .24  
 N 68  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales with values in between. 
Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis. Data from the 
Ankara survey (2009). 
 
Moving on, I address the interviewees’ self-positioning on the left-right continuum. Those 
interviewees that were in support of the traditional Kemalist principles (3 out of 25) place 
themselves closer to the centre expressing their agreement with the key pillars of Kemalism 
such as nationalism and secularism. Whereas those participants that are more moderate 
supporters of Kemalism place themselves on the centre-left or closer to the left side of the 
spectrum (10 out of 25). However, the two sophisticated supporters of the traditional 
Kemalist side criticize the characterisation of Kemalism and the CHP as a centre-left party. 
They note that the recent acquisition by CHP of socio-democratic principles –typical of 
various European countries- is not coherent with the original Kemalist system of values. To 
use the words of interviewee no. 12: 
 ‘Kemalism is not a left ideology but it rather belongs to the centre. It does not 
promote socialism and it does not promote a religious society. It promotes principles 
based on the national unity, the nation, the role of religion and secularism’.91 
There is also a number of participants self-identifying with the centre-right side of the 
spectrum, hence supporting the AKP. Their justification is based on the party’s combination 
of liberal and conservative characteristics. According to them, the party rightfully promotes 
religious freedoms and in addition has provided growth through an excellent management of 
economic policies. In this case, sophistication does not seem to play a significant role since 
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 Also, interviewee no.3 notes ‘There are many ways that Kemalism is being interpreted. What I understand is 
that Kemalism is the adoption of the principles of Ataturk. Namely, to defend the democracy [refers to the 
Republican Turkey, the state]. That for me is a very important issue. Kemalism in Turkey is being understood as 
a left, socio-democratic ideology but I strongly disagree with that. Should be positioned in the middle of the 
ideological spectrum instead and not on the left end of the spectrum. That way more people will feel close to the 
real face of Kemalism’. 
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the majority of AKP supporters lean towards the centre-right regardless of their sophistication 
levels. Yet sophisticates are able to justify their position with more details referring to liberal 
conservative ideas the AKP represents (such as the economy and individual freedoms) which 
position the party on the centre-right (2 out of 25) whereas low sophisticates refer to the 
characteristics of the party that are closer to centre-right using as a guideline the Kemalist 
ideas and the oppression suffered from the Kemalist elites (3 out of 25).  
Three participants expressed their agreement with anarchism and communism placing 
themselves on the extreme end of the left-right continuum. Interestingly, these participants, - 
although they avoid placing themselves on the political Islam-Kemalism pole - they opt for 
the left-right placement. In addition, the nationalist MHP supporters place themselves easily 
on the right end of the spectrum highlighting the importance of nationalism and religious and 
conservative ideas as necessary for the Turkish state (2 out of 25). 
Two participants do not place themselves on the left-right end but rather combine 
elements from both sides. They come from both the CHP and AKP camp. As interviewee 
no.5 explained: 
 ‘I feel that I am a bit closer to the right but not the right end of the left-right spectrum 
but more towards the middle. I would say that I am a centre-right Kemalist. On some 
things my ideas are a bit more conservative such as the state; on others my ideas are 
more progressive such as modernization and religion’. Similarly, interviewee no. 10 
says ‘In Turkey those who are in support of Islam belong to the right and those who 
do not agree with the Islamic principles belong to the left. Personally I am religious, I 
am Muslim and deeply liberal without placing myself anywhere near the left-right 
division’.  
 
7.3 Party Placement on the Kemalism-Political Islam Continuum 
Following up from the discussion on participants’ understanding and self-placement on the 
three main ideological continua it is evident that the key consideration that drives their view 
is based on the considerations that are inherent to the political Islam and Kemalism 
dichotomy i.e. the role of religion, secularism as well as issues such as the nation, the 
economy as well as individual freedoms and rights. Taking this into account and in order to 
examine in more depth the consistency and valence of their political judgements, I asked 
them to place the key political actors on the political Islam-Kemalism continuum. The 
discussion here yields some interesting findings. Interestingly the majority of participants 
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provided their responses with relative ease without finding it difficult to provide their 
justifications. The majority of participants referred to the AKP and CHP in answering this 
question and only a couple of nationalist supporters of MHP placed the party on this 
continuum.  
Interestingly, all interviewees acknowledged the AK Party’s electoral domination as a 
significant landmark that brought important changes in the country’s social and political life. 
In addressing the AK Party the vast majority of participants acknowledged that it belongs to 
the right end of the spectrum representing political Islam (17 out of 25). The opinions coming 
from opponents to AKP are mainly uniform referring to a wide range of issues such as the 
party’s hidden Islamic agenda, fears of its increasing power, disagreement with the party 
practices and actions (i.e. public policies), its political Islamist roots and the past actions of 
Erdoğan as mayor of Istanbul. High sophisticates that are supporters of CHP (4 out of 14) 
placed the AKP on the political Islam end focusing predominantly on the ideological line and 
political practices the party follows. On the contrary, low sophisticates supporters of CHP (10 
out of 14) pointed mainly at the practices that AKP follows and its hidden Islamic agenda that 
promotes an Islam-based society, with certain restrictions of freedom against opposing voices 
and signs of backwardness in regards to modernization. Similar are the views expressed by 
those interviewees who lean towards the extreme-left side of the political spectrum who view 
AKP as a deeply conservative and Islamic party that promotes an Islamic agenda using 
religion as a factor that unifies the citizenry. In addition, they also point to the authoritarian 
tendencies practised by AKP in trying to silence all opposing voices in the society using its 
increasing power to restrict freedoms and individual rights.  
A different approach is expressed by those who are in support of the nationalist MHP 
(2 out of 25). For them, AKP resembles a pro-Islamist party however they both point to the 
party’s relaxation of the Islamic agenda and its modern outlook for the country as well as its 
respect towards the secular principles as set by the constitution. However, both highlight 
certain fears in regards to the increasing power of the party and the danger this poses for the 
country in the case of an increase in the party’s authoritarian tendencies. They place the MHP 
- which is the party they support -, at the middle of the spectrum focusing in particular on the 
importance of the nation viewing religion as a unifying factor.  
A very different perspective is expressed by the 6 participants that support the AK 
Party. They unanimously point to the party’s distance from political Islam focusing on the 
liberal conservatism principles it advocates. However, they all admit that religion plays a 
significant role in the public life under the AKP rule (6 out of 25). In this case, sophisticates 
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(2 out of 25) focus on the party’s rhetoric in support of liberal and conservative ideals. They 
draw upon certain examples such as economic liberalisation and the appearance of a new 
middle class, freedom of religion and individual expression of religiosity, the end of the 
domination of the Kemalist elites and consequent normalisation of social life. Low 
sophisticates point to these issues without focusing on the party rhetoric and ideology. Instead 
they focus on elements such as religious freedoms and economic growth of the country in 
justifying their perception of AK Party as an advocate of a type of liberalism combined with 
conservatism. They eventually evaluate positively the development of the party into a new 
progressive political actor aiming to advance and democratize the country. 
 The opinions of CH Party supporters were more uniform. In fact, all acknowledged 
that the party that was founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk belongs to the Kemalist end of the 
spectrum; yet the justification they provided vary on the basis of their support or opposition 
to the party’s ideology and political line. For CHP supporters, and regardless of their level of 
sophistication, CHP is the only advocator of Kemalism in Turkey promoting the principles of 
secularism, nationalism and modernization. Here, it is important to note that there are a few 
supporters of CHP who hold a more critical stance towards the party; they suggest that the 
current face of CHP does not promote the Kemalist principles in the way they were 
established by the party’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (2 out of 25). At the same time, a 
few participants point to the CHP’s socio-democratic and left turn of the party that is in line 
with the current needs of the society (2 out of 25). Extreme-left supporters position CHP on 
the Kemalist end acknowledging its conservative basis. The opponents of CHP, such as the 
MHP and AKP supporters, refer to the CHP’s placement on the Kemalist end of the 
ideological dichotomy by arguing that the party’s Kemalist political elites seek to control the 
social and political life. According to them, they do so in the attempt of regaining the 
privileges they had in the past as well as the power to control all aspects of public life.  
In discussing the party boundaries and their placement on the political Islam-Kemalist 
continuum, several participants expressed some interesting opinions on how the majority of 
Turkey’s citizenry turned in support of political Islam by AKP. A large number of 
participants (16 out of 25) noted that not all Turkish citizens fall into the two camps of 
political Islam and Kemalism. Interestingly even participants that place themselves easily on 
the political Islam-Kemalist scale acknowledged that a vast majority of the Turkish society 
are not clearly identifying with this scale. To put it in simple electoral terms, those who vote 
for AKP are not political Islamists and those who vote for CHP are not Kemalists. This is a 
very indicative and significant statement as it unpacks even more the Turkish political 
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complexity. These citizens belong in between the two ends of the ideological spectrum, 
highlighting the democratic and neoliberal segments of the population. They explain that in 
their view a large segment of those who are uneducated or under-educated turned to political 
Islam and AKP with a hope for a better future than the one offered by Kemalism. At the same 
time, several others that hold social and democratic tendencies find themselves in support of 
the CHP.  
In trying to explain the complex political arena of the country in ideological and 
party-related terms, a few interviewees that are voters of the communist TKP but also more 
moderate supporters of CHP who lean towards socio-democracy, drew upon certain socio-
demographic elements that they view as important in explaining the electoral basis of AK and 
CH Party (11 out of 25). These participants share the view that the electoral basis of CHP 
comes from the upper classes of Turkey. They explain this by acknowledging that under the 
role of Kemalism these citizens (the CHP voters) used to have access to the governance and 
economic structures. Consequentially, they had better economic conditions and educational 
level, which enabled them to acknowledge the importance of the principles of secularism and 
modernization for the development of the country. On the other hand, as they note, the social 
power of AKP and political Islam is not widespread in big cities such as Ankara or Istanbul 
but in the smaller and poorer areas. These are also areas where the majority of the population 
lives. They view these citizens as more religious and appreciate that they have been 
disadvantaged by the Kemalist establishment. Drawing upon the political past of the country 
these participants identify the Kemalist time as an oppressive era where people:  
‘had an ideology getting into their houses determining every little aspect of how they 
should live oppressing their religious feelings and suppressing them economically’ 
(interviewee no.13). 
As a result, this has generated a negative perception of Kemalism among these citizens. This 
factor is seen as a key driver for people leaning towards the political Islam version of the AK 
Party. This point is, in fact reflecting the geographical basis of both ideologies and their party 
advocators, in driving citizens’ electoral preferences. These opinions towards the Kemalist 
status quo that form the basis for explaining the electoral stronghold of AKP come from 
interviewees who hold both high and low sophistication levels and who retain a critical 
approach towards the Kemalist past although remaining supporters of the party under its new 
socio-democratic face.  
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7.4 Judgments and Evaluations of Key Party Actors 
Next, I examined participants’ likes and dislikes of key political actors in Turkey. Their 
responses provide some very interesting insights into the way they perceive, process and 
shape their evaluations towards the key political actors that dominate the political life of the 
country.  
 
AK Party (Justice and Development Party) 
In addressing the AKP, interviewees provided a range of considerations that refer to both the 
positives and negative aspects since the Party’s first electoral win in 2001. The majority of 
the interviewees hold negative attitudes towards the AK Party however there also some 
important positive aspects that have been mentioned by some opponents of the party. 
Importantly, attitudes towards AKP are driven by ideological orientations i.e. attachment to 
Kemalism-Islamism, left-right and liberalism-conservatism as well as value based 
preferences towards religion, individual rights and the role of nation. Sophistication, in most 
cases seems to condition the reasoning in support of these opinions. 
 Starting with the positive aspects of the AKP the common agreement between its 
voters (6 out of 25) is that the party had the ability to put together a diverse base of supporters 
that in the past were dispersed across the political spectrum such as Islamists, nationalists, 
liberals, conservatives, citizens of Kurdish origin (6 out of 25). This is viewed as a very 
important achievement of AKP that has brought stabilization in the political environment of 
the country and which reduced the electorate’s polarization levels to a smaller number of 
parties. In particular, the two sophisticated supporters of AKP paid great attention to this, 
highlighting the benefits of having a more stable economic, social and political environment 
in contrast to the past. Another positive aspect of AKP that is discussed by a few participants 
is the party’s self-declaration as liberal conservative and its successful attempts to develop 
the economy as well as to promote democracy (3 out of 25).
92
 For others, the space the party 
has provided for religious expressions in society is considered as a significant step towards 
religious freedom and is viewed as a positive aspect of AKP and a very important step for 
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 To use the words of interviewee no. 15: ‘In one of the first public announcement of the party is that they 
abandoned their previous conservative ideas and became more democratic. We cannot say that AKP is an 
advocator of political Islam because it looks more like a party of collaborations in the sense that it is a big party 
that in the past brought together people from the left, neoliberals like me because this is the change that Turkey 
needed. The party was created because Turkey needed a change, the whole world has changed. There has been 
this need for more democratic ideas and the old ideas in Turkey had to be abandoned [here the interviewee 
points to the old Kemalist establishment].’ 
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Turkey. Some participants (4 out of 25) also refer to the party’s success in overthrowing the 
domination of the past Kemalist establishment that were controlling certain aspects of the 
society (4 out of 6). 
However, it is important to note that some of the participants that acknowledge these 
positive sides of AKP express certain fears for the future of the AKP’s governance (2 out of 6 
supporters). These ideas come from two sophisticated supporters of the AKP as well as one 
novice supporter of the party. As interviewee no. 19 notes, since 2010 AKP seems to have 
changed in terms of its policies and practices at the social level. This interviewee highlights 
that: 
 ‘the AKP’s continuing electoral wins have provided the space to act as the only 
player in the political arena disregarding and silencing any opposing voice. I hope 
this will not escalate and the party will go back to where is started’.  
In a similar fashion interviewee no. 15 notes:  
‘The AK Party seems to have taken a turn towards conservatism and political Islam. I 
don’t want to say that AKP is 100% political Islam; It’s not like Refah93 but recently it 
has started stepping towards this direction although it is not where it was heading 
when it was founded.’ 
Focusing on the AKP’s opponents, there are some participants who acknowledge a few 
positive aspects of the AKP while appreciating the drawbacks of the party’s governance. In 
particular some low sophisticate supporters of the CHP express positive views in respect to 
the AKP’s attempts to modernize the city of Istanbul in particular, with important work done 
in the area of transportation (i.e. the creation of new big roads, the expansion of the metro 
system etc.), in the area of education thanks to the provision of free books at schools but also 
in the health sector with citizens being able to access both the private and public sector for 
healthcare (2 out of 25).  
Moving to the negative elements of the AKP the opinions range from simple criticism 
to more aggressive opposition. The fact that AKP has been governing Turkey for so long is 
viewed by several participants as negative (17 out of 25). Due to its electoral stronghold in 
the past years, which has stabilised the party’s position in state institutions both at the 
national and local level the party is seen as being the ‘absolute political player’ in Turkey. 
Several participants mention explicitly that the long-standing strength of AKP has in fact 
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 Here the interviewee refers to the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), which was a party representing political 
Islam. The Party was banned from the political life of the country in 1998 for violating the constitutional 
principle of secularism. Notably, Erdoğan and several other founding members of the AKP come from the lines 
of the Welfare Party. 
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given the party and its representatives the power to monopolise political decisions. According 
to them, this aspect poses challenges and limits a significant number of people in the country 
(15 out of 25). As interviewee no. 1 noted:  
‘People are brought to courts, go to jail for years without an official accuse. Same 
like the Kemalists. Kemalism under the name of the deep state was torturing, 
imprisoning and killing civilians whereas AKP is dragging them for years, takes their 
freedom, imprisons them. If those people are innocent they will go back to their 
houses after being humiliated and beaten. For example, a friend of mine was 
prosecuted in the KCK case
94
, another one was accused for being a member of the 
Revolutionary Headquarters
95
. Another one was accused and arrested in Ankara for 
the events in Hopa
96
 during a large protest. That guy during the prosecution stage 
was beaten up badly. [….] Overall they have a lot of power in their hands those from 
AKP and they are using it for their own agenda and they terrorize everyone who is 
against them. This is the biggest problem of AKP and the country’ (interviewee no.1). 
Several participants also criticize the party’s self-declaration as neoliberal suggesting that this 
is only limited to the party’s stance towards the economy rather than the whole society with 
several restrictions of freedom and individual rights being breached (15 out of 25). In 
addition, a large number of participants refer to a wide instilment of fear to the public 
because of the mounting suppression of critical anti-government voices. A few of these 
interviewees, refer to personal experiences or report examples form their close social circle of 
friends being scared to express critical voices against AKP or Erdoğan over the phone and the 
internet due to the installation of certain security filters as well as in private discussions in 
public spaces. Another aspect that is brought up is the issue of the AKP’s control over the 
judiciary and the use of its power serving the aims of the Party. Four participants, note that 
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 KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union) is seen as the civil and political wing of the PKK. 
95
 The interviewee here refers to the Revolutionary Headquarters (Devrimci Karargâh in Turkish), which is a 
terrorist organization that adopts Marxism- Leninism. Several bomb attacks during the period 2008-2009 where 
accused to the group. In 2009 in the area of Bostanci in Istanbul there was a class between members of he 
organization and the police during which a bystander, the leader of the organization and a police officer was 
killed. Several members of the organization have been detained and many were imprisoned (Hürriyet Daily 
News, 2009). 
96
 The neoliberal energy politics of AKP involved the creation Hydro Electric Power Plants across Turkey. Part 
of this plan involved the creation of hydroelectric pipes passing through the rivers of the north coast destroying 
a very large area of the surrounding habited regions. On May 2011 a large protest against the AKP’s plans was 
organised by the locals in Hopa (in Arvin, a north coast municipality), which was met by the police with the use 
of excessive force. As a result a protester (high school teacher) died of heart attack because of a gas bomb. A 
large protest in support of the Hopa supporters was organised in Ankara the day after. Protesters were met with 
excessive use of violence by the police forces. Several protesters were arrested and detained some of which 
remained in prison for 6 months.  
Chapter 7. Data Analysis and Findings: Political Ideology 
 144 
this control over the judiciary’s power undermines its independency. This increases the 
public fear with the consequence that oppositional voices are silenced.  
The Kurdish issue comes up as one more aspect of criticism towards the AKP. Its 
handling is negatively criticized by CHP voters and most strongly by those who belong to the 
extreme left. These interviewees refer explicitly to the party’s inability and unwillingness to 
provide a peaceful and viable solution. The nationalist voters of MHP on the other hand 
criticize the AKP for its incapability and unwillingness to combat the Kurdish issue accusing 
the party line as too soft and moderate, which is also seen as posing a great threat to the 
Turkish nation and the country.  
 Several participants also provide some interesting insights into the electoral basis of 
the AKP attracting supporters from the very poor masses from all across the country and the 
southeast regions (6 out of 25). These participants come from the CHP pool of voters as well 
as the extreme-left. They refer to the manipulation of the issue of religion along with the 
provision of certain goods to these segments of the population by the AKP in order to attract 
and preserve their electoral support as well their support to increasingly conservative policies. 
Along the same lines, there is also a sophisticated CHP supporter that points to the issue of 
the relationship between the AKP and the Gülen movement.
97
 Seen as one of the strongest 
supporters of AKP in 2012 - when the interviews took place -, this participant criticizes 
negatively Gülen’s religious movement because it became deeply involved in the country’s 
political affairs creating the basis of the political Islamist outlook and the ideological basis of 
the governing party (interviewee no.23).  
 The harm caused by the increasing role of religion in society is addressed by a large 
number of AKP’s opponents that come both from the Kemalist CHP as well as those that 
belong to the extreme-left. These participants refer to the Islamist agenda of the Party and its 
attempts to move back religion at the centre of public life. In this case interviewees make 
references to the party’s attempts to normalise the Islamic practices and culture in public life. 
This is seen as a breach in the country’s constitutional principles by CHP supporters of 
Kemalism and as a strategic tactic aiming to attract and stabilise the party’s electoral support 
from conservative segments of the population according to TKP supporters. Several 
participants bring examples from their everyday life to point to the re-entrance of religion in 
the public life as well as the promotion of certain policies that favour Islamic practices, 
culture and religion in the public life. A number of sophisticates address the end of the 
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 In Turkish: Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü, FETÖ. 
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headscarf ban as well as certain education policies that favour Islamic schools as evidence of 
the religious turn that the government promotes for the Turkish society. Along the same lines, 
two novices from the pool of CHP supporters focus also on the existing social problems in 
Turkey such as inflation, unemployment and the deep economic gap between the very poor 
masses and the new middle class that resulted from the AKP’s neoliberal policies. The two 
interviewees focus on the AKP’s conservative outlook judging the party’s inefficient 
governance in combating existing social problems. It is instead argued that it has enhanced 
the social polarization among the citizenry.
98
 
 Another important criticism against AKP comes from the two nationalist MHP voters. 
They are critical of AKP because of the peace negotiations with the Kurds that started in 
2007, considered by the MHP leader as a form of treason.
99
 They also view with suspicion in 
regards to the country’s future the corruption of the government and the increasing power of 
the AKP. 
 
CH Party (Republican People’s Party) 
The CH Party has been steadily the second party in terms of electoral support in Turkey since 
the AKP’s first electoral win in 2002. The discussion with the interviewees unveils a variety 
of opinions in regards to the party’s ability to act as a real opposition to AKP but also to 
sustain and promote its Kemalist principles. Overall, participants express highly critical 
views of CHP, yet a good number of its supporters advocate that it is the only true secular 
party in Turkey that promotes democracy and unity following the Kemalist ideals against 
AKP’s political and social oppression (14 out of 25). Contrary to the previous party 
administration by Baykal, the turn of the party under the leadership of Kılıçdaroğlu is viewed 
positively by a number of participants that are in support of the party’s socio-democratic 
tendency (10 out of 25). The opinions among CHP supporters are divided in two separate 
camps. On the one side, are those who hold an appreciation of socio-democratic principles, 
whilst on the other side, stand those who are more strict supporters of the traditional 
Kemalism. Political sophistication in this case, conditions the strength of these opinions along 
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 Characteristically, an interesting point is expressed by a low sophisticate CHP supporter (interviewee no.7) 
who notes ‘It’s a party that has received approximately the 50% of people’s support and instead of taking care of 
the people of the country has only focused on its own people. It could be a more democratic party, it could 
exercise a more objective governance and they could in fact bring some social peace in action. Yet they failed in 
all the above. What they do is they divide the public into those that follow them and those who don't. I strongly 
dislike that.’ 
99
 For more on this, please see Haber Hergün (2014).  
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with the ability of these participants to justify their statements, yet it does not seem to act as a 
driver of their opinions.  
Specifically, those who are supporters of the socio-democratic face of the CHP 
express their support of the new party’s administration viewed as capable and well equipped 
to stand against the AKP’s domination. However, among them there are also a few who claim 
that although the party’s name claims a ‘People’s party’, in reality its leaders have not set the 
conditions for establishing a real connection with the electorate. In particular, criticism is 
directed towards the party’s elites dominating the party’s agenda that still in present times 
remains faithful to the past value-system (5 out of 25, both high and low sophisticates). And 
while they acknowledge the promising future of the new leader (i.e. Kılıçdaroğlu), they argue 
that other key figures from the party administration do not offer sufficient guarantees to 
enlarge its electorate basis (interviewee no.1). According to these interviewees, this is a key 
factor that sustains CHP’s steady second place behind the electoral domination of AKP.  
Contrary to this, there are four (of 25) CHP supporters who are more critical towards 
the party’s socio-democratic direction. They put themselves closer to the centre of the 
ideological spectrum and express the importance of the promotion of the Kemalist principles 
in a more open and straightforward fashion in order to combat the AKP’s domination of 
power and regain public electoral support. Characteristically, as interviewee no.5 notes, CHP 
sustains a stable party support from leftish voters leaving aside a large number of right-wing 
citizens who value the Kemalist principles. The party ‘threw out the nationalist Turks by 
adopting a more centre-left social-democratic face’, to use the words of interviewee no.12. 
This led the party to lose its nationalist focus. Two of these interviewees note that although 
the party promotes the Kemalist ideals, its positions are neither clear nor straightforward on a 
wide range of issues such as the Kurdish question as well as the role of religion and religious 
freedoms. This is because the party is trying to serve the interests of its heterogeneous 
electoral basis composed by various groups such as Alevis, nationalists, patriots, nationalists 
and so on. To use the words of interviewee 12:  
‘[…] others vote for it simply because it is the party that was created by Ataturk, 
while others support it only because it is the only viable solution against AKP and its 
dominance in politics. The party’s leadership is trying to balance in between its 
founding principles and all other sides which leads to the incapability to get back its 
past social power’.  
An important aspect that generates some negative critique against CHP among its supporters 
and its opponents is that the party does not express its key positions clearly to the public. 
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About five (of 25) participants note that CHP fails to come forward as a drastic agent of 
opposition by promoting alternative and viable political solutions based on the principles of 
Kemalism. Interviewee no.6 also noted ‘It doesn’t look like CHP would be even able to apply 
drastic changes in the political life in case it ever won the elections’. A few participants also 
expressed more critical ideas suggesting that the party has changed along with its ability to 
persuade voters with its positions insofar it currently uses the face of Kemal Ataturk only in 
order to attract voters. Also, interviewee no.6 who is a voter - yet holds a critical stance - of 
CHP suggested that ‘the logic that the party’s members’ hold is not about bringing change 
but instead to get elected for personal gains’. 
Another important critique towards CHP comes from an interviewee that does not 
support the party’s ideological line. A peculiar characteristic is that this interviewee votes for 
the party and at the same time belongs to a family whose members have been members of the 
CHP for over thirty years (interviewee no.1). This participant suggests that the activities of 
the party’s members do not show a willingness to bring real change. As he noted  
‘While the mayor and the other AKP people work hard for the elections. CHP 
members do not do anything and just wait a few months before the elections to work 
for support. Obviously that’s not enough’.  
This was a shared view among several participants that support the party’s socio-democratic 
turn; yet, they held a critical stance towards the party’s activities. Specifically, two 
participants pointed to a sense of ‘weird confidence’ that characterizes the party’s electoral 
basis. They explained this by suggesting that no matter what happens the majority of the 
party’s voters will continue to support the party.  
There are also more critical views towards CHP coming from its opponents. 
Specifically, interviewees who place themselves on the liberal-conservative side of AKP 
suggested that CHP is a deeply conservative party because it is based on the Kemalist 
principles. Interviewee no.19 who is also politically sophisticated noted:  
‘the symbol of CHP contains six distinct arrows, these arrows represent the basic 
principles of Kemalism. The party never tried to change the way it thinks, to 
democratise. Even Islamist actors with the creation of AKP tried to modernise and 
democratise, Kemalists and CHP became even more conservative’.  
He went on to add that: 
‘CHP is a deeply conservative party with no respect for individual rights and it will 
never change’.  
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The same line of argument is, also shared by the extreme-left supporters. Interestingly, for 
these participants both CHP and AKP - being the agents of Kemalism and political Islam 
respectively - are the two parties that have been consistently driving the country towards a 
deeper social conflict and polarization. As interviewee no. 21 noted: 
 ‘In the past, we had Kemalists with CHP telling us what to do and how to live. Now 
we have the AKP to determine what is acceptable and what not. These two parties are 
absolutely oppressive and conservative and they only care about getting the votes to 
govern so they can promote their own interests rather than serve the people’.  
Finally, a strong critique against the CHP comes from the two nationalist supporters of the 
MHP that highlight the party’s authoritarian secularism. This in their view does not 
acknowledge that Islam and religion in Turkey offer a significant basis of unity. These 
participants argue, that CHP is based upon ideological principles that do not promote the real 
face of the Turkish state, which is predominantly based on the combination of Turkish 
identity and Islamic religion.  
 
MH Party (Nationalist Movement Party) 
The discussion focuses predominantly on the party’s nationalist stance, its practices as well as 
its current role in opposition to the AKP. It is important to note here that a certain pattern 
emerges when looking at the positions towards the party. On the one side, there are the two 
interviewees that are in support of the MHP who naturally express positive opinions. On the 
other, stand the opponents of the party who come from a number of ideological and political 
camps; namely, the CHP supporters, extreme-left voters, as well as AKP supporters.  
 The two participants that are supporters of the MHP report low levels of 
sophistication. Both participants highlighted as a positive aspect of the party that it is the only 
political actor that remains truly faithful to nationalism and the Turkish state while at the 
same time supporting the role of Islam and its importance in the public life. A positive 
perspective towards the party comes from interviewee no. 14 who admitted his steady support 
to the party focusing particularly on the party’s leader Devlet Bacheli. According to this 
interviewee, Bahceli has managed to get rid of the aggressive fascist tendencies
100
 in the 
                                                 
100
 Here the interviewee refers to the past activities of the MHP from the so-called ‘Ülkücüler’ also known as the 
‘Grey Wolves’. Members of the group were using extreme radical acts such as violent attacks and murders of 
their opponents targeting specifically left-wing supporters, activists and intellectuals. Bahçeli, who has been the 
party leader since 1997, has been trying to turn the party into a more peaceful nationalist party getting rid of the 
use of violence and armed attacks against opposition. In fact, he has been trying to shape a narrative that the 
Party represents the true interests of the Turkish nation. However, the party still remains an advocator of ultra-
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party and turned towards the centre-right without abandoning its nationalist face. Interviewee 
no. 18 pointed to the party’s capability to reflect upon the needs of the society without acting 
blindly as an oppositional actor highlighting in particular to its positive stance towards the 
EU.
101
 Interestingly, both MHP supporters value positively that the party does not act as blind 
opposition to the AKP government but instead shows its support to the government when its 
handling seems correct especially on issues that concern national matters. Interviewee no.14 
noted:  
‘Bahçeli managed to get rid of the fascist and aggressive young people of his party 
that used to become members of the Grey Wolves (Ülkü Ocakları). He is the person 
you motivated the youth of the party to become educated, to study to stop creating 
bloody and extremely violent episodes in the streets. He tried to bring the party more 
towards the centre-right; it is a party that represents the Turkish interests and is open 
for everyone that loves the country. Honestly, I appreciate that. Also what I really like 
from Bahçeli is that he doesn’t want to act as a blind oppositional power but he 
supports the government when something seems right and especially on issues of 
national politics. The only negative that I can say for the party is that it sometimes the 
leader has to express the party’s ideas more clearly. All in all, I find MHP’s positions 
correct and I fully support it’. 
However, it is important to note, that the very same issues that are considered by the Party’s 
supporters as positives - such as the nationalist ideals as well as its readiness to support AKP 
for its stance on national issues - are viewed negatively by other participants, who are critical 
of the MHP. 
An important criticism that comes from both CHP and extreme-left supporters 
suggests that the party has adjusted its past ‘nationalist and fascist’ tendency transforming 
into a party that acts as the lifeline of AKP (6 out of 25). As interviewee no. 25 notes: 
‘Although AKP and MHP have very important differences, many believe that MHP is 
always ready to step in and help AKP when it comes to decide on important national 
matters. It’s like the tail of AKP.’  
                                                                                                                                                        
nationalism, acknowledging as its main opponents left-wing supporters, supporters of the Western liberalisation 
and all minorities in Turkey especially the Kurds.  
101
 MH Party has been against the Western liberalization process viewed as posing a great danger to the Turkish 
nation. However the party progressively adopted a more EU friendly approach –yet particularly conservative-, 
which favors the EU prospect of the country within certain boundaries that preserve and protect the character 
and nature of the Turkish nation. The limits the nationalist MHP pose refer mainly on the EU conditions on 
human rights and individual freedoms which are viewed as dangerous for increasing the rights of the minorities 
in Turkey.  
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In explaining this, interviewee no.1 notes: 
‘[….] MHP works like an extension of AKP in many occasions. If AKP has a hard 
time to secure majority in parliament then MHP is always there to back up the Party. 
It seems like the only ideological difference that divides the two is the position 
towards minorities. Namely, Alevis and Kurds… Yet if a problem comes up AKP will 
eventually adopt a more strict and nationalist view and will collaborate easily with 
MHP if needed. It’s not that MHP plays a significant role in Turkish politics right 
now apart from this. It is just a mass that reacts on the basis of nationalism’.  
In fact, MHP is viewed by two interviewees (coming from extreme-left and CHP supporters), 
as a party that possesses a nationalist reflectivity standing up in those occasions that pose a 
danger to the nation. Specifically, these interviewees highlight the party’s aggressive reaction 
to the peaceful opening initiative by the AKP aiming to harmonize the Kurdish issue as the 
only instance that MHP went against AKP. Two participants who are high sophisticates also 
point to the party’s electoral performance to highlight its inefficient nature, doing ‘more 
damage than good in the political scene of the country’ to use the words of interviewee 
no.20. They note that the party has never managed to sustain its electoral basis but instead has 
been consistently acting as a party that shares its supporters to other conservative actors in the 
political arena when the situation requires it. Interestingly, a large segment of the party’s 
faithful voters moved to AKP due to the party’s inability to play an active and decisive role in 
Turkish politics.  
Another negative critique focuses on the party’s ideological agreement with ultra 
nationalism. This view is shared among interviewees from both the CHP and the extreme-left 
(12 out of 25). For these interviewees the MHP is a fascist and nationalist actor that promotes 
its agenda using a variety of ways including the usage of political violence and terrorism. 
Analytically, participants refer to the past activities of the Grey Wolves and the violence 
against socialists and left-wing supporters. 
 Finally, looking at the AKP supporters who self-characterize as liberal conservatives, 
only two interviewees - who are both high sophisticates - express a negative position towards 
the MHP. All (6 out of 6) refer to it as an out-dated nationalist political actor that does not 
play a significant role in current Turkish politics and who has failed to address the real needs 
of the society. The two sophisticates AKP supporters focus predominantly on the main 
difference existing between AKP and MHP. In their view, while AKP combined liberalism 
with certain conservative principles, MHP seems to be a ‘numbed political actor remaining 
stuck to its ultra-nationalism’ to use the words of interviewee no. 19. These two supporters of 
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AKP also evaluate negatively the MHP’s opposition to government’s attempts to seek for a 
peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue. 
 
Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP, Peace and Democracy Party) 
The final political actor that was discussed by some interviewees was the pro-Kurdish BD 
Party. The participants that address the BDP are three participants who self-identify as 
supporters of the extreme-left as well as one AKP voter and two CHP supporters. 
Sophistication only seems to matter for one AKP voter who follows the official rhetoric of 
the party towards BDP. Ideological orientations and values seem to drive the interviewees’ 
positioning. The majority of interviewees hold a particularly negative stance whereas only a 
few acknowledge the party’s positive view on minority rights and individual freedoms.  
Referring to the positives aspects of the BD Party the three interviewees from the 
extreme-left as well as two of young socio-democrat supporters of the CHP highlight the 
party’s positive stance towards fundamental freedoms and individual rights for all citizens of 
the country and its emphasis on the protection of Kurdish minorities. In an interesting extract 
interviewee no. 1 points to the party’s position towards LGTB rights: 
‘Everyone can develop these kind of attitudes towards trans and gay people 
regardless of the party they vote. Yet the only party that has been really brave and 
open towards this issue, protecting and promoting the rights of LGTB individuals is 
the BDP. In fact members of the party marched in the Gay Pride in Istanbul. They did 
so because the party advocated individual freedoms and equality’.  
Along the same lines, the two interviewees who support the TKP suggest that Kurdish rights 
should be promoted and supported, yet the party does not manage to focus on these 
exclusively since it promotes a highly nationalist agenda that goes against the religious 
fellowship idea as suggested by AK Party. 
The most important aspect that generates negative perceptions of the party is related 
to its promotion of Kurdish nationalism. This is viewed as an issue that poses a great danger 
to Turkey especially in combination with the activities of the PKK. For the two communist 
participants the BDP fails to promote a viable solution for the oppression of the Kurdish 
minority since they refer only to freedoms and rights within the borders of Kurdish 
nationalism without making references to the broader socio-political arena and the general 
oppressive nature of the Turkish state. These participants along with the one anarcho-
communist interviewee point to the party’s alleged ties with the PKK, which is also viewed 
Chapter 7. Data Analysis and Findings: Political Ideology 
 152 
as restricting the party from playing a more active role in the official political scene of 
Turkey. Six participants state their direct opposition to the party because of its links with the 
PKK and its leaders. As interviewee no.12 noted: 
 ‘I will never express something positive for BDP. Regardless of what they say that 
they represent the Kurdish people I am not convinced at all. I believe they represent 
PKK and take their orders from Ocalan. I believe they are doing an open propaganda 
in support of a terrorist organisation, the PKK.’ 
Finally, an AKP supporter with a high level of sophistication classifies both MHP and BDP 
as belonging to the same group of parties advocating similar orientations. Characteristically, 
interviewee no.2 noted:  
‘Both MHP and BDP represent the same nationalist ideology. The only difference is 
that the one [MHP] advocates Turkish nationalism whereas the other [BDP] 
represents Kurdish nationalism. None of the two can provide a positive alternative to 
the Turkish society. They both promote an aggressive nationalism that can only create 
more problems than do any good’.  
This participant, following the rhetoric and the peaceful opening that has been initiated by 
Erdoğan and which intensified with the discussion on the constitutional amendments in 2011, 
acknowledges the need for more individual freedoms for the Kurds. At the same time, this 
interviewee supports the BDP’s need to participate in the discussion about the constitutional 
changes. Here the participant accepts that Kurds have been oppressed for a long time in 
Turkey and they deserve to have a say for the creation of a ‘liberal constitution’.  
 
7.5 Party Identification and Voting Preferences 
The final issue that I look as part of the political ideology section, focuses on party 
identification and voting preferences. Interviewees’ party preferences reveal a more 
complicated picture in comparison to their ideological understanding and ideological 
positioning. This is directly related to the levels of sophistication participants’ hold in that 
sophistication acts as a mediating agent when it comes to consistency and stability of voting 
preferences, identification with certain parties, as well as their motivated reasoning.  
All participants discussed willingly their party identification and electoral preferences. 
From the 25 participants, everyone but two have been casting their vote consistently in 
national and local elections (excluding those who were not eligible due to age). Of the two 
that have not been voting in all elections, one participant has voted selectively in some 
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national and local elections and the second one had abstained from voting since 2007. This 
person voted then because of the importance of the country’s political situation, and also 
voted in all elections that followed.  
In reference to party identification and electoral choices, a few interviewees report 
inconsistencies between the party they affiliate with and their voting preferences. On these 
occasions the levels of political sophistication, play a significant role that directs motivational 
reasoning behind their choices. Specifically, the majority of participants have been 
consistently voting for a certain party, holding ideas that are in agreement with the party’s 
main ideology and practices. Yet others - and this is mostly the case for CHP voters - have a 
certain understanding of the ideology the party promotes, hold some critical ideas for the 
party they support, yet they end up casting their vote in support of it simply because there is 
no other political actor that can serve their values and personal interests.  
Similar is the case with AKP, with a significant twist. Although supporters of AKP 
vote for the party for a great variety of reasons ranging from the party’s liberal stance towards 
the economy, the freedom of religion it promotes or even simply to oppose the past Kemalist 
establishment, two interviewees express fear and great concern for the future of the country 
as a result of the stability in AKP’s electoral win and increasing authoritarian tendencies. 
Two interviewees voted in the national elections in agreement with their party preferences 
however they decided to vote differently in local elections and supported a candidate rather 
than a party. They are low sophisticates and their justification relies predominantly on the 
expectations they have from the specific candidates due to their personality characteristics or 
their ability to offer ‘more’ in the locality than the candidate the party of their support 
promotes. Yet, the majority of the interviewees have been consistently supporting the same 
party they identify with regardless of their level of political sophistication. However, the 
ideological consistency and the reasoning behind their electoral preferences vary between 
high sophisticates and novices.  
 Focusing on electoral support, 6 vote for the governing AK Party, with 2 being high 
sophisticates and 4 low sophisticates. The key justification for their support of AKP concerns 
the party’s ability to gather a large electoral basis bringing together a true mix of citizens 
regardless of their individual differences. AKP supporters pay great attention to the stability 
of the country under the electoral domination of AKP since 2002. All AKP supporters 
acknowledge as important the party’s stance towards liberal conservatism combining liberal 
economic principles and the openness towards religious values in the society. As such great 
attention is therefore paid on the issue of religious freedoms and practices. The justification 
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of all participants who support the AKP is in line with the official party rhetoric. Political 
sophistication appears to condition the explanation of AKP’s supporters for their party 
identification and preference. Specifically, sophistication plays a significant role in 
highlighting important differences in the coherence and consistency among high sophisticates 
and novices. High sophisticates, express a coherent and consistent system of beliefs with their 
ideological principles in line with their party preferences. In particular, the two sophisticated 
supporters of AKP focus predominantly on the issue of liberal conservatism stance promoted 
by AKP, which has an important effect on the country’s economy as well as the party’s 
relaxation of religious boundaries providing more freedom to a large segment of the society 
that is religious. They both also express materialistic considerations placing great importance 
on the issue of economic growth and stability of the country under the AKP. Yet, it is useful 
to note here that both sophisticates that support the AKP express their concern in regards to 
the excessive power AKP has gathered in its hands for the future of the country.  
On the contrary, novices express a wide range of ideas that are mainly in line with 
their personal and political values serving their motivational goals. Ideological considerations 
here seem to be overshadowed by every day practices and value preferences. In particular, the 
four low sophisticated supporters of the party justify their party preference by focusing 
predominantly on the AKP religious freedoms addressing the difference with the past 
Kemalist elites. They also point to the economic development and stability of the country 
under the AKP. Another participant although expressed negative attitudes towards the party’s 
leaning towards political Islam and explained that he has been casting his vote towards AKP 
simply because it performs well in the economy. This participant evaluates positively the 
growing importance assumed by Turkey at the international level. Interestingly, the four low 
sophisticates also focus on the appeal of certain politicians of the party than its ideological 
principles in their justification of casting their votes in support of AKP. An interesting extract 
from interviewee no.10 provides valuable insights in respect to the choice of supporting the 
AKP by a low sophisticate: 
 ‘In the 2009 local elections I also voted for AKP [the name of the district was 
removed for security purposes] in Ankara. Although the person I voted for didn’t have 
a good reputation for his democratic sensitivities he was however a good candidate 
and a good fit to govern the city.’  
The same is the case when participant no. 24 is asked to justify his AKP party preference. 
This participant acknowledges that even if not all policies are good, AKP candidates have 
been the best in both local and national elections.  
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 Next, I focus on the 15 interviewees who supported the CHP. From the CHP voters 
four are high sophisticates and the remaining ten are novices. Sophistication plays a 
significant role in influencing the reasoning and justification for supporting the party. 
Interestingly an issue that differentiates these participants refers to the ideological 
inclinations they hold which they acknowledge. Four of the 14 supporters of the CHP, 
suggest that they are supporters of the Kemalist ideas whereas 10 embrace the CHP’s socio-
democratic turn combined with Kemalism. 
Political sophistication mediates the justifications participants provide. High 
sophisticates that are in support of the Kemalist principles (2 out of 4) view Kemalism as a 
centre-based ideology that promotes secularism and nationalism and regards the nation as 
uniform under one flag and one language. They justify their electoral preference by referring 
directly to the Kemalist principles and Kemalist ideology of the CH Party. The two novices 
supporters of Kemalism mainly refer to their value-system arguing that it is in line with the 
Kemalist camp and also focus on their opposition to the AKP party. In particular, the most 
important aspect is the issue of secularism and the importance of the single united nation 
under the Turkish flag as opposed to the increasing Islamist agenda promoted by AKP. 
Interviewee no.25 evaluates negatively the ‘Islamization of the Turkish society which goes 
against the constitution of the country’.  
 A similar pattern appears when we look at the remaining 10 supporters of CHP (10 
out of 14). The two high sophisticates that support the socio-democratic tendency of CHP 
welcome the party’s direction towards socio-democracy and its attempts to modernise its 
ideological line to more progressive standards, focusing in particular on the positive role of 
the new leadership under Kılıçdaroğlu. For these high sophisticates, CHP is the only political 
actor in Turkey that promotes secularism and attachment towards the nation, supporting 
national unity while at the same time respecting individual rights and freedoms. They 
criticize negatively AKP for its Islamist outlook and conservative direction in all aspects of 
life, focusing in particular on the increasing role of religion and restriction on individual 
rights and liberties against those who are against the party. They also refer to the AKP’s total 
control over security forces and its attempts to control the judiciary as endangering the 
country’s Kemalist character. The remaining 8 CHP low sophisticates, also point to the 
secularism and nationalism principles yet they focus predominantly on the AKP oppression 
and the party’s Islamist ideology. These are seen as a step backwards which weakens the 
country’s democratic values and principles. Again here, we see that participants are led by 
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their value preferences and opposition to the AKP in shaping their justification for supporting 
the CHP.  
Interestingly seven of those interviewees who self-identify with the socio-democratic 
stance of CHP, regardless of their sophistication levels express their dissent with the past 
Kemalist elites highlighting their oppressive practices against those citizens that were not in 
line with the imposed guidelines set by the Kemalist principles. However, they express a 
hope for the role the CHP with its socio-democratic agenda can play in the future constituting 
the sole capable political agent that can oppose AKP with its secularism and support for a 
more citizen friendly society.  
An interesting case of a low sophisticate, is a participant who self-identified with 
anarcho-communism yet voted for the CHP. His reasoning is based on the AKP’s 
domination, which he saw as dangerous for the country. CHP was instead seen as the only 
actor that can openly challenge the AKP and which seems to step on a more progressive 
socio-democratic path. Characteristically, interviewee no.1 noted:  
‘I am an anarcho-communist by principle. But I also have this in my mind: before I 
express my support for a politician or a party I need to take into account the country’s 
political reality and not only my dream ideal society. For this reason, although 
personally and in principle I am against voting I am in favour of the idea of voting for 
a party in order to demise the power of an ideology that is more dangerous and 
restrictive’.  
In explaining his electoral choice at the 2011 election, he says that although we was 
supporting the BDP party’s independent candidate, he was not happy with some of the 
party’s candidates from Ankara. He adds that that no matter the result those independent 
candidates would never manage to pass the 10 per cent threshold. This in combination with 
the fact that AK Party’s candidate in Ankara was a strong one, led to his decision to vote for 
CHP. Admittedly this is a very simple yet complicated process for negotiating the electoral 
choice within an electoral system that applies a 10% threshold for entering the parliament.  
Along these lines, we see that despite of some participants’ disagreement with the past 
actions of the CHP, their criticism of Kemalist practices or even their misalignment with 
several positions of the party, they end up supporting CHP by engaging with a self-
negotiation process. In other words, they support the only political actor that is closer to their 
beliefs and that can effectively antagonise the AKP.  
What is interesting in the case of the CHP is that the party manages to gather 
supporters from a wide range of political and ideological camps, such as the extreme left as in 
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the case of the anarcho-communist participant, the centre and centre-right that participants 
who are supporters of the traditional Kemalist principles, as well as the centre-left and socio-
democracy. The justification for the party support varies among participants yet they all 
appear to have a single common point: their disapproval and direct opposition to AKP’s 
ideological line and administration. Here, participants refer to the increasing level of 
authoritarianism by AKP and the party’s attempts to silence oppositional voices, the 
increasing role of religion in the public life that is seen as contradictory to the constitutional 
basis of the country.  
The MH Party is voted for by 2 out of the 25 interviewees. One of the 2 however, 
notes that he has cast his vote in support of the AKP in some local elections due to the 
candidate’s better profile. Both supporters of the MHP score low on sophistication. They 
justify their electoral support by referring to the nationalist character of the party along with 
their support of the party leader Bahçeli who is seen as an important political figure that 
serves adequately the MHP. Here, participants express their agreement with the nationalist 
agenda of the party, focusing on the party’s position towards the Kurdish minorities as well 
as the party’s support and acknowledgement of the Islamic character of the Turkish society. 
One of the two participants also expresses his agreement with the party’s EU position, which 
ensures the preservation of the country’s fundamental principles protecting the true nature of 
the Turkish nation. It is essential to note that both MHP supporters value highly the fact that 
the MHP has been playing a constructive oppositional role supporting AKP’s priority to put 
the sense of national identity first. The MHP supporter who has been casting his vote in 
support of the AKP candidates in two instances in local elections explains his choice by 
referring to his agreement with the candidates’ choice as efficient and with good character as 
opposed to the candidate selected by MHP. Here, the participant also refers to the higher 
possibility of his selected candidate to be elected rather than the one supported by MHP. He 
justifies this choice by focusing on the main opponent of CHP who was against his values 
and ideological leanings towards nationalism.  
 Finally, we turn to the two voters of the TK Party, one of which is a high sophisticate 
and one is a novice. Both express ideological agreement and value preferences that are in 
accordance with the communist principles expressed by the party. These participants - self-
identifying as extreme-left - acknowledge the conservative character of the majority of 
political parties in Turkey and suggest that the only viable solution that can offer a real 
change in the society can be through a different political pole that goes against the traditional 
political Islam-Kemalism dichotomy. They saw this as the key reason that keeps Turkey a 
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highly undemocratic and conservative society. Both refer to the usage of religion in 
generating a deep fragmentation in the society not allowing citizens to identify the real class-
based problems. In other words, they criticize the relationship between religion and political 
power. They go openly against all key political actors in Turkey that refer to religion either as 
a source of unification (referring to AKP) or as a private matter (referring to CHP) and 
highlight the issue of the working class unification under the enemy of conservatism. They 
both saw class struggle as dressed with a facade of religious domination or Kemalism yet the 
rights of the workers are what should drive the power struggle in the country. When asked 
whether TKP can make a difference, they both admit that the extreme-left in Turkey has been 
historically oppressed yet the importance of supporting its principles is fundamental to make 
their voices heard. They provided examples of the state-based oppression against extreme-left 
supporters throughout the history, coming from both the Kemalist elites as well as the Islam-
based elites with the more recent examples coming from AKP. They suggested that this aims, 
to silence all opposition voices coming from all sides regardless of their ideological 
orientation. The key difference between the sophisticate and novice supporter of TKP is that 
the former refers mainly to the ideological line promoted by the Party as opposed to the 
ideological lines expressed by its opponents using real life examples to substantiate his 
points, whereas the latter focuses predominantly on real life example and personal 
experiences as well as the key opposition parties to justify his support towards the TKP.  
 
7.6 Concluding Remarks 
The empirical findings discussed in this chapter, demonstrate that ideological considerations 
play a driving role in shaping citizens political behaviour in Turkey. This is in line with 
political psychology studies that highlight the role of ideology in driving political judgments 
(Jost et al., 2009; Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Knight, 1985; Feldman, 1989). My 
findings highlight the deep fragmentation that characterizes the public in Turkey by shedding 
light on ideological divisions. Exploring in particular citizens’ conceptualisation, 
understanding and self-positioning on the political Islam-Kemalism, left-right and liberalism-
conservatism continuums my work provides insights into the way citizens internalise the 
country’s current political environment and formulate their ideological orientations, which 
shape their party preferences and electoral behaviour.  
 The empirical analysis confirms the ideological complexity that is inherent to the 
political arena of Turkey. Specifically, my findings suggest that ideological inclinations in 
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Turkey do not follow the traditional left-right or liberalism-conservatism continuums used in 
the study of Western societies. One of the most meaningful divisions pertains to political 
Islam and Kemalism and its related values of Islamism and secularism. Analytically, one of 
the most important indicators that point to the ideological division in Turkey is the 
positioning towards the governing AK Party. Opponents of the AKP (which belong to the 
Kemalist CHP and to the extreme-left) point to the party’s identity that places it in the 
political Islamist tradition highlighting its view on the role of religion in the society, as well 
as its practices towards individual rights and certain policies that promote its conservative 
pro-Islamist principles. On the opposite side, stand those who are in support of the AK Party 
and who deny the existence of political Islam in Turkey yet highlight the party’s liberal 
conservative face as promoted by its key political actors. At the same time, nationalists MHP 
voters also deny the existence of political Islam yet they point to certain disagreements with 
the AKP on minority rights and corruption. Citizens in Turkey seem to follow the ideological 
evolution the main political actors in Turkey have been following with AK Party self-
identifying as an agent of liberal conservatism and CHP as an advocator of socio-democracy. 
The value orientations that are relevant to the two parties, which are based on the Islamism-
secularism division, seem to drive citizens’ ideological inclinations. My study, provides 
evidence on the more relaxed, moderate segments of those who identify with socio-
democracy and liberal conservatism (as expressed by CHP and AKP) highlighting the 
processes that individuals go through in adjusting their ideological inclinations on the basis of 
the country’s political actors.  
 Political sophistication is important in determining the role of ideology at the 
individual level. High sophisticates, rely on complex constructs, which refer to the key 
ideological principles as promoted by the main political actors in justifying their self-
placement and positions towards politics. Low sophisticates, rely predominantly on their 
value orientations-more specifically those related to the Islamism-secularism continuum- to 
justify their ideological inclinations and party preferences.  
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Chapter 8. Data Analysis and Findings: Value orientations 
 
This chapter discusses the findings on my work on the role of value-orientations on political 
behaviour. I provide an in-depth account of the motivational nature of the core personal and 
political values that shape citizens’ judgmental evaluations towards politics. My elaboration 
on the findings on values touch upon two distinct dimensions. First, I address interviewees’ 
value-orientations and second, I discuss the way these orientations affect their positions on 
political affairs revealing their motivational nature. I also look at political sophistication, and 
how levels of political sophistication affect the consistency and coherence of values and 
political preferences such as ideological orientations and electoral behaviour. The chapter is 
divided in two distinct parts corresponding to the two types of values my investigation relies 
upon: core values and political values.  
 
8.1 Core Personal Values 
Focusing on core personal values I look at participants’ orientations on religiosity and the 
opinions they hold in regards to the role of religion in life, traditions and culture as well as 
modernization.  
 
Religiosity: The role of religion in personal life 
The first issue I look at is the role of religion in individual life drawing upon the patterns 
emerging from the quantitative data analysis from the WVS, the Ankara survey and the 
qualitative data from the semi-structured interviews. In doing so, I first address the role that 
ideologically charged attachment i.e. attachment to political Islam and Kemalism, attachment 
to Islam and the nation as well as political sophistication play in shaping attitudes towards the 
importance of religion and its role in citizens life. I then move on to the interview findings 
where participants have the space to unfold their thoughts and discuss analytically the 
motivational goals behind the values they hold. I also discuss the relationship between their 
value preferences and ideological and political positions.  
The WVS data show that ideological orientations on the political Islam-Kemalism 
continuum and sophistication play a determining role in shaping participants’ attitudes 
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towards religion.
102
 In particular, looking at Table 8.1, we see that attachment to Islamism is 
the strongest predictor of religiosity in comparison to Kemalism. Specifically, for a unit 
change in attachment to political Islam we see a number of religiosity-related attitudes 
increase significantly, such as the importance of religion in life (b=.25), the importance of 
Allah in life (b=.14), attendance to religious services (b=.26), and self-positioning on the 
religious scale (b=.17). Attachment to Kemalism is mostly insignificant but plays a 
statistically significant, albeit minor, negative role in terms of reducing self- positioning on 
the religious scale (b=-.05). Sophistication has overall a significant and negative impact on all 
religiosity variables, but when it interacts with support for political Islam its negative effect is 
moderated for the importance of Allah by.26 points, the frequency of attending religious 
services by .29 points, and the strength of personal characterisation as religious by.23 points. 
The importance of religion in life decreases even further by .13 points for those sophisticates 
who support the nation, adding to the negative 1.32 points effect of sophistication. 
 The conflict between fate and control in life is another aspect that relates to religiosity 
in the sense that citizens with higher level of attachment to religion may place their faith to 
religion as the key-determining factor for their future rather than believing in their own 
individual control over life. Participants were asked to indicate whether they believe that 
individuals can decide their own destiny, or whether it is impossible to escape a pre-
determined fate. Here we see that Kemalism increases agreement with control of life (b=.30). 
On the other hand political Islam has a negative significant influence predicting preferences 
towards the predetermined path of life by fate b=.-18 points). Sophistication does not play a 
significant role when looking at ideological orientations. Sophistication also plays an 
important role; as it increases the belief towards citizens’ control over life increases (b=2.19) 
leading to a more cosmic understanding of life than a religious-based predetermined path. 
 In light of these findings, we see that ideological orientations towards Islamism and 
Kemalism as well as sophistication play a significant role in determining citizens’ level of 
religiosity. Ideological inclinations and particularly Islamism plays a significantly positive 
role. Sophistication has a negative effect, which is moderated by its positive interaction with 
Islamic preferences. The impact of sophistication is also important when we look at faith vs. 
control over life where it reinforces beliefs towards control over life.  
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 For a summary of the main WVS findings on the effects of ideology and sophistication, please see Table 5.1 
in Appendix 5. 
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Table 8.1 Religiosity 
 
 
Importance of religion in life  
(V9) 
Constant 7.85*** (.30) 
Political Islam .25*** (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.02 (.03) 
High Sophisticates -1.32** (.48) 
High Soph. x Islam .22*** (.05) 
High Soph. x Nation -.13* (.06) 
Adj R
2
 .22  
N 1345  
Importance of Allah in life  
(V192) 
 
 
Constant 8.5*** (.22) 
Political Islam .14*** (.02) 
Kemalist Nationalism .03  (.03) 
High Sophisticates -2.50*** (.35) 
High Soph. x Islam .26*** (.04) 
High Soph. x Nation .07 (.04) 
Adj R
2
 
N 
.21 
1345 
 
Frequency of attendance at 
religious services  
(V186) 
Constant 3.37***   (.52) 
Political Islam .26*** (.06) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.05 (.06) 
High Sophisticates -1.38
+
 (.82) 
High Soph. x Islam .29*** (.08) 
High Soph. x Nation -.01 (.10) 
Adj R
2
 .07  
N 1345  
Religious person-personal 
characterisation    
(V187) 
Constant 8.74*** (.26) 
Political Islam .17*** (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.05 
+
 (.03) 
High Sophisticates -2.26*** (.41) 
High Soph. x Islam .23*** (.04) 
High Soph. x Nation .04 (.05) 
Adj R
2
 .18  
N 1345  
Fate vs. control  
(V188) 
Constant 4.07***  (.47) 
Political Islam -.18*** (.05) 
Kemalist Nationalism .30***  (.05) 
High Sophisticates 2.19***  (.74) 
High Soph. x Islam -.01  (.07) 
High Soph. x Nation -.13  (.09) 
Adj R
2
 .08   
N 1345   
Note: 
+ 
p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, 
standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are measured on 0-10 scales, with values in between. Data from the 
2007 WVS. 
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Next, I look at the findings from the Ankara survey on the role of religion and religiosity. 
Table 7.2 (in page 146) summarizes the mean values of participants’ attachment to religion. 
As we see on a 0-10 scale where 0 is not important at all and 10 is very important CHP voters 
have a mean value of MCHPvoters=6.3 on the importance of Allah. The importance of religion 
also gathers a high mean value among these participants MCHPvoters=7.7. The mean values 
here suggest that religion is important even among the secular CHP voters.  
In trying to explain the drivers of these levels of importance of religion and Allah in 
the life of CHP voters, I look at the role of attachment to Islam and the nation. As Table 8.2 
shows CHP voters’ attachment to Islam increases the importance of Allah in their lives 
(b=.35). This is consistent with the WVS data and suggests that the importance of religion 
overpasses the electoral and the related ideological boundaries. Attachment to Islam plays a 
driving role in determining individual levels of religiosity even for the supporters of the 
traditional secularist CH Party. The effect of attachment to the nation on the other hand does 
not yield statistically significant findings.  
 
Table 8.2 Religiosity 
 
 
  CHP supporters 
Allah important in life Constant 5.04* (1.89) 
 Attachment to Islam .35*** (.09) 
 Attachment to the 
nation 
-.02 (.21) 
 Adj R
2
 .18  
 N 68  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales with values in between. 
Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis. Data from the 
Ankara survey (2009). 
 
Moving on to the interviews, the findings reveal a similar pattern with those from the WVS 
and the Ankara survey. Interviewees are divided in three different categories when it comes 
to their level of religiosity. First, there are those who denote themselves as atheists, having a 
complete distrust in anything related to religion. For these participants religion is viewed as a 
powerful control mechanism over the citizens in Turkey. These participants provide highly 
negative statements in regards to the role of religion in setting up boundaries to what 
constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in individual life. These ideas are 
expressed by three young participants who place themselves on the left side of Kemalism, 
supporters of its socio-democratic tendency as well as the three participants who place 
themselves on the extreme left end of the left-right pole (6 out of 25). Here we also get 
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qualitative evidence of how sophistication reinforces the reasoning behind negative 
religiosity attitudes. One high sophisticate that comes from the CHP pool of voters rejects the 
role of religion by highlighting its manipulative role and its usage for political purposes 
targeting the AKP for its increasing Islamism. The high sophisticate voter of the communist 
TKP highlights the conservative role that Islam has been playing historically in the country 
being promoted as an agent of unity criticizing negatively this aspect. He also pointed to the 
usage of religion for political purposes. Specifically, drawing upon both political agents i.e. 
the Kemalist CHP and the political Islamist AKP, the interviewee suggests that they have 
both been using religion in a different way (based on their ideological principles) aiming to 
serve their own interests and preserve the polarization levels intact in the society. Low 
sophisticates from both sides also focus on the usage of religion for political purposes paying 
great attention to the AKP and its electoral domination. The only difference comes from the 
TKP low sophisticate who also refers to the past Kemalist establishment and its attack on 
religious freedoms which ‘started what we witness today with AKP responding back in terms 
of religious freedoms’ to use the words of interviewee no. 21.  
Second, there are participants for whom religion is important in their personal life (16 
out of 25). These interviewees self-declare as religious, they believe in Allah but their 
relationship with religion is more moderate in the sense that they do not practice religion by 
following the Islamic rule. They noted that they take strength from their feeling that Allah 
exists and helps them and acknowledge the cultural importance of Islam in the country. The 
majority of those participants do not attend religious services frequently but mainly on certain 
occasions and as part of family gatherings and traditions. In fact, most religious interviewees 
noted that although they do not attend the mosques and they do not pray five times a day 
according to the Quran, they fast during the holy months of Ramadan and they pray alone 
when they feel like (13 out of 25).
103
 Several state that they are religious yet sustain a 
personal connection with Islam highlighting that their religiosity and their relationship with 
Allah helps them a lot in their private life (9 out of 15). Some also note that their relationship 
with religion reinforces their sense of humanity yet suggesting that it is not a matter of Islam 
per se but a result of their connection with religion (4 out of 15). These ideas are expressed 
by a wide rage of participants such as high sophisticates of the CHP party (3 out 25), novices 
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 Interviewee no.5 notes ‘ I don’t follow religious practices yet I avoid engaging with activities that are seen 
as sinful by Islam. I am neither purely religious nor an atheist. I am in the middle I guess’. Then goes on saying 
that the idea of God’s existence is comforting highlighting the importance of faith on someone and the sense of 
trust in someone above is powerful. Similarly, interviewee no.11 states ‘I don’t need to go to the mosque to 
pray. I prefer not to go and pray in my private moments. I also try to fast whenever it is possible. I’m religious 
but my connection with Allah is personal and I like keeping it that way.’ 
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who support the CHP (8 out of 25), supporters of the AKP (3 out of 25), as well as the two 
nationalist MHP voters. For them, political sophistication does not seem to interfere in 
shaping attitudes towards religious practices. All participants provide a justification that 
places religion within the limits of their personal life without pointing to its role in the public 
life. In other words these participants focus on the importance of religion in their personal life 
rather than its importance for the country. This, could be explained as a result of the 
important role that Islamic tradition and religion has been playing in Turkey, with 
participants who are against the domination of religion in the political life acknowledging 
either explicitly (high sophisticates) or implicitly (novices) the importance of religion in 
personal life as opposed to its domination in the public life. These participants regard religion 
as a deeply personal matter and as a result sustain a personal relationship with religion. This 
is an interesting twist, which was not visible by looking at the survey data alone.  
Third, there are also a few participants that identify religion as an important aspect of 
their personal life, are highly religious and try to follow the rules of Islam not necessarily by 
engaging with all aspects of practising their faith but still remain faithful to its values (3 out 
of 25). Interestingly, these participants acknowledge that religion plays an important role with 
religious values driving all aspects of their personal life. These were low sophisticates voters 
of AKP and shared the acknowledgement of Islam and religious practices as an important 
aspect at the individual level but also a unifying factor for the Turkish society.  
 
Religion: Individual Freedoms and Constraints 
The motivational goal that religion holds in the personal life has a significant effect on 
citizens’ attitudes towards the constraints as well as freedoms related to religion. During the 
discussion on the role of religion in personal life several participants referred to a number of 
issues that are deeply political and which have a direct impact on the individual level and in 
extent the public life in general such as the issue of the headscarf as well as individual 
lifestyle choices.  
Being at the centre of public debate the AKP has been supporting the freedom of 
wearing the headscarf in all public places, arguing that it is related to the Islamic tradition and 
culture.
104
 The CHP have been strong opponents of the public use of headscarf in public 
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 The headscarf issue is a deeply controversial one and concerns the role that religion plays both at the 
individual and the collective level. At the same time, it is an issue that has been at the center of the political 
discourse assuming a strong political connotation. 
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spaces due to its symbolic religious connotation.
105
 The interviews took place in 2012, at a 
time during which the debate on the use of the headscarf was at the top of the political agenda 
generating a lively and divisive debate between the two key political actors i.e. AKP and 
CHP. The majority of citizens picked sides either supporting the AKP’s position for lifting 
the ban, or opposing this on the grounds of the secular nature of the state. The majority of 
participants in my study hold strong positions and attitudes on this issue. In fact, 
interviewees’ attitudes are divided on the basis of their ideological and political orientations 
while following the motivational goals as served by their levels to religiosity.  
Several participants place themselves against the lift of the headscarf ban providing a 
variety of considerations (4 out of 25). They come from the Kemalist camp (2 of which hold 
strong Kemalist ideals and two that self-identify with the socio-democratic tendency of the 
CH Party). Two have high levels of sophistication and two are novices. The common aspect 
here is their adherence to the secularist principles of the country expressing the opinion that 
religion should stay away from public life in accordance with the secularist principles of the 
Republic. The headscarf is widely seen by these participants as a symbol of political Islam 
and the lift of its ban would pose a great threat to the secular nature of the state and open the 
path for Islam to play a key role in the public life of the country. Two of these participants 
who also hold high levels of sophistication noted that allowing the public use of the headscarf 
would create even more discrimination on an issue that is deeply personal and the decision on 
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 It is important to provide some background information here concerning the debate on the ban of the use of 
headscarf. With the principle of secularism being one of the most important pillars of the Turkish constitution 
the headscarf has been banned from all public institutions, civil services, educational as well as political 
institutions. In 2008 Erdoğan passed through the parliament a constitutional amendment that was putting an end 
to the ban of the use of the headscarf at universities. However, the country’s Constitutional Court annulled this 
amendment. In 2010 AKP with Erdoğan has managed to pass the constitutional amendment with a lift to the ban 
for university students, which came into effect immediately. It took 3 more years for the AKP government and 
Erdoğan to lift the ban over the headscarf in state institutions. The lift of the headscarf ban was promoted by 
AKP as a symbol of increasing individual and religious freedoms offering the same opportunities to religious 
University students but also to all civil servants in their workplace. Interestingly and as expected the issue of 
lifting the ban on the use of the headscarf has motivated key political parties to promote actively their positions 
which elucidated the deep ideological and political split of the political arena of Turkey when it comes to the 
issue of religion and individual expressions of religiosity. In short, the governing AK Party in promoting the lift 
of the ban did so as part of its Democratization and Human Right package that was brought into parliament in 
2013. In regards to the headscarf the party and its leader Erdoğan stated that it constitutes a significant step 
towards individual liberties and rights aiming to advance the country’s democracy. A supporting position was 
also held by the nationalist MHP whose leader stated that promoting a solution for the headscarf issue would 
result in relaxing a very large part of the society expressing a clear support of the individual freedom to choose 
to wear or not the headscarf. At the opposite side of the lift stands the Kemalist CH Party who declared its 
opposition by referring to violation of the constitution addressing the danger the lift of the ban poses at the 
secular principles of the Republic. Several MPs accused Erdoğan of promoting an Islamist agenda aiming to 
move Turkey to a conservative and Islamic path against its founding principles. 
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whether to use it or not should be personal and should stay away from political matters. 
106
 In 
short, these participants remained faithful to their view of religion as a private matter as well 
as to their ideological orientations in support of secularism and Kemalism. Opposition to 
AKP and its Islamic practices come to the fore among these interviewees in combination with 
the fear of the increasing role of Islam in the country. 
Interestingly, a more relaxed position in regards to the use of headscarf comes from 
the CHP supporters who are in support of the socio-democratic tendency of the party (5 out 
of 25) as well as the extreme-left participants (2 out of 25). Among these, two score high in 
sophistication and five score low. These participants are more open in regards to the use of 
the headscarf yet they provide more sceptical positions when it comes to the amendment of 
the constitution as well as the public spaces within which the ban would be lifted. In 
particular, these interviewees express their support of religious freedoms and the freedom of 
expressing one’s level of religiosity. Two high sophisticates also consider the means through 
which the suspension of the ban would come into effect addressing the difference existing 
between the usage of a constitutional or a legal amendment. A change in the constitution is 
viewed negatively by all participants since it would violate the secularist principles of the 
country whereas a legal amendment would still solve the issue without changing any of the 
fundamental principles of the country as the two high sophisticates note. A number of 
interviewees that support the ban as well as the 3 extreme left supporters (7 out of 25) suggest 
that they do not disagree with the lift of the ban of the use of headscarf at the universities 
referring to religious freedoms. Interviewee no.6 notes  
‘When I was at the university there were girls that wearing the headscarf and it was 
kind of weird, but now there is no problem. There were also girls that were coming 
with mini skirts. When the ones enter why shouldn’t the other enter as well? It’s just a 
matter of respecting one’s individual choices nothing more. Religion should not pose 
any constraints when it comes to education. However, the ban for public institutions 
is a different discussion. These are the state institutions and they should follow the 
constitution remaining secular without religious symbols’.  
However, the majority of them disagree from lifting the ban for public services. This 
differentiation is justified on the basis of the nature of the space within which individuals get 
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 Interviewee no.3 notes ‘I don’t really have a problem with the headscarf in general, but at this moment I 
would not approve the headscarf in public spaces. A very good friend of mine is covered and we always sit 
together at the university. Of course this is not a problem for me she decides to do whatever she wants, we are 
friends but that is her own choice. But because the headscarf right now is a deeply political issue I keep this 
position. [….] Having covered woman and not covered women can automatically create discrimination anyway, 
and that’s not good.’ 
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to express their religious views. This is nicely summarized by the following extract from 
interviewee no. 20 who suggests: 
‘being a university student wearing a headscarf is one thing but being an MP wearing 
a headscarf is another. When you are a university student you express your own ideas 
and views and that is respectable. But when you are an MP or any other civil servant 
you represent and work for the society. Wearing a headscarf would mean that you 
disrespect the secularist ideals of our society that are set by the constitution’.  
At the opposite side, stand the AKP voters (3 out of 25) and one MHP voter who are in 
support of the lift of the headscarf ban. These participants regardless of their level of 
sophistication express the opinion that the lift of the ban will end a long-standing 
discrimination against those females that choose to wear it, while at the same time, it will 
bolster the country’s democracy by extending individual liberties. They view the issue of the 
headscarf as an individual choice related to religious attachment and therefore argue that 
there should not be any set restrictions to its use in any public space. For them, the individual 
choice of a female wearing a headscarf in public should be protected and the AKP’s attempts 
to provide this freedom is setting another stone to the democratic principles of the country.  
Another issue that came up while addressing the role of religion in personal life 
concerns the individual freedoms of religious expression and lifestyle choices. That is also an 
issue that is ideologically driven because of its reference to the impact of religion on the 
boundaries society sets for what is perceived to be as acceptable behaviour. Again, 
participants’ responses are diverse and reflect their religiosity as well as their ideological 
orientations and electoral preferences. Few similarities with the discussion on the headscarf 
ban emerge. There is the camp of the strict Kemalists who reject any public role for religion 
(2 out of 25), those socio-democratic supporters of CHP (8 out of 25) and extreme-left (3 out 
of 25) who acknowledge the individual freedom of expressing one’s religiosity yet deny the 
imposition of restrictions in regards to one’s lifestyle choices. What brings together both 
sides, is the common acknowledgement that all individuals should have the space to express 
themselves and their values freely within the boundaries of secularism. Interestingly in this 
case those interviewees that declare as atheist as well as those who self-identify as 
moderately religious and those who hold a private respect towards religion come together by 
rejecting the imposition of certain rules in the society that restrict the expression of certain 
ideas and lifestyle choices. Another common aspect that brings together these participants, is 
their disagreement and direct opposition to the AKP and its increasing tendencies in favour of 
Islam that are seen as posing a danger to the society’s secular basis. Additionally the two 
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communist participants acknowledge that religion has been used by the competitive sides of 
secularism and political Islam in Turkey, resulting in a deep polarization of the electorate 
creating boundaries and individual restrictions that keep alive this polarization.  
Political sophistication plays a mediating role. Specifically, the interviewees who 
score high in sophistication refer predominantly to their ideological orientations to 
substantiate their value orientations and to explain their position on the role that religion 
plays in society. On the contrary, novices draw upon their value preferences in combination 
with their electoral choices to substantiate their positions.  
Interestingly, many point to the invasive nature of religion in the country because it 
establishes boundaries that affect accepted behaviours and certain lifestyles instead of being 
seen as a strictly private issue (13 out of 25). They come from the Kemalist camp as well as 
the extreme left. They share opposition to the AKP and its religious oriented practices while 
political sophistication seems to reinforce value-based preferences and ideological 
orientations in regards to religious freedoms and constraints. As several participants note, 
although they prefer religion either out of their lives or to be limited in their private life 
eventually religion finds the way to infiltrate their lives through political and social channels 
(11 out of 25). By referring to political channels here several interviewees refer to the 
extensive use of religion and Islam by AKP promoting religious based policies and paving 
the path through which certain lifestyles are being seen as righteous while others are 
condemned.  
Several participants provide colourful examples addressing the imposition of certain 
behavioural patterns seen as appropriate by the public as well as the involvement of state-
based institutions (i.e. judiciary and police) in controlling individual levels of freedom of 
expression of religious attitudes (5 out of 25). Interviewee no. 11 summarizes this in a clear 
fashion:  
‘I am religious and sometimes I might pray but this is personal, it is something I do 
for myself and only. […] Yes religion has a direct impact in my life. I don't like it –in 
fact I hate it- and this should not happen, but it does […]. Let me give you an 
example. Last year, I was in a bus going somewhere and there was this young couple 
hugging each other. They were only hugging nothing else. The bus driver stopped the 
bus, approached them and said that the bus is not the place to do sex and asked them 
to go down from the bus. These young people could have been my friends. Think, this 
came from a bus driver, the same you can hear from a cay shop owner or a restaurant 
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owner. It’s just some attitudes are not tolerated and this has to do with the religious 
domination of AKP and its practices’.  
Another element that concerns the limitations and restrictions religion brings to public and 
individual life is the use of alcohol in public spaces. Regardless of the level of sophistication, 
the restrictions on the use of alcohol - either being imposed by religious citizens or even by 
the state - are seen as a breach of individual freedoms and lifestyle choices (4 out of 25). 
Interviewee no.20 noted: 
‘I like going out drinking raki with my friends. In Turkey this is a type of social 
behaviour that is how we socialize. I like also drinking beer by the sea with my friends 
talking. I don’t want to think that, wherever we are, a very conservative and religious 
person will come to us shouting and swearing that we insult him and Islam by 
drinking and having fun. I don’t say to disrespect certain rules. For instance I don’t 
say to go and have drinks in front of a mosque that is forbidden but I want the 
freedom to go out, have some drinks with my friends and enjoy it without being 
worried about how conservative the neighbourhood is. It’s my life, my choice and as 
far as I don’t bother anyone I also don’t want to be bothered’.  
Along the same lines interviewee no. 1 noted: 
‘If I want to have a drink and sit on the beach in Moda you might have an argument 
with a religious passerby. In the centre of Kadikoy or Cihangir nothing might happen, 
but in Kartal, Pendik or in Fatih I might have serious problems and fights
 107
 Same, if 
I go to Corum or Cankiri they will surely complain and fight with me.
108
 I don’t refer 
to these places by chance. In fact me and my friends have come across several people 
in these areas that shout at us for being sinners and acting against Islam insulting 
Allah.’  
At the same time, a few participants discuss openly state-based restrictions in regards to 
freedom of religious expression and imposed constraints (2 out of 25). An illustrative 
example comes from interviewee no.1 who explains:  
‘There is this very popular webpage […](the name of the webpage is not mentioned 
here for security purposes). It’s an online open space for public discussions 
addressing a variety of issues from politics and philosophy to music and sports, 
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 Moda is a district in the Asian side of Istanbul. Cihangir is a neighbourhood in the Beyoğlu district 
in Istanbul. They are both considered to be hype neighborhoods with western-like cafes and restaurants. Kartal 
and Pendik are located in the Asian side of Istanbul and are considered as conservative districts. Fatih is a 
capital district in the European side of Istanbul.  
108
 Corum is a Northern Anatolian city located in the central Black Sea Region. Çankırı is the capital city of 
Çankırı Province located in the northeast of Ankara. 
Chapter 8. Data Analysis and Findings: Value orientations 
 171 
lifestyle and the like  […]. Several users enter the page and write satirical, humorous 
or ironical comments. One of them was about Prophet Muhammad and Allah. […] A 
popular figure of Islam
109
 - who to me is more like a caricature but anyway... - made 
a formal complain to the prosecutor with the accusation that there were several 
comments that were insulting Islam and the prophets. Around 40-50 users were found 
and the prosecutor charged them. One of those guys is a friend of mine. He didn’t 
insult anyone but his name and the charge is already stored in the system. I don't 
want to deal with religion at all. But you see it can be everywhere and somehow it 
gets its way in your life and becomes a part of our everyday life by restricting you and 
controlling the way you live.’  
Contrary to the aforementioned critical views against the boundaries religion sets in the 
individual life, there are also some interviewees for whom religion in Turkey does not pose 
constraints to citizens yet it is the past political establishments that created boundaries that 
repressed religious individuals (5 out of 25). These views come from AKP and MHP 
supporters. These interviewees shared the opinion that there needs to be a more balanced 
view of religion in the society. Specifically, they pointed to the need for a normalisation of 
the view of religion without the constant fear that the secular principles of the country are 
under attack. They said that Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country and naturally religion 
plays a driving role through traditions and culture that are based on Islam. On this basis, they 
highlighted that the country’s religious population should be respected and granted the same 
rights held by every other citizen. Accordingly, religious citizens need to have the space and 
the right to express their levels of religiosity in every way they choose without restrictions in 
the same way as those who are not religious. To give an example, interviewee no. 9 was 
discussing the issue of alcohol consumption and expressed a friendly attitude, which hinders 
a confrontation on the basis of the state of religious freedoms in Turkey. The interviewee 
noted: 
‘I don’t have a problem with people who drink. In fact many of my friends drink when 
we go out. I just select to drink something non-alcoholic. There is no problem with 
that. However, when a friend of mine is covered and they don’t allow her enter a 
certain bar then that is discrimination. If we want freedoms in Turkey we need to  
apply them for everyone and not only for certain types of behaviours that are 
considered more European.’ 
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 Here the interviewee refers to Adnan Oktar, advocator of Islamic creationism. 
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Religion and Public Life 
In addressing the issue of religion in public life several participants highlighted the 
interference of religion into politics suggesting that religion has become a vibrant part of the 
socio-political affairs. Overall, there is unanimous agreement that religion plays a significant 
role in Turkey’s public life. Although this generalised belief is equally shared amongst all 
participants, there are differences in the level of involvement in public life, their agreement as 
well as the impact this has in the society but also on their individual life. In fact, the 
ideological orientations, party preferences as well as the level of sophistication in most cases 
play a driving role in shaping attitudes towards the role of religion in public life. Some 
interviewees are against the involvement of religion in public life, some others acknowledge 
its importance yet place certain boundaries and others accept its involvement with certain 
concerns about its use. Practically these attitudes reflect the diversity of ideological positions 
of the key political actors in the country.  
Interestingly, the majority of interviewees - who are CHP voters, regardless of their 
level of sophistication - note that religion is a deeply private matter, which does not belong in 
the public sphere. They opposed the involvement of religion in public affairs and highlighted 
that Islam or any type of religion should not have any involvement in politics and the public 
domain. This opinion was uniform among all CHP supporters regardless of their level of 
religiosity. However, the justification varied on the basis of their ideological inclination. For 
instance participants with strong Kemalist orientations (4 out of 25) and who remain faithful 
to Kemalist ideas suggested that by no means religion should interact with the state and its 
rules because Turkey is by constitution - and should remain - a secular state.
110
 They paid 
great attention to the Kemalist pillar of secularism, which is also a constitutional principle 
that shapes the country’s socio-political outlook.111 They all expressed a direct opposition to 
AKP and its political practices that point to the increasing role of Islam in public life. 
Those who lean towards the centre-left (i.e. the socio-democratic tendency of CHP) 
spoke about religion by referring to the freedom everyone should have to choose whether to 
                                                 
110 Interviewee no.16 highlights that ‘Islam in Turkey has been involved into politics for good but I don’t see 
that positively. The state should not have a religion. Turkey is a secular state by constitution and everyone 
should respect that. There shouldn’t be any space for Islam in the political life. Religion was not in the epicenter 
in the past but due to AKP and its policies lately religion has entered the public life and this is very worrying’. 
111
 Interviewee no. 23 notes ‘ Secularism is one of the key principles that Ataturk brought. This is what made 
Turkey a modern Republic and need to preserve it that way. Today AKP and Erdoğan seem to ignore this and 
although they operate within the boundaries of the constitution their practices go against secularism. Islam is 
becoming more and more involved in politics one way or another and this is something that I am totally 
against’.  
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believe or not in their private life. They also highlighted the necessary separation of religion 
from public affairs (10 out of 25).
112
 They acknowledged the importance of religion stating 
that being Turkey a predominantly Muslim country, it is expected that religion will somehow 
impact the public life through customs and traditions inherent in the society. However, they 
all rejected the role of religion in driving political affairs or posing boundaries among people 
shaping social interactions. Eventually, for these participants the tradition and cultures that 
are related to Islam were seen as normal, and in some cases important to the extent they did 
not interfere with public affairs. For instance, interviewees no. 8 pointed to the traditions of 
Islam during the Ramadan period where young people pay their respects to the older by 
referring to practices such as kissing the older relatives’ hands. For these participants certain 
traditions that are religiously generated are not necessarily bad since they refer to a certain 
type of social interaction that has nothing to do with the way the political life operates. 
Interviewee no. 1 in an illustrative statement notes:  
‘I am an atheist and my mother and father are atheists too. I haven’t been in a 
mosque or prayed since I was 10 years old. Because most of my relatives are atheists 
I never had this ‘first-time experiences’ when it comes to religion. But let me tell you 
this. My aunt is religious but has nothing to do with Islamists or political Islam. She 
votes for CHP and she is following its ideological line more or less. When it comes to 
religion she holds a more secular view you know ‘I pray to god, but I will also have 
some glasses of raki’. But for instance, when I visit her in [the place has been 
excluded for security purposes] she always ask me to go to the mosque with my 
cousin, you know as a family tie. And I always come back to her saying since I don't 
believe I don't find it respectful to just go and pray in something that I don't trust or 
follow. And she tells me ‘nothing will happen, you will go once, twice and then you 
will just get used to it’.  So look. Although religion is important, the way that religion 
is practices in personal life is not always conscious and does not necessarily involve a 
conscious devotion to god, or Islam. In many cases like with my aunt it can just be a 
routine not a conscious choice but that doesn’t mean that religion should be given the 
space to determine politics. In fact, it should rely on the individual level whether to 
believe or not and have no involvement in the way politics function’. 
Yet, a couple of participants point to these practices - i.e. kissing the hands of older as a form 
of respect - as unnecessary and expressed a position that religion should by no means set the 
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 As interviewee no.6 notes ‘I don’t like religion being involved into politics. Religion is something that is 
inside us, everyone is free to be a believer or not. It is not nice to link religion with politics’.  
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rules of social interaction.
113
 Again here participants focused on AKP and its religious 
outlook expressing a fear of the increasing role that Islam and its related practices play in 
Turkey.  
On the other hand the three interviewees who self-identify with the extreme-left, 
expressed a more direct position in regards to the role of religion as a source of polarization 
in the society. They highlighted the usage of religion by the key political actors in Turkey 
(AKP and CHP). For these participants, religion was a private matter and should by no means 
become involved in the social life of the country. Interviewee no.17 suggests:  
‘Islam has always been in the centre of the political debate. For me this is something 
that I cannot relate to and I am totally against it. Religion either in the form of 
Islamism or with Kemalism is an issue that divides the country in two: those who 
support and those who oppose. Isn’t it absurd? We need to overcome this. Religion is 
a private matter and should remain outside of the social environment. We live in a 
country that has very high unemployment levels with high poverty and we continue 
talking about Islam. Its not religion that creates these. The main parties use religion 
to attract voters and preserve the situation as it is. Imagine if people realize that it is 
not religion the key issue here. Imagine what will happen if people start asking for 
their fundamental rights to work and live decently without oppression’. 
Participants paid greater attention to the role of AKP and its view of religion in the society. 
As they suggested, AKP is shaping the public dialogue with Islam viewed as unifying factor. 
As interviewee no. 21 noted: 
 ‘At the end of the day AKP has been using Islam and its liberal stance towards 
religion to attract voters from those who felt oppressed in the past.’  
Referring to this religious reactionism, these interviewees reject the involvement of religion 
in the political sphere. 
A common aspect among those opponents of the AKP is that they acknowledged that 
religion has become a tool for political purposes by the governing party. These views were 
expressed both by strong supporters of Kemalism and CHP as well as more moderate centre-
left supporters of the party. For instance, several interviewees noted the usage of religion by 
the governing party in promoting certain limitations and setting up boundaries within which 
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 Interviewee no. 20 notes ‘I am religious in my personal life, but I don’t think that religion should play a role 
in the society. Look there are certain things that I don’t want to do although they come from religion. For 
instance this thing to kiss our older relatives’ hand in the Bayram for me is totally needless. I express my 
respect differently. I don’t need the Bayram to show my respect to them. I don’t like when religion tells me what 
to do in my private life or even social life.’ 
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citizens should operate in the social and private life (13 out of 25). Sophistication here played 
an interesting role. A few high sophisticates CHP voters (2 out of 4) as well as one voter of 
the Communist TKP suggested that religion- as much as Turkish-ness- were two of the most 
commonly used elements by certain political actors for electoral purposes. Focusing on the 
AKP’s tenure in the country’s governance they point to Erdoğan’s references to Islam and 
ethnic identity of the Turkish population promoted as the main unifying characteristics of the 
nation. As these interviewees suggested, the governing party promotes a certain idea of 
religious values and ethnic belonging with the purpose of shaping a conservative religious 
nationalistic type of citizen.  
Finally, there are those participants for whom religion will inevitably play a role in 
the public life of Turkey. They are mainly AKP and MHP voters who ideologically lean 
towards the conservative and centre-right and right. For them, political sophistication did not 
affect their responses on this matter. As interviewee no.19 highlights:  
‘Religion should be a part of the political reality both at the national and 
international level. Look, every religion has two sides, the one is the practice and the 
other is praying. Practice concerns the ever day life and the impact of religion on it. 
Practice is related to the social behaviour. In a country [like Turkey] with 98 % of 
Muslims it is absolutely logical the everyday social and political life to be affected by 
religion.’ 
According to these participants, the fact that religion was brought back in the public domain 
should not restrict anyone in the society. To use the words of interviewee no.14, who is a 
nationalist supporter of MHP: 
 ‘Religion should not directly affect politics for one key reason. There is nothing to 
negotiate when it comes to religion.’  
As interviewee no. 2 states: 
‘There is no rule that states whether to be a believer or not. If you want you go to the 
mosque, if not you don’t. Everyone should be free to choose whether to wear a 
headscarf or not and not being forced to not wear a headscarf for political purposes. 
We cannot talk about freedoms when there are rules that oppress those that believe in 
Islam and its words. For me, religion interferes with politics when it comes to 
personal boundaries’.  
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Religion and Politicians 
Another issue related to the role of religion in society is the connection between religion and 
political actors. Again here we see that interviewees’ opinions were divided on the basis of 
their ideological orientations, motivational values and levels of political sophistication.  
 In particular, the majority of interviewees who were strong supporters of Kemalism 
and CHP, along with more moderate centre-left supporters suggested that political actors 
should keep their religious views and levels of religiosity away from politics. For them, 
sophistication does not play a driving role since both novices and high sophisticates 
expressed the same opinion in regards to the limitation of religious expressions and religious 
values in the private life. A similar opinion came from those on the extreme-left end of the 
left-right ideological pole. They highlighted the use of religion by key political actors for 
electoral purposes leading to a deeper polarization in the society. They viewed religion as a 
tool that is being used to overpass important inequalities within the country aiming to 
preserve the two opposing ends, that are those supporters of Islam (AKP and political Islam) 
and those of secularism (i.e. CHP and Kemalism). 
 Moving on to AKP supporters, their personal values and specifically their religiosity 
and view of the role of religion in the society drove their opinions on the matter. They 
expressed more relaxed attitudes in regards to the expression of religiosity by certain 
politicians. Specifically, four noted that the expression of religiousness by politicians is not 
viewed negatively. The justification for this lies in the fact that being Turkey a Muslim 
country it is expected to a certain extent that politicians will express their religious attitudes. 
As interview no.15 noted: 
‘Most politicians are elected from religious people and so expressing their religion is 
something normal’.  
Along the same lines, interviewee no.10 suggested:  
‘A politician in a country that is Muslim by majority should be careful of his public 
profile. For instance he can’t drink water in a public appearance during the 
Ramadan. But this doesn’t mean he uses religion for personal gains.’ 
 We see that these participants - for whom religion is important in their life as a driver of 
good in the society - applied the same principles when it comes to shape their views towards 
religious politicians. In other words for those who are believers of Islam, a religious politician 
can have good virtues that can help the society as far as they shows respect for religious 
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freedoms.
114
 A similar view, was also expressed by a MHP voter who suggested that 
politicians should be allowed to express their religious values because the Turkish society is 
religious and its culture and traditions are based on Islam.  
 Yet, there are a few exceptions to this that come from high sophisticates that identify 
with the more liberal segment of AKP, as well as from the nationalist MHP, for whom 
materialistic considerations are of great significance (i.e. economy of the country). They 
highlighted that that they were not interested in the level of religiosity of certain politicians, 
but said it is their honesty, efficiency, self-discipline and political plan that matters the most. 
As interviewee no. 19 noted: ‘these are not virtues that are dependent on one’s level of 
religiosity’.  
At the same time, the two AKP high sophisticates held a negative view towards 
politicians who use their religiosity as a justification for imposing certain boundaries in the 
society undermining by consequence individual freedoms.  
 
Current status of freedom of religious expression 
Religious freedom in society is another important topic discussed during the interviews. 
There was uniform agreement that Sunni Muslims are free to exercise their religion without 
any constraints in Turkey. However, a number of participants refer to certain restrictions of 
practising religion. These participants again were divided on the basis of their ideological 
orientations and values when it comes to issue of religious freedoms in the country.  
The majority of AKP opponents coming from the CHP pool of voters as well as the 
extreme-left, highlighted that religion is free in Turkey pointing to certain policies by AKP 
that go far beyond the essential limits (14 out of 25). They pointed to AKP, which has placed 
religion in the middle of the socio-political arena, opening up the space for a more 
conservative outlook of the society that relies on basic Islamic principles. Several participants 
also noted that because of the increasing religious conservatism, certain lifestyle choices are 
openly criticized by religious citizens. Certain policies were also addressed such as the 
increase in Imam Hatip (religious-based) schools as opposed to secular-based institutions, 
which according to interviewee no. 5 is a clear indicator of the increasing religious 
conservatism of Turkey. An interesting perspective came from a participant who is low 
sophisticate CHP voter and who referred to geographical differences between the west and 
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As interviewee no.2 suggests ‘[…] religion should only deal with the fairness of those who govern and not 
whether someone is Muslim or not’. 
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the southeast of the country on the issue of freedom of expression. As interviewee no.16 
noted:  
‘People are free in terms of practising their religion in Turkey. Yet this differs on the 
basis of the geography. For instance in the west some very religious people might be 
seen in a weird way like “what is he doing?”. Whereas in the east and south religious 
practices are more common. In general there is a big difference between the west and 
the southeast.’ The interviewee also notes that ‘in the past people were more reserved 
to share their religious beliefs yet in the last 5 years this seems to have changed 
because of AKP’. 
At the same time, those who belonged to the socio-democratic camp of CHP along with 
extreme-left supporters criticized restrictions of religious expression towards minorities (5 
out of 25). They suggested that followers of other religious denominations are not free and 
instead face a number of restrictions for their religious practices. As interviewee no.21 noted:  
 ‘Yes people in Turkey are free in terms of religion. They are so free that they can 
impose rules to those who follow different religions. Alevis, for instance, are using the 
cemevis for their religious practices that are considered as cultural places and not 
recognized as religious spaces. Christians, have their own worship places but they 
don't have complete freedom when it comes to practising their religion. For instance, 
they don't have the right to erect a new church neither they can put into use an old 
church that was closed in the past. And these are all set in the constitution. Jews also 
have closed themselves inside their worship places to protect themselves. You can see 
huge iron doors that protect the entrance to their worship places. […] To give you an 
example: I have an Armenian friend whose name was […]115 but after the Hrank 
Dink
116
 events in 2007 she had to change her surname on facebook because she was 
receiving threats for her life’. 
On the opposite side, stand AKP and MHP supporters who expressed the opinion that 
Muslim people in Turkey are absolutely free to express their religious orientation and there is 
no form of religious oppression. The one different opinion came from a high sophisticate 
AKP supporter who used a different framework to express the opinion that there are certain 
restrictions on religious exercise. Characteristically interviewee no.2 noted:  
                                                 
115
 The name has been omitted for security purposes. 
116
 Hrank Dink was the editor-in-chief of the Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos who was assassinated in 
January 2007 in Istanbul by a Turkish nationalist.  
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‘People are about 60% free to express their religious freedom. For instance, an 
employee of the Koç business group wants to pray but does not have this luxury. 
Religion for some is important for others not, but we have to respect the one who is a 
believer. […] There is oppression towards believers today in Turkey and this creates 
a situation where religious people think that repression will continue and that is why 
they want to take the power in their hands so that no one can repress them. This is 
one of the worse things of Kemalism; it made people angry, it managed to polarize the 
society [….] It created a system of hate among people’. 
 
Tradition and Culture 
The next set of results look at attitudes towards tradition and culture. Looking at Table 8.3 
below and specifically at the effects of ideological attachment on attitudes towards tradition, 
an interesting pattern emerges. Specifically both attachment to political Islam and Kemalism 
increase the importance of tradition, with attachment to Islamism having a slightly higher 
influence (b=.19) than attachment to Kemalism (b=.16). Sophistication does not play an 
important role, but for sophisticates support for the nation reduces the importance of 
traditions by .13 points. This can be explained by the higher scepticism of high sophisticates 
on the role that traditions play in public life.  
 
Table 8.3. Attitudes towards Tradition 
 
Importance of traditions 
(V89) 
Constant 6.22***  (.30) 
Political Islam .19*** (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism .16*** (.03) 
High Sophisticates .70 (.48) 
High Soph. x Islam -.01 (.05) 
High Soph. x Nation -.13** (.05) 
Adj R
2
 .09  
N 1345  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression 
coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are measured on 0-10 scales, with values in 
between. Data from the 2007 WVS. 
 
A similar pattern emerges also when looking at the interviews. Specifically, the preservation 
of certain traditional and cultural aspects of society is seen as a positive thing from the vast 
majority of interviewees. In fact, all interviewees note that preserving traditions and culture is 
very important since they act as a unifying factor for society in general, the state as well as 
the family unit. For instance several interviewees regardless of their ideological positions and 
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voting preferences suggested that traditions and culture are good to be preserved because it is 
what gives to the Turkish society its distinct characteristics (21 out of 25). As interviewee no. 
3 noted:  
‘Traditions give people a sense of [social] identification. It is nice to be part of a 
world where we are not all the same. And traditions make us all different’.  
A significant point to make here is about the participants’ view of the source of traditions and 
culture as well as the mechanisms of their preservation. This is also the starting point that 
differentiates the uniform view of the positive role of traditions and culture in the society. In 
a revealing statement interviewee no.4 summarized the two main sources of tradition in 
Turkey noting that:  
 ‘Turkish culture is a combination of two elements. First the Turkish, which has 
behind it a very long history and the Islamic element that also has a long history. 
Both the Islamic and Turkish element have been assimilated in the Turkish society, 
they coexist nicely and since a very long time. We do need to protect these since this is 
who we [Turks] are.’  
This extract points to the root of the diverse opinions that interviewees expressed in regards 
to the source of traditions and cultures but also to the importance of preserving them. Those 
interviewees that argue that religion and Islam play a significant role in their life and who 
make political choices that are related to their religious values (i.e. AKP voters) pointed to 
traditions and cultural aspects that are generated both from religion and the nation’s history. 
They referred to the significance of preserving these, in order to strengthen both national and 
family ties. A similar opinion is expressed by the two nationalist MHP voters, who argued 
that traditions and culture are important for the nation and its progress. However, those 
interviewees that hold secularist ideas referred to traditions and culture in a more general 
fashion referring to their impact on the social life as a source that ties the Turkish population 
together. For instance, 15 secular interviewees discussed the existence of certain religious 
traditions and culture as part of a routine without holding any particular significance or 
meaning for the society apart from keeping family and social ties alive. For instance the 
celebration of the Ramadan and the Bayram holidays were viewed as important as long as 
they serve both the religious and traditional characteristics of the society.
 
Interviewee no. 11 
explains: 
 ‘In my family we are not vey religious some family members are religious, a couple 
are atheists and some do not pay much attention to religion. However, we all gather 
together in the holidays and sit around the table to celebrate. What I want to say… 
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some things are nice to preserve even if they are generated from religion. Celebrating 
a religious holiday is part of our culture and regardless if someone believes or not 
you will see most young people travel even long distance to go to their parents and 
celebrate all together’. 
Interestingly, among these participants a large number of interviewees (12 out of 25) set also 
a number of boundaries that refer to certain levels of oppression coming from traditions and 
culture. In particular, the majority of the secular participants regardless of their voting 
preferences and ideological leanings suggest that ‘preserving traditions and cultures is a 
good thing as far as this does not mean that anyone is oppressed in the society to follow 
them’ as interviewee no. 7 notes.  
Several participants, who are opponents of AKP, spoke openly against the usage of 
religion -and the respective tradition and culture-based elements that generate via religious 
channels- in order to reinforce the Islamic character of the society (12 out of 25). Here, 
participants discussed the AKP’s governance and the party’s practices towards religion. They 
pointed at the power held by the state and the governing AKP through which they can impose 
certain practices that are in accordance with religion as acceptable and in line with the culture 
of the country. Several participants made an interesting statement. Conservative opinions that 
are based on religion can be generated by two key sources which play an equal role in the 
society: first by AKP and the party’s conservative and religious governance and second by 
members of the public who are deeply religious - and in most cases supporters of political 
Islam and AKP - for whom certain lifestyle choices and their public expression are viewed as 
against the Islamic culture of the country. In both cases, the oppression that comes from 
imposing or even openly condemning behaviours that do not fit within the religious standards 
were rejected. For example, the usage of alcohol that is prohibited by Islam and the 
increasing hostility of religious people against those who drink in public (regardless of their 
own level of religiosity) was the most common example among these participants (4 out of 
25 point to this). Another example referred to expression of affect between young couples in 
public such as holding hands or kissing, which was viewed as offensive by religious citizens 
as many interviewees note (5 out of 25). Both cases, were used as an example of repression 
that is being generated by supporters of AKP that according to these interviewees feel 
legitimised to act as such simply because the party dominates the political arena. However, 
interviewees who have a private view of religion or are even atheists perceived these attitudes 
as deeply oppressive and part of a twisted perception of the culture of the country that is 
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rooted in religious conservatism.
117
 They pointed to the conservative views held by Islam and 
the Islamist character of the current AKP governance, which were seen as posing a threat to 
the country’s modernization and democratisation levels. 
 
Modernization  
In this section, I look at attitudes towards modernization across the three studies. First I 
discuss the results from the WV Survey in regards to attitudes towards modernization and 
rational thinking. The analyses here concern the potential effects of science and technology, 
whether they bring new opportunities for the next generations, and whether they increase the 
speed of the pace of life.  
When looking at the effects of citizens’ ideological orientations (i.e. Islamism versus 
Kemalism) as well as the role of political sophistication in Table 8.4 below, I find evidence of 
positive effects for both. On the significance of science and technology in life, Kemalism has 
the highest influence (b= .18), while Islamism follows with a lower yet positive effect (b= 
.06). On whether the next generation will be provided with new opportunities due to scientific 
and technological achievements, a unit increase in Kemalism has a positive effect (b=.20) and 
political Islam follows again with a lower positive effect (b=.06). On whether technology 
brings about quick changes in life, Kemalism has a strong impact (b=.27) followed by the 
lower effect of Islamism (b=.08). Looking at the effects of political sophistication we see that 
it plays an equally important role. We see that high sophisticates give high importance to 
science and technology in life (b=1.5), the rise of new opportunities due to scientific and 
technological achievements for next generations (b=1.61) and the quick changes in lifestyle 
(b=1.73). We also note the negative interaction of political sophistication with Kemalism. 
Citizens that demonstrate a stronger attachment with Kemalism and higher level of 
sophistication express a higher scepticism towards modernization and technological 
advancements. In particular, Kemalist considerations when interacting with sophistication 
demonstrate a negative effect for the positive impact of science and technology in life (b=-
.12), on the opportunities that will be provided to future generations (b=.-13) and on the 
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 Interviewee no. 20 notes ‘Let me explain this. Personally I am fine with traditions that are based on Islam at 
the end they are part of the Turkish culture. My problem is when these shape a certain idea of how people 
should live their lives. To give you an example, I do not fasten in the Ramadan month. I just don’t see the 
purpose. I want to be free to go around my neighborhood and the city to smoke my cigarette, drink my coffee 
without having anyone staring at me badly or even having someone shouting at me for not fastening and for 
being a sinner. These things have happened to me they don’t come out of my imagination. You know it’s my 
matter how I choose to live and how I selected to respect Islam and no one should interfere.’ 
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quick changes that science and technology bring to life (b=-.17). This reverse effect of 
political sophistication could be explained by the higher scepticism that high sophisticates 
supporters of Kemalism hold in regards to the usage of science and technology by the 
governing AK Party.  
 
Table 8.4 Attitudes towards Modernization  
 
 
Science and technology are 
making our lives healthier, easier  
(V91) 
Constant 6.45***  (.29) 
Political Islam .06 
+ 
 (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism .18*** (.03) 
High Sophisticates 1.5*** (.46) 
High Soph. x Islam -.04 (.05) 
High Soph. x Nation -.12* (.05) 
Adj R
2
 .03  
N 1345  
Because of science and 
technology, there will 
be more opportunities for the 
next generation  
(V92) 
Constant 6.46*** (.27) 
Political Islam .06* (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism .20*** (.03) 
High Sophisticates 1.61*** (.42) 
High Soph. x Islam -.03 (.04) 
High Soph. x Nation -.13** (.05) 
Adj R
2
 .05  
N 1345  
Science and technology make our 
way of life change too fast  
(V93) 
Constant 5.51*** (.30) 
Political Islam .08* (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism .27*** (.03) 
High Sophisticates 1.73***  (47) 
High Soph. x Islam -.02 (.05) 
High Soph. x Nation -.17*** (.06) 
Adj R
2
 .06  
N 1345  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression 
coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are measured on 0-10 scales, with values in 
between. Data from the 2007 WVS. 
 
In what follows, I present the findings on attitudes towards modernization from the Ankara 
survey. The average scores of CHP supporters towards issues related to modernization and 
tradition provide an interesting picture (Table 7.2, p.134). CHP voters reported high average 
scores when it comes to the coexistence of modern values with traditions (MCHPvoters=8.6), the 
need for respect of modern values towards traditions (MCHPvoters=6.7) and the need of people 
to adjust their behaviour to the changing world (MCHPvoters=6.3). Much lower was the support 
towards modern values being more important than tradition in the society (MCHPvoters=5.6) as 
well as their agreement with the negative effect of modern lifestyles towards the society 
(MCHPvoters=4.7). We see that among CHP supporters there is a strong appreciation of the 
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coexistence between modern values and tradition and moderate appreciation of the role of 
modern values and the changes they bring in the society.  
 Next, we move to the OLS regression findings on the salience of attachment to the 
nation and Islam on CHP supporters’ considerations towards modernization and the role of 
traditions, which are presented in Table 8.5 below. What is most interesting here is that 
attachment to Islam had a positive effect whereas attachment to the nation had a negative 
effect. Specifically, attachment to Islam increased agreement with modernization over 
tradition (b=.27) and reinforced agreement with the statement about the coexistence of 
modern values with traditions (b=.15). On the contrary, when attachment to nation was 
significant, the agreement with the statement that new lifestyles contribute to the breakdown 
of the society increased (b=.58). It is interesting to note that these findings suggest that 
attitudes towards modernization and the role of traditions even among the CHP voters were 
driven by both considerations. We can explain this by accounting for the importance of 
Islamic values and traditions for the majority of Turkish citizens that are intertwined with the 
Turkish culture. Therefore, when citizens -even those that stand against the AK Party such as 
the CHP voters- are asked about their positions towards the coexistence of modern values and 
tradition attachment to Islam is what drives their attitudes. On the contrary, when attachment 
to the nation becomes salient, CHP voters held unfavourable opinions towards new lifestyles 
and their impact on the society. We could explain this by considering the growth of AKP and 
the consequent prominent role assumed by political Islam in Turkey. This paved the way for 
the creation of new lifestyles within the limits and boundaries set by the governing party. In 
this sense, CHP party supporters may view negatively those nationalistic tendencies that are 
predominantly influenced by the Islamic religion. 
 
Table 8.5 Attitudes towards Modernization 
 
 
  CHP supporters 
Emphasize modern values more 
than tradition 
Constant 7.66*** (1.71) 
 Attachment to Islam .27** (.08) 
 Attachment to the nation -.35
+
 (.19) 
 Adj R
2
 .19  
 N 67  
    
Modern values coexist with 
tradition 
Constant 7.74*** (1.34) 
 Attachment to Islam .15* (.06) 
 Attachment to the nation .03 (.15) 
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 Adj R
2
 .06  
 N 67  
    
Newer lifestyles contribute to 
breakdown of society 
Constant -.56 (2.12) 
 Attachment to Islam .03 (.96) 
 Attachment to the nation .58* (.23) 
 Adj R
2
 .06  
 N 67  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales with values in between. 
Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis. Data 
from the Ankara survey (2009). 
 
Next, I discuss interviewees’ attitudes towards modernization. Participants were asked to 
address their understanding and the meaning of modernization as well as its importance for 
their life and Turkey in general. The majority of participants viewed modernization as the 
attempt of the country to become modernised and progressed in all aspects touching upon 
both the private and public life (21 out of 25). When participants were asked to conceptualise 
the notion of modernization they all came up with similar ideas related to their levels of 
political sophistication. For example, novices referred to modernization as technological 
advancements that can assist in the social development of the country such as innovations in 
heavy industry, medicine and so on as well as wide economic development and low 
unemployment levels. High sophisticates provided more detailed explanations addressing as 
indicators of modernization, the improvement of educational level of the population, the 
increase of living standards for the citizens as well as the high quality of education and health 
provisions in combination with technological advancements and economic progress.  
 The division line between participants’ view of modernization becomes clear when 
asked about the country’s current level of modernization. Interestingly, for the majority 
Turkey is not a totally modernised county (21 out of 25). In fact, this is the point where 
individual differences appeared, since the indicators that point to the failure of the country to 
modernize differed on the basis of values, ideological inclinations, party preferences and their 
level of sophistication. A meaningful statement came from interviewee no. 16 who noted:  
‘We should never forget that modernization has different starting points depending on 
who we look at. For example: for a homosexual the idea of modernization is 
something different than a deeply religious Muslim’.  
Along this line, participants’ views about modernization in Turkey were divided on the basis 
of their ideological standpoint but also of their value preferences - and in particular religiosity 
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and attitudes towards freedoms and constraints generated by religion - which both point to 
diverse electoral preferences and party identification. 
For those participants that belong to the liberal conservative segment of the 
population and supported the governing AK Party, modernization was related with 
liberalisation and the provision of freedoms across all members of the society without being 
based on religion or any other constraints. Most AKP supporters viewed the need for high 
tolerance towards religious people and the provision of equal opportunities to everyone as a 
necessary step for the modernization of society. They pointed to the past Kemalist 
domination and the oppression experienced by certain religious segments of the population 
experienced because of their attachment to religion.  
Also in this case, sophistication had an important role. For those participants that were 
attached to AKP - with high levels of religiosity and low level of sophistication - Turkey is a 
modernised country that has been progressively taking more advanced steps on the basis of 
individual liberties and freedoms of the previously oppressed religious segments of the 
population. Interestingly, the point of comparison for many is the backward looking Middle 
Eastern world which brings these participants to highlight the important advancement of 
Turkey in regards to modernization with increased individual freedoms, technological 
advancements and economic development. Interviewee no.24, who was a low sophisticate 
supporter of AKP, summarized the position of low sophisticates supporters of AKP quite 
effectively in the following extract: 
 ‘Turkey to be modernised needs to be more liberal where everyone is free and there 
are no limits as to what we can do in our life. But there is also something else. Look, 
Turkey is a Muslim country. Religion is very important for many people, also for me 
personally. Religious freedoms are very important and they should be granted to 
everyone without constraints that come from politics.’  
Contrary to this, the two sophisticated AKP voters suggested that Turkey was partially 
modernized, highlighting that the country needs to take more steps in order to advance its 
level of modernization. These high sophisticates focused more on materialistic considerations 
referring openly to the issue of socio-political stability and economic liberalisation as 
necessary for the country’s development (both domestically and internationally) combined 
with a high level of individual freedoms and rights that are not limited to certain levels of 
religiosity. Interviewee no. 19, who is a high sophisticate AKP supporter, suggested:  
 ‘Look, for Turkey to advance its modernization level, it needs to continue its path 
towards a stable political environment as we have it now [with the AKP]. We need 
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economic liberalisation where there are no boundaries to how businesses operate 
with limited state control and extended freedoms. We need freedoms that are not 
limited to certain groups but to everyone. Let me explain this. Religious freedoms 
should be granted to everyone. Everyone, regardless of how much they believe or not, 
should have the same opportunities. Contrary to the past, AKP has managed to bring 
this in the society. In the past religious people had problems to operate freely in the 
competitive market. Today, this has changed and I view it as very important. […] 
Three words I think are important: democracy, economic liberalism and freedoms 
that touch upon all aspects of life’. 
On the opposite camp, stand those in support of the Kemalist CHP party and opponents of the 
AKP’s governance. For those faithful to the hard Kemalist line, modernization was viewed as 
a synonym to secularism and the placement of religion in the private life (3 out of 25). For 
those who were in support of the socio-democratic tendency of CHP the two key elements 
necessary for modernization were democracy with advanced individual freedoms and rights 
and secularism (9 out of 25). Here, we see a convergence between those who were strong 
supporters of Kemalism and those who were more relaxed placing themselves towards the 
centre-left of the political spectrum on the issue of secularism and the role that religion plays 
in the society. Their opinions diverge in that CHP voters of the socio-democratic tendency, 
referred often to the issue of individual rights and personal freedoms. Both sides mentioned 
the AKP’s Islamist tendency characterising the party as an enemy of modernization and 
backwardness in the country due to its religious outlook (14 out of 25). They pointed to the 
fact that Turkey is a country that took a few steps towards modernization yet this processes 
has never been completed. Along these lines, many participants acknowledged that on some 
issues Turkey has modernised yet in others it remains a country that looks backwards. The 
starting point for these ideas is the AKP’s political dominance. In more detail, the majority 
pointed to the backward steps Turkey has been making under the rule of AKP with religion 
taking a central place in public life while the level of individual freedoms and liberties is 
constantly decreasing. Several others mentioned the AKP’s new version of conservative 
modernization that is selective and which applies principles based on religion and 
authoritarianism contrary to the western version of modernization (6 out of 25). In an 
interesting extract interviewee no.5 noted:  
‘Turkey is a country that tried to modernise but the process was not successful. Some 
areas are modernised as a result of the modernization process the country underwent 
but because this process was never completed Turkey remained somewhere in the 
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middle. In the last 10 years the country started moving away from modernization. It 
becomes more conservative, focuses more on religion without any attempt to hide it, 
there is a prime minister [he refers to Erdoğan who was the country’s prime minister 
in 2012] that intervenes in the social machinery by saying that “we want to grow a 
conservative Islamic generation” and this is the modernization he promotes. There is 
a conservative modernization that we are moving towards. Before with Kemalism we 
were heading towards a Westernized modernization now conservatism is what leads 
the way.’  
In addition, a few high sophisticates from this camp also mentioned the country’s problematic 
educational system and the citizens low level of education and high level of ignorance as 
indicators of low level of modernization (3 out of 25).  
A similar view was also shared among the three extreme-left supporters from my 
sample. The only difference here is their view that both sides of Kemalism (as represented by 
CHP) and political Islam (as represented by AKP) are agents of conservatism in the society, 
which diminishes the modernization and democratisation process. According to these 
interviewees, restrictions of freedom and individual liberties as well as the issue of secularism 
as being advocated by both political actors and ideologies, construct boundaries and divide 
the population of Turkey in two camps which sustain a highly polarised society. As 
interviewee no.21 said:  
‘People in Turkey need to leave aside religious differences and focus more on their 
class-based rights overcoming these fake boundaries’.  
Interestingly, the two nationalist MHP voters expressed a more positive opinion in regards to 
the country’s level of modernization. They both held a more conservative view of 
modernization paying great attention to a strong state with technological advancements and 
good economic conditions that could ensure the country’s progress both within but also in the 
international arena. For these participants, Turkey was a modernised country that has 
managed to ‘sustain its “authentic” culture based on religion and the Turkish identity. To 
use the words of interviewee no.18: 
‘What we need in Turkey is make our nation stronger by focusing on the Turkish 
citizens and our economy. This will keep our country strong’. 
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Coexistence of modernization and tradition 
In discussing the coexistence of modernization and traditions, all participants -regardless of 
their individual-based differences- suggested that the two can coexist harmonically in society 
regardless of their individual-based differences. Yet, the explanation of the mode of 
coexistence each participant holds along with their reasoning, relied strongly on their 
ideological leanings, value preferences and party identification. Here sophistication did not 
play a significant role.  
 Those who held an attachment to religious values and Islam and who supported the 
AKP, promoted a view that bridges the Islamic values, traditions and culture with 
modernization by appreciating the two as not diametrically antithetical. For instance, 
interviewee no. 12 suggested: ‘Both traditions and modernization can go together. I don’t 
think they are opposite. For instance the Quaran encourages both women and men to learn 
about science’. The issue of their coexistence for these participants is important as far as both 
tradition and modernization do not pose any boundaries and limitations to individual 
freedoms (5 out of 25). A similar view, was expressed by the nationalist voters of MHP who 
view the combination of modernization and traditions as necessary in order to preserve and 
strengthen the nation. Characteristically interviewee no.14 noted:  
 ‘We should focus on a version of modernization while preserving our traditions. It’s 
not either the one or the other. Both traditions and modernization matter and they 
need to be in place in order to sustain ourselves as a nation and to progress in the 
future’. 
At the opposite camp, stand those who are critical on the role of religion in society and view 
traditions and culture as a part of general routine that acts as a unifying and characteristic 
element of the country and the family unit. These supporters were CHP voters or stand 
towards the centre-left side of the CHP and held a more secular view of traditions placing 
religion outside of the public sphere. They acknowledged the peaceful coexistence between 
the two in so far traditions and cultural elements do not overcome the secular principles that 
are essential for a truly modernised society. Yet again, those interviewees who held socio-
democratic values pointed to the coexistence of the two under the principle that they do not 
pose any obstacle (such as oppressing certain styles of life) to the progress of the society 
towards modernization. Here, both hard-line Kemalists, as well as socio-democrat CHP 
voters, expressed a critical view against religious-based traditions that came out of Islam and 
whose existence and promotion through the AKP’s governance oppress citizens as well as 
pose a danger to the secularist establishment of the country (12 out of 25). For instance some 
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said that certain traditions that are based on Islam and are linked with certain lifestyles (i.e. 
usage of alcohol, expression of affect among couples) should be abandoned because in 
practice they can pose a challenge towards modernization and individual freedoms (4 out of 
25).  
A similar view was shared among the three extreme-left interviewees who supported a 
peaceful coexistence between traditions and modernization pointing at the need of 
abandoning every aspect that promotes conservatism in any form (i.e. Islamism or 
Kemalism). For them, culture and traditions can play a unifying role in a modern democratic 
society that focuses on the rights of the majority of the population (referring to the working 
class) overcoming certain division generated by the advocators of political Islam and 
Kemalism. Also these participants held a more secular view of traditions and culture.  
 
8.2 Political values 
In this section, I investigate participants’ political value orientations and the role they play in 
shaping their political preferences. Specifically, I focus on attitudes towards democracy, the 
role of state, government and the public, views on the state and its efficacy, attitudes towards 
the nation and the prerequisites for obtaining the Turkish citizenship as well as attitudes 
towards individual freedoms and human rights.  
 
Democracy  
The investigation of the role of political values starts with attitudes towards democracy. 
Looking at the WVS data, I focus on the effects of citizens’ ideological orientations –namely, 
attachment to Kemalism and Islamism- on how much participants value democracy in 
general, and what is the level of democracy they assign to the present political environment. 
Interestingly, the way the question was asked stimulated different ideological considerations. 
Table 8.6 shows that evaluations of the importance of democracy were driven significantly by 
Kemalist considerations (b=.12), while Islamist considerations did not have a significant 
effect. However, this changed when we look at participants’ appreciation of the level of 
democracy in the current political environment. Here attachment to Islamism had a positive 
influence (b=.13) whereas Kemalism had a lower yet again positive influence (b=.08). This 
apparent discrepancy is not a surprise. The pro-Islamist AKP views religious expression as 
evidence of democratisation in society. In addition, the ruling party has also been advocating 
for freedom of religion as an important aspect of its current establishment promoting citizens’ 
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perceptions that the liberal conservative version of AKP driven by Islamism, secures 
democratization and stabilization. Therefore, AKP supporters express favourable attitudes in 
regards to the country’s level of democracy, whereas opponents of the party express a 
positive –yet lower- evaluation of the country’s democratic establishment under the AKP’s 
tenure in governance. However, we need to consider the timeframe that the WVS was 
conducted. In 2007 the authoritarian drift of AKP was starting to emerge and its opponents 
seem to have not crystallised their later opinion in regards to the country’s backward steps 
towards democratisation.  
Political sophistication and its effects towards democratic values reveal an interesting 
pattern. Table 8.6 below, shows that political sophistication alone does not play an important 
role in attitudes towards democratic values. The same is the case for the interaction between 
sophistication and attachment to Kemalism. This again comes to no surprise. Those 
participants that hold Kemalist orientations are strong supporters of democracy (b=.12) due to 
the Kemalist principles, regardless of their level of sophistication. Taking into account the 
increasing repression from the current government against the past political elites represented 
by CHP- but also the AKP’s conservative liberalism- ideological attachment towards 
Kemalism is expected to play the driving role in attitudes favouring democracy. However, 
when we look at the interaction between political sophistication and Islamism we find a 
different pattern. For those with higher levels of sophistication and attachment to Islamism 
we see a decline in the importance of democracy (b=-.08). This could be explained by the 
competitive view that supporters of Islamism and of AKP hold against the past Kemalist 
status quo. Sophisticated supporters of Islamism might view democracy as of secondary 
importance when compared to the essential changes the AK government needs to promote in 
order to stabilize its power against the past status quo, which oppressed the pious segments of 
the population. However, sophisticates with strong Islamist views have even stronger (b=.12) 
opinions on the current level of democracy in the country, on top of the effect that Islamist 
considerations have alone (b=.13). 
 
Table 8.6 Attitudes towards Democracy 
 
 
Importance of Democracy  
v162 
Constant 7.88*** (.24) 
Political Islam .02 (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism .12*** (.03) 
High Sophisticates .27 (.38) 
High Soph. x Islam -.08*  (.04) 
High Soph. x Nation .04  (.04) 
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Adj R
2
 .03  
N 1345  
Level of democracy in own country  
v163 
Constant 4.33*** (.38) 
Politcal Islam .13***  (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism .08
+
  (.04) 
High Sophisticates -.56  (.61) 
High Soph. x Islam .12
+
 (.006) 
High Soph. x Nation -.10 (.07) 
Adj R
2
 .05  
N 1345  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, 
standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are measured on 0-10 scales, with values in between. Data from the 
2007 WVS. 
 
Moving on with the WVS data, I examine perceptions of the essential characteristics of 
democratic governance. As Table 8.7 shows, the two ideological orientations inspire different 
desires when it comes to certain characteristics of democracy, yet in some cases they come 
together demonstrating a line of agreement over certain issues. Specifically, the data show 
that the key polarizing effect between Islamist and Kemalist orientations is demonstrated 
when citizens are asked to provide their evaluations on the ability of religious authorities to 
interpret the laws. A unit increase in the attachment to Islamism increases agreement by .34 
points while Kemalist orientations have an opposite effect decreasing agreement by about the 
same amount (b=-.33). This attitudinal polarization between the supporters of Islamism and 
Kemalism comes as a logical consequence of the two ideological camps on the role and level 
of involvement of religion in the socio-political life. At the same time, there are certain issues 
that are being inspired by only Kemalist considerations. In particular, attachment to 
Kemalism inspires positive attitudes towards the selection of leaders in free elections (b=.18) 
as well as the army taking over when the country’s government is incompetent (b=.16). Both 
lines of consideration, favoured by Kemalist orientations are explained on the basis of the 
principles of Kemalist ideology where free elections are seen as important in the democratic 
basis of the society as well as the view of the army as the sole protector of the country’s 
democratic establishment.  
It is interesting to note, that both attachment to Islamism and Kemalism demonstrate 
similar attitudes with differential strength when it comes to certain characteristics of 
democracy. In particular, Islamism leads on attitudes towards taxing the rich and subsidising 
the poor as an essential element of democracy with an effect of .16 points compared to the 
.10 point effect of Kemalism. At the same time, Kemalism is a significant predictor of the 
role of civil rights in protecting citizens against oppression (b=.25), the ability of people to 
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change the laws with referendums (b=.21), the need for equal rights of women and men 
(b=.18). Interestingly, the effects of Islamism on these attitudes are positive yet much weaker, 
for example .11 points on the ability of people to change the laws with referendums, about 
.09 points on equal rights of women and men and .08 points on the role of civil rights. What 
we see is that both ideological camps view as essential characteristics of democracy issues 
such as civil rights, the usage of instruments of direct democracy (i.e. referendums) as well as 
equality between women and men yet with a different strength.  
Turning to political sophistication, we see that alone it has a significant positive effect 
on attitudes towards civil rights (b=1.26) and the usage of referendums (b=1.22). This 
suggests that ideological orientations and sophistication levels are important drivers of these 
attitudes towards democracy. Looking at the interaction between political sophistication and 
ideological inclinations, we see that the only statistically significant effect is produced when 
examining the role of the army in taking over when the government appears incompetent. 
Here, the interaction of sophistication and Kemalism produces a negative effect towards this 
issue. For sophisticates that are supporters of Kemalism, the impact of Kemalism on opinions 
about the army taking over reduces by -.27 points. Interestingly, we see that high 
sophistication and Kemalism change the direction of this effect on the involvement of the 
army in the political life, as opposed to the effect of Kemalism alone that is positive (b=.16). 
In explaining this, political sophisticates who hold Kemalist considerations do not value as an 
essential characteristic of democracy the army’s involvement in the political life. They go 
against the favourable position of the Kemalist elites towards the armed forces viewed as the 
key protector of the Republic. This could be explained by taking into account the past 
memories, knowledge and understanding of the past involvement of the country’s military in  
the political life which resulted in a number of coup d’états which had a detrimental effect on 
the country’s political life but also on citizens’ everyday life and freedoms. Another possible 
explanation can be found in the AK Party’s attempts to obtain the control over the armed 
forces, which may create a higher distrust towards their role in protecting the democratic 
basis of the Turkish society.  
 Looking at the interaction of Islamism with political sophistication there is a negative 
effect towards the issue of gender equality. In particular, for sophisticates who support 
Islamism, support for gender equality drops by -.09 points. Again, this effect reverses the 
direction of the impact that Islamism taken alone has on gender equality which is positive 
(b=.09). This could be explained by considering that high sophisticates that are attached to 
Islamism hold more conservative attitudes in respect to low sophisticates favouring gender 
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inequalities based on views about the roles to be assumed to women and men according to 
religious beliefs.  
Table 8.7 Essential Characteristics of Democratic Governance 
 
 
Democracy: Governments tax the 
rich and subsidize the poor   
(V152) 
Constant 5.14*** (.44) 
Political Islam .16***  (.05) 
Kemalist Nationalism .10* (.05) 
High Sophisticates 1.08       (.71) 
High Soph. x Islam -.08  (.07) 
High Soph. x Nation -.10 (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .01  
N 1345  
Democracy: People choose their 
leaders in free elections  
(V154) 
Constant 6.68*** (.30) 
Political Islam  .04 (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism .18*** (.03) 
High Sophisticates -.14 (.48) 
High Soph. x Islam -.03 (.05) 
High Soph. x Nation .08  (.06) 
Adj R
2
 .05  
N 1345  
Democracy: Religious authorities 
interpret the laws  
(V153) 
Constant 4.65*** (.45) 
Political Islam .34*** (.05) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.33*** (.05) 
High Sophisticates .46 (.72) 
High Soph. x Islam -.08 (.07) 
High Soph. x Nation -.05 (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .10  
N 1345  
Democracy: The army takes over 
when government is incompetence  
(V156) 
Constant 3.96***  (.50) 
Political Islam .01 (.05) 
Kemalist Nationalism .16** (.06) 
High Sophisticates .65 (.80) 
High Soph. x Islam .13 (.08) 
High Soph. x Nation -.27** (.09) 
Adj R
2
 .01  
N 1345  
Democracy: Civil rights protect 
people’s liberty against oppression   
(V157) 
Constant 5.73*** (.31) 
Political Islam .08* (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism .25*** (.04_ 
High Sophisticates 1.26* (.50) 
High Soph. x Islam -.04 (.05) 
High Soph. x Nation -.10 + (.06) 
Adj R
2
 .06  
N 1345  
Democracy: People can change the 
laws in referendums  
(V160) 
Constant 5.97*** (.33) 
Political Islam .11** (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism .21*** (.04) 
High Sophisticates 1.22 * (.52) 
High Soph. x Islam -.08 (.05) 
High Soph. x Nation -.10 (.06) 
Adj R
2
 .04  
N 1345  
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Democracy: Women have the same 
rights as men  
(V161) 
Constant 6.67*** (.29) 
Political Islam .09** (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism .18*** (.03) 
High Sophisticates .91 
+
 (.47) 
High Soph. x Islam -.09* (.05) 
High Soph. x Nation -.02 (.05) 
Adj R
2
 .04  
N 1345  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, 
standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are measured on 0-10 scales, with values in between. Data from the 
2007 WVS. 
 
Next, I discuss the evidence from the interviews looking in particular on the importance of 
democracy and its current conditions in Turkey. Interestingly, there is a unanimous 
agreement on the importance of democracy regardless of individual differences on the basis 
of sophistication, ideological inclinations and party preferences. All interviewees expressed 
their favourable support of living in a democratic society where they can freely express their 
opinions and attitudes and be respected regardless of their individual based differences. They 
all stood against repression and especially state-generated forms of repression. However, 
although the importance given to living in a democratic society is at very high levels for all 
participants, the two nationalist MHP voters demonstrated a lower importance in their 
expressions. This is not to suggest they do not value democracy but it seems that the 
democratic element of the country is viewed as of secondary importance for them after the 
preservation of a strong united nation. 
 What divides interviewees is their views of what constitutes democracy and their 
reasoning behind their position on the country’s state of democracy. Ideological attachments, 
party identification and values come into play and shape these views. Political sophistication 
does not appear to play a decisive role. Eventually, the issue of democracy in Turkey comes 
down to the view one holds about the current AKP government as well as the individual 
positioning on the Kemalist principles. In other words, individual party preferences, 
ideological self-placement and value orientations play a key role in this case. 
 On the one side, stand those that self-identify as strong supporters of Kemalism and 
who are voters of the CHP, along with those that place themselves on the socio-democratic 
and centre-left side of the CHP (12 out of 25). For them, democracy in Turkey is very 
limited. Their sophistication does not seem to play an important role in shaping their 
opinions. Both high and low sophisticates provide interesting explanations of the limitation of 
democracy in Turkey by referring to the AKP’s dominance and restrictions of freedoms and 
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liberties as well as the domination of religion in public life. In an interesting extract 
interviewee no.12 noted: 
 ‘Democracy sounds nice, we all want democracy. But democracy is not about 
discussing in general about its importance and its practice. How can we say Turkey is 
a democratic society when certain politicians are being prosecuted simply because 
they are against AKP and Erdoğan? How can we talk about a democratic Turkey 
when certain behaviours are considered acceptable simply because they comply with 
the conservative and religious rules whereas others are criticised negatively? How 
can we see Turkey as democratic when AKP promotes his Islamic agenda going 
against the Kemalist principles that are set by the constitution?’ 
According to those closer to Kemalism who support the CHP, the key indicators that point to 
the failure of democracy in the country are the increasing restrictions of freedom, state 
oppression under the AKP rule and its religious conservatism. A different perspective on the 
state of democracy in Turkey was expressed by two novices supporters of CHP. Although 
they both acknowledged certain limitations in individual freedoms and human rights – on the 
basis of religion and gender- they suggested that the level of democracy in the country was 
satisfactory. According to them, the fact that people have the chance to express their views 
democratically through elections is a significant indicator of democracy. To use the words of 
interviewee no. 4:  
 ‘Turkey is a democratic country. We have free elections and the people decide who 
they want to govern them through elections. I don’t say we are good in terms of 
individual rights. For instance women rights are low. There are also certain 
restrictions that come out of Islam. But that doesn’t mean we are not a democracy. 
We have a long way until we reach the perfect democracy but its not that Turkey is 
not democratic’.  
Supporters of the extreme-left follow a similar line with those who support the CH Party with 
an important differentiation. For them, Turkey has never been a democratic country and this 
is due to the past domination of Kemalist elites and the current domination of AKP. They 
pointed to the usage of certain issues such as religion and secularism in sustaining the public 
polarization in the two camps of Islamism and Kemalism respectively. They also pointed to 
the incompetent electoral system of the country and the 10% threshold that a party needs in 
order to enter the parliament. For these interviewees, the electoral law is purely anti-
democratic restricting small parties to get a voice in the parliament. Equally there was also 
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the view of how certain politicians are being elected and hold public offices without receiving 
a wide public support. Interviewee no.1 stated: 
 ‘Democracy? [laughing ironically] In Turkey? Democracy certainly does not exist! 
Even the sense of democracy is twisted here. […] Even the electoral system operates 
in a weird way. For example the major of Ankara Melih Goksek was elected with a 
30% of the votes with the remaining 60% of the population in Ankara not wanting 
him. Yet, he is currently the major of the city.’ 
At the opposite camp, there are those interviewees that are in support of the AK Party and the 
nationalist supporters of the MHP. For them, sophistication affects their reasoning and 
justification of their positions on the state of the country’s democracy. They- in contract with 
those that see the absolute absence of freedom in Turkey- believe, that currently Turkey is 
more democratic than ever in comparison to the past. They pointed to the increase in religious 
freedoms as implemented by AKP that put an end to the past political domination of 
Kemalism that imposed restrictions towards religious expression. These attitudes were 
mainly expressed by low sophisticates from the pool of AKP supporters (4 out of 6). 
The two high sophisticates in support of the governing party suggested that although 
there are still some restrictions on certain freedoms, Turkey is more democratic than any 
other Middle Eastern country. Interestingly participant no. 19 noted:  
‘On a 0-5 scale I believe Turkey is around 3 in terms of democracy. Look at all 
Middle Eastern countries. The West views Turkey as an example of democracy in the 
Muslim world. This is not by chance. AKP has managed to democratize Turkey. I 
don’t say we are great. I mean if you compare Turkey with Scandinavian countries of 
course we are very much behind. Unfortunately there are still certain restrictions of 
freedoms and individual rights but we are on a very good road. It all depends on the 
economy. AKP has been very successful and if its economic success continues 
democracy will go better. If people have the necessary resources to live then they can 
think clearly about the rest. Economy is directly related with the tolerance towards 
the other’.  
However, the two sophisticated AKP supporters who belong to the more liberal side of the 
party express their concern when it comes to the future of democracy in Turkey referring to 
the increasing power of Erdoğan. Characteristically, interviewee no. 19 noted:  
 ‘I am not very optimistic about the future of democracy because Erdoğan is a very 
powerful man. If he uses his power in a positive fashion then democracy will have a 
very positive future in Turkey. But there is also a possibility that he might use his 
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power in a dictatorial way, which will be dangerous. In fact right now he is the only 
strong person in his party and the government. And he is a very charismatic leader. A 
person like him can easily change his steps into a dictatorship’. 
An alternative view is expressed by some conservative participants that view as positive 
certain limitations in the level of democracy of Turkey, referring to the vast population of the 
country. Three interviewees -one of which is a moderate supporter of AKP and two 
nationalist MHP supporters- suggested that democracy needs to be limited in order to work 
properly. To use the words of interviewee no.15:  
‘Democracy in Turkey needs to have some limits. Think that Turkey is a country of 70 
million people and these people are being represented by 550 MPs. But 550 MPs is 
impossible to do the will of 70 million people. Hence, democracy in Turkey has its 
limits but in a democracy that works properly having limits doesn’t mean anything.’  
For them, certain restrictions are necessary in order to sustain a good level of democratic 
governance in a country that has a vast population with several issues that divide them on the 
basis of religion, ethnicity and the like. To explain this, the two nationalist MHP supporters 
go a step further addressing the need for certain restrictions in order to protect the nation and 
its unity.  
 
State, Governance and People’s Representative Power 
Then we turn to public attitudes towards the state and its different aspect of the country’s 
governance. Looking at the WVS data in Table 8.8 below, we note a level of polarization 
between Islamism and Kemalism. However, on certain occasions the two seem to follow a 
similar direction when it comes to the country’s governance. In particular, Table 8.8 shows 
that attachment to Islamism predicts greater respect for authority (b=.27) while Kemalism is a 
significant predictor of having a democratic political system (b=.27), placing emphasis on 
technology (b=.21), and having experts making decisions (b=.10). The pattern here goes in 
line with the key focus of both orientations. Specifically, Islamism demonstrates higher 
respect towards authorities that belong in the hands of the key advocator of Islamism (the AK 
Party). Kemalism, due to its opposition to the AKP establishment, advocates the need for 
democracy in Turkey -as opposed to the AKP’s practices-, the need for technological 
advancement that is seen as a sign of modernization as well as the important role of experts in 
taking decisions for the country’s governance as opposed to the current conservative religious 
political actors that come from the governing party. Interestingly, attachment to Islamism 
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(b=.11) and Kemalism (b=.13) both have a significant positive effect on the importance of a 
strong leader. This can be explained by the focus of both political parties that represent the 
two ideological orientations (i.e. AKP and CHP) on certain political actors seen as symbolic 
for the country’s future direction. Erdoğan being a founding member and leader of AKP has 
managed to change Turkey’s face both domestically and internationally, with economic and 
political stability and advancement of religious freedoms. Ataturk, founder of the CH Party, 
established the Republican secular and modern state.  
Political sophistication is a significant predictor of having strong leaders (b=1.55) and 
the importance of having a democratic political system (b=1.17). This can be explained by 
considering the importance of democracy for sophisticates, regardless of their ideological 
leanings, but also the need for strong decisive leaders to bring changes in Turkey. The 
interaction of political sophistication and attachment to Kemalism reduces the importance of 
having strong leaders (b=-.22). Sophisticated supporters of the nation consider leaders less 
important, which can be explained on the basis of the changes that Erdoğan has brought to 
the country’s governance.  
 
 
Table 8.8 Attitudes towards the State and Governance 
 
 
Having a strong leader 
(V148) 
Constant 3.8*** (.46) 
Political Islam  .11* (.05) 
Kemalist Nationalism .13* (.05) 
High Sophisticates 1.55* (.73) 
High Soph. x Islam .00 (.07) 
High Soph. x Nation -.22** (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .01  
N 1345  
Having experts make 
decisions 
(V149) 
Constant 4.92*** (38) 
Political Islam  .06 (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism .10* (.04) 
High Sophisticates .32 (.61) 
High Soph. x Islam -.03 (.06) 
High Soph. x Nation -.02  
Adj R
2
 .00  
N 1345  
Having a democratic political 
system  
(V151) 
Constant 6.11*** (.33) 
Political Islam -.032 (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism .27*** (.04) 
High Sophisticates 1.17* (.53) 
High Soph. x Islam -.03 (.05) 
High Soph. x Nation -.09 (.06) 
Adj R
2
 .06  
N 1345  
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More emphasis on 
technology  
(V77) 
Constant 7.19*** (.36) 
Political Islam  -.03 (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism .21*** (.04) 
High Sophisticates -.23 (.57) 
High Soph. x Islam .07 (.06) 
High Soph. x Nation -.01 (.07) 
Adj R
2
 .03  
N 1345  
Greater respect for authority  
(V78) 
Constant 5.71*** (.43) 
Political Islam .27*** (.05) 
Kemalist Nationalism .03 (.05) 
High Sophisticates -1.16
+
 (.69) 
High Soph. x Islam .002 (.07) 
High Soph. x Nation .08 (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .06  
N 1345  
Having the army rule  
(V150) 
Constant 4.40*** (.41) 
Political Islam  -.01 (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.00 (.05) 
High Sophisticates .16 (.65) 
High Soph. x Islam .02 (.07) 
High Soph. x Nation -.14
+
 (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .02  
N 1345  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, 
standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are measured on 0-10 scales, with values in between. Data from the 
2007 WVS. 
 
Next, I look at attitudes towards democratic principles and the role of the state from the 
Ankara survey data. Table 7.2. (p.134), shows the mean scores of CHP supporters on the 
importance of giving people more say in governmental decisions, protecting freedom of 
speech and obeying the state unconditionally.
118
 CHP voters score high on the importance of 
the protection of freedom of speech (MCHPvoters=9.3), tolerance towards different moral 
standards (MCHPvoters=9.1) and giving people more to say in government decisions 
(MCHPvoters=8.9). However, the unconditional love and obedience towards the state gathers a 
much lower support (MCHPvoters=3.6).  
 I then look at the shared impact of attachment to the nation and Islam, on a number of 
considerations that concern democracy and the role of the state. Table 8.9 presents the results 
of the regression coefficients for each component. Specifically, attachment to the nation is a 
strong predictor for obedience towards the state (b=.61) as well as promoting tolerance 
towards different moral standards (b=.24) whereas attachment to Islam is a strong yet 
negative predictor of giving people more say in government decisions (b=-.12) and protecting 
freedom of speech (b=-.09). Here we see that for CHP voters, attachment to Islam plays a 
                                                 
118
 These items are measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 stands for not important at all and 10 for very important. 
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significant role in reducing the importance of otherwise strongly valued political preferences. 
This is a very interesting finding that points to the negative effect of Islamist considerations - 
even when these are held by supporters of CHP -, predicting low support towards certain 
democratic principles. At the same time, although obedience towards the state gathers a low 
mean value (MCHPvoters=3.6), attachment to the nation drives this consideration. The effect of 
attachment to the nation here is as much as three times stronger in comparison to the effect of 
attachment to Islam (b=-.02), which is not statistically significant. Another important issue to 
note is the positive effect of the attachment to the nation on tolerance towards different moral 
standards. Although the effect size of attachment to the nation (b=.24) is much lower than 
that of the obedience towards the state (b=.61), it is important to note the salience of 
nationalism when it comes to respect towards different moral standards. This can be 
interpreted as an increase of the democratic tendencies among CHP voters. This to an extent 
demonstrates an interesting pattern for the CHP voters, which stands against the past hard 
Kemalist standpoint towards minorities and the attempts to absorb and assimilate ethnic and 
religious minorities under the flag of the Turkish state.  
 
Table 8.9 Attitudes towards the State, the Government and Political 
Participation 
 
  CHP supporters 
Obeying the state Constant -1.79 (2.23) 
 Attachment to Islam -.02 (.10) 
 Attachment to the nation .61** (.24) 
 Adj R
2
 .09  
 N 68  
    
Giving people more say in 
government decisions 
Constant 9.95*** (.95) 
 Attachment to Islam -.12** (.04) 
 Attachment to the nation -.06 (.10) 
 Adj R
2
 .09  
 N 68  
    
Protecting freedom of speech Constant 10.02*** (.87) 
 Attachment to Islam -.09* (.04) 
 Attachment to the nation -.04 (.09) 
 Adj R
2
 .05  
 N 68  
Tolerance for different moral 
standards 
Constant 6.94*** (.97) 
 Attachment to Islam -.00 (.04) 
 Attachment to the nation .24* (.11) 
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 Adj R
2
 .05  
 N 67  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales with values in 
between. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in 
parenthesis. Data from the Ankara survey (2009). 
 
I also examined the relationship between the state and public’s representative power as well 
as the public responsibilities in the state. Interviewees are divided in three distinct camps that 
reflect the key ideological dichotomies and party attachments participants hold. On the one 
side, stand those who are strong supporters of Kemalism, voters of CHP as well as those that 
belong to the socio-democratic centre-left side of CHP, who are also strong opponents of the 
AKP government. These participants, regardless of their level of sophistication, pointed to 
the anti-democratic practices of the AK Party’s establishment -stabilising its power and 
driving the state according to its principles- as the key factor that undermines the 
representative power the public holds. Several participants mentioned the heightened 
emotions of fear that the oppression of the AKP has instilled in all opposing voices (7 out of 
25). 
A different perspective was expressed by those that self-identified with the extreme-
left (3 out of 25). They noted that the representative power of the public in Turkey has always 
been very limited due to the domination of the Kemalist and Islamist political elites seen both 
as agents of conservatism. According to them, the representative power of the public has been 
worsening under the AKP rule and the decline in individual freedoms which ‘limits the space 
we have to make our voices heard’ as interviewee no. 17 noted. Along the same lines, 
interviewee no.1 suggested: 
 ‘Look, elections do not seem to be able to change Turkey. But what will? Think about 
it. There is not much space left to express our dissent. If you post online a statement 
that insults Erdoğan or Islam then you might be arrested. This is what happens in 
Turkey. You want to protest for say the 1
st
 of May and you are not allowed to go to 
Taksim –which holds a great history. […] What freedoms do we have left? Everyone 
who is against the AKP and Erdoğan is scared to speak out and even afraid to express 
this fear’.  
Interestingly, what brings together those of the extreme left and the more socio-democratic 
supporters of CHP is their acknowledgement that electoral practices do not provide the space 
to bring real change. Several participants noted the existence of certain restrictions of 
freedom and civil liberties suggesting that the public is scared to get out in the streets and 
express their opinion on a number of key issues (9 out of 25). As interviewee no. 16 said:  
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 ‘We go and vote and then we all know that AKP will win. But this is not the only 
thing that we can do... I mean through elections. People should get out in the streets 
but it seems that everyone is either scared or doesn’t want to bother. The majority of 
people just go and vote thinking that this is the only way things can change and they 
don’t consider a demonstration or a strike like in western European countries. People 
in Turkey are scared. They have a deep fear created by AKP every time they want to 
express an opposite voice’.  
In the same lines, interviewee no.21 noted: 
‘Take as an example this. There are university students right now in prison because 
they simply held a banner asking free education in Turkey. They got arrested for this 
reason. People are becoming increasingly scared. People who are against AKP 
instead of going out protesting and advocating their rights they are worried, scared 
and remain in their houses thinking that elections will solve all the problems. We have 
been witnessing so many cases of electoral frauds... AKP has the power and the 
mechanisms to manipulate electoral results. Change in Turkey will not come through 
elections as things stand now. People need to go out in the streets and overcome their 
fear. But again think, if you are worried about your personal freedom, if you think 
that they might arrest you then how do you decide to go out? It’s very difficult’.  
On the opposite camp, stand the AKP supporters (6 out of 25) accompanied by the two 
nationalist voters of MHP. They held a more positive opinion in regards to public 
representativity and its power towards the state in Turkey suggesting that democratic 
practices are in place. Electoral processes were viewed as the most important factor that offer 
to all citizens the opportunity to take an active part in the shaping the political sphere of the 
country. As interviewee no.18 noted:  
 ‘In Turkey it is the people that decide who they want to govern. Unlike other Middle 
Eastern societies Turkey holds free democratic elections. People go cast their vote 
and the electoral outcome is what determines the country’s future. Whoever doesn’t 
agree with the result of any election should abide to the will of the majority and wait 
for the next elections. This is what happens in all democratic countries’.  
The two participants that belong to the liberal segment of the AKP and have high levels of 
political sophistication expressed certain fears in regards to the power of the public in Turkey 
under the increasing dominance of AKP and Erdoğan in particular. Although these 
participants express the opinion highlighted above about the democratic nature of elections in 
Chapter 8. Data Analysis and Findings: Value orientations 
 204 
the country, they also point to the danger posed by the domination of AKP and the increasing 
power of the prime minister.  
 Another important issue that was addressed during the interviews concerns the 
perceptions on public involvement in political affairs. I asked participants whether political 
matters and affairs should be discussed publicly or privately. The majority said that all 
political issues should be brought to the public arena for discussion (23 out of 25) with only 
two expressing the opposite opinion. Here it seems that attachment to the value of democracy 
is what drives interviewee’s opinions rather than their ideological orientations. Political 
sophistication had an impact on the reasoning interviewees provided in supporting their 
opinions. Political sophisticates, noted the importance of the public being informed about 
what happens in the political arena, which is viewed as necessary to shape informed opinions 
about the political life. They also noted the public nature of politics as a prerequisite for a 
democratic society and the responsibility of citizens to be ready to make informed decisions. 
Novices, mainly focused on the danger that discussing political affairs in private can bring for 
the society. For instance, several low sophisticates suggested that political decisions that are 
mainly taken privately serve only the interests of the political elites rather than the public.  
 The two participants that were at the opposite direction came from the AKP pool of 
supporters as well as the nationalist MHP camp, and were low sophisticates. Here we see that 
ideological orientation, party attachment and political sophistication did play a role in 
shaping the opinion of those participants who believed that certain issues should be discussed 
privately rather than brought to the public. The AKP novice said that the public does not 
necessarily know how to decide on a number of important issues but point to this being the 
actual role of the elected politicians. To use the words of interviewee no.9: 
‘I am not an expert in politics. To be honest I don’t want to spend my time with 
politics. There are certain issues that politicians know better and that is why they are 
elected to solve the problems of the country. Once a decision is taken I will express 
my opinion.’  
However, the MHP novice in providing a different justification suggested that: 
 ‘Yes some issues especially the ones of high importance for the nation and the state 
should not be discussed in public. In fact all issues that are of high importance should 
be discussed away from the public sphere. We don’t need to know everything. We [the 
citizens] voted for our representatives. They will talk and solve any possible issues. 
We should trust our politicians that are democratically elected.’ (interviewee no.14) 
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Nation and Citizenship  
I also examined attitudes towards the nation and beliefs about the prerequisites for obtaining 
the Turkish citizenship. Looking at the WVS data, we see that in some cases attachment to 
Islamism and Kemalism drive different considerations whereas in others have a similar 
effect. Specifically, in Table 8.10 below, we see that pride towards the Turkish nationality 
and identifying as a world citizen are properties of political Islam (.14 and .13 points 
respectively) whereas Kemalism increases self-perceptions as an autonomous individual (.23 
points). These demonstrate a polarization between the two ideologies, which can be explained 
on the basis of the current socio-political climate. Because of the AKP’s dominance, Turkey 
is re-shaped under the principles of Islamist pride combined with the Turkish nationality. At 
the same time, feeling as a world citizen may be explained by accounting for the AKP’s view 
of Islam as a unifying factor among the Middle Eastern countries. This is accompanied by the 
party’s attempts to bring Turkey in the EU by combining both the Islamic and Western world. 
Attachment to Kemalism, which stands in opposition to the AKP’s stance on the role of 
religion, brings those citizens who hold secularist views away from the Turkish state and 
closer to a more liberal way of belonging favouring a sense of autonomy. We also see that in 
some cases both attachment to Islamism and Kemalism came into play in shaping attitudes 
towards individual belonging in the world. In particular, both Islamism and Kemalism were 
predictors of one’s willingness to fight in a war for Turkey with Islamism having a stronger 
positive effect (b=.12) than Kemalism (b=.09). Seeing oneself as a member of the local 
community was also influenced by both, although attachment to Islamism shows stronger 
effects (b=.22) than Kemalism (b=.07 points). Similarly, seeing oneself as a citizen of the 
Turkish nation is strongly influenced by Islamism (b=.16) and less by Kemalism (b=.08). We 
can explain the above favourable positions of fighting in war defending the country as well as 
the attachment to the local community and the nation driven by both Islamism and Kemalism 
as a result of both ideological orientations’ position on the importance of the state. The higher 
scores of Islamism and consequently the lower scores of Kemalism on these items can be 
attributed to the fact that under the AKP’s tenure in governance it is the principles of 
Islamism that drive the socio-political arena.  
 Sophistication serves as a strong predictor of attachment to the nation (b=1.35) 
whereas its interaction with Kemalism has a negative effect leading to a decline of self-
identification with the Turkish nation by .14 points. This effect of the interaction between 
Kemalism and sophistication can be explained by taking into account the current state of the 
nation under the AKP’s tenure in the country’s governance. With political Islam driving the 
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country, high sophisticates who hold Kemalist considerations are naturally expected to feel 
less attached to the nation that is under the influence of the main ideological and political 
opponent (i.e. AKP and political Islam). Political sophistication has an interesting interaction 
effect with Islamism when we look at attachment to the local community. For high 
sophisticates that support Islamism, attachment to the local community declined by .09 
points. This could be explained by accounting for the importance of the nation and the 
Islamic identity of the state as promoted by the AK Party creating strong ties between the 
citizens and the current nation state reinforcing citizens’ belonging and undermining 
attachment to local communities.  
 
Table 8.10 Attitudes towards the Nation and World Institutions 
 
 
How proud of nationality 
(V209) 
Constant 8.18*** (.26) 
Political Islam .14*** (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism .02 (.03) 
High Sophisticates .41 (.42) 
High Soph. x Islam .02 (.04) 
High Soph. x Nation -.07 (.05) 
Adj R
2
 .04  
N 1267  
Be willing to fight in war for 
your country 
(V75) 
Constant 8.01*** (.35) 
Political Islam .12** (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism .09 * (.04) 
High Sophisticates 1.05 
+
 (.56) 
High Soph. x Islam -.11 
+
 (.06) 
High Soph. x Nation -.05 (.07) 
Adj R
2
 .01  
N 1345  
I see myself as a world citizen  
(V210) 
Constant 5.89*** (.37) 
Political Islam .13*** (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism .06 (.04) 
High Sophisticates .41 (.58) 
High Soph. x Islam -.10 (.06) 
High Soph. x Nation .07 (.07) 
Adj R
2
 .01  
N 1345  
I see myself as member of my 
local community  
(V211) 
Constant 6.24*** (.30) 
Political Islam .22*** (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism .07* (.03) 
High Sophisticates .63 (.50) 
High Soph. x Islam -.09* (.05) 
High Soph. x Nation -.01 (.06) 
Adj R2 .05  
N 1345  
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I see myself as citizen of the 
Turkish nation  
(V212) 
Constant 7.14*** (.25) 
Political Islam .16*** (.03) 
Kemalist Nationalism .08** (.03) 
High Sophisticates 1.35*** (.41) 
High Soph. x Islam -.04 (.04) 
High Soph. x Nation -.14** (.05) 
Adj R
2
 .05  
N 1345  
I see myself as an autonomous 
individual (V214) 
Constant 4.98*** (.41) 
Political Islam -.01 (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism .23*** (.05) 
High Sophisticates .85 (.65) 
High Soph. x Islam .02 (.06) 
High Soph. x Nation -.08 (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .03  
N 1345  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, 
standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are measured on 0-10 scales, with values in between. Data from the 
2007 WVS. 
 
I also examined perceptions of the essential elements of Turkish citizenship as they emerged 
from the WVS data analysis. Table 8.11 shows that attachment to Islamism was the driving 
force behind most considerations, such as the importance of adopting the customs of Turkey 
(b=.31 points), having ancestors from Turkey and being born on Turkish soil (b=.30 each). 
The only issue that is evoked by both ideological inclinations is the importance of abiding 
Turkey’s law as a requirement for the Turkish citizenship. Islamism leads the way with a 
positive effect (b=.25) followed by Kemalism with a positive yet lower effect (b=.10).  
Political sophistication also increased agreement with the necessity of abiding to 
Turkey’s law as a key requirement for acquiring citizenship (b=1.48). However, when 
sophistication interacts with Islamism, it creates a negative effect, which reduces agreement 
with the importance of abiding with the country’s laws by.15 points. It seems that high 
sophisticates who are in agreement with Islamism prioritize other virtues than the law as 
necessary elements for acquiring the citizenship such as religion and place of birth as well as 
the origins of ancestors. In other words, one’s origins and acceptance of the dominant culture 
is more important than the rule of law for high sophisticates who are attached to Islamism.  
 
Table 8.11 Requirements for Citizenship 
 
 
Requirements for citizenship: 
having ancestors from my 
country (V217) 
 
Constant 2.89*** (.58) 
Political Islam .30*** (.06) 
Kemalist Nationalism .06 (.07) 
High Sophisticates -.53 (.93) 
High Soph. x Islam .06 (.09) 
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High Soph. x Nation -.08 (.11) 
Adj R
2
 .05  
N 1345  
Requirements for citizenship: 
being born on my country’s soil 
(V218) 
Constant 3.01*** (.58) 
Political Islam .30*** (.06) 
Kemalist Nationalism .04 (.07) 
High Sophisticates -.02 (.93) 
High Soph. x Islam .06 (.09) 
High Soph. x Nation -.16 (.11) 
Adj R
2
 .05  
N 1345  
Requirements for citizenship: 
adopting the customs of my 
country (V219) 
Constant 5.45***  (.47) 
Political Islam .31*** (.05) 
Kemalist Nationalism .05 (.05) 
High Sophisticates .33 (.74) 
High Soph. x Islam -.01 (.07) 
High Soph. x Nation -.07 (.09) 
Adj R
2
 .05  
N 1345  
Requirements for citizenship: 
abiding by my country´s laws  
(V220) 
Constant 6.59*** (.35) 
Political Islam .25*** (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism .10* (.04) 
High Sophisticates 1.48** (.56) 
High Soph. x Islam -.15** (.56) 
High Soph. x Nation -.05 (.07) 
Adj R
2
 .04  
N 1345  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, 
standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are measured on 0-10 scales, with values in between. Data from the 
2007 WVS. 
 
Next, I focus on the results from the survey in Ankara by looking at CHP voters’ 
considerations towards elements of national identity. Interestingly the considerations of CHP 
supporters when it comes to the prerequisites of someone having the Turkish citizenship are 
shared by their attachment to the nation and Islam in a rather interesting way. In Table 7.2 (p. 
134) we see that CHP voters value greatly a type of citizenship that is oriented towards the 
rule of law with a mean value of 7.6 (on a 0-10 scale) for abiding the law as a prerequisite for 
someone to have the Turkish citizenship. Equally, high support was given to the adoption of 
customs (MCHPvoters=6.3) whereas much lower support was given towards being born on 
Turkish soil (MCHPvoters=4.3) and having Turkish ancestors (MCHPvoters=4.3).  
Below, I look at the mediating effect of attachment to the nation and Islam in shaping 
CHP voters’ perception of the necessary characteristics for someone in order to claim the 
Turkish citizenship. Here we see a differentiation on the components of Turkish citizenship 
on the basis of attachment to Islam and the nation. Specifically, Table 8.12 shows that 
attachment to the nation serves as a significant predictor for the opinion that abiding to the 
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rule of law is what makes someone worthy of the Turkish citizenship (b=.55). Contrary to 
this, attachment to Islam is a significant predictor for viewing Turkish ancestry (b=.23), being 
born on Turkish soil (b=.20) and adopting the country’s customs (b=.18). However, it is 
important to highlight here the effect size of attachment to the nation that is more than double 
than the effect of attachment to Islam. This demonstrates that it is the attachment to the nation 
that is the predominant driver of CHP voters’ attitudes towards the prerequisites for Turkish 
citizenship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The issue of national identity and attitudes towards the nation are also addressed in the 
interviews. Expectedly, interviewees were again divided on the basis of their ideological 
positioning on the political Islam-Kemalism continuum and their party preferences and issue-
based preferences on the role of the nation. Political sophistication also played an important 
role in mediating positions towards the nature and elements of cohesiveness of the Turkish 
state.  
Table 8.12 Elements of National Identity  
 
  CHP supporters 
Citizenship: having ancestors Constant 2.62 (2.36) 
 Attachment to Islam .23* (.11) 
 Attachment to the nation .08 (.26) 
 Adj R
2
 .04  
 N 68  
    
Citizenship: born on soil Constant 5.47* (2.25) 
 Attachment to Islam .20
+
 (.10) 
 Attachment to the nation -.23 (.25) 
 Adj R
2
 .04  
 N 68  
    
Citizenship: adopt customs Constant 3.95* (1.87) 
 Attachment to Islam .18* (.09) 
 Attachment to the nation .18 (.20) 
 Adj R
2
  .05  
 N 68  
    
Citizenship: abide by laws Constant 2.32 (1.62) 
 Attachment to Islam .10 (.07) 
 Attachment to the nation .55** (.18) 
 Adj R
2
 .16  
 N 68  
Notes:  
+ 
p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales with values in between. 
Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis. Data 
from the Ankara survey (2009). 
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 Those interviewees that hold a strong attachment to the traditional principles of 
Kemalism (4 out of 14) addressed the issue of the nation by referring to its key importance 
embedded in the Kemalist principles. Here political sophistication plays an important role. 
High sophisticates (2 out of 4) addressed the Kemalist principles providing lengthy 
explanations of their importance focusing on the aims of the founder of the Republic for a 
strong and united Republican state under secularism, nationalism and laicism. On the other 
side, low sophisticates mainly pointed to the principles of secularism, republicanism and 
nationalism referring to the importance they hold for the country and the unity of the nation. 
The key element that differentiated sophisticated supporters of Kemalism is their knowledge 
of the principles of the ideology yet they all demonstrate a sufficient understanding of the key 
principles underpinning Kemalism. Both high and low sophisticates, expressed a strong 
support towards the Kemalist view of nationalism where the nation is viewed as the unifying 
elements for all Turkish citizens, secular and modern.
119
 They all highlighted the importance 
of the constitution for the nation as set by the founder of the Republic, pointing to the factors 
such as the flag or the knowledge of the Turkish language as the key unification elements that 
hold together Turkish citizens. Another element that divides high and low sophisticates is that 
novices in their discussion on the nation refer predominantly to their opposition to AKP and 
its practices, whereas high sophisticates rely on their ideological principles to explain their 
positions.  
 A relatively close yet different, view of the nation is expressed by the supporters of 
Kemalism, who place themselves on the centre-left and the socio-democratic tendency of the 
CHP (10 out of 14). These participants regardless of their level of sophistication hold more 
relaxed attitudes towards the nation in line with their socio-democratic political placement. In 
particular, for them the secularist nation is of great importance for their belonging. They all 
refer to the Kemalist sense of nationalism that assisted in the creation of a unified Turkish 
Republic but at the same time they go against the strict notion of nationalism that places the 
state above all citizens creating in many cases oppression.
120
  They hold an appreciation of a 
                                                 
119 Interviewee no 23 suggests: ‘The Turkish nation is us, the citizens. The basic principles were shaped by the 
founder of the Republic and are the backbone of the country’s constitution. You know for me without these [i.e. 
the Kemalist principles] Turkey might well turn into a conservative Islamist state just like other Middle Eastern 
countries. Turkey will be fully modernized and democratic only following the principles of Kemalism, 
secularism, nationalism, laicism. The unity of the nation as founded by Ataturk is based on these. We should 
preserve them and protect our nation and country.’ 
120
 Interviewee no. 8 notes: ‘I respect and love my nation. I think this is normal but I am not a nationalist as 
most people mean nationalism. I believe in democracy and I want Turkey to be democratic. All citizens should 
be free to live and make their choices and no one should be oppressed. I am against politicians who want to 
control the nation and Turkey for their own benefit. The state is above us all but that should be the basis of our 
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more democratic version of Kemalism. Most of them stood openly against the past 
domination of Kemalist elites and the consequent repression towards a large segment of the 
population in economic, social and political terms (8 out of 25). They also expressed a clear 
opposition against any form of state generated repression and advocated individual freedoms 
and civil rights as generated by AKP. This is viewed as necessary for the modernization of 
the country but also for the normalisation of the social and political life. Also a few of them 
(3 out of 25), regardless of their level of sophistication, referred to minority rights holding a 
more moderate view of the nation as opposed to the strict nationalism promoted by CHP and 
Ataturk’s principles.121  
Importantly, those who are in support of the strict Kemalist principles but also those 
supporting the socio-democratic tendency of CHP, express a very strong attachment to the 
secular nature of the nation and the constitutional law. Again here, CHP voters who are in 
support of its socio-democratic tendency refer to the AKP by highlighting their opposition to 
the party’s view in regards to the role of religion in society as well as its practices that 
undermine individual rights and freedoms. High sophisticates could provide in detail their 
opinions referring to their ideological orientation supporting socio-democracy and articulate 
their disagreement with AKP, whereas novices focused predominantly on their negative view 
of the AKP’s governance focusing in particular on the party’s positions and practices in 
regards to the role of religion and individual rights.  
 The three interviewees that belonged to the extreme-left side of the political spectrum 
expressed a negative view towards nationalism as promoted by both Kemalist and political 
Islam elites and the political actors of CHP and AKP respectively. In fact they pointed to a 
sense of nationalism that is tailored on the basis of the dominant elites coming either from 
CHP or AKP respectively. For them, the Turkish nation is important only to the extent it acts 
as a unifying factor of the citizens without posing boundaries and creating senses of 
oppression. As interviewee no. 1 suggested:  
                                                                                                                                                        
democracy in Turkey... I mean to stop oppression against the poor, the weaker, the minorities and offer 
freedoms, rights and liberties that let people live their life as they want it.’ 
121
 As interviewee 6 notes: ‘The nation is important for me. Kemalism promotes a deep love and respect towards 
the nation. In my opinion Kemalism was what Turkey needed when it was founded, today this line of Kemalism 
that promotes a strong sense of nationalism is out fashioned for several reasons. Turkey has to be a society 
based on social and democratic characteristics. I am not a nationalist with the strict sense. Look, Turkey needs 
to look forward to become a more open and democratic society. We need to focus on individual freedoms that 
have been significantly undermined under AKP. And when I say freedoms I don’t refer only to us but also to 
minorities. The Kurds. They need to be granted certain rights. They cannot be always excluded from certain 
rights. They should have the chance to learn their language at school.’ 
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‘ I am not a nationalist, I was born in Turkey and I am a Turkish citizen. I belong 
here. I have respect for my country but I am not a nationalist. All political actors 
promote a sense of nationalism that serves their interest. Kemalist nationalism was as 
conservative as is the nationalism of AKP. The only difference is their starting point. 
At the end both sides want a nation to follow and serve the political elites they 
represent. I stand against this. I would respect a nation that is democratic, and 
provides a free life to everyone. A nation that respects and acknowledges different 
people without restricting their life as they have done and do on Kurds and Alevis’.  
Supporters of AKP and its conservative liberalism expressed a different version of support 
towards the nation. Here political sophistication played a determinant role. High sophisticates 
(2 out of 25) who are supporters of the economic liberalism of AKP demonstrated a view that 
looked at the nation as important yet they pointed to the preservation of individual freedoms 
and liberties without any boundaries imposed by the central state.
122
 On the other hand, for 
the remaining 4 participants who were low sophisticates and supporters of AKP the nation is 
important and should be respected and protected against anyone who aims to pose a danger 
against the unity of the country. With varying strength all 4 participants expressed their 
attachment and support towards the Turkish nation focusing on the role of religion seen a 
unifying element. To use the words of interview no. 10: 
 ‘Turkey is a Muslim country. Islam keeps Turkey together and this should not be 
under any kind of negotiation. Everyone is free in Turkey as far as they respect that 
we are one nation with one flag and one religion.’  
Finally, supporters of the nationalist MHP where the only ones to hold a genuine support 
towards strict nationalist principles as expressed by the ideology and the party they support. 
For them, the protection of a strong nation is of key importance for Turkey. In fact for both 
participants the nation is viewed as sacred and needs to be protected against any domestic or 
foreign actors. The two participants here expressed openly a concern in regards to the role of 
minorities in the country focusing in particular on the Kurdish issue and the rights of the 
Kurdish people in Turkey which can potentially pose a great threat to the national unity. As 
interviewee no. 14 notes:  
                                                 
122
 Interviewee no.2 suggests ‘Our nation is sacred. You know all Turks respect our nation regardless our 
political differences. For me a strong nation is an indicator of being able as a country to progress. I believe all 
people should be given the freedom to make their choices. Like the Kurds they should be granted certain rights 
but of course talking about independence is not acceptable. They live in Turkey and they should abide by the 
laws of the country not to try to break the country they live in. For me what is important is the idea of liberalism 
within Turkey. I believe that the only way to go beyond the problems of the past is everyone to have the 
opportunity to develop economically and socially’. 
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 ‘The strong love and respect towards the nation is what preserved Turkey throughout 
the centuries. This is what we need now to protect our country. Don’t get me wrong I 
am not a fascist. I do not believe I am better that you. I just love my nation and I 
would do everything to protect it from anyone that would like to see Turkey dissolved 
or weakened. We should protect our secular characteristics but also our Muslim 
identity against everyone who wants to see Turkey weakened.’  
The polarization among interviewees on their view of the nation is a direct result of their 
ideological orientations, party preferences and their value-based attitudes. All participants 
expressed a respect toward the nation yet their interpretation of the expression of respect 
varied on the basis of their individual judgements. A key issue that divided those participants 
who occupy the two ends of Kemalism and political Islam and their derivative alternatives of 
social democracy and liberal conservatism, focused on the issue of Kemalism and the role of 
religion. Here we see that respect towards Kemalism and the principle of secularism 
promoted a more secular version of nationalism, whereas attachment to political Islam brings 
religion into the discussion shaping a religious based nationalism. A similar line of religious-
based nationalism was promoted by those supporting the nationalist MHP. Those from the 
extreme-left did not assign religious or Kemalism related characteristics to the nation and 
focused more on values such as democracy and freedoms within the borders of the state. 
 
Individual Freedoms, Human Rights and State Oppression  
The issue of individual freedoms and human rights was at the heart of the interview 
discussions with the majority of participants. Attitudes towards the state of democratic 
principles in the country are expressed both explicitly when participants were asked directly 
about this but also implicitly when asked to provide their opinions on a range of issues such 
as the role of religion in the society, the state of democracy as well as the ideological 
dichotomies and political actors.  
When participants were invited to discuss the state of individual rights in Turkey the 
majority of interviewees that stand against AKP (17 out of 25) responded in a rather 
straightforward fashion, pointing to the absence of democratic principles, the little respect to 
individual freedoms and human rights, the state generated repression as well as the major 
inequalities among the population. Some of the most prominent factors that were identified as 
contributing to the absence of freedom were the role of religion and its position in public life 
and the increasing state control over individual lifestyle choices due to the AK Party’s 
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policies. Several participants also mentioned the decline of the country’s democratic 
principles accompanied by an increasing conservatism and authoritarianism in the country. 
Interestingly, participants found it easy to use examples from real life that demonstrated the 
state of oppression in Turkey to justify their opinions regardless of the level of sophistication. 
On the contrary, there were also participants who suggested that Turkey is more democratic 
than in the past (8 out of 25). The indicators of increasing democracy that are mentioned by 
these participants touch upon religious freedoms, the liberalisation of economy and the state 
and the end of the domination of past Kemalist elites. Attitudes towards the state of 
individual rights, freedoms and civil liberties were driven by participants’ ideological 
leanings and party preferences as well as value-orientations. Political sophistication played a 
key role, affecting the valence of attitudinal responses rather than determining their nature.  
These responses could fit into five distinct camps. First, on the one side stood those 
that were openly opposing the AKP and belonged to the traditional Kemalist camp supporting 
the CH Party. Second, others were closer to the centre-left of the political continuum, were 
opponents of the AKP and supporters of the socio-democratic tendency of the CHP. A third 
set of responses was provided by those who belonged to the extreme-left end of the political 
spectrum and who were opponents of the Kemalist establishment but also of the AKP. 
Another set of responses involved those that were supporters of the AKP or the nationalist 
MHP. Finally, the fifth set of responses was by those that belonged to the more liberal 
segment of AKP who expressed some fears concerning the future of individual rights and 
freedoms due to the increasing power given to the party. Individual level of support and 
appreciation of the AKP’s governance and its practices along with the ideological placement, 
party preferences and values were the determining factors in shaping opinions towards the 
level of democratic principles of the country and in particular towards individual freedoms 
and rights. Political sophistication intensified the strength of the attitudes and their 
justification.  
The interviewees that supported the traditional Kemalist line and who voted 
consistently for the CHP viewed the party and its principles as the sole advocator of 
democracy and key protector of individual rights and freedoms (4 out of 25). To use the 
words of interviewee no. 23: ‘Kemalism is about defending the democracy of the Republic 
and promoting individual rights and freedoms for all Turkish citizens.’ This was expressed 
unanimously by the strong supporters of Kemalism along with their direct opposition to the 
AKP’s governance. In order to justify their position, they referred to the anti-democratic rule 
of AKP by addressing the increasing levels of state repression against any opposing voice, 
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highlighting the conservative and authoritarian tendency of the current political 
establishment. They also pointed to the increasing impact of religion in society under the 
AKP, evident in a number of social policies (such as the increase in the Imam Hatip schools, 
the lift of the headscarf ban at the universities and public institutions). High sophisticates, 
referred in detail to the Kemalist principles, which they viewed as the backbone of the 
democratic establishment in Turkey (2 out of 4). They drew upon examples from their own 
experiences and the news to point to the usage of oppressive techniques by AKP and justify 
their ideological stance against AKP and its repressive practices. Low sophisticates, focused 
more on the AKP’s oppression while referring in more simple ways to the Kemalist 
principles and their values in regards to the role of religion (2 out of 4). They also mentioned 
repressive practices using examples from their everyday life to reinforce their point about the 
current status of AKP’s governance.  
Those who placed themselves on the centre-left end of Kemalism, who were 
supporters of the Party’s socio-democratic tendency (10 out of 25) referred to the Kemalist 
principles superficially focusing mostly on the secular, socio-democratic face of the CHP as 
the only hope for the establishment of democracy in the country. The secular framework of 
CHP and in extent of Kemalism was seen as the only ideological camp that respects 
individual choices on the basis of modern standards rather than the pro-Islamist stance 
promoted by the AKP. They highlighted the increasing conservatism and authoritarianism 
promoted under the AKP rule as well as the increasing role that religion played in society. 
Sophistication served again as a factor that affected the ability of participants to reason their 
attitudes rather than being a factor that drives them. High sophisticates were able to point in a 
clear fashion to the socio-democratic ideological inclinations of the new face of the CHP 
under Kılıçdaroğlu (2 out of 10) and rely on their personal and political values in regards to 
democracy and the role of the public. Low sophisticates focused more on the secularist face 
and centre-left placement of the party as the only actor that protected individual rights and 
freedoms in Turkey and their core personal and political values (8 out of 10). Yet, they all 
pointed to the increasing oppression coming from AKP’s rule in opposing its own boundaries 
for civic and political life offering very little tolerance towards alternative views.  
 A different position was expressed by those who self-identified with the extreme-left 
(3 out of 25). They saw the country’s high level of conservatism as the main source of 
restrictions on individual freedoms and rights, or to use the words of interviewee no.19: 
‘conservatism that comes from all sides is the biggest enemy to freedoms in Turkey’. These 
three interviewees, referred to the conservative tendency of the country whose basis lies on 
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the Kemalism versus political Islam dichotomy. They held critical attitudes against the two 
key political actors of CHP and AKP and the ideological lines of Kemalism and political 
Islam. And as they considered the effects that the antagonism between the two sides has had 
on the public and political life, they pointed to the usage of oppressive techniques by both 
establishments – Kemalist in the past and currently the political Islamist by AKP-, which 
impose their own worldviews and rules on the society.
123
 They also provided a number of 
examples in regards to restrictions of individual freedoms as well as the limited space that 
currently exists in expressing any opposition to the current political establishment. In 
addition, they offered examples of the increasing usage of oppression by AKP in order to 
silence opposing voices such as prosecutions and arrests from friends or referring to the 
control of the news.  
These three sides hold different views on the root cause of existing restrictions on 
individual freedoms as well as varying opinions on the way that these can be overcome. What 
brings them together is their views on the key responsible actor and ideology of the current 
levels of state oppression which limits individual liberties. They all pointed to the AKP’s 
political rule, which limited significantly the space for expressing opposing views, alternative 
beliefs and lifestyles from the standards set by the current regime (17 out of 25). Regardless 
of their ideological and party placement several of them pointed to a breadth of examples on 
existing restrictions that limit individual rights, freedoms and pose a risk to human rights in 
the country. These participants shared the view that they were not free to live according to 
their will; they could not follow their own lifestyle if this did not abide with the social and 
political norms of AKP. The following extract summarizes effectively the level of freedoms 
in the country through the eyes of interviewee no.1: 
‘In Turkey if you are a man, straight, Sunni and Turkish then you are free. If you are 
not something of these and you want to show your diversity, then it’s a pity for 
yourself. Your life will be very difficult. Me here in Kadikoy I am comfortable but if I 
go out I don't feel comfortable to discuss who I am and what I believe: an Alevi, 
atheist, with Kurdish origins that I support an anarchic view of communism. If you 
are a foreigner that doesn't hold the [Turkish] citizenship you can become accepted. 
However if you start living in conditions that are better from Turkish citizens or if 
                                                 
123
 Interviewee no. 17 notes: ‘ To talk about freedom and individual rights when those who dominate the 
political arena AKP and CHP represent two ideologies that are based on restricting certain segments of he 
population is a joke. In Turkey because of our history and the failure to democratize and move the society 
towards a more modern path we are victims of actors that promote freedom through restricting the rights of 
their opponent.’ 
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your social class is better from your neighbour then you might have several 
problems.’  
This extract, points to a number of issues that several participants - who opposed the current 
AKP status quo - referred to, when addressing the issue of state of freedom and equal rights 
in Turkey. These are based on religion, ethnic origin, gender and ideological inclinations. A 
good number of participants provided statements that pointed to oppression coming from the 
current domination of AKP such as an increasing fear of expressing freely opposing views 
towards the role of religion or the prime minister and its practices in public (15 out of 25). A 
participant mentioned the example of a friend being prosecuted due to his online activity 
where he was making comments against religion, others noted that they were worried to 
speak freely on their phone (4 out of 25) and the majority noted a certain fear in expressing 
polemic attitudes against the AKP in their workspace or other public spaces (15 out of 25). 
The fear of prosecution and arrest came from several participants as a possible scenario 
resulting from expressing opposing voices to the AKP’s practices. Another interesting 
example of oppression referred to individual rights and freedoms of the members of the 
LGTB community. This was addressed by two extreme-left participants as well as a 
participant from the centre-left of the CHP camp. These participants acknowledged that 
members of the community do not feel safe or free and tried their best to hide their identity. 
As interviewee no. 21 suggests this oppression is being shaped due to high levels of 
conservatism in combination with religiously generated values that determine what is 
acceptable and what not.  
Opposite were those supporting the AKP and nationalists MHP voters who 
appreciated the changes brought under the AKP rule. For them, the increase in religious 
freedoms, which came about after the end of the Kemalist oppression is the most relevant 
example of the country’s positive steps towards democracy (6 out of 25). For them Kemalism 
was posing great risks to the level of individual rights and freedoms. Although a number of 
participants acknowledged the existence of certain inequalities based on gender, they held 
positive views in regards to the future of AKP’s rule in reducing these. An interesting 
position is also brought up by a nationalist MHP voter who poses certain boundaries in 
discussing religious freedoms and minority rights. Participant no.14 remaining consistent 
with his ideological position, stated, that democracy needs to be well defined in the case of 
Turkey to avoid stepping over certain limits that put the nation and the country into trouble. 
Characteristically, he said: ‘If for instance one suggests that freedom is to create his own 
state, that is not possible. This is withdrawal from the principles of the nation.’ 
Chapter 8. Data Analysis and Findings: Value orientations 
 218 
 Finally, there are a few who were more critical supporters of AKP and viewed 
positively the religious freedoms provided by the party as well as the liberalisation of the 
country’s economy. They expressed a level of uncertainty and worry about the future of 
Turkey in terms of individual rights and freedoms (2 out of 6). These participants were both 
high sophisticates, valued highly materialistic considerations and placed their hopes on the 
state of the economy in Turkey. As interviewee no.2 suggests, if the economy goes well 
democracy and individual freedoms will advance. At the same time, they both expressed 
some concerns in regards to the future of democracy in the country as a result of the 
increasing power gathered by AKP and Erdoğan. Characteristically, interviewee no.19 
pointed to the increasing power of AKP under the rule of Erdoğan creating fears of how he 
will use his powers in the future. He mentioned two possible directions the country can 
follow: either an increasing authoritarianism and dictatorship or a democratic path based on 
economic advancements, freedom of religious expression and civil liberties. 
 
8.3 Concluding Remarks 
My findings suggest that value-orientations play a predominant role in the formation of 
citizens’ political judgements in the case of Turkey. In line with my empirical evidence on 
political ideology, I suggest that citizens’ values have followed the evolution of both 
ideological orientations that pertain to political Islam and Kemalism and their corresponding 
political actors those of AKP and CHP.  
 On this basis citizens’ value orientations are based on citizens’ individual positioning 
towards the AKP. Those that supported the governing party expressed more conservative 
values whereas those who were against it demonstrated more liberal value orientations. 
However, there were also some exceptions with certain CHP supporters that also expressed 
conservative values confirming their ideological inclinations that favour the Kemalist 
principles of secularist nationalism. Along these lines, the study of value orientations -when 
combined with an extensive understanding of citizens’ appreciation of the main ideological 
spaces- provides insights that enable us to gain a deeper understanding of the multi-layered 
and fragmented Turkish socio-political arena.  
An interesting finding is that the supporters of Islamism and Kemalism, under certain 
circumstances converged in their appreciation of values such as the importance of 
democracy, the preservation of traditions and culture, attitudes towards modernization, 
respect towards the nation and the importance of preserving and protecting basic human 
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rights and individual freedoms. This showed that citizens in Turkey can in fact overcome the 
ideological boundaries set by the fragmentation dictated by the dominant political actors. In 
addition, my findings suggest that regardless of these common points there are significant 
differences that pertain to the positions citizens’ hold in regards to the role of religion in the 
society, freedoms of religious expression and religious based constraints, the country’s level 
of modernization and democracy, the role of the state and the public, the nation and the 
prerequisites for obtaining the Turkish citizenship and the current status of human rights and 
state oppression. These differentiations were justified on the basis of citizens’ motivational 
goals for the society, which were influenced by the main political actors they support.  
Political sophistication here played an interesting role. High sophisticates were able to 
justify in extent their value orientations demonstrating the tight structure of their belief 
system, which allow them to formulate internally consistent opinions and beliefs. Low 
sophisticates provided simple explanations of their value orientations highlighting their 
importance in their personal life along with the importance each value holds for their view of 
the society.  
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Chapter 9. Data Analysis and Findings: Emotions 
 
This chapter discusses the affective element of participants’ political judgements. The 
interviews allowed participants to express their emotions freely by addressing the source of 
their affective reactions and providing their reasoning. They referred to their emotions 
towards political matters in both explicit and implicit ways. In particular, they addressed their 
emotions either by naming them or by expressing a negative or positive reaction towards 
certain issues while they were coming up throughout the interview discussion. Interestingly, 
several participants refer to their felt emotions not only when asked directly about what 
makes them feel as they do but rather, by making references to their emotions while 
discussing certain issues like democracy, individual rights and freedoms and the current 
socio-political environment of the country. 
In the discussion that follows, I first examine the emotional reactions of participants 
towards political actors and issues. Specifically, I address the explicit emotions participants 
refer to by naming them as well as their implicit emotional expressions when addressing 
certain political affairs. Participants had the space to refer to their emotions by explaining 
what makes them feel the way they do as well as to reveal the motivational role of these 
emotions relating to the positions they took as a result of these feelings. Second, I focus on 
the role of political sophistication on the emotional expressions of participants. I look at the 
effects of sophistication on coherence of political attitudes and its role on valence of 
emotional reactions. The chapter is divided into a discussion of positive and negative valence 
emotions.  
 
9.1 Positive Valence Emotions 
The group of positive valence emotions contained trust and confidence towards political 
actors and institutions, trust for individual life and personal future, hope and positive 
perceptions of the future, enthusiasm as well as pride and admiration towards certain political 
actors and symbols. The expression of positive affective reactions was somewhat limited. 
Interestingly the largest segment of affective reactions was negative valence emotions. The 
positive valence emotions although fewer in terms of frequency appeared despite ideological 
orientations, party preferences and levels of sophistication. The key issue that generated 
variability on the way positive valence emotions were felt and expressed at the individual 
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level was in the nature of the stimulus that created the affective state along with the reasoning 
that accompanied the felt emotion. In the pages that follow, I discuss the full range of positive 
valence emotions as revealed from participants during the in-depth interviews.  
 
Trust and confidence in politics and political institutions 
Looking at the determinants of confidence towards political institutions from the WVS data 
in Table 9.1, the effects of attachment to political Islam and Kemalism appeared distinct and 
often polarizing. For example, attachment to Islamism predicted confidence in the parliament 
(b=.32), the police (b=.21), the judicial system (b=.21), and the civil service (b=.09), while 
attachment to Kemalism predicted lack of confidence in the media (b=-.10). While political 
Islam was a positive predictor of confidence towards the government (b=.42), mosques 
(b=.36), and the political parties (b=.13), Kemalism was a negative predictor, undermining 
confidence towards these institutions (b=-.17, b=-.18 and b=-.11 respectively). Political Islam 
and Kemalist nationalism only came together in explaining confidence towards the armed 
forces, both having a positive effect (b=.10 and b=.11 respectively). Political sophistication 
yielded some interesting findings too. In particular, sophistication was a significant negative 
predictor of confidence towards the government (b=-1.54) and the mosques (b=-.12).  
These findings are expected by considering the AKP’s tenure in the government and 
its attempts to end the past domination of Kemalism getting in its hands the control of 
institutions such as the judiciary, the police, media outlets, civil services and the army. 
Taking into account, that AKP is the key political advocator of Islamist considerations 
citizens who were attached to Islamist principles expressed high confidence towards the key 
state actors. On the contrary, attachment to Kemalism demonstrated the absence of 
confidence towards key institutions controlled by the government such as the government 
itself, the political parties but also the key religious actor in the country that is the mosques. 
However, we see that both sides expressed high levels of confidence towards the armed 
forces, which can be explained in two ways. For those attached to Kemalism, armed forces 
are considered the safeguard of the Republic ready to intervene when the constitution or the 
country in general is in danger. Those who were attached to political Islam expressed high 
levels of confidence towards the army mainly due to the AKP’s attempts to control the army 
ending the past Kemalist domination in all ranks within armed forces. We also see that 
political expertise increases individual scepticism towards the government but also towards 
religious institutions. 
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Table 9.1 Confidence in Political Institutions  
 
 
Confidence: Mosques  
 (V131) 
Constant 5.66*** (.40) 
 Political Islam .36*** (.04) 
 Kemalist Nationalism -.18*** (.05) 
 High Sophisticates -.12* (.63) 
 High Soph. x Islam .09 (.06) 
 High Soph. x Nation -.01 (.07) 
 Adj R
2
 .16  
 N 1345  
Confidence: Armed Forces 
(V132) 
Constant 7.07*** (.41) 
Political Islam .10* (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism .11* (.05) 
High Sophisticates .08 (.65) 
High Soph. x Islam .03 (.07) 
High Soph. x Nation -.12 (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .02  
N 1345  
Confidence: Television  
(V134) 
Constant 4.76*** (.40) 
Political Islam -.04 (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.10* (.05) 
High Sophisticates -.63 (.64) 
High Soph. x Islam -.02 (.06) 
High Soph. x Nation .06 (.07) 
Adj R
2
 .01  
N 1345  
Confidence: Labour Unions 
(V135) 
Constant 5.16*** (.41) 
Political Islam -.08 
+
 (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.04 (.05) 
High Sophisticates .05 (.65) 
High Soph. x Islam -.07 (.06) 
High Soph. x Nation .01 (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .01  
N 1345  
Confidence: The Police  
(V136) 
 
Constant 5.91*** (.45) 
Political Islam .21*** (.05) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.03 (.05) 
High Sophisticates -1.06 (.71) 
High Soph. x Islam .10 (.07) 
High Soph. x Nation -.10 (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .08  
N 1345  
Confidence: Justice System 
(V137) 
Constant 5.65*** (.43) 
Political Islam .21*** (.05) 
Kemalist Nationalism .01 (.05) 
High Sophisticates -1.09 (.68) 
High Soph. x Islam .03 (.07) 
High Soph. x Nation .02 (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .05  
N 1345  
Confidence: The Constant 4.86*** (.43) 
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Government  
(V138) 
Political Islam .42*** (.05) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.17*** (.05) 
High Sophisticates -1.54* (.69) 
High Soph. x Islam .10 (.07) 
High Soph. x Nation -.04 (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .19  
N 1345  
Confidence: The Political 
Parties  
(V139) 
Constant 3.92*** (.40) 
Political  Islam .13** (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.11* (.05) 
High Sophisticates -1.05 (.64) 
High Soph. x Islam .02 (.06) 
High Soph. x Nation .07 (.07) 
Adj R
2
 .03  
N 1345  
Confidence: Parliament  
(V140) 
Constant 3.85*** (.44) 
Political Islam .32*** (.05) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.01 (.05) 
High Sophisticates -.52 (.69) 
High Soph. x Islam .06 (.07) 
High Soph. x Nation -.07 (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .09  
N 1345  
Confidence: The Civil 
Services  
(V141) 
Constant 5.17*** (.40) 
Political Islam .09* (.04) 
Kemalist Nationalism -.07 (.05) 
High Sophisticates -.76 (.64) 
High Soph. x Islam .05 (.06) 
High Soph. x Nation -.03 (.08) 
Adj R
2
 .03  
N 1345  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, 
standard errors in parenthesis. All variables are measured on 0-10 scales, with values in between. Data from the 
2007 WVS. 
 
The next set of data looks at citizens’ confidence in political actors, drawing on the 2009 
survey in Ankara. Table 7.2 (p. 134), presents interesting levels of variability in the 
confidence ratings among CHP supporters reflecting an pattern of selective confidence 
towards political actors and institutions. In particular, CHP voters showed high levels of 
confidence towards the armed forces (MCHPvoters=5.29) and the judicial system 
(MCHPvoters=5.4) but low levels of confidence towards the labor unions (MCHPvoters=4,8), 
religious leaders (MCHPvoters=1.9), the parliament (MCHPvoters=2.3), political parties 
(MCHPvoters=2.3), the EU (MCHPvoters=2.5) and the UN (MCHPvoters=2.8). These findings point to 
the expected direction of confidence on the basis of attachment to the CHP. CHP voters 
expressed their confidence to the armed forces and the judicial system (i.e. the courts) who 
are traditionally viewed as protectors of the Kemalist establishment. The remaining political 
institutions were viewed negatively by CHP voters because of the AK Party’s increasing 
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influence towards these actors as a result of the party’s electoral stability in the country’s 
governance.  
 The impact of the attachment to Islam and to the nation on the confidence evaluations 
of CHP supporters yields some very interesting findings. Table 9.2 presents my findings from 
OLS regression analyses for each institution and political actor separately. Here my aim is to 
examine whether CHP supporters draw their confidence ratings from their traditional 
attachment to the nation as it derives from the Kemalist ideology, or if they hold a certain 
attachment to Islam that comes into play. In looking at the findings, attachment to the nation 
promoted higher confidence in the parliament (b=.16) whereas it reduced confidence towards 
political parties (b=-.47), the EU (b=-40) and the UN (b=-.34). These results show, that when 
accounting for attachment to the nation CHP voters showed higher levels of confidence 
towards the secular establishment that is promoted by the parliament and the political parties 
but at the same time their confidence decreased significantly -more than double in size- when 
they considered international institutions such as the EU and the UN. We see that confidence 
evaluations of CHP voters were not driven only by their attachment to the nation but also by 
attachment to Islam. Attachment to Islam among CHP supporters, promoted an increase in 
levels of confidence towards the EU (b=.13) and the UN (b=.18). Attachment to Islam 
restored confidence in political institutions, which were perceived negatively on the basis of 
attachments to the nation. Similarly, attachment to Islam decreased confidence towards the 
labour unions (b=-.14) and the courts (b=-0.15) which shows that when religion-based 
considerations become salient in the mind of CHP supporters they form unfavourable 
considerations for these institutions that go against the overall positive evaluations as seen in 
Table 9.2.  
 
Table 9.2 Confidence in Political Institutions 
 
  CHP supporters 
    
Confidence in the parliament  Constant .06 (1.54) 
 Attachment to Islam .19 (.07) 
 Attachment to the nation .16** (.17) 
 Adj R
2
 .09  
 N 68  
Confidence in political parties Constant 6.04*** (1.57) 
 Attachment to Islam .11 (.07) 
 Attachment to the nation -.47** (.17) 
 Adj R2 .10  
 N 68  
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Confidence in labour unions Constant 5.50*** (1.64) 
 Attachment to Islam -.14
+
 (.07) 
 Attachment to the nation -.02 (.18) 
 Adj R
2
 .02  
 N 68  
Confidence in courts Constant 5.38** (1.72) 
 Attachment to Islam -0.15
+
 (.08) 
 Attachment to the nation .07 (.19) 
 Adj R
2
 .03  
 N 68  
Confidence in the EU Constant  5.57*** (1.5) 
 Attachment to Islam .13
+
 (.07) 
 Attachment to the nation -.40* (.17) 
 Adj R
2
 .09  
 N 68  
Confidence in the UN Constant 5.17** (1.7) 
 Attachment to Islam .18* (.08) 
 Attachment to the nation -.34
+
 (.18) 
 Adj R
2
 .09  
 N 68  
Notes: 
+ 
p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Variables recoded in 0-10 scales with values in between. 
Parameter estimates are unstandardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis. Data 
from the Ankara survey (2009). 
 
Next, we examine levels of trust towards political actors and politics in general. When 
participants were asked whom or what they trust the most in politics, their responses vary 
greatly. Expressions of trust were dependant on ideological inclinations, party preferences 
and value orientations. Sophistication in some cases played an interesting role promoting 
higher levels of trust, and had an impact on the consistency of their belief systems (i.e. 
stability and coherence of party preferences and ideological inclinations).  
 Those opposing the AK Party expressed high levels of trust towards certain political 
actors rather than politics in general. The source of trust for these interviewees was found in 
certain political leaders, in line with their ideological orientations and voting preferences. In 
particular, six participants (out of 25) who place themselves on the centre-left of the CHP 
indicated their trust towards the current leader of the party (Kılıçdaroğlu) saying that he has 
the potential to broaden public support towards CHP and bring real change to the political life 
of Turkey in combating AKP’s domination. Among them, two are high sophisticates and four 
are low sophisticates. The key difference between the two is that high sophisticates could 
explain in more detail their trust towards the new leader by referring to key changes in the 
party’s positions under the new leadership and the socio-democratic turn of the party. Low 
sophisticates simply referred to their trust in changing the party’s past identity and playing a 
more progressive role in the Turkish arena. Both high and low sophisticates that show trust 
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towards Kılıçdaroğlu, supported the changes the new party leader brought against the past 
political elites that dominated the party which are seen as partially responsible for the 
electoral results of the past decades. These participants also remained consistent with their 
ideological and voting preferences regardless of their level of sophistication. Sophistication 
conditioned the type of reasoning these participants engaged with in explaining their trust in 
Kılıçdaroğlu and the socio-democratic tendency of the party. Analytically, for high 
sophisticates the principles of socio-democracy promoted by the leader came first in their 
discussion. Low sophisticates took as a starting point the leader in addressing the changes 
they hoped he would bring in the party in order to perform better in forthcoming elections 
and in extent to play a more active role against AKP’s dominance. 
One of the nationalist supporters of MHP expressed his trust towards the current 
leader (Bahçeli), remaining faithful to his ideological placement (nationalist and centre-right) 
and party preference. He explained his trust towards the Party leader by referring to his 
attempts to bring the party towards the centre-right, eliminate the fascist elements and also 
act as a constructing opposition to the AK party (interviewee no.14). For this participant the 
centre-right direction that the current leader followed seemed to be important in obtaining the 
past electoral support from the society while playing a significant role as an opposition force 
in the parliament. The second MHP supporter, expressed his total trust in the party by 
referring to the party’s constructive role in acting in opposition to the AKP, supporting issues 
that are positive for the nation and future of the country and opposing aspects that were 
viewed as dangerous or negative.  
An interesting position is expressed by one interviewee who self-identifies with the 
extreme-left (i.e. anarcho-communist), standing against the current and past Islamist and 
Kemalist status quo, and an open supporter of individual freedoms and rights. This 
participant, who is a low sophisticate, presented an inconsistency between his ideological 
orientation and party preference. He ended up casting his vote in support of the CHP, which 
he saw as the only party that has the power and potential to stands decisively against AKP. 
Interestingly, as he noted he trusted certain individuals that come from the BDP Party namely 
Ertuğrul Kürkçü and Sırrı Süreyya Önder. In explaining his reasoning, interviewee no.1 
noted:  
‘They are both two important figures of the left. They are social activists that have 
shown that they are in politics to fight against any form of oppression and not to serve 
just their party. They are both honest and protect the weak people’s rights and their 
history shows just that’. 
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Turning to the AKP supporters, four out of the six who voted in support for the AKP 
demonstrated high levels of trust towards the party. Sophistication mediated their justification 
of their levels of trust. Two of these participants, are high sophisticates and their trust went to 
the liberal segment of AKP, which is in line with their material interests focusing on 
economy and freedom of religious expression. This was justified on the basis of their own 
ideological inclinations and principles focusing on the importance of economic stability and 
progress of the country but also on the importance of citizens feeling free to express and 
practice their religious sentiments. The high trust towards the AKP, from low sophisticates, 
was justified on the basis of the party’s protection of religious and overall individual rights 
and freedoms as opposed to the past Kemalist establishment and boundaries in individual 
expressions of religiosity.  
 
Trust for Personal Life and Individual Future 
Participants also commented on their levels of trust in their personal life and in their future. 
Interestingly a very small number of participants expressed a sense of trust and a positive 
perspective towards their future life (5 out of 25). These are those participants who trusted the 
governing AKP, and a MHP voter. The two low sophisticated supporters of AKP expressed 
trust towards their individual future and their personal life by referring to the changes the 
AKP has brought in the country such as individual freedoms in terms of religion, economic 
development and social stability because of the AKP’s electoral stronghold. The two high 
sophisticates who supported the AKP expressed their trust in the neoliberal segment of the 
AKP, which promotes their material interests in terms of economic advancements and 
individual freedoms. We see that both high and low sophisticates remained consistent in their 
expression of trust towards their personal life and individual future under the AKP’s 
governance. The difference is that high sophisticates drew upon the ideological basis and 
actions of AKP, whereas low sophisticates referred solely on the everyday practices of the 
governing party. It is important to note, that both high sophisticates and one out of the two 
low sophisticates expressed some concern for the future performance of the party due to its 
continuing electoral power and the conflict between the AKP camp and the Kemalist elites. 
In addition the MHP voter who expressed trust for the future noted: 
‘I trust Turkish citizens. I believe they love the nation and they will do the best to 
protect it as they have shown throughout history. We have many important political 
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issues to deal with, but I trust that both MHP as well as AKP can in fact generate 
positive results that will strengthen Turkey’ (interviewee no. 18).  
 
Hope and Enthusiasm 
The expression of positive emotions such as hope and enthusiasm as a result of the political 
life was limited (8 out of 25). The majority noted that there was nothing that makes them feel 
enthusiastic or hopeful about politics. This was despite their sophistication levels, ideological 
inclinations and voting preferences. A possible explanation for this could be the generalised 
low levels of trust towards politics among the participants. An explanation for high 
sophisticates on the dominance of negative emotions towards politics, could be their 
knowledge and appreciation of the complicated political arena with the high levels of 
polarization and fragmentation that bring to the surface an understanding of the instability 
and uncertainty for the country’s future. Another possible explanation could come from the 
certain distance low sophisticates hold towards politics, keeping them separate from their 
personal life. This could create the absence of any hope and enthusiasm in issues related to 
politics leading them to trust and hold their hopes only for their personal life. On this basis, 
there are very few participants that expressed hope and enthusiasm by making explicit 
references to these emotions during the interview process. The expression of hope and 
enthusiasm towards politics, when they occurred, were aligned with their ideological 
inclinations and party preferences.  
First, positive valence emotions of hope and enthusiasm were expressed by some who 
oppose the AKP and its tenure in the country’s government. For instance, interviewee no.1 -
who is an anarcho-communist that stands in direct opposition to AKP and belongs in the 
extreme-left- noted:  
‘The only thing that makes me feel enthusiastic is mass mobilisations and protests. I 
feel enthusiastic when people go down in the streets promoting their own rights. It’s 
the only hope that there is left and the only tool we have left against Erdoğan and 
AKP.’  
A similar view, is expressed by the other two extreme-left interviewees who voted for the 
communist TKP. They both referred to a certain enthusiasm and hope towards the power of 
the people in Turkey, that can lead thousands of people in the streets promoting their rights. 
Characteristically, interviewee no. 21 noted: 
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‘I feel enthusiasm when I am in a mass protest. You know in Turkey going down in the 
street and protesting is not easy. There has always been state involvement in breaking 
down protests especially when these go against the government, any government. I am 
not referring only to AKP but also to past governments. But witnessing and 
participating in massive protests brings a certain level of hope that nothing is lost and 
we can still fight for our life and our country’.  
Also, these participants who self-identify with the extreme left and who hold a deep 
disappointment from Turkish politics argued that the only hope for Turkey was the creation 
of a new party that can play a real oppositional role against the AKP governance. This party 
should break the past stereotypes of Kemalism versus Islamism and could potentially gather 
people from both sides (2 out of 25). Yet, this was also seen as a wish rather than a possible 
scenario by interviewees who expressed this hope.  
Enthusiasm and hope were also expressed by some of the AKP and MHP supporters. 
Contrary to those who oppose the country’s current administration, what stimulates these 
positive valence emotions among them is the AKP’s governance. In particular, the way AKP 
handles the political life regardless of whether someone supports or not the party is a source 
of hope and enthusiasm for those participants. Interviewee no.18 who is a supporter of the 
nationalist MHP noted:  
‘Turkey is progressing well, AKP is doing very good public relations, it makes me feel 
enthusiastic for the way they handle things regardless of my personal disagreements 
with certain actions the Party is taking’.  
This interviewee was a low sophisticate and although being a stable party supporter of MHP, 
this statement reveals an inconsistency between the ideological inclination and party 
preference on one hand and the emotional expression towards the AKP’s performance on the 
other. However, to use the same interviewee’s statement, he believes that MHP is acting as a 
constructive opposition force by acknowledging the positives of the AK Party while pointing 
to its negatives at the same time. On the other side, we could also draw upon the words of 
those interviewees who point to MH Party as the lifeline of AKP assisting the party when it is 
mostly needed.  
Another expression of positive valence emotions, comes from a sophisticated 
supporter of AKP who expressed hope for the future by referring to the positive changes that 
the neoliberal stance of AKP can bring both to the country’s economy but also in the area of 
freedom and liberties. This participant was consistent in terms of ideological positioning and 
party preference, belonging to the neo-liberal segment of AKP. Yet, it is important to note, 
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that this came with the hope that the more conservative forces from the conservative side of 
AKP (representing the Islamists) would not dominate the party and the country’s future. 
Hope resulting from the AKPs governance came also from two AKP supporters (low 
sophisticates) who suggest that the AKP had the potential to continue the positive change in 
the society and harmonize social relations by promoting individual freedoms ending the past 
domination of conservative Kemalists. Another source of hope came from the two nationalist 
MHP voters who looked with a hopeful eye at the MHP’s leader. They both said that Bahçeli 
had the potential to enhance the party’s position and role in the political arena of the country. 
For interviewee no. 14, the centre-right direction that the party leader followed was important 
in obtaining its past electoral support while playing a significant role as opposition in the 
parliament.  
 
Pride and Admiration 
Several interviewees reported feelings of pride and admiration when they saw the national 
flag and/or the picture of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. An interesting pattern is revealed here. 
Participants that came from a variety of ideological spaces such as voters of the MHP, voters 
of the AKP, as well as CHP supporters, expressed pride when they looked at the Turkish flag. 
The emotion justification among these interviewees varies on the basis of their value 
orientations, their views towards nationalism, on the role they assign to religion as well as 
their attachment to Kemalism. Feelings of pride and admiration towards the founder of the 
Republic, are reported by those interviewees, who are supporters of CHP and Kemalism.  
 Focusing on the emotions stimulated when looking at the Turkish flag, eleven 
participants (of the 25) reported feelings of pride. More precisely, these participants noted 
that the country’s flag held a great significance as a symbol in their life and in the society in 
general. The ideological orientation of those who demonstrate feelings of pride towards the 
national flag varies. In particular, there were four AKP supporters who noted that they felt 
great pride when they looked at the Turkish flag. The same was the case for the two 
nationalist MH Party voters. Similarly, six CHP supporters reported pride when looking at 
the flag. Interestingly, the justification behind the feeling of pride among them depended on 
the nature and level of their ideological attachment and value preferences. In particular, the 
three AKP supporters who reported pride were low sophisticates and viewed the flag as a 
symbol of unity (combined with religion) among the Turkish nation. The one sophisticated 
AKP supporter simply mentioned that the flag is a respected national symbol, which 
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generated pride. In a similar fashion, the two nationalist MHP supporters focused 
predominantly on the flag as a great symbol of the country and the nation advocating the 
significance that it carries for the Turkish citizens and national unity. For those who were in 
support of the Kemalist CHP, the flag was seen as a source of pride and admiration mainly 
for the secularist ideas it holds. In this case, participants pointed to the contribution of 
Ataturk as the father of the Turks who created the Republican State under the Turkish flag 
and modernised the country against its Ottoman past. 
 Feelings of pride and admiration towards Ataturk were also reported by nine 
interviewees.
124
 These interviewees who are Kemalists reported great admiration and pride 
towards the founder of the Republic (4 out of 25) irrespective of their level of sophistication. 
Same is the case for those who are in support of the socio-democratic tendency of CHP. They 
too viewed Ataturk as a great historical figure, acknowledged as the ‘father of all Turks’ 
(which is the meaning of ‘Ataturk’ that was inserted in front of his name Mustafa Kemal) 
who modernised the country under the key principle of secularism. Although they 
acknowledged a number of negatives in the implementation of Kemalism, they still pointed to 
the importance of this figure. 
 It is necessary to note here, that feelings of pride and admiration were not unanimous 
or expressed in the same way among interviewees. For instance, there were four participants 
(who noted that they did not feel anything when they look at the flag or at the picture of 
Ataturk. Among them, three justify this as a result of the excessive use of both as symbolic 
items that had recently become a trend in Turkey.
125
 Several participants (9 out of 25) also 
noted that although they felt proud for the Turkish flag and the picture of Ataturk the 
excessive use of both in public and private places created negative feelings. To use the words 
of interviewee no.5:  
‘Especially in the last years you can see the flag pretty much everywhere. Although I 
am proud to be Turk, seeing the flag in every place doesn’t make me feel comfortable. 
You know it resembles with very negative situations where the flag dominates all 
spheres of life’.  
                                                 
124
 Characteristically, as interviewee no. 16 noted: ‘Ataturk is very important. There is no way to thank him 
enough because he is the reason that we are living in a modern Turkey. I am proud that Ataturk was a Turk and 
for all he did for us and the nation.’  
125
 To use the words of interviewee no.8: ‘In the last years there is this trend to hang the flag pretty much 
everywhere to see it. But I don’t get this. There is no real purpose and it doesn’t serve anything to have the flag 
everywhere around us. After a point you just get used to seeing the flag and you don’t feel anything. Most 
people including myself I am so used of looking at the flag that most of the times I ignore it’. 
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Some interviewees also (4 out of 25) highlighted that although they felt indifferent when they 
was the flag or the picture of Ataturk within the country - due to its excessive use - emotions 
of pride come to the surface when they see the same items abroad. The excessive use of both 
symbols (i.e. the flag and the picture of Ataturk) for political purposes, which went against 
participants’ own system of beliefs created several negative valence emotions such as anger. 
These are addressed analytically in the following section on negative valence emotions. 
 Finishing here the discussion on pride and admiration, it is necessary to note that 
these feelings were only reported towards the flag and the picture of Ataturk and there were 
no other sources of positive emotions towards politics. 
 
9.2 Negative Valence Emotions 
In this section, I discuss the negative affective reactions that were expressed during the 
interviews. The negative valence emotions’ group contains expressions of anger, explicit and 
implicit fear, concern for the future and feelings of uncertainty and insecurity. It also includes 
disappointment, pessimism, hopelessness, distrust and unhappiness as well as disappointment 
for the social and political future and the individual life.  
 
Anger  
Anger, was expressed both explicitly and implicitly during the interviews by a large number 
of interviewees. The issues that generated anger were the discussion on dominant ideologies 
in the country, the representation of these ideologies by key political actors, certain policies, 
the issue of democratic principles and individual freedoms and rights as well as state-
generated oppression. Several participants when asked directly about what made them feel 
angry, in regards to politics, were ready to provide lengthy explanations followed by their 
detailed reasoning. Many also expressed anger implicitly, while addressing several items 
throughout the interviews. 
A number of interviewees expressed anger, when discussing about the dominant 
ideological orientations of the country and their key political advocators. In particular, the 
discussion on political Islam brought to the surface a significant amount of statements 
entailing anger against AKP and its attempts to promote the party as agent of conservative 
neoliberalism while violating individual rights and freedoms and promoting a more religious 
outlook for the society (17 out of 25). Anger against the AKP, was expressed in a 
straightforward fashion and with varying density among the majority of those participants 
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who were opponents of the party. Two participants openly pointed to the Islamist agenda of 
AKP, suggesting that the party aims to convert the Turkish state into a conservative Islamic 
state. A few interviewees also expressed anger against the AKP and its attempts to control 
every aspect of the public life such as the judiciary, the media and the armed forces (4 out of 
25). Participants that remained faithful to the Kemalist establishment and the principles of the 
founder of the Republic expressed anger against the domination of AKP and pointed to the 
party’s false promises about the development of democracy in Turkey but also to the 
limitation of personal freedoms and rights as well as the increasing role of religion. To use 
the words of interviewee no.23:  
 ‘I get really angry when I hear that AKP is a party promoting human rights and 
freedom. Come on. AKP is a party that has taken a series of measures that go against 
public rights and freedoms in the name of its religious conservative agenda. It is 
governing the country by oppressing individuals, reducing our freedoms and 
generating a widespread feeling of fear’.  
This statement came from a sophisticated opponent of AKP who has been voting in support 
of the Kemalist CHP, summarized powerfully the view of several participants that were 
against the governing AKP. Interestingly, what conditioned such expressions of anger against 
the AKP were their opposition to the party and its relation to political Islam. Sophistication 
played a role only when it came to the justification of the expressions of anger. Those with 
high sophistication were able to rely upon their past knowledge of events and the ideological 
principles that AKP holds whereas low sophisticates relied predominantly on every day 
practices, and values on the role of religion, individual rights and freedoms. Both high and 
low sophisticated opponents of the AKP remained consistent with their ideological leanings, 
party identification and value preferences in expressing ideas that were in line with their 
system of beliefs.  
Another source of anger, but also deep sadness and disappointment, was the 
oppression exercised by the governing AK Party. With meaningful examples of prosecutions 
and other violations of individual rights four participants made it clear that they were very 
angry and sad living under the current oppressive conditions in Turkey. Three young 
interviewees also, stated clearly, that once they get a chance they would do their best to go 
away from Turkey, to move abroad and live freely without any oppression. The way of life 
was at the heart of feelings of anger and sadness for many interviewees. According to many 
participants, lifestyle choices seem to be difficult to make when one is thinking about their 
own self, disregarding elements such as religion and conservative tendencies in the society 
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(13 out of 25). Again, five interviewees referred to behaviours that were not considered 
acceptable and that generated aggressive reactions. A few examples that are illustrative of 
aggressive behaviours coming from conservative individuals were drinking in the street, 
being a woman smoking in public, or being a young couple walking around Istanbul kissing 
in public. These, were seen as posing heavy pressure and resulted in a strong sense of anger 
expressed by a number of interviewees that advocated individual rights and freedom in 
selecting their own lifestyle without being willing to undermine anyone else’s values and 
view of life.  
A number of participants also expressed anger when they addressed restrictions of 
individual rights and freedoms (3 out of 25). They referred to their friends or family members 
being under investigation or even prosecuted, due to acts against the governing party (either 
online or in their workplace). In total, six interviewees pointed to their anger against the 
governing party and its practices in ensuring its power by silencing oppositional voices. 
Political sophistication here played an interesting role. For low sophisticates, their anger 
against the governing party is justified by restrictions on freedoms, whereas high 
sophisticates - having shaped a coherent and consistent position against AKP - relied on 
restrictions of freedom and individual rights as an example of the party’s practices and the 
aims of its political agenda. However, these feelings were shared among opponents of the 
AKP. What drove the expressions of anger against the governing party, was the individual 
ideological placement, party identification along with the personal and political values a 
person holds along with their personal experiences.  
Anger, was also expressed, when participants addressed the issue of polarization of 
society as a result of the conflict between Islamism and Kemalism. Five participants provided 
statements of anger, because of the never-ending conflict between the political actors that 
represent political Islam and Kemalism. Yet, the ideological and political profile of those 
participants was not uniform which also means they provided different reasons for their 
anger. Three extreme-left participants preferred to not place themselves on either side of the 
political Islam-Kemalist pole and sustained a rather aggressive attitude against the role the 
two sides have been playing in society, creating clear-cut boundaries that divide the Turkish 
population. According to them, this polarization has generated a wide range of attitudes such 
as intolerance, fanatic behaviours as well as deep disappointment and distrust towards the 
future of the society. Their expression of anger, was accompanied by a general distrust 
against the future of democracy for the country with participants reporting the absence of 
hope ‘while people remain bound to the two ideologies without looking at the real extent of 
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the damage this has brought in our lives’ as interviewee no. 17 notes. In addition, the socio-
political environment of Turkey, in combination with the pressure that comes from the two 
dominant ideologies and political actors of political Islam and Kemalism, was said to be the 
source of anger, deep disappointment and sadness for several participants who said that this 
conflictual situation does not offer the space for the expression of new voices and the creation 
of new political agents. This, eventually created, a deep sense of pessimism about the future 
of Turkey.
126
 Two participants also mentioned their anger against the fanatic supporters of 
both sides, seen as posing great danger to the future of the country, deepening this 
polarization and strengthening the two ends of political Islam and Kemalism. In a rather 
indicative statement, interviewee no.1 used these words:  
‘Kemalists that shout at women with headscarves’, ‘making tattoos with Ataturk’s 
signatures’; ‘the police [following the government’s orders] targets people that drink 
beer on the streets.’  
He noted that these were not acceptable according to the Islamic standards of life.
127
 
At the same time, some participants brought up the conflict of interests between the 
political elites that in the past dominated the country under Kemalism and today’s political 
Islam which under AKP ‘races for the complete subordination of the society to its rule’ 
(interviewee no. 17). These opinions came from both the socio-democratic CHP camp (2 out 
of 25) as well as the extreme-left (3 out of 25). These participants, stood against the Kemalist 
nationalism and its conservative past, and expressed anger and dissent against the Kemalist 
repression that acted as a domino for the current domination of Islamism through AKP. In 
fact, this was viewed as the reason for the country’s polarization and conflictual social 
environment. Analytically, two high sophisticates -who held a critical stance towards the 
current CHP- referred to a race between political elites, and the changes the Kemalist rule 
brought to the society by oppressing the religious segments both by the rule of law (and the 
consequent placement of religion into the private sphere) and by controlling certain state 
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 Characteristically interviewee no.1 stated: ‘I do not support either sides. The pressure that comes out from 
their conflict makes me really angry, very unhappy and truly sad. I don’t want to have to choose between two 
things that do not advocate me and certainly I do not want to choose an ideology that will take back freedom 
from somebody else. A third pole needs to be created and offer an alternative solution away from the two sides.’ 
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 ‘Fanatic supporters of both sides clash in the everyday life. And this clash is a clash that takes place at all 
levels. For example let me say that. There are people that tattoo on their hands the signature of Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk, others swear and shout at women that wear headscarves while at the same time someone becomes a 
target by being a supporter of Kemal. There is a very deep conflict in the country that has started becoming 
more and more obvious. Or another example: people in Turkey like to sit on the streets and drink beer and 
discuss, you know have fun. What has changed now, is that the police harass those people for drinking in a 
public space because it goes against the new principles of the state. The police is clearly supporting the new 
ideology and the new way of life promoted by the government’ [Interviewee no.1].  
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institutions such as the judiciary and the military. Participants no. 12, suggested that, the 
current AKP political elites after having stabilised their political rule have moved on to take 
back what the past political elites took in their hands following a different political and 
ideological perspective (religious conservatism or political Islam). Yet, this commonality 
between the two ideological sides as expressed by the political elites lies at the source of 
anger for certain participants.
128
 Another interesting statement, was provided by interviewee 
no.13 (low sophisticate CHP supporter) who noted that in the past citizens were used to live 
all together and coexist regardless of their individual characteristics and political tendencies 
(i.e. party, ethnic etc.), however during the last years and especially since 2005 the level of 
tolerance has decreased significantly, while the levels of polarization have drastically 
increased. As he noted, people react in an aggressive fashion even within the same family 
when someone expresses an opposite idea from their own. What we see here is that the 
effects of political sophistication are diverse when it comes to anger against those who are 
seen responsible for the country’s polarization. High sophisticates and in particular, CHP 
voters, that sustain a critical stance towards the party and who are affiliated with the centre-
left wing of CHP, acknowledge the historical mistakes made by past political elites of CHP 
while discussing the domino effects brought about by the long standing conflict between the 
two ideologies. For those that belong to the extreme-left, sophistication did not matter since 
they expressed a uniform opinion acknowledging both Kemalist and political Islam elites 
responsible for the current state of polarization and fragmentation of the country. An 
interesting finding emerges when we look at novices. They draw upon simpler considerations 
that are related to their everyday life or close social circle as well as their values and easier-
to-grasp explanations, and they arrived at the same conclusion as political sophisticates. Both 
sides identified the political elites advocating the ideological sides of political Islam and 
Kemalism, as responsible for the deep fragmentation and polarization seen in Turkey.  
 Another source of anger, which came from AKP supporters, focused on the CHP 
party and Kemalist forces that historically have oppressed significantly the Turkish society 
with the imposed rules of life (3 out of 25). These participants expressed direct anger against 
Kemalism and its advocators, viewing them as the most conservative group in Turkey. They 
also provided several accusations against Kemalists and Ataturk. His system was compared 
to a dictatorship that took away individual freedoms in order to impose a new top-down 
                                                 
128
 In a meaningful extract interviewee no. 4 noted: ‘whoever is not a supporter of AKP is angry, but those in 
support of AKP and especially those from the lower classes believe that they finally got a government that 
finally represents them. To make you a simplistic example, AKP is now saying ‘its’ our turn, now we will do the 
things they were [Kemalists under CHP rule] before us.’ 
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system to the people. Interestingly, the participants who expressed this view were low 
sophisticates and managed to retain their consistency between their ideological inclinations, 
party and value preferences by going against the past Kemalist status quo.  
 Religion and its role in society, along with religious freedoms, are also issues that 
generated a wide range of expressions of anger among a large number of interviewees (17 out 
of 25). This discussion, points to the debate on religion between political Islam and 
Kemalism. Although several participants appreciated that religion plays a significant cultural 
role in Turkey, many are those who clearly expressed anger towards high levels of religiosity 
and the lifestyle choices individuals should make in order to abide to the current socio-
political environment under the AKP rule (16 out of 25). These ideas were mainly expressed 
by CHP supporters - regardless of their levels of sophistication- as well as supporters of the 
extreme-left. Anger, was also expressed by supporters of the nationalist MHP who held more 
relaxed beliefs about this issue (2 out of 25). For them, although religion should not play a 
role in politics, it should hold a predominant role in the society, leaving the space for Islamic 
culture and tradition to go in hand with modern values. To use the words of interviewee no. 
18:  
 ‘I get mad when I hear that Turkey is a deeply religious state. In fact we are not. The 
majority of the population is Muslim, Turkey is a Muslim country and everyone 
should respect that. I don’t say that religion should determine politics. But religious 
values have to go in hand with all other aspects of the social life. Religion is another 
way that keeps our nation together and we should not forget that’.  
There are also some AKP supporters that expressed anger against the past religious 
oppression that was generated by the Kemalist elites. They advocated freedom of religious 
expression and stood against any form of oppression towards individual choices. In other 
words, they supported the freedom of expression of religion as promoted by AKP and stood 
against the religious oppression as it was imposed by the past Kemalist elites.  
 Another source of anger came from discussing the role of religion, its involvement in 
the socio-political arena as well as individual freedoms. Affective reactions of anger on this 
issue were mainly expressed by socio-democrats CHP voters who did not see the Islamic 
culture and traditions as posing a danger to the country and its democracy although they 
acknowledged that religion should remain a private matter while society should be open for 
the individual expression of religious beliefs (4 out of 25). In addition, two sophisticates AKP 
supporters acknowledged the importance of religion in Turkey; yet, they said that religion 
should remain in the private sphere but religious freedoms of expression should be granted to 
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all citizens. The difference between these two positions relies, on the opposition to AKP that 
CHP supporters expressed. They evaluated negatively the party’s Islamic agenda but viewed 
positively the steps taken in regards to the freedom of religion. What connects the two 
positions, is their support of religious freedoms as well as the placement of religion in the 
private sphere. 
 Anger, was also expressed, when participants discussed their feelings towards 
symbols like the Turkish flag and the pictures of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Six interviewees, 
noted the extensive use of both symbols in public spaces but also in private spaces such as 
banks, shops, restaurants, schools and the like. They suggested that their excessive use in 
every place of the country makes them feel that these are ‘holy untouchable symbols’ 
(interviewee no.1).
129
 It is interesting to note that anger against the extensive use of the 
Turkish flag, comes from those who are openly in support for democratic ideals and suggest 
that having the flag ‘in every corner makes you feel that someone is trying to impose you a 
sense of national identification’ to use the words of interviewee no. 17. This view, comes 
from those who belong to either the centre-left Kemalist camp or the supporters of the 
extreme-left, regardless of their level of sophistication. The picture of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
generated anger among those who supported the socio-democratic tendency of CHP as well 
as those that identified with the extreme-left. For two participants (one high sophisticated and 
supporter of AKP and a participant who self-identified as anarcho-communist) having the 
picture of Ataturk was undemocratic and closer to dictatorial systems. Anger about the 
pictures of Ataturk, was also expressed by a couple of participants who were AKP voters. For 
them, Ataturk represents an ideology. Although they were respectful of those who admire 
him, they expressed anger when his pictures appear anywhere.
130
 
 Anger, was also expressed by a nationalist participant when addressing the Kurdish 
BDP party. Participant no. 14, in line with his ideological orientation and party preference in 
favour of the MHP, noted: 
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 Also, interviewee no. 16 said: ‘When I see the national flag everywhere around me I get a bit angry, 
although I love our flag. I do not think it is a holy object. Yet when I see a Turkish flag if I am abroad I feel like 
I see an acquaintance of mine.’ 
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 Interviewee no. 2 noted: ‘I get angry when I see the picture of Ataturk everywhere. Because this picture does 
not represent a person, but it is a symbol, a worldview, a political ideology For instance his picture is also 
everywhere just like the flag, in schools, public offices, literally everywhere. I cannot understand why his picture 
is everywhere. That is very dictatorship-like. When I see his picture, I get mad really; I don’t feel anything 
positive in this. However if I see it abroad I will most probably want to know who put it there. Also, if I see a 
person who hangs his picture just because he loves and admires Kemal, then I have nothing to say to that 
person, I respect him. But, when his picture is used or equalized with the flag, then I don’t feel nice’. 
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‘BDP is under the control of PKK. It makes me very angry to know that a party is 
allowed to propagate in support of a terrorist organisation and play a legitimate role 
in politics’.  
Another source of anger was the result of the opposition towards certain socio-political issues 
as well as social policies. It came from supporters of the CH Party as well as from supporters 
of the extreme left. It is important to note here, that certain value-laden issues such as 
attitudes towards individual freedoms and liberties, the role of women in society, as well as 
the issue of religiosity was the root of the anger of those participants, as it reinforced their 
ideological inclinations. Specifically, some issues that were mentioned by several participants 
as a source of their anger against the current situation in Turkey were: the mandatory military 
service, the violence and attacks against LGTB people, social policies towards women in 
general, the enforcement of power and open provocations against oppositional voices, the fact 
that there is no freedom for expressing dissent against people who hold power –either at the 
national level or local level, the increasing role of religion in society reaching the educational 
system with the increase in the number of Imam Hatip schools over secular education. Two 
interviewees coming from the extreme-left, noted their anger against the political life of the 
country due to the ‘the fact that there are no choices left for us anymore.’ (interviewee no.1) 
 
Fear  
Expressions of fear, were widespread and took the form of open expressions of worry, 
concern for the future and uncertainty, as well as feelings of insecurity. Fear was expressed 
by a large number of interviewees and about a variety of issues such as the political Islam-
Kemalist conflict and the AKP domination followed by restrictions of freedom and individual 
rights. Fear, was also expressed for the increasing influence of AKP on the police and in 
general on security forces of the country, but also for the Kurdish issue and national unity as 
well as the future of democracy in Turkey. Participants made direct references to their fear as 
well as feelings of uncertainty and anxiety, especially when they addressed issues such as the 
future of democracy and individual rights and freedoms.  
 Those who belong to the extreme-left, express an open fear towards the fanatic 
support that comes from both sides of Kemalists and political Islamists voting for CHP and 
AKP respectively (3 out of 25). They viewed the fanatic attitudes that resulted from the 
support of both sides as dangerous for the society, acting as a source of legitimisation of the 
social polarization while also undermining the country’s democratic establishment. They 
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considered both political camps as being the main conservative agents whose social-based 
conflict pose significant threats to the future of the country. Specifically, they substantiated 
this view by referring to the current polarization of the country originating in the power 
interchange between the two competitive sides. 
Another interesting aspect brought up, was the issue of social and political stability. 
Certain social groups were seen as posing a great threat, to the political and social stability of 
the country. Depending on interviewees’ ideological and political orientation, the groups they 
mentioned were: Kemalists, hard-line Islamists, Kurds and other terrorist groups. Interviewee 
no.2 summarized this in the following sentence:  
 ‘Whoever wants to change the current situation and impose their own reality can 
play a significant destabilising role for Turkey. And these groups are many and too 
dangerous.’  
Similarly, a high sense of fear was present among novices, opponents of AKP, who pointed 
to the heightened levels of polarization in society. They noted that the social conflict between 
supporters of AKP and its’ opponents -namely the CHP and other left and extreme-left 
supporters- was more evident than ever. This, generated uncertainty about the way this social 
conflict will unfold, both at the social and at the political level. In particular, two CHP 
supporters mentioned the increasing role that ideological dichotomies play in the society with 
tensions being evident among friends, colleagues and also family members.
131
 Referring to 
the economic growth of Turkey (that in 2012 was evident in all aspects of life), two 
sophisticated AKP supporters said that the country’s better economic performance had 
corresponded with an improved social stability. In explaining this, they noted that because of 
the economic stability people have started becoming more tolerant towards the other. Yet, 
interviewee no. 19 feared that once the economic state of Turkey starts the 
‘[…] downward slide then this tolerance will definitely collapse and underlying 
problems that are currently hidden will come to the surface’.  
Fear, was also expressed by some AKP opponents about the increasing role of religion and its 
impact on society. Namely, several participants noted that the increasing role of Islam in 
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 In an illustrative statement interviewee no.5 highlighted that ‘the conflict between the government and its 
opposition [referring to the political Islam and Kemalism component of AKP and CHP respectively] has gone to 
the streets now. I do not know how this will unfold. But it worries me a lot about the future.’ Similarly, 
interviewee no. 20 notes: ‘For the people, this conflict is being more evident. There is a very high polarization. 
For instance, there is a deep conflict between those who vote for AKP and those who are against it. There was 
not something like that before. I don’t think something similar happened in the previous elections prior to 2010 
but in the last elections this polarization is very evident. And this worries me. I discuss about politics with my 
friends and there is a high tension. Politics never had such importance and never acquired such a central level 
of attention like it has now’.  
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society posed a high level of danger against the secular ideals of the Republic but also against 
the individual freedoms as they relate to religious expression. They noted that they were 
scared to live freely and follow lifestyle decisions that were not based on the rules of Islam 
but on more modern European-like standards. Interestingly, here, sophistication did not seem 
to play an important role. What seems to drive the expression of fear against the dominant 
role of Islam in the current Turkey, was the ideological inclinations these supporters held. 
Specifically, they were either CHP supporters or identified with the extreme-left. 
Feelings of fear, anxiety, insecurity and uncertainty were both explicitly and 
implicitly expressed by those who were openly critical towards the AKP government. The 
key issue that creates these emotions involves individual freedoms and liberties, which 
eventually points to the level of democracy in the country. High levels of fear were also 
expressed by a large number of participants for violations of individual rights and freedoms 
and state control over citizens. They mentioned their growing fears of the AKP’s oppression 
and the consequences for the open expression of any view, belief or idea that goes against the 
government and its status quo. Interestingly, this sense of fear for most participants was 
combined with the uncertainty about the future of the democracy in the country. To give an 
example, four interviewees openly acknowledged that the AKP has instilled certain fears to 
all citizens who are against its policies and social practices, citizens were worried for their 
personal security and freedom when criticizing negatively the government and certain 
politicians in public such as their workspace or on the internet, but also in their private life 
over the phone. Along these lines, two participants expressed fear towards the increasing 
influence of the AKP government on security forces and specifically the police. In particular, 
two interviewees who experienced prosecution directly (themselves) or indirectly (their 
friends) were worried about the role of the police towards those that express dissent against 
the government or the Prime Minister. At the same time, another supporter justified this fear 
of the police as a result of the domination of AKP and the party’s willingness to use the 
security forces in order to silence all opposing voices. Levels of sophistication do not play a 
role in generating this fear. Their justification depended on their level of sophistication; for 
novices, there were personal experiences that justified this feeling as well as their opposition 
to the party and made references to their values such as democracy and individual freedoms 
and rights. High sophisticates justified their fear, on their knowledge and understanding of 
the potential danger the AKP’s control and domination hold for the expression of dissent and 
opposition but also for the country’s democracy. 
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In addition, several participants openly pointed to the restriction of freedoms and 
individual rights that brought high levels of uncertainty and insecurity for individual life but 
also for the country’s future. For instance, two supporters of the AKP expressed their worries 
in regards to the future of the party’s administration. In particular, holding the hope that AKP 
will continue following the same liberal conservative line as it advocates, they both expressed 
a sense of uncertainty for the future. They both noted that there is uncertainty in terms of how 
the situation will unfold for the democratic stability of the country by referring to the party’s 
electoral stronghold and its increasing powers and authority. They suggested that the only 
source of security for them but also for the country in general was the economy. Because they 
valued highly materialistic considerations and were sophisticates, they viewed the economy 
as a stabilising domestic factor. They suggested that by securing a healthy economy, the 
social life would consequentially improve, because of higher levels of tolerance and the 
advances on the life standards. 
At the same time, there was a clear expression of uncertainty by opponents of the 
AKP party who voted for the CHP or identified with the extreme-left. For them, the 
uncertainty that comes from the domination of AKP and the inability of other political agents 
to play a decisive role against the AKP was particularly worrying. They also expressed a 
feeling of uncertainty in regards to the future of democracy in Turkey with AKP becoming 
increasingly authoritarian. As interviewee no. 23 noted:  
 ‘I’m very worried about the future of democracy in Turkey. AKP has a very strong 
support and it seems that the more power they get the more invasive there are in the 
society with their practices’.  
This feeling of uncertainty in some cases took extremes forms. Three interviewees expressed 
open worries about their own freedom. For instance, interviewee no.1 noted: ‘Today I may 
write something online, tomorrow they arrest me and they prosecute me, they put me in 
prison for years.’ This heightened level of uncertainty that relates to individual freedom in 
the literal form, is indicative of the existing fear and insecurity in regards to the future of 
AKP’s administration.  
The future of the democracy in the country is another issue that created a sense of 
uncertainty, insecurity, concern and great worry. Eight participants openly acknowledged 
their fear towards the future of the country. This expression of fear came from opponents of 
the AKP regardless of their level of sophistication but interestingly also from some critical 
supporters of the party who belong to its liberal segment being faithful to its official liberal 
conservative stance. Yet, the increasing levels of authoritarianism and the party’s control over 
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oppositional forces worried its own supporters that hold materialistic considerations (i.e. 
focus on the economic development of the country and the levels of individual freedom). 
Fear and great concern for the country’s future was also expressed as a result of the 
increasing power that Erdoğan has acquired over the years. This, in combination with the fear 
of Turkey turning into a dictatorship as a result of the AKP’s governance under the rule of 
Erdoğan, was expressed by opponents of the AKP (both supporters of CHP and extreme left) 
regardless of their level of political sophistication.
132
 Yet, a similar fear was also expressed 
from two sophisticated supporters of the party with liberal inclinations, who identified with 
the liberal segment of AKP. 
  Six female opponents of the AKP party also pointed to a fear generated by the growth 
of the Islamic tendency in the country and the impact this will have on women. Four male 
extreme-left supporters, and CHP voters, also pointed to women’s right to abortion and the 
oppression by AKP in implementing the Islamic rule that goes against abortion. Again here, 
political sophistication did not play a role, but it was the ideological inclinations and the 
values of freedom and religiosity as well as gender equality that mattered in their 
considerations.  
 Another source of heightened fear was for some others the Kurdish issue. Ideological 
orientations were important for the justification of their affective state. For instance, two of 
the nationalist MHP voters noted that Kurdish demands for autonomy were worrying 
bringing to the discussion the possibility of a civil war.
133
 One sophisticated AKP supporter 
mentioned his fear towards the Kurdish issue. As interview no. 2 noted:  
 ‘One of the biggest problems of the country is the Kurdish issue that has the 
possibility to disintegrate the country and create a civil war. I am scared of thinking 
of this. We should not end up like Egypt. It is very difficult, we are a very rational and 
with composure nation. I cannot go now and kill a mother or a child. But I will kill if 
anyone comes to kill my wife or my child… If a civil war happens things will be very 
bad and no one wants that. I just hope AKP will be able to provide a viable solution’.  
A similar fear, but with a different understanding of the situation, was expressed by four 
identifiers of the centre-left CHP and the extreme-left. For these participants, it was the 
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 Interviewee no. 2 noted: ‘Another thing that makes me feel fear and real concern from today’s political 
situation is the possibility to turn our political system into a dictatorship. It scares me a lot that Erdoğan has so 
much power.’ 
133
 Interview no.14 characteristically stated: ‘I am very worried and concerned for the future of Turkey. The 
most important issue we have to face is national unity. In the past Kurds were not talking openly for national 
autonomy. […] I am very worried for one single reason. If the Kurds request their autonomy and establish their 
own independent state no one in this country will let them. In that case a civil war will definitely come out.’ 
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AKP’s handling of the Kurdish issue that created fear for the future and resolution of the 
Kurdish issue.  
Fear and concern towards political issues, was also expressed by some opponents of 
AKP who were high and low sophisticates. A few pointed to the concern over external threats 
to the country. For instance, interviewee no.3 expressed worry due to the Syrian crisis and the 
impact this will have on Turkey but also the possibility of terror attacks this might create, 
highlighting that AKP is not a party that can play a helpful role vis-à-vis a peaceful 
resolution. Interviewee no.23, pointed to the source of terrorism while addressing the 
incapability of the AKP government to deal with this issue. Similarly, interviewee no.5 noted 
that the current government fails to take action in addressing important political problems 
such as terrorism.
134
 Other issues that generated great concern among interviewees, was the 
increase of Imam Hatip schools (interviewee no.5), the LGTB freedoms and rights 
(interviewee no.1), the issue of the headscarf and the impact of its ban for society (4 out of 25 
interviewees). 
 
Disappointment  
The expression of disappointment by many interviewees implies a range of affective 
reactions including pessimism, hopelessness, distrust and unhappiness. Most interviewees, 
when asked which actor or institution they trusted, reported high levels of distrust for politics 
in general without providing further justification (21 out of 25). For low sophisticates, 
politics and politicians in general represent their own interests and look at the general society 
rather than the life of the citizens. Interestingly, even for those low sophisticates with clear 
ideological inclinations their distrust towards politics was justified on the basis of the same 
arguments. Several low sophisticated, supporters of CHP, justified their general low levels of 
trust on their fear about expressing their opposition in general against the dominant AKP (6 
out of 25). Three sophisticated CHP voters had very low levels of trust pointing to the 
incapability of the party to play an active role in society against the AKP, to provide viable 
alternative suggestions and solutions to the public in order to gain back its past electoral 
support. For them, the actual party presence and the way its key political actors promote its 
principles were not sufficient and they do not address the needs of society. However, they do 
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 This participant noted: ‘Take terrorism for instance. The only thing that the government is doing, is 
criticizing it. Nothing else. But this does not solve the problem of terrorism. The problem remains. The same 
goes for many other things’. 
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hold some hope about the party’s new leader and the role he can play in shaping the party as 
a political agent that can stand decisively against AKP. 
In most cases, distrust of politics, is accompanied by a sense of deep pessimism, 
hopelessness, fear and uncertainty for the country’s future.135 Especially for opponents of 
AKP and its governance, this was translated into fear about the state of individual rights and 
freedoms but also in some cases in respect to the augmented role played by religion in the 
society. For instance, there were several participants that expressed a deep disappointment 
and pessimism about the increasing role of Islam in society as well as its involvement in the 
political life (13 out of 25).
136
 There are also some sophisticated supporters of the traditional 
Kemalist view of the CHP that showed distrust towards the role that the current party 
administration, under Kılıçdaroğlu, will play for the future of the country.137 
Next, I examined the levels of trust towards individual life and personal future. Here 
the majority of participants reported heightened levels of distrust, but also hopelessness, 
pessimism and unhappiness. Specifically, the majority noted that they do not have any trust 
concerning what the future will bring, which also denotes uncertainty for society and their 
individual life. Interestingly, political sophistication did not play a significant role insofar the 
majority of participants responded in line with their ideological leanings, their party 
preference and value orientations. Analytically, AKP opponents were deeply disappointed by 
the country’s change and the increase in power of the pro-Islamist AKP with all the relative 
implications this had to the country’s principles as well as for the state of individual 
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 Characteristically, to use the words of interviewee no. 4: ‘I do not trust anyone in politics. I do support 
certain politicians and I vote for CHP yet all my hopes are gone. I am not sure many things will change in 
Turkey. Look how AKP has dominated politics. There is no space for us that we are against it [the AKP]. I am 
very pessimistic and negative as to what the future will bring and I am very worried that Turkey will change 
dramatically in the future. It will become less democratic and more conservative’. Along the same lines 
interviewee no. 17 who is a supporter of the Communist TKP highlights: ‘My only hope lies to the people. One 
day, they might realize that all AKP promises are fake and that CHP is as conservative as AKP. People should 
take the situation in their hands. But it’s not easy. People are even scared to go out and speak in public against 
Erdoğan; I am not sure how things can become even a bit better. I feel deeply disappointed and also hurt when I 
think about Turkish politics. It’s becoming harder and harder to live under these conditions and be worried 
about what will happen if you go out and criticize AKP or if you go out and protest.’ 
136
 Interviewee no. 11 noted: ‘The more AKP stabilizes its power, the society will become more religious and 
more conservative. I don’t have any hope about the country’s future. I am pessimistic and afraid about how this 
country will be. There are already big changes taking place. You see more and more religious people in the 
street, more young girls wearing headscarf, more public servants wearing headscarf. You can see religious 
people complaining about people who drink or smoke in the streets. And then the rest of us cannot speak out 
since AKP is in power. I don’t know how a real change can happen’. 
137
 Interviewee no. 3 suggested: ‘I am a strong supporter of the Kemalist principles […]. I am not sure this 
recent change in the direction of the party towards socio-democracy under Kılıçdaroğlu can help much. Those 
who support him in the party, say that this is what we need in these times with AKP’s religious conservatism. 
They suggest that this is the only way to increase the party’s electoral performance. I am not sure this is the 
case. I believe that remaining faithful to Kemalism principles, is the only thing that can help in the current 
political environment. See, AKP is against all Kemalist principles. Although he tries to follow the Constitution 
because he has to, what he does and the principles he advocates are against Kemalism’. 
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freedoms. In this case, participants drew upon their values and ideological inclinations to 
substantiate their opinions. Those in support of the CHP referred to the role of religion, 
individual freedoms and rights as well as the country’s level of democracy, which was 
viewed as declining dramatically. The extreme-left supporters condemned the conservative 
basis of Turkish politics that has been dominating the social life throughout time, posing 
great obstacles for the country’s democratisation. They also referred to the current role of 
religion in the society as promoted by AKP as well as the state of basic freedoms and human 
rights that have been significantly undermined by the AKP governance.  
Many also expressed distrust and hopelessness for their individual future. Some 
justified this by making reference to their feelings of insecurity and fear due to restrictions of 
individual rights and freedoms promoted by the governing party. Others considered moving 
to another country abroad as a result of the political life in Turkey. Characteristically, 
interviewee no.1 noted:  
 ‘I don’t feel trust towards my future. […] Today I may write something online, 
tomorrow they arrest me and they prosecute me, they put me in prison for years. 
That’s it.’ 
A politically sophisticated participant said:  
‘I don’t have trust for my future. Not anymore. I am even thinking of moving abroad, 
maybe to Germany where I already have some family members. I am worried about 
how things will unfold and what worries me the most is that no one feels free anymore 
to express opposition or an alternative position. If there was a healthy dialogue 
among political actors that would be one thing, but when you lose that, then you lose 
your hope.’  
Responses of AKP supporters varied. For instance, two noted that they felt more comfortable 
to express their religious views yet they were afraid how the social conflict will unfold. From 
this, we see that expressions of negative feelings depended highly on the ideological 
orientations, value preferences and party orientations. A significant determinant and division 
line here appears to be individual agreement or opposition levels to the AKP governance and 
its principles and practices.  
 
9.3. Concluding Remarks 
Studying the role of affect in the formation of political judgements in the case of Turkey 
provides some interesting insights. One of the most important finding is that the expression of 
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negative valence emotions outnumbers the manifestation of positive valence emotions among 
all citizens. Specifically, the expression of fear, anxiety, uncertainty, disappointment and 
distrust is frequent among most, whereas enthusiasm, hope and confidence towards political 
institutions are significantly less frequent and less intense.  
 In addition, participants regardless of their levels of sophistication demonstrated 
positive valence emotions in support of their ideological inclinations and value preferences 
and negative valence emotions in respect to issues that were against their values and 
ideological orientations. However, the levels of sophistication shaped an interesting dynamic 
in regards to the role of emotions at the individual level. For high sophisticates, emotions 
were an integral part of their belief system, in line with their ideological inclinations and 
preferences. Sophisticates - having an internally consistent and broad structure of political 
beliefs - referred to their emotions effortlessly in the sense that they did not require much to 
substantiate their feelings. This is because their ideological orientations and values were 
aligned with their affective evaluations and expressions. On the contrary, affect for low 
sophisticates operated differently. Because low sophisticates tend to rely on simpler 
considerations to formulate their judgements, their previously stored affective expressions 
played a predominant role in discussing political matters and affairs. This also explained the 
fact that the majority of low sophisticated interviewees referred to their emotions while 
discussing their ideological and value preferences. For these novices emotions operated as 
powerful heuristics that allowed them to draw from stored affective shortcuts as well as their 
value orientations towards politics in order to substantiate their political choices.  
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Since the early days of this research project, Turkey has gone through a series of events that 
have left a significant mark in the social and political arena of the country. These events have 
been the result of actions taken by both external and internal actors and the accompanying 
responses of the current government in order to ensure and protect the country’s social and 
political stability. Specifically, a number of attacks orchestrated by terrorist groups, as well as 
the latest coup d’état, have left a significant mark on the public sphere. In response to these 
events, the country has been under an extended state of emergency since the aftermath of the 
July 2016 failed coup, which has also influenced significantly the public domain undermining 
the - already constrained - democratic ideals that were in place. Apart from the expected 
effects of extra-cautionary measures taken by the state and its administration to protect the 
country and its citizens, a massive government crackdown targeting all oppositional voices 
unfolded. This, resulted in the arrest of thousands of civil servants coming from the armed 
forces, as well as teachers, academics, health workers and media representatives over alleged 
links with the Gülen movement (FETÖ) that was accused of being the key orchestrator of the 
coup attempt. In addition, since the coup, a very large number of non-governmental 
organisations working on human rights and individual freedoms were banned and closed 
down over suspicions of their links with the Gülen movement or with the PKK, which are 
viewed by the governing AKP as terrorist organisations. At the same time, a number of 
political figures were imprisoned with allegations of being members of terrorist organisations 
(such is the case for the arrested members of the pro-Kurdish HD Party). The latest case is the 
conviction of a CHP MP with the accusation of leaking state secrets to the media. The most 
recent arrests, in July 2017, targeted personnel from the Amnesty International organisation -
including the organisation’s head in Turkey -on the basis of alleged connections with the 
Gülen movement. Amidst this turbulent environment, the country’s media outlets have also 
been met with similar suspicion concerning the ideas they promote. This resulted in the 
closure of a number of newspapers and TV stations, whose control, was consequently passed 
to the government.  
 In this context, the AKP is the most powerful political actor in the country gathering 
the majority of the public support. The referendum of 16 April 2016 was the latest test the 
party went through. Its outcome brought the constitutional change from a parliamentary to a 
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presidential system, where all executive powers will be concentrated in the hands of the 
country’s President from 2019 onwards. Although the social and political arenas have been 
significantly affected as a consequence of the recent events in Turkey, the status quo and the 
dominant political actors that hold power have not been undermined or questioned. Despite 
the fact that the characteristics of the AKP’s governance have changed throughout time, its 
political dominance remains electorally undeniable with a stable electoral support since 2002.  
It is meaningful to note the change in the country’s mode of governance throughout 
these years. Focusing on the AKP’s approach, even though at the beginning evaluations were 
positive in respect to its guarantees for the country’s democratisation and Europeanization, a 
rising scepticism has mounted since 2009. During its first years of governance, Turkey has 
been characterized as being under an ‘unconsolidated democratic transition’ (Kubicek, 2001; 
Tessler and Altinoğlu 2004). However, the evidence of authoritarian tendencies marked by 
the AKP’s conservative, Islam-driven practices have initiated a process that shows evidence 
of the country’s democratic backslide in the last years (Özbudun, 2014; Önis, 2015; Esen and 
Gumuscu, 2016; Karakatsanis, 2016). Recent studies label Turkey as a case of ‘electoral 
authoritarianism’ (Arbatli, 2014; Herzog, 2015) or ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Esen and 
Gumuscu, 2016). The above demonstrate the co-existence of two seemingly antithetical 
elements: authoritarianism expressed with significant restrictions in individual freedoms and 
liberties under the complete control of the governing party yet dependent on electoral 
procedures which offer the constitution-based universal right of voting to the public for the 
selection of the government. 
Throughout time, public opinion in Turkey has been consistently characterized by 
high levels of fragmentation and volatility (Ozbudun, 2013; Başlevent et al., 2004; 
Kalaycioğlu, 1997). However, the levels of volatility have significantly dropped since the 
AKP’s stabilisation in power. Yet, the polarization of society seems to be stronger than ever, 
reinforcing the existing clear-cut boundaries on the basis of those in support of the AKP’s 
line of governance and those against it.  
Extant research on the country’s public opinion has predominantly focused on the 
aggregate level of analysis looking in particular at the role of certain factors in shaping 
electoral choices. The studies that look at the individual-based underpinning of electoral 
behaviour are fewer, with most offering a descriptive account of the country’s public opinion 
without going into testing the applicability of existing theories and their explanatory power in 
the Turkish context. There are only a handful of studies that test theoretical models with 
empirical rigor in the Turkish case and which offer some important insights into the public 
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mind of Turkish citizens. Yet again, these are limited insofar their focus falls on the 
particularities of the Turkish case with very few exceptions. An important line of work, 
which examines how the public perceives and shapes its position in this political 
environment, offers insights into the fluidity of the previously considered ‘hard-line 
divisions’ of public opinion. For instance, several scholars have pointed to the creation of 
new social dynamics since 2009 and especially after 2013 that have relaxed the clear-cut 
boundaries of secularism-Islamism (Bayramoğlu, 2009; Turam, 2015; Damar, 2016). In 
addition, a few studies looked at the changes in the public sphere offering important insights 
into the way that the public and in particular activists shape their belonging and act under the 
conditions shaped by AKP (Bee, 2017; Bee and Kaya, 2017). These studies, point to certain 
trends that have been developed under the influence of the socio-political changes in Turkey, 
but do not examine the individual-based determinants, which shape these outcomes.  
Taking into account the shortcomings of both research streams, my study comes to 
bridge this gap by employing a political psychology framework that looks into the 
psychological underpinnings of political behaviour in Turkey. Looking in particular at the 
period between 2009 - when the authoritarian turn of AKP started unfolding - and 2012 - a 
year before the Gezi protests took place - my study, offers important insights into the way 
citizens internalize the socio-political arena of the country, process it and shape their political 
judgements. My study surveys the individual underlying mechanisms of political behaviour 
that take place within the context of the transformational modifications of the Turkish 
political arena and which drive the way that citizens understand, think, decide and feel about 
political affairs. Specifically, my study unpacks the individual-based cognitive, affective and 
motivational mechanisms that underlie the processes through which citizens engage with in 
order to either negotiate their political identities and belonging in the Turkish society. By 
focusing on the complex role that ideology, values, affect and sophistication play my work 
also provides a first analytical account of the instances where citizens overcome traditional 
boundaries coming together under common grievances and goals for the society or remain 
faithful to the existing boundaries enhancing the existing polarization of the country.  
Focusing on the role of political ideology, in line with Hypothesis 1, my findings 
suggest that the majority of citizens rely on ideology to formulate their political judgements. 
The two main ideological orientations of political Islam and Kemalism operate as powerful 
interpretative frameworks on the basis of which citizens formulate their positioning on the 
left-right and liberal-conservative spectrum as well as their value orientations and attitudinal 
responses towards politics. Specifically, my research highlights that the levels of polarization 
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among citizens are clear-cut with most evident the division between the advocators of pro-
Islamist attitudes (framed as political Islam by its opponents) and Kemalism. This is also 
summarized in the division between AK Party and its main opponents, namely the CH Party. 
The majority of citizens, regardless of their level of sophistication, are familiar with both 
ideological orientations, their respective political actors and their principles, and hold clear 
and identifiable positions towards them. Accordingly, an important finding is that ideological 
inclinations do not only play a role when it comes to individual placement on specific camps 
but instead they form the basis upon which citizens decide upon political affairs. This is in 
line with the evidence from political psychology studies that suggest that self-placement on 
ideology scales allows for predictions regarding specific policy preferences (Jacoby, 1991). It 
also corroborates findings by several studies that highlight the importance of political 
ideology in shaping political opinions and beliefs (Feldman, 2003, 2013; Jost et al., 2009; 
Lane, 1969). 
Another interesting finding is that certain citizens feel more comfortable explaining 
their positioning on the political Islam (or pro-Islamism)-Kemalism continuum rather than 
the left-right or liberalism-conservatism continuums. Yet, there are also other citizens that 
belong to the more moderate camps of both sides who seem to follow the ideological 
transformation of the CHP and AKP, referring to the socio-democratic or liberal conservative 
principles followed by each actor respectively. Contrary to extant studies that employ the 
Islamism-secularism or left-right continuums in the study of electoral behaviour, I argue that 
citizens’ understanding is not uniform and requires a more complex plan of investigation that 
takes into account the underlying factors that motivate citizens’ political behaviour 
(Çarkoğlu, 1998, 2004 and 2012; Esmer, 2002; Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2007; Başlevent et al., 
2004). As several scholars have suggested, self-positioning on the ends of the continuums 
point to a schematic categorisation of ideological inclinations and political preferences that 
are pre-identified on the principles that each ideological orientation holds (Feldman, 2003; 
Huber and Inglehart, 1995; Knutsen, 1998; Piurko et al., 2011). Applying this to the context 
of Turkey, my study suggests that the two main ideologies that dominate the socio-political 
arena are context-specific and refer to the division between Kemalism and political Islam as 
well as the changing faces of their respective political advocators CHP and AKP respectively. 
The two main ideologies that have been dominating the country along with their principles 
are rooted in the heart and minds of the Turkish citizens. However, their boundaries for 
certain individuals are relaxed, producing alternative models of individual belonging even 
among those who self-identify with each side of the political Islam-Kemalism spectrum.  
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My findings also confirm Hypothesis 2 that citizens’ ideological orientations are in 
line with their party preferences and issue-based positions. Strong supporters of political 
Islam and Kemalism, follow the ideological line promoted by the main party advocators 
(AKP and CHP respectively), whereas more moderate supporters of the two ideologies focus 
predominantly on their value orientations and their personal experiences to substantiate their 
ideological orientations. This point is important. In addition, citizens’ ideological engagement 
varies on the basis of their political sophistication levels, which is an added dimension that 
offers valuable insights into the role that ideology plays in the formation of citizens’ political 
judgments and their reasoning. 
 In line with my hypothesis on the interaction between ideological orientations and 
political sophistication (Hypothesis 8), my findings suggest that together they have a direct 
impact on the motivational element that characterizes individual ideological orientations. 
Ideological orientations for political sophisticates operate as powerful heuristics that drive the 
full spectrum of expressions towards political affairs (cognitive, affective and motivational). 
For novices, ideological inclinations are mostly related to their values. What is particularly 
important, is that regardless of their sophistication level, sophisticates and novices hold 
coherent and consistent systems of beliefs following the changes that they key political actors 
in Turkey have been going through in the last years. There are sophisticated AKP supporters 
who are faithful to the liberal conservative agenda of the AKP, novices AKP voters who refer 
predominantly on the party’s agenda on individual rights and freedom of religious 
expression, sophisticated and novices hard-line Kemalists that remain faithful to the Kemalist 
principles as well as socio-democratic supporters of the CH Party, nationalist MHP 
supporters, and those who self-identify with anarchic values and the communist ideology. 
These participants, regardless of their level of sophistication show the following: novices do 
not hold sufficient information about the country’s social and political domains but in the end 
they manage to formulate coherent positions that are broadly based upon the principles and 
the values that are traditionally expressed by the key political actors in the country. The 
evolution of the key ideological principles that underline these actors has been taking place 
well before 2002 and has brought a number of important changes in the social and political 
arena of the country. All participants seem to be familiar with these – to the extent their 
experiences allow- and demonstrate ideological positions in line with these changes. This 
finding is in line with what we know already about the role that political sophistication plays 
in the cognitive structure that characterizes citizens’ political behaviour (Luskin, 1987; 
Zaller, 1992; Rahn et al., 1990; Krosnick, 1988; Fiske et al., 1983).  
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Looking at the role of core personal and political values, in line with Hypotheses 3 
and 4, my findings highlight their importance for driving citizens’ political judgements. The 
values individuals hold are directly linked with their ideological inclinations acting as guiding 
principles in citizens’ political orientations. Interestingly, value-based orientations reveal 
important patterns. Although value-orientations are distinct among the main ideological 
camps, there are some values that bring together diverse segments of citizens. Specifically, 
the more moderate supporters (in the Kemalism-political Islam division) converge when it 
comes to attitudes towards individual rights and freedoms, democracy, modernization and the 
preservation of traditions. This result, is uniform among the three studies of my work, and 
confirms the findings of other studies that point to the formation of more fluid boundaries 
between secularism and Islamism. My work, offers an in-depth account of this trend 
highlighting that citizens have followed the convergence of certain segments of the 
population along specific values. However, this is not uniform and it is not the same for all 
citizens. There are still clear-cut boundaries between the hard-line supporters of each 
ideological and political camp. This is in line with Hypotheses 3 and 4, which suggest that 
attachment to certain personal and political values (the role that religion should play in life, 
along with the role of the state and the public) are driven by the dominant ideological division 
of political Islam and Kemalism and their respective political actors. This is confirmed 
throughout the three studies reinforcing the view that certain values fit with specific 
ideological orientations not leaving the space for more flexible positions. My study, confirms 
that the study of value orientations, can provide important insights into the underlying 
determinants of attitudes towards politics offering information on the motivational basis of 
citizens’ political opinions and actions (Bem, 1970; Tetlock, 2000; Conover and Feldman, 
1981; Feldman, 2003; Kinder, 1998; Capelos et al., 2017a). This highlights, that focusing 
solely on ideological inclinations, is not sufficient for understanding the motivational bases of 
citizens’ political judgements (Converse, 1964; Feldman, 2003). 
Looking at the role of political sophistication and its interaction with values my 
findings confirm values operate as cognitive schemas. In line with Hypotheses 8 and 9, I 
show that high sophisticates hold coherent, internally consistent and well-connected cognitive 
systems and their ideological inclinations and political values along with their personal values 
are hierarchically structured. Novices, refer predominantly to their personal and political 
values as they have been linked with their ideological orientations. Specifically, for novices, 
values guide their political judgements without necessary holding detailed knowledge and 
understanding of the existing ideologies. I also find that when sophisticates are asked to 
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formulate their positions towards politics they refer first to their ideological orientations and 
their political values, which are directly linked with their personal values. Low sophisticates 
refer to their value-orientations first as they provide an easier pathway towards their 
ideological orientations. The explanation of this, lays on the nature of the cognitive 
organisation of the belief systems of high and low sophisticates. Again, this is in line with the 
political psychology studies that look at the role of political sophistication and its impact on 
the underlying mechanisms of political behaviour (Conover and Feldman, 2003; Pierce, 
1993).  
 Looking at affect, my work provides an in-depth account of how affective reactions, 
and in particular positive and negative valence emotional expressions are linked to particular 
decision-making and reasoning outcomes. My findings suggest that affect plays a significant 
role in the formation of political judgements among all citizens. In fact, affect -in 
combination with the cognitive processes that characterize ideological thinking and value-
based preferences- drives the motivational aspect that characterizes citizens’ political 
opinions and judgements in Turkey. My findings reveal that affective reactions are in line 
with citizens’ ideological inclinations and value-orientations, assisting in the formation of 
their political judgements. In line with the extant research on the role of emotions in political 
psychology, also in the case of Turkey emotions are significant insofar they drive the full 
spectrum of political behaviour (Sniderman et al., 2009; Redlawsk, 2006; Neuman et al., 
2007; Lodge and Taber, 2000; Marcus, 2002). In line with Hypothesis 5 on the role of affect, 
the emotional expressions participants reported were in line with their individual belief 
systems. Positive valence emotions, were generated when individuals are thinking about 
issues that were in agreement with their ideological inclinations and value preferences; 
whereas negative emotional reactions, were aroused when individuals were confronted with 
positions that were against their ideas and which consequentially constituted a danger to their 
own system of beliefs. In other words, citizens hold varying emotional expressions that are 
evoked on the basis of their ideological inclinations, value orientations and levels of political 
sophistication, which when combined together, drive their political judgement and reasoning. 
Confirming Hypothesis 6, those citizens who were strong supporters of ideologies, expressed 
positive emotions for aspects that were in line with their ideological inclinations and 
promoted their value system. Moderate supporters, relied upon their value orientations to 
express positive and negative responses towards politics. Evaluative judgments also provided 
an important picture on the role that affect plays in citizens’ political behaviour. Interestingly, 
in line with Hypothesis 7, strong supporters of AKP and CHP (and their corresponding 
Chapter 10. Conclusion and Discussion 
 255 
ideologies) relied on their ideological agreement and value orientations to justify their 
support of the political actor whereas more moderate supporters of both parties did point at 
both negative and positive aspects of both ideologies and actors. These findings are important 
because there has only been one more study that focuses on the role of emotions in the 
Turkish case, looking in particular at citizens attitudes in the context of a crisis (specifically 
the Syrian crisis) by Erisen in 2013. 
Looking at the interaction between affect and political sophistication, my study 
provides some interesting findings in regards to the functionality of emotional expressions. In 
line with Hypotheses 8 and 9, my findings, suggest that high sophisticates express positive 
emotional reactions in line with their ideological orientations and value-orientations. 
Emotions for high sophisticates are part on their coherent system of beliefs, which is 
hierarchically structured and based on a consistent combination between complex constructs 
linked with emotions of positive and negative nature on the basis of individual agreement on 
specific issues. Low sophisticates rely predominantly on easier-to-grasp concepts, such as 
their value-based orientations that are related with the issue that is being discussed which 
evokes the specific emotional reaction. Also, novices express affective expressions in line 
with their system of beliefs. The key difference with sophisticates is that they rely 
predominantly on their values and lower abstract considerations -such as their personal 
values- along with previously stored emotional tags from past experiences. 
My findings on political sophistication, confirm my hypotheses regarding its 
importance in shaping the mechanisms of political behaviour of citizens in Turkey 
(Hypothesis 8 and 9). Taking into account that sophistication is a factor that has been ignored 
in the examination of public opinion and its behaviour in Turkey, my study, becomes even 
more relevant. It reveals, that sophistication has a key role in determining individual-based 
mechanisms that shape the outcomes of political behaviour. The interaction of political 
sophistication with ideological inclinations, values and emotions become the basis for the 
formation of the motivational element that underlies all political choices that Turkish citizens 
make. This is in line with the existing literature on the role of political sophistication, which 
highlights its importance (Sniderman et al., 2001; Kinder, 1994; Lupia et al., 2000).  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 10. Conclusion and Discussion 
 256 
 Contribution and Further Avenues for Research  
 
My research, complements the empirical studies that deal with the determinants of citizens’ 
political behaviour in Turkey as well as research in political psychology that deals with the 
tri-partite nature of political behaviour focusing on the interaction between cognition, affect 
and motivation. My exploration provides a first glimpse into the full spectrum of the 
underlying determinants that drive and shape citizens’ cognitive and affective considerations 
in a country that has not been studied under this lens before. My findings, point to the 
mechanisms that drive citizens’ political judgements, adding an additional layer of 
complexity that is the peculiarities of the Turkish context and its authoritarian regime 
trajectory.  
My work highlights that ideological orientations, values, emotions and sophistication 
when looked together produce complex outcomes that go beyond what quantitative studies 
highlight by looking at aggregated trends. In simple terms, studies that employ quantitative 
accounts on the psychological underpinnings of political behaviour explain the complexity of 
factors and mechanisms; yet, they are constrained within the limits of their design 
(experimental or survey). Involving the individual in the research process through the 
investigation of the processes by which citizens develop their political identity and negotiate 
their political judgments can in fact produce more noise that the findings from quantitative 
studies (Hochschild, 1981).  
In addressing this point, my study offers four important contributions that speak to 
political psychology research that study political behaviour as well as to the studies that focus 
on the Turkish public opinion.  
 Ideological orientations are more complex and go beyond the simple self-
identification with a side of the political continuums. Although certain citizens 
may decide to place themselves on the Kemalist side or the liberal –
conservative end of ideology, their reasoning varies, as does their 
understanding of what each side of the spectrum represents.  
 Citizens’ attachment to values plays a determining role in driving their 
political preferences. My findings suggest that in certain occasions citizens 
that belong in adversary ideological and political camps come together sharing 
their value-orientations favouring democracy, respecting the nation and 
advocating individual freedoms and rights. However, this does not tell the full 
story. The individual understanding that each citizen holds varies. The 
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understanding and expectations each individual holds depends significantly on 
their general system of beliefs and drives their future political acts.  
 My study highlights the importance of emotions in shaping political 
judgments. In the case of Turkey, emotions of negative valence outnumber by 
far the expression of emotions with positive valence. Emotions play an 
important role driving individual opinions and judgements towards politics. 
Yet, although the content of emotional expressions is similar among all 
interviewees regardless their ideological inclinations and values the experience 
of these emotions by each individual varies on the basis of the same factors. 
My study, suggests that the sources of emotional arousal are diverse for 
citizens and therefore the meaning associated to each emotional expression is 
different resulting in the various modes of political behaviour. As such, the 
individual and in extent the social experience of these emotions depends 
largely on the full mechanism of political behaviour each individual holds 
driving them to think, feel and decide as they do.  
 My study points to sophistication as an important determinant that drives the 
way that ideological orientations, affective expressions and value-orientations 
are being processed at the individual level. My findings suggest that 
sophisticated citizens hold organised and articulated systems of beliefs 
whereas novices rely on easier to grasp concepts and on their emotions to 
formulate their political judgements. However, what is important is that 
regardless of levels of sophistication each individual draws upon the specific 
elements of the political ideology or the political actor they support which in 
turn result into political decisions that can be adequately reasoned and justified 
on the basis of one’s system of beliefs no matter how broad or narrow that is.  
The contribution of my work relies predominantly on the aforementioned factors. Looking at 
existing studies in political psychology that focus on the mechanics of emotions, ideology, 
values and sophistication what is missing is our understanding of how each individual shapes 
their political belonging, expresses and shapes their narratives which in turn drive the full 
spectrum of their political behaviour. Even when citizens point to the similar direction such 
as support the same values, the same ideologies or feel fear about politics it is an the end the 
underlying causes of these actions that matter and which can explain the complexity of 
citizens political behaviour. Contrary to extant studies of Turkish public opinion, my work 
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argues that citizens’ understanding is not uniform and requires a more complex plan of 
investigation that takes into account the underlying factors that motivate citizens’ political 
behaviour.  
 Another contribution of my study concerns the application of political psychology 
models, in the context of Turkey. Research on public opinion in Turkey, has focused 
predominantly on electoral behaviour looking at the aggregate level of analysis whereas 
studies that investigate the underpinning factors of political behaviour at the individual level 
are a minority. This study brings the psychological into the examination of the political and 
puts into empirical test the findings of political psychology in a non-westernized country. The 
theoretical and methodological model that my study employs, offers new insights on the 
individual-based processes of political behaviour of decision-making and motivated 
reasoning but also on the role of emotional arousal, capturing the full spectrum of political 
behaviour. On this account, my study offers a first step towards the investigation of the 
underlying mechanisms of political behaviour in Turkey shedding light on the intersection of 
ideological inclinations, value-based preferences, affect and levels of sophistication in the 
formation of political behaviour. This offers a working model for the exploration of the 
psychological underpinnings of public opinion in other non-western countries. For Turkey in 
particular, my study offers a first step towards a more rounded understanding of the 
developments that the public has gone through in Turkey amidst the growing 
authoritarianism. It also provides a first empirical account of the mechanisms that led to the 
Gezi movement and post-coup events.  
My work also provides insights into the details of how the two dominant ideological 
orientations of political Islam (or pro-Islamism) and Kemalism work at the individual level. 
Taking into account that the majority of public opinion studies focus on individual self-
placement on the left-right ideological continuum, my work provides a first step of obtaining 
an understanding of what and how citizens perceive the existing ideologies, and how they 
negotiate and decide about their positioning in the political sphere. In addition, my work 
offers a detailed account of the role that values play in shaping citizens’ political behaviour. 
Accounting for the fact that values in Turkey have been examined either as proxies of 
ideological orientations or have been looked at separately because of their importance in 
driving specific policy choices, my work expands this by focusing on the role that core 
personal and political values play at the individual level when it comes to the formulation of 
political judgements.  
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My research also provides a detailed account of the role of affect in the formation of 
political decisions and judgments. Taking into account that the study of emotions in Turkey is 
very limited my work offers evidence of the underlying mechanisms that drive positive and 
negative emotional arousal when it comes to politics. At the same time, the analysis provides 
an in-depth account of the role that political sophistication plays in the formation of political 
behaviour. Looking at the effects of political sophistication on the affective, cognitive and 
motivational mechanisms my study reveals its effect on the varying modalities of citizen 
behaviour based on high and low sophistication. These findings set the ground upon which 
new hypotheses can be formulated and tested in the Turkish context using national 
representative samples to assess the nature and functionality of the cognitive, affective and 
motivational determinants of citizens’ political behaviour. 
My approach, offers innovative insights into the study of political behaviour contexts 
whose regime trajectory does not follow the Western model of democracy. Specifically, my 
study offers new knowledge on citizens’ political behaviour in Turkey, which has been 
characterized by growing authoritarianism and political repression as well as by the long-
standing dominance of polarization and fragmentation. Obtaining a deep understanding of the 
way that citizens think, feel and decide in such a context allows to grasp not only the 
mechanism that moves individual political behaviour but also the political process itself 
through the eyes of the public. My theoretical and methodological discussion, provides a 
model that can be employed and tested in other similar non-Western
138
 authoritarian contexts 
Another contribution of my work, is that it considers the contextual environment as a 
vital determinant that has a direct impact on the mechanisms, through which individuals 
process and evaluate incoming political information, feel, decide and reason. I argue, that the 
contextual environment within which the individual belongs to, needs to be brought back to 
attention and accounted for when developing and testing political behaviour models. Studies 
in political psychology often view as secondary the impact of the contextual environment and 
focus predominantly on the universality of the individual based cognitive, affective and 
motivational functions. They view the context, as an explanatory factor that assists in the 
interpretation of the findings, and not as the starting point from which the various patterns of 
individual political behaviour arise and develop. My research points to the necessity of 
accounting for context-specific characteristics when examining the latent mechanisms of 
                                                 
138
 By using the term non-Western, I point to the countries that do not follow the Western pattern of advanced 
democratic systems and their model of social, political and economic development.  
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political behaviour. Understanding the mechanisms that drive political behaviour in various 
and highly differentiated contexts, can offer a more universal approach to understanding the 
public’s political hearts and minds, mainly due to their dependence on the cerebral, affective 
and motivational processes that individuals engage with. 
My study also offers innovative theoretical and methodological insights. By focusing 
on the intersection of cognition, motivation and affect, my research model bridges the driving 
components of political behaviour in a single study. McGraw points at the limited availability 
of studies that look at the tripartite nature of political behaviour (2003). Drawing upon this, 
my work offers an exploration of the affective, cognitive and motivational basis of political 
behaviour in a single case study. My model brings forward the value of the theoretical and 
empirical investigation of all aspects of individual political behaviour by following the work 
of Lane (1962) and Hochschild (1981). By utilizing theoretical insights from political 
psychology and bringing together both quantitative (survey data) and qualitative methods of 
inquiry (semi-structured interviews), this study sets the ground upon which a context-based 
exploration of political behaviour can be extracted, by focusing on the individual unit of the 
public. Echoing and complementing the suggestion by Capelos et al. (2017a), I close my 
study with an invitation to use values and affect as important tools to map the point where 
individual attitudes translate into collective expressions of participatory practices, either 
conventional or unconventional, based on antithetical and usually adversary ideologies or 
parties.  
 In my introduction, I argued that the traditional aggregate level analyses of public 
opinion oversee the processes that take place at the individual level. Focusing on the 
outcomes of political behaviour (being electoral results, opinion polls and the like) provides 
only partial answers. Drawing upon the strengths of the multi-disciplinary perspective of 
political psychology, my study delivers significant results for the investigation of public 
opinion and political behaviour in Turkey.  
 Ideological considerations are still highly relevant when citizens make political 
decisions but with a twist. Although the Islamism-secularism or left-right 
continuums are used by many citizens, their understanding is not uniform. Hard-
line supporters adopt clear-cut boundaries, but for moderate supporters of AKP 
and CHP, the boundaries between their seemingly opposing ideologies are 
relaxed, and they adopt ‘hybrid models’ of belonging to the original bi-polar 
labels of political Islam and Kemalism.  
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 Political sophistication matters. Sophisticates hold coherent and internally 
consistent cognitive systems, while novices rely on simpler, less structured 
cognitions. In addition, sophisticates use ideology as a powerful heuristic whereas 
novices demonstrate a very strong link between their ideological inclinations and 
their values.  
 Value orientations, seen as exclusive qualities of the main ideological camps, 
appear to bring together diverse segments of the electorate. Moderate supporters 
of political Islam or Kemalism share an appreciation of individual rights and 
freedoms, democracy, modernization and preservation of traditions, demonstrating 
fluid value boundaries between secularism and Islamism.  
 Citizens experience diverse emotional reactions, which are aligned to varying 
degrees with their ideological inclinations and value orientations, depending on 
their level political sophistication. As such, emotions are not just generated by 
external political stimuli and they are not the same for all. Emotions are 
internalized, amplified and organized within the individuals’ belief systems. 
Feeling angry, sad, proud, disappointed, does not carry the same meaning for 
strong and weak supporters of political Islam or Kemalism, neither does it hold 
the same content for sophisticates and novices.  
My empirical analysis was able to shed light on these key findings because it considered the 
effects of affectivity, values, ideology, and political sophistication on political reasoning and 
decision-making. Understanding the processes by which individuals negotiate the boundaries 
of their political identities, express emotionality, engage with values, and engage with the 
political world, can provide important insights into current events and political tensions. 
 Taken together, my empirical findings demonstrate the complexity that characterizes 
the study of political behaviour in Turkey. Looking back at the contextual particularities of 
the Turkish environment, the possibility of overcoming the current uncertainty that 
characterizes the society remains to be seen. Whether we can expect the normalisation of the 
social and political situation under a democratic framework or a deepening of 
authoritarianism with higher levels of repression is not clear. Whatever the future outcome 
will be, it largely depends on the psychological underpinnings and the individual based 
mechanisms that drive citizens’ political belonging and behaviour in the particular political 
context. Without any doubt, recent events have forcefully entered the public mind and have 
shaped citizens’ view in regards to the country’s stability, security as well as their trust in the 
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efficacy of certain political actors. Looking ahead, studies that contribute to our in-depth 
understanding of how citizens negotiate their political identity and frame their political 
belonging amidst the authoritarian turn in the country, can unveil insights into the viability of 
the Turkish model.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Electoral Results 
Table 1.1 National Elections Results for the Period Between 2002-2015  
 
Party November 2015 June 2015 June 2011 July 2007 
 
November 2002 
 
 Percentages Seats Percentages Seats Percentages Seats Percentages Seats Percentages Seats 
AKP 49.50% 317 40.87% 258 49.83% 327 46.58% 341 34.28% 363 
ANAP -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5.13% -- 
BBP --  -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.02% -- 
CHP 25.32% 134 24.95% 132 25.98% 135 20.88% 112 19.39% 178 
DSP -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.22% 0 
DTP -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
DHP -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 6.22% 0 
DYP -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 9.54% 0 
DP -- -- -- -- -- -- 5.42% -- -- -- 
HDP 10.76% 59 13.12% 80 -- --     
Independents -- -- 1.06% -- 6.57% 35 5.24% 26 1.00% 9 
GP -- -- -- -- -- -- 3.04% -- 7.25% 0 
MHP 11.90% 40 16.29% 80 13.01% 53 14.27% 71 8.36% 0 
SP -- -- 2.06% -- 1.27% -- 2.34% -- 2.49% 0 
YTP -- --   -- -- -- -- 1.15% -- 
Others 2.52% -- 1.65%  3.34%  2.23% -- 2.96% -- 
Turnout 48.537.695 47.507.467 43.914.948 36.056.293 32.768.161 
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(85.23%) (83.92%) (83.16%) (84.25%) (79.14%) 
Valid Votes 47.840.231 46.163.243 42.941.763 35.049.691 31.528.783 
AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) 
ANAP: Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) 
BBP: Büyük Birlik Partisi (Great Union Party) 
CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican’s People Party) 
DSP: Demokratik Sol Partisi (Demokratic Left Party) 
DTP: Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party) 
DHP: Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People’s Party) 
DYP: Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party) 
DP: Demokrat Partisi (Democrat Party) 
HDP: Halkların Demokratik Partisi (People’s Democratic Party) 
GP: Genç Parti (Young Party) 
MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party) 
SP: Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party) 
YTP: Yeni Türkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party) 
[Source: Republic of Turkey Supreme Election Council (T.C. Yüksek Secim Kurulu). Available online at: http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/faces/GenelSecimler?_adf.ctrl-
state=v9u2sdr5p_36&wcnav.model=YSKUstMenu&_afrLoop=3251361568809030  
 
Appendix 2. Map of Political Behaviour Processes  
Figure 2.1 Processes, Determinants and Outcomes of Political Behaviour  
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Appendix 3. Complimentary Hypotheses on the Basis of Ideological 
Orientations 
 
Table 3.1 Hypotheses for the WVS Data Analysis by Sophistication, Kemalism 
and Islamism 
 
 Sophistication Kemalist 
Nationalism  
Islamism 
 
Core Values: Religiosity 
 
Importance of religion in 
public and private life 
 
Attendance of religious 
services 
 
Attitudes towards its 
importance in political 
controversies. 
Low Sophisticates No effect  
 
Positive effect  
 
 
 
Sophisticates 
Negative effect  
 
Sophisticated 
Kemalists see 
religion as a private 
matter, away from the 
political spectrum 
Very strong positive 
effect  
 
For sophisticated 
Islamists religion is a 
very important issue 
that should 
characterize every 
aspect of life 
  
Core Values: 
Modernisation and 
Rational Thinking 
 
Value of science and 
technology 
Low Sophisticates Positive effect  Negative effect 
 
Sophisticates 
 
Strong positive effect Low positive effect  
Political Values: Attitudes 
towards Democracy  
 
Democracy as a significant 
element for peaceful living. 
 
Level of democracy in 
Turkey  
 
 
Low Sophisticates 
Positive effect for 
significance  
 
Negative effect for 
level of democracy 
 
 
Positive effect of 
significance 
 
Positive effect on 
level of democracy 
 
 
 
Sophisticates 
Positive effect for 
significance  
 
Negative effect for 
level of democracy 
 
 
Negative effect of 
significance 
 
Positive effect on 
level of democracy  
Political Values: Essential 
Characteristics of 
Democracy 
 
Civil rights 
 
Public political 
participation 
 
Involvement of religious 
authorities in political life  
 
Involvement of army in 
political life 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low Sophisticates 
Strong positive effect 
for civil rights 
 
Strong positive effect 
on political 
participation 
 
Negative effect on 
involvement of 
religious authorities 
 
Negative effect on 
involvement of army 
 
 
Strong positive effect 
for civil rights 
 
Strong positive effect 
on political 
participation 
 
 Positive effect on 
involvement of 
religious authorities 
 
Positive effect on 
involvement of army 
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Sophisticates 
Strong positive effect 
for civil rights 
 
Strong positive effect 
on political 
participation 
 
Negative effect on 
involvement of 
religious authorities 
Positive effect on 
involvement of army 
  
Positive effect for 
civil rights 
 
Positive effect on 
political participation 
 
Positive effect on 
involvement of 
religious authorities 
 
 Strong negative 
effect on involvement 
of army 
 
Political Values: Attitudes 
towards the State and 
Governance 
 
Democratic political system 
 
Strong leader  
 
Experts making decisions 
 
Respect for authorities  
 
Emphasis on technology 
 
 
 
 
 
Low Sophisticates 
 
Positive effect on 
importance of 
democratic political 
system  
 
 
Positive effect on 
respect for 
authorities  
 
Positive effect on 
importance of 
democratic political 
system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sophisticates 
Positive effect on 
importance of 
democratic political 
system  
 
Positive effect strong 
leader 
 
Positive effect on 
emphasis on 
technology 
 
Positive effect on 
experts making 
decisions.  
 
Strong positive effect 
on respect for 
authorities 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Values: Attitudes 
towards the nation and 
World institutions 
 
 
National pride  
 
Willingness to fight in war 
 
Autonomy vs. affiliation 
with community 
 
 
 
Low Sophisticates 
Positive effect on 
national pride 
 
Positive effect on 
willingness to fight 
 
Positive effect on 
autonomy 
 
Positive effect on 
national pride 
 
 Positive effect on 
willingness to fight 
 
Negative effect on 
autonomy 
 
 
 
 
Sophisticates 
Positive effect on 
national pride 
 
Negative effect on 
willingness to fight 
 
Positive effect on 
autonomy 
 
Positive effect on 
national pride 
 
Strong Positive effect 
on willingness to 
fight 
 
Negative effect on 
autonomy 
Political Values: 
Requirements for 
Citizenship 
 
 
Follow country’s laws 
 
 
Low Sophisticates 
 
Positive effect on 
following of the 
country’s laws 
Positive effect on 
ancestors from 
Turkey  
 
Positive effect on 
born in the country’s 
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Have ancestors from Turkey  
 
Born in the country’s soil 
soil 
 
 
 
 
Sophisticates 
 
Strong positive effect 
on following of the 
country’s laws 
Strong positive effect 
on ancestors from 
Turkey  
 
Strong positive effect 
on born in the 
country’s soil 
 
Emotions: Confidence in 
political institutions 
 
Police 
 
Labour Unions 
 
Government 
 
Television 
 
Mosques 
 
Justice system 
 
Armed forces 
 
 
 
 
 
Low Sophisticates 
 
Positive effect on 
police 
 
Positive effect on 
labour unions 
Positive effect on 
police 
 
Positive effect on 
government 
 
Positive effect on 
television 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sophisticates 
 
Strong positive effect 
on armed forces 
Strong positive effect 
on police 
 
Strong positive effect 
on government 
 
Strong positive effect 
on television 
 
Strong positive effect 
on Justice system 
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Table 3.2 Hypotheses for the Ankara Survey Data Analysis by Kemalist 
Nationalism and Islamism 
 
 Kemalist nationalism Islamism 
 
 
Ideological 
Placement 
(Left-Right) 
 
 
 
Placement on the Centre-Left 
 
 
Placement on the Centre-Right 
 
 
Core Values: 
Religiosity 
 
Low importance of religion 
in public life. Religion is a 
private matter, which lies 
away from the political 
spectrum. 
(negative influence) 
 
 
High importance of religion. 
Religion has a social value that 
cannot be overwhelmed by 
modernisation processes. 
(positive influence) 
 
Political Values: 
Turkish identity  
 
Emphasis on the secular state 
(positive influence) 
 
Emphasis on traditional values 
and principles. 
(positive influence) 
 
 
Political Values: 
Attitudes towards 
the State  
 
Respect towards the secular 
basis of state and Kemalist 
principles. 
(negative influence) 
 
 
Respect towards the current 
government and the state. 
(positive influence) 
 
Political values: 
Modernisation  
 
Agreement in line with the 
Kemalist inheritance. 
(positive influence) 
 
Conservative modernisation in 
line with the Turkish and 
Islamic values and traditions. 
(positive influence) 
 
 
Emotions: 
Confidence 
towards 
institutions 
 
Confidence towards the 
judicial system (courts) and 
military. 
(positive influence) 
 
 
Confidence towards the 
parliament, police and 
religious leaders. 
(positive influence) 
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Appendix 4. Methodological Approach 
 
Table 4.1 Research Design: Benefits and Shortcomings by Empirical Study 
 
WVS Data Analysis 
(2007) 
Public Opinion Survey 
(Ankara, 2009) 
In-depth Semi-Structured Interviews 
(Istanbul, 2012) 
Benefits Shortcomings Benefits Shortcomings Benefits Shortcomings 
Large size sample Lacks of measures 
(emotions; attachment 
to Islam, attachment 
to nation) 
Flexibility in 
measurement 
Small sample Provide evidence that 
cannot be obtained 
via surveys: in-depth, 
rich data that allow 
for a deep 
investigation of the 
mechanisms of 
political behaviour 
Small sample 
National 
Representative 
sample 
Constrained 
operationalization of 
concepts due to the 
lack of measures 
(political 
sophistication items 
limited) 
Flexibility in the 
operationalization of 
specific concepts 
Not national 
representative 
Accounts for 
diversity in responses 
identifying the 
underlying 
mechanisms of 
attitudinal responses 
Not national 
representative sample 
Allows to compare 
quantitatively the 
trends emerged from 
the 2009 study  
Does not account for 
the mechanisms of 
political behaviour 
that lead respondents 
to select an answer/ 
answer on a given 
question 
Compare 
quantitatively main 
trends with the WVS 
2007 wave 
Not generalizable 
findings 
Exploratory: allows 
to generate new 
hypothesis and offers 
the ground to explain 
qualitatively puzzling 
results from the 
survey analysis 
Not generalizable 
findings 
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Tests existing 
hypothesis  
 Examines the 
decision-making 
process on the basis 
of attachment to 
Islam and nation and 
issue-based 
preferences 
Does not account for 
the motivational and 
affective mechanisms 
that lead respondents 
to select an answer/ 
answer on a given 
question 
Flexibility of 
instrument (interview 
schedule) 
 
Allows for 
predictions 
 Control sampling 
technique 
 Accounts for the 
cognitive, affective 
and motivational 
mechanisms that 
underlie political 
behaviour 
 
Examines causality 
via statistical analysis 
(objective) 
 Examines causality 
via statistical analysis 
(objective 
 Focus on use of 
language, signs of 
emotions, allows to 
explain reasoning 
behind one’s 
positions on a given 
matter 
 
Suitable for 
examining behavioral 
patterns 
 Suitable for 
examining behavioral 
patterns 
 Suitable for 
examining behavioral 
patterns 
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4.2 Survey Questions for Public Opinion Survey in Ankara 
 
Political Participation 
1. On a -5 to 5 scale were -5 is not at all and 5 is very much how interested are you in 
Turkish politics?  
[TRpolint] 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
 Not at all interested                                                                                       Very interested                
 
2. On a 0-10 scale were 0 is not at all and 10 is very much how interested are you in 
World politics.  
[Wpolint] 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
 Not at all interested                                                                                       Very interested                
 
3. There are people who follow what is going on in politics, whether there is an election 
going on or not. Others are not interested. Would you say that you follow what is going 
on in politics?  
 
[genpoint] 
Most of the time 
 
Some of the time 
 
Only now and then 
 
Hardly at all 
 
 
4. Did you vote in the last elections?  [vote] 
 
 
If yes for which party did you vote? Please write your answer in the box below  
[partyvot] 
 
 
5. If there was a national election tomorrow, which party would you vote for? If you are 
uncertain, please indicate which party appeals to you the most.  
[tomparot] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes  No  
 Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
 Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
 Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 
 Democratic Society Party  (DTP) 
 Democratic Left Party (DSP 
 Freedom and Solidarity Party (ODP) 
 Great Union Party (BBP) 
 Democratic Party (DP) 
 Felicity Party (SP) 
 Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) 
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6. From the list above which party is your second choice? If you are uncertain, please 
indicate which party appeals to you the most?  [2patvot] 
Please write your answer in the box   
 
 
7. Is there any party from the above list that you would never vote for?  
 
[nevpvot] 
Yes  No  
 
If yes, which one is it? Please write your answer in the box  
 
Media exposure 
8. People use different sources to learn what is going on in their country and the world. 
For each of the following sources, use the scale from 0 to 7 to indicate how many days 
per week you use each source to obtain information.  
 
[mdexpdn] 
 
[mdextv] 
 
  
[mdexinern] 
 
 
 
[mdexfrien] 
 
 
9. How many hours a day do you watch national Television news Broadcasts? [tvhrs] 
Please write your answer in the box   
 
10. How many hours a day you read a (daily) newspaper? [daydnews] 
Please write your answer in the box   
 
11. How many hours a day do you surf the internet for political news? [hrsintern] Please 
write your answer in the box   
Daily Newspaper 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
News broadcasts on radio or TV 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Internet, Email 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Talk with friends or colleagues 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Appendices 
 307 
Secularization 
12. People often talk about what the aims of their country should be for the next ten years. 
Here we list some of the goals, which different people mentioned as top priority. On a 
scale of 0-10, where 0 is not at all important and 10 is very important, how important is 
each of these for you?  
[ecgrowth] 
A high level of economic growth 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
[defforce] 
Making sure this country has strong defense forces 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
[membEU] 
Membership in the European Union 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
 
13. For the following please choose how important each statement is for you using the scale 
of 0-10, where 0 is not at all important and 10 is very important.  
[ordernat] 
Maintaining order in the nation 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
[peopdec] 
Giving people more say in important government decisions 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
[figpric] 
Fighting rising prices 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
[freespe] 
 Protecting freedom of speech 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
 
14. Here is another list. Please do the same using the scale of 0-10, where 0 is not at all 
important and 10 is very important. (Hypothesis 1, 2) 
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[stabec] 
A stable economy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
[proghum] 
Progress toward a less impersonal and humane society 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
[progide] 
Progress toward a society which ideas count more than money 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
[membEU] 
Membership in the European Union 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
 
15. Below is a list of organizations. Please select how much confidence you have in each of 
them: is it a great deal of confidence, some confidence, a little confidence or no 
confidence at all?   
[relead] 
Religious leaders 
Great deal of 
confidence 
 
 
Some 
confidence 
 
A little 
Confidence 
 
No confidence at 
all 
 
 [armfor] 
Armed forces 
Great deal of 
confidence  
 
Some 
confidence  
 
A little 
Confidence 
  
No confidence at 
all 
 
 
[medconf] 
Media 
Great deal of 
confidence  
 
Some 
confidence  
 
A little 
Confidence 
  
No confidence at 
all 
 
 
[labuncon] 
Labor Unions 
Great deal of 
confidence  
 
Some 
confidence  
 
A little 
Confidence 
  
No confidence at 
all 
 
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[polconf] 
Police 
Great deal of 
confidence  
 
Some 
confidence  
 
A little 
Confidence 
  
No confidence at 
all 
 
 
[courcon] 
The courts 
Great deal of 
confidence  
 
Some 
confidence  
 
A little 
Confidence 
  
No confidence at 
all 
 
 
 [parlcon] 
Parliament 
Great deal of 
confidence  
 
Some 
confidence  
 
A little 
Confidence 
  
No confidence at 
all 
 
 
[Ppcon] 
Political Parties 
Great deal of 
confidence  
 
Some 
confidence  
 
A little 
Confidence 
  
No confidence at 
all 
 
 
[EUcon] 
European Union 
Great deal of 
confidence  
 
 
Some 
confidence  
 
A little 
Confidence 
  
No confidence at 
all 
 
 
[UNcon] 
United Nations 
Great deal of 
confidence  
 
Some 
confidence  
 
A little 
Confidence 
  
No confidence at 
all 
 
 
16. Please indicate how much trust you have in the organizations below: is it a great deal of 
trust, some trust, a little trust or no trust at all?  
[reltr] 
Religious leaders 
Great deal of trust  Some trust 
 
A little trust  
 
No trust at all 
 
 
[armftr] 
Armed forces 
Great deal of trust  Some trust 
 
A little trust 
  
No trust at all 
 
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[medtrus] 
Media 
Great deal of trust  Some trust 
 
A little trust 
  
No trust at all 
 
 
[labuntr] 
Labor Unions 
Great deal of trust  Some trust 
 
A little trust 
  
No trust at all 
 
 
[poltrus] 
Police 
Great deal of trust  Some trust 
 
A little trust 
  
No trust at all 
 
 
 
 [courtrus] 
The courts 
Great deal of trust  Some trust 
 
A little trust 
  
No trust at all 
 
 
[parltrus] 
Parliament 
Great deal of trust  Some trust 
 
A little trust 
  
No trust at all 
 
 
[polptrus] 
Political Parties 
Great deal of trust  Some trust 
 
A little trust 
  
No trust at all 
 
 
[EUtrus] 
European Union 
Great deal of trust  Some trust 
 
A little trust 
  
No trust at all 
 
 
[UNtrus] 
United Nations 
Great deal of trust  Some trust 
 
A little trust 
  
No trust at all 
 
 
17. On a 0-10 scale were 0 is not at all and 10 is very important, how important is it for you 
to live in a country that is governed democratically?  
[democr] 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                                                                                   Very important  
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18. People have different views about themselves and how they are related to the world. On 
a -5 to +5 scale were -5 is totally disagree and +5 totally agree please indicate how 
strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see 
yourself?  
 
[worcitiz] 
I see myself as a world citizen 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
[localcit] 
I see myself as a part of my local community 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
[Turkcit] 
I see myself as a part of the Turkish nation 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
 
[Islamcit] 
I see myself as a part of the Islamic world 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
[autindiv] 
I see myself as an autonomous individual 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
19. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements using 
the scale of -5 to 5 , where -5 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree. 
[emptrad] 
We should emphasize tradition more than modern values 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
 [empmodv] 
We should emphasize modern values more than tradition. 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
 [emptrmo] 
Both tradition and modern values should coexist in the Turkish society 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
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20. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements  using 
the scale of -5 to 5, where -5 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree. 
[mvrestrd] 
 Modern values have to respect tradition as it is structured 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
[mvnewdi] 
Modern values have to offer a new dimension of thought and change traditions. 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
21. Please indicate whether you are in favour or against the following using the scale of -5 
to 5, where -5 is strongly against and 5 is strongly in favour.  
[Turvalim] 
The principles and values of your country 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly against                                                                                           Strongly in favor 
 
[EUvalimp] 
The Principles and values of EU 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly against                                                                                           Strongly in favor 
 
 
Nationalism- Islamism 
22.  There are a lot of different groups in society. Citizens can either like or dislike such 
groups. f you had to choose, which group in society do you dislike the most? [disgroup] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. Please indicate which, if any, you would NOT like to have as neighbours? (select all 
that apply)[neigroup] 
 Drug addicts 
 People of different race 
 People who have AIDS 
 Immigrants, foreign workers 
 Homosexuals, 
 People of different religion 
 Heavy drinkers, 
 Unmarried couple living together 
 People who speak a different 
language 
 Drug addicts 
 People of different race 
 People who have AIDS 
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24.  And which, if any, should NOT be allowed to teach in schools?   (select all that apply)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25. Please use the scale -5 to 5 where -5 is strongly disagree at and 5 is strongly agree to 
indicate your opinion about the characteristics of a person who wants to take the 
Turkish citizenship. 
[anceTRci] 
Having ancestors from my country 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
[borTRci] 
Being born on my country’s soil 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
 [cusTRci] 
Adopting the customs of my country 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
[lawTRci] 
Abiding by my country’s laws   
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
 
 
 Immigrants, foreign workers 
 Homosexuals, 
 People of different religion 
 Heavy drinkers, 
 Unmarried couple living together 
 People who speak a different 
language 
 Drug addicts 
 People of different race 
 People who have AIDS 
 Immigrants, foreign workers 
 Homosexuals, 
 People of different religion 
 Heavy drinkers, 
 Unmarried couple living together 
 People who speak a different 
language 
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26.  What do you think about ethnic diversity? Use the scale from -5 to 5 where -5 is 
strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree in order to evaluate the following statements.  
[etdiver] 
ethnic diversity erodes a country’s unity  
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
 [etdiven] 
ethnic diversity enriches life 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
27.  Please use the -5 to 5 scale were -5 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree to 
indicate your opinion.  
[adjusmch] 
The world is changing and we should adjust our view of moral behaviour to those changes 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
[nlifbreak] 
The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
 [tolerdif] 
We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, 
even if they are very different from our own. 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
28. On a 0-10 scale were 0 is not at all and 10 is very important how important is for you 
the issue of integration of ethnic minorities in your country?  
[integmin] 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
29. Please use the scale -5 to 5 where -5 is strongly disagree and 5 is agree to indicate your 
opinion for the following statements. 
[statunco] 
State is sacred. Must be loved and obeyed unconditionally. 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
[stacrit] 
State must be very much respected and strongly supported but can be criticized if individuals’ 
rights and beliefs are violated. 
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-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
30. In many states around the world there are problems with minority populations. Please 
use the scale -5 to 5 where -5 is strongly disagree and 5 is agree to indicate your 
opinion for the following statements.  
 [discmino] 
I am opposed to any discussion and compromising with any minority assertions 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
[minright] 
We must defend national unity but support granting cultural rights for the minority population. 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
31. In our globalised world, every state has to choose the states that will have relations. 
Please choose the position that suits you most.  
[relWP] 
What should be the relation of Turkey with the Western Powers 
Unconditional relation 
 
Conditional by Turkey’s place 
 
No relation at all 
 
 [relIN] 
What should be the relation of Turkey with Islamic nations 
Unconditional relation 
 
Conditional by Turkey’s place 
 
No relation at all 
 
32. Please use the scale from -5 to 5 where -5 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree to 
indicate your position (Hypothesis 14, 15) 
 [nmTRval] 
It doesn’t matters to me with which states my country will have relations since the values and 
beliefs will be maintained 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
 
Role of religion 
33. Some people feel they have free choice and control over their lives, while others feel 
that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use the scale from 
-5 to 5 where -5 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree to select the answer that fits 
your best.  
[shapfate] 
People shape their fate themselves 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
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[detefate] 
Everything in life is determined by fate 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
34. Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are:   
 
[relpers] 
 
 
 
 
35. How important is Allah in your life?  
[allahimp] 
Very important 
 
Somewhat Important 
 
Not very important 
 
Not at all important 
 
 
36. Do you believe you get comfort and strength from religion? [comfrel] 
Yes 
 
No 
 
I do not know 
 
 
37. How important is in your opinion the issue of religion in your country?  
[TRrel] 
Very important 
 
Somewhat Important 
 
Not very important 
 
Not at all important 
 
 
 
Turkey and EU 
38. On a 0-10 scale were 0 is not at all important and 10 is very important. How important 
is in your opinion the issue of the Turkish Membership in the EU? [TREUimp] 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all important                Very important  
 
39. Do you think that Turkey’s EU membership will have a have a great impact on 
Turkey’s community (daily life)? [TREUresul] 
Yes a positive 
one 
 
Yes a negative one 
 
No impact at 
all 
 
I am not sure/ 
I do not know 
 
 
40. Some see certain disadvantages for Turkey joining the EU. From the list below, please 
indicate how likely is any of these risks with Turkey’s joining the EC.  
[dEUrel] 
Weakening of religious values 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
 A religious person 
 Not a religious person 
 An atheist 
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Not at all likely                                                                                                       Very likely 
 
[dEUnatid] 
Weakening of national identity  
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Not at all likely                                                                                                       Very likely 
  
[dEUreind] 
Restriction of independence 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Not at all likely                                                                                                       Very likely 
  
 [dEUagric] 
Weakening of the agricultural sector 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Not at all likely                                                                                                       Very likely 
 
[DEUsepmo] 
Rise of separatist movements 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Not at all likely                                                                                                       Very likely 
  
[dEUTRfir] 
Weakening of Turkish firms 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Strongly disagree                                                                                       Strongly Agree 
 
[dEUrelfu] 
Rise of religious fundamentalism 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Not at all likely                                                                                                       Very likely 
  
 
 [dEUdntk] 
I have no idea / I do not know 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Not at all likely                                                                                                       Very likely 
  
41. Some people see advantages of joining the EU for Turkey. Please indicate how likely 
are the outcomes below  
[aEUintst] 
Strengthen Turkey’s position in the international stage 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Not at all likely                                                                                                       Very likely 
 
 [aEUTRec] 
Economic advantages for Turkey’s economy 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
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Not at all likely                                                                                                       Very likely 
  
 [aEUtrav] 
Free EU travelling without (visa needed) 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Not at all likely                                                                                                       Very likely 
  
 [aEUdemoc] 
Democratization of Turkey according to the EU pattern 
-5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0 1  2  3  4  5  
Not at all likely                                                                                                       Very likely 
 
 
Control Variables 
Ideological Self- Placement 
42. Political opinions are often described in terms of left and right. When you think on your 
own political opinions, where would you place yourself? Please select the option that 
applies to you. [ideplac] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gender 
43. Are you : [pgender] 
Male  Female  
 
 
Age  
44. What is your date of birth? Please complete the date here 19 
[parage] 
 
 
Family status 
45. What is your marital status? [marstat] 
 
 
 
 
 
Educational level 
46. What is the highest level of education level that you have completed? [educlevl] 
 Left 
 Left- center 
 Center 
 Right 
 Right- center 
 Don't know 
 Married 
 Widow 
 Divorced 
 Single 
 No formal education 
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Work 
47.  Are you employed now or not?  [employ] 
Yes  No  
 
48. If yes, are you a: [typeempl] 
 
 
 
 
 
49. Talking about various social classes, if you were to assign yourself to a particular social 
class which one could that be? [socclas] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income 
50. In which of these categories lays the monthly income before taxes of all of your family 
members together? Please tick your answer.  
   [income] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Incomplete primary school 
 Complete primary school 
 Incomplete secondary school 
 Complete secondary school 
 Some university level education, 
without degree  
 University level education, with degree 
 part time employee  
 a full time employee 
 Working class 
 Upper Working class 
 Middle class, 
 Upper middle class 
 Upper class 
 100- 200 YTL 
 200-500 YTL 
 500- 750 YTL 
 1750- 1500 YTL 
 1.500- 3.000 YTL 
 3.000- 5.000 YTL 
 5.000-10.000 YTL 
 10.000 YTL and more 
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4.3 Interviews Question Wording 
 
Questions for Political Ideology 
1. What is your understanding of political Islam as an ideology? Can you provide a 
short definition? 
2. What is your understanding of Kemalism as an ideology? Can you provide a short 
definition? 
3. What are the differences between the two of them? 
4. Can you recognize any commonalities within the two ideological positions? 
5. Where would you place yourself in regard to those two orientations? 
6. What is the role of political Islam and Kemalism in Turkey today? 
7. Do you think that Political Islam and Kemalism are in conflict nowadays? 
8. Can they both exist in the modern Turkish society? Why? And how do you view 
this coexistence? 
9. When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as extremely liberal, 
liberal, slightly liberal, moderate or middle of the road, slightly conservative, 
conservative, extremely conservative, or haven’t you thought much about this? 
10. Now using a different scale could you please place yourself on the scale, which 
consists of Islamism on the one edge and on the other edge with Kemalism? 
11. Now using a different scale could you please place yourself on the scale, which 
consists of left on the one edge and on the other edge with right? 
12. Could you please position Kemalism and political Islam on the left-right and 
liberal-conservative scales? Differences between past and current nature of both 
ideologies.  
 
Questions on Factual Knowledge and Political Information  
1. Do you know when was ratified the current Constitution and which are its main 
principles?  
2. Do you know how long the term for the President of the Republic is? 
3. Which body holds the executive and which the legislative power in Turkey?  
4. When was the universal voting implemented in Turkey? 
5. How many members has the Parliament?  
6. Could you please name the Minister of Labour and Social Security, and Minister of 
National Defence? 
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7. Write down the vote percentages and number of seats that each party received in the 
last elections that took place in June 12, 2011 and 2007 (AKP:.....// CHP:......// 
MHP:......// Independents:.....) 
8. What is the current unemployment and inflation rate? 
 
 Questions on Media Exposure 
1. Which of the following sources do you use in order to obtain political information: 
daily newspaper, magazines, in-depth reports on radio or television, books, the 
internet or email and also whether they talked with friends or colleagues. Please 
mention the exact source such as TV channel, name of newspaper or magazine, 
radio station etc.  
 
2. How often do you use each of them – according to your previous answer. 
 
Questions on Parties and Candidates Likes and Dislikes 
1. I would like to ask you what you think are the good and bad points about the parties 
in the parliament? (AKP, CHP and MHP). Is there anything particular that you like 
and dislike about them? 
Questions on Political Interest 
1. On a -5 to 5 scale were -5 is not at all and 5 is very much how interested are you in 
Turkish politics?  
2. On a 0-10 scale were 0 is not at all and 10 is very much how interested are you in 
World politics.  
3. There are people who follow what is going on in politics, whether there is an 
election going on or not. Others are not interested. Would you say that you follow 
what is going on in politics?  
 
Questions on Participation in Politics 
Electoral Activity - Voting 
1. Did you vote in the last three general elections (2011, 2007 and 2002)? 
2. Could you please tell me which party did you vote for in the last general elections 
(2011)? 
3. Could you recollect which party did you vote for in the 2007 and 2002 elections? 
4. Did you vote in the last three local elections (2009, 2004 and 1999) ? 
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5. Could you please tell me which party’s candidate did you vote for in the last local 
elections (2009)? 
6. Could you please name the candidates that you were most in favour during the local 
elections in 2009? 
7. Could you recollect which party’s candidates did you vote for in the 2007 and 2002 
elections? 
8. Could you recollect the names of the candidates that you were most in favour 
during the local elections in 2007 and 2002? 
Membership and Campaign Activity 
1. Are you a member of a political party? 
 
(Actions meant to influence politics indirectly) 
1. Do you find yourself discussing about politics (issues related to general/specific 
political issues) with friends colleagues, family? 
2. Have you ever tried to persuade or convince someone towards specific political 
direction? (vote intention, take part in a conventional or non-conventional act). 
Question on Education 
1. Could you please mention the highest educational level that you have attended? 
Questions on Religion and Secularization 
Self- identification 
1. How could you characterize yourself in regard to your personal identification 
towards religion? 
Religious Values 
 1. What is the importance of Religion in your personal life/ and in Turkey in general? 
 2. What is the importance of Allah in your personal life? 
 
Religious Participation  
1. How often to you attend religious services? 
2. How often do you pray to Allah outside religious services? 
Religion and Politics 
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1. Do you think that religion should influence Turkey’s national and international 
agenda? To what extend? 
2. What do you think about politician who are strongly attached to religion? 
3. What do you think about politicians who do not place religion in the political life? 
4. What do you think about the involvement of religious leaders in political life? 
5. Would you favour establishment of a Shari ‘a based religious state? 
 
Religion and Society 
1. Overall do you think that people in Turkey are free to practice worship 
requirements of Islam? 
2. Is there oppression of religious people in Turkey? If so can you give me some 
examples? 
3. Does religion help a person to stay honest and keep on the right track or doesn’t it 
make a difference? 
 
Questions on tradition and modernization 
1. How do you consider modernization? 
2. How do you consider preservation of traditions? 
3. Do you think that in Turkey modernization and traditions coexist? 
4. If so, could you please give me some examples of this? // If no why? 
5. What is your own opinion regarding the relationship between modernisation and 
traditions? 
Questions on Patriotism, National Identity and Xenophobia 
1. How do you feel when you see the Turkish flag? 
2. How do you feel when you see the picture of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk? 
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3. Talking about the market do you prefer buying Turkish products no matter what is 
the price difference or do you prefer cheaper imported ones? 
4. What should be the prerequisites for someone that wants to obtain the Turkish 
citizenship? Can you comment on the following: having ancestors from Turkey, 
being born in Turkey’s soil, adopting the country’s customs, and abiding the 
country’s law. 
 
Questions on Democracy 
1. According to your opinion what is democracy? And what do you understand when 
you hear the phrase democratic values? 
2. According to your opinion how important is democracy? 
3. According to your opinion are there any limits to democracy? Why? 
4. What kind of things would you consider undemocratic? Why?  
5. In general do you think that elected leaders are more likely to know what is the best 
for the country? Why? 
6. How democratic is Turkey according to your opinion? Why? Provide Examples. 
7. What do you think the future of democracy will be in Turkey? 
 
Questions on Freedoms 
1. According to your opinion what is freedom? 
2. How important is freedom in your life? 
3. Are there any limits to freedom? Why? 
4. What are the dangers of freedom in Turkey? 
5. Some people believe that should be more freedom that there is now in Turkey; 
others believe that there should be less. What do you think? What kind of freedom? 
6. How free do you feel today in Turkey? 
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7. Are there any groups in Turkey that they could go a bit too far if they had too much 
freedom? Who? How? 
8. Do you sometimes feel that listening to all different points of view on a subject is 
too confusing and that you would like to hear just one point of view from somebody 
who knows? example 
9. Are there any kinds of things that you think might better be discussed privately 
instead of the newspapers and on the air where anybody can see and hear them? 
What kinds of things? 
 
Questions on Emotions towards Politics 
1. What or whom do you trust more in the political life in Turkey?  
2. When you think about politics what makes you feel anxiety? 
3. When you think about politics what makes you feel fear? 
4. When you think about politics what makes you feel anger? 
5. When you think about politics what makes you feel aversion? 
6. When you think about politics what makes you feel enthusiasm? 
7. When you think about politics what makes you feel fanaticism? 
8. What issue related to politics makes you feel security in your personal life 
 
Standard demographic questions 
1. What is your date of birth?  
2. What is your marital status?  
3. Are you employed now or not?  
4. What is your work about? 
5. What is your monthly income? 
Appendices 
 326 
6. Talking about various social classes, if you were to assign yourself to a particular 
social class which one could that be? (Upper class, upper middle, middle, middle 
working, working class) 
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Appendix 5. Results from the WVS Data Analysis 
 
 
Table 5.1: Summary of main and interaction effects by Kemalism, Islamism and Sophistication 
 
 Kemalist 
Nationalism 
Political Islam Sophistication 
Attitudes towards 
Religion 
 
Low 
Sophisticates 
Importance of religion in life 
Importance of Allah in life 
Attendance of religious services 
Religious characterization 
Fate vs. Control 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-.05 
.30 
.25 
.14 
.26 
.17 
-.18 
 
Sophisticates Importance of religion in life 
Importance of Allah in life 
Attendance of religious services 
Religious characterization 
Fate vs. Control 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.47 = (.25+.22) 
.40 = (.14+.26) 
.55 = (.26+ .29) 
.40 = (.17+.23) 
-- 
-1.32 
-2.50 
-1.38 
-2.26 
2.19 
Modernisation 
and rational 
thinking  
 
Low 
Sophisticates 
Science and technology making our lives 
healthier 
More opportunities for next generation 
Science and technology make our way of 
life change too fast 
.18 
 
.20 
 
.27 
.06 
 
.06 
 
.08 
 
 
Sophisticates Science and technology making our lives 
healthier 
More opportunities for next generation 
Science and technology make our way of 
life change too fast 
.6 = [.18 + (-.12)] 
 
.07 = [.20+ (-.13)] 
 
.10 = [.27 + (-.17)] 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
1.5 
 
1.61 
 
1.73 
Attitudes towards 
democracy  
 
 Low 
Sophisticates 
Importance of Democracy 
Level of democracy in own country 
.12 
.08 
-- 
.13 
 
Sophisticates Importance of Democracy 
Level of democracy in own country 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.25 = (.13+ .12) 
-- 
-- 
Essential Low Governments tax the rich and subsidize the .10 .16  
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characteristics of 
Democracy 
 
Sophisticates poor 
People choose their leaders in free elections 
 
Religious authorities interpret the laws 
 
The army takes over when government is 
incompetence 
Civil rights protect people’s liberty against 
oppression 
People can change the laws in referendums 
 
Women have the same rights as men 
 
.18 
 
-.33 
 
.16 
 
.25 
 
.21 
 
.18 
 
-- 
 
.34 
 
-- 
 
.08 
 
.11 
 
.09 
Sophisticates Governments tax the rich and subsidize the 
poor 
People choose their leaders in free elections 
Religious authorities interpret the laws 
The army takes over when government is 
incompetence 
Civil rights protect people’s liberty against 
oppression 
People can change the laws in referendums 
Women have the same rights as men 
-- 
 
-- 
-- 
-.11 = [.16+ (-.27)] 
 
.15 = [.25 + (-.10) 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
.0 = [.09 + (-.09)] 
-- 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
 
1.26 
 
1.22 
.91 
Attitudes towards 
the nation and 
World Institutions 
 
 Low 
Sophisticates 
How proud of nationality 
Fight in war for your country 
I see myself as a world citizen 
Myself as member local community 
Myself as citizen Turkish nation 
Myself as autonomous individual 
-- 
.09 
-- 
.07 
.08 
.23 
.14 
.12 
.13 
.22 
.16 
-- 
 
Sophisticates How proud of nationality 
Fight in war for your country 
I see myself as a world citizen 
Myself as member local community 
Myself as citizen Turkish nation 
Myself as autonomous individual 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-.06 = [.08+ (-.14)] 
-- 
-- 
.01 = [.12 + (-.11)] 
-- 
.13 =[.22+ (-.09)] 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1.05 
-- 
-- 
1.35 
-- 
Requirements for 
citizenship 
 
Low 
Sophisticates 
Having ancestors from my country 
Being born on my country’s soil 
Adopting customs of my country 
Abiding by my country´s laws 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.10 
.30 
.30 
.31 
.25 
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Sophisticates Having ancestors from my country 
Being born on my country’s soil 
Adopting customs of my country 
Abiding by my country´s laws 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.10 = [.25+ (-.15)] 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1.48 
Confidence in 
political 
institutions 
 
 Low 
Sophisticates 
Mosques 
Armed Forces 
Television 
Labor Unions 
The Police  
Justice System 
The Government 
The Political Parties 
Parliament 
The Civil Services 
-.18 
.11 
-.10 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-.17 
-.11 
-- 
-- 
.36 
.10 
-- 
-.08 
.21 
.21 
.42 
.13 
.32 
.09 
 
Sophisticates Mosques 
Armed Forces 
Television 
Labor Unions 
The Police  
Justice System 
The Government 
The Political Parties 
Parliament 
The Civil Services 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-.12 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-1.54 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Attitudes towards 
Governance 
 
 Low 
Sophisticates 
 
Having a strong leader 
Having experts make decisions 
Democratic political system 
More emphasis on technology 
Greater respect for authority 
Having the army rule 
.13 
.10 
.27 
.21 
-- 
-- 
.11 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.27 
-- 
 
Sophisticates Having a strong leader 
Having experts make decisions 
Democratic political system 
More emphasis on technology 
Greater respect for authority 
Having the army rule 
-.09 = [.13 + (-.22)] 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
1.55 
-- 
1.17 
-- 
-1.16 
-- 
Ideological Self-
Placement 
 Low 
Sophisticates 
Self positioning in Left-Right scale -- 
 
.34 
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Note: Data from the 2007 WVS. Parameter estimates are unstandardised OLS regression coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sophisticates Self positioning in Left-Right scale -- .44 = (.34 + .10) -- 
Appendices 
 331 
 
